ORDER : J.B. Pardiwala, J. Life Insurance Corporation of India has preferred this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and order dated 1st September 2009 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad in Reference (ITC) No. 23/2002, Reference (CGITA) No. 1208/2004, Reference (ITC) No. 996/2008, whereby the Tribunal partly allowed the Reference of the respondent No. 2 - workman preferred through the Union and reduced the penalty of withholding of one increment with future effect to that of withholding of one increment without future effect. 2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition can be summarised as under : 1. Respondent No. 2 is serving as Assistant with the Corporation. 2. He joined services of the Corporation on 16th June 1989 as Assistant. 3. On 4th June 1999 he left the office at about 4 : 10 hours without informing his superior or without obtaining any permission. 4. As a result of which, his senior officer put up a note of absence for half day on that particular date. 5. On the next day, when respondent No. 2 resumed his duties, he misbehaved with his senior officer by shouting and hurling abuses. 6. On the charge of insubordination and misconduct, departmental inquiry was ordered to be initiated against the respondent No. 2. 7. Respondent No. 2 was found guilty of the alleged misconduct and a penalty of withholding of one increment in the pay-scale of Assistant with permanent effect in terms of Regulation 39(1)(d) of the L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 was imposed vide order dated 14th July 2000. 8. Aggrieved by the said order of imposition of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority, he preferred appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the Zonal Manager. 9. The appellate authority, vide order dated 6th February 2001 confirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority of imposition of penalty of withholding of one increment with future effect. 10. Against the said order of the appellate authority, the respondent No. 2 invoked Regulation 49 of the L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 in the form of the Memorial before the Chairman. 11. The Chairman, vide order dated 30th August 2001, rejected the Memorial. 12. 10. Against the said order of the appellate authority, the respondent No. 2 invoked Regulation 49 of the L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 in the form of the Memorial before the Chairman. 11. The Chairman, vide order dated 30th August 2001, rejected the Memorial. 12. Respondent No. 2 thereafter filed reference under Section 10(2)(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act') before the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, challenging the orders passed by the petitioner - Corporation. 13. The reference came to be partly allowed vide order dated 1st September 2009. While allowing the reference in part, the Tribunal disturbed the order of punishment. The Tribunal reduced the penalty by ordering withholding of one increment without future effect. The Tribunal further ordered that as a result of the reduction in the penalty, the Corporation shall pay the necessary salary and other benefits after giving benefits of the increment but shall not pay the amount towards the difference. It is this order, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 3. I have heard learned advocate Mr. Daxesh T.Dave for the petitioner - Corporation and Mr. Raxit J.Dholakia for the respondent No. 2. 4. Contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner - Corporation are as under : 1. The Tribunal has seriously erred in disturbing the order of penalty imposed upon the respondent No. 2 by the authorities of the Corporation. 2. It is submitted that the Tribunal has exceeded its powers and jurisdiction in interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed on the respondent. 3. It is submitted that it was not even within the discretionary power of the Tribunal to have done so particularly on the facts of this case. 4. It is submitted that the Tribunal ought not to have disturbed the order of penalty, more particularly, when the Tribunal has believed the misconduct committed by the respondent and proved during the course of the departmental proceedings. 5. It is further submitted that the reasoning of the Tribunal are wholly unsupportable. The reasons are not relevant or germane to modify the punishment. 5. Per contra, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 are as under : 1. It is submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is just and proper. 2. 5. It is further submitted that the reasoning of the Tribunal are wholly unsupportable. The reasons are not relevant or germane to modify the punishment. 5. Per contra, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 are as under : 1. It is submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is just and proper. 2. The Tribunal has not committed any error which can be termed as an error apparent on the face of the record. 3. It is further submitted that under Section 11A of the Act, the Tribunal has got powers to apply its mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. 4. It is submitted that having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has thought it fit to reduce the penalty and this Court, in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, may not disturb the order passed by the Tribunal. 6. The sum and substance of the submission is that the power under Section 11A of the Act is akin to appellate power. The competent adjudicating authority has jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment even in cases where finding of guilt recorded by the employer is uphold or in the case of no inquiry or defective inquiry. 7. Having regard to the rival contentions of the parties, I am of the view that the Tribunal has committed a serious error in passing the impugned order under challenge. Firstly, it deserves to be noted that the Tribunal has actually appreciated the entire evidence which has come on record and it is evident from the contents of the impugned order that the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the misconduct is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the entire case is in the realm of suspicion. Secondly, the Tribunal seems to have lost sight of a very settled position of law that the guilt of a delinquent in a departmental proceeding has to be established on preponderance of probabilities and the degree of proof in a departmental proceeding is not that of reasonable doubt. The Tribunal ought to have kept in mind that three authorities, namely, the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the Chairman of the Corporation have come to the conclusion that the misconduct on the part of the respondent No. 2 stands established by cogent evidence on record. The Tribunal ought to have kept in mind that three authorities, namely, the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the Chairman of the Corporation have come to the conclusion that the misconduct on the part of the respondent No. 2 stands established by cogent evidence on record. Having regard to the limited jurisdiction in considering such type of orders in exercise of power under Section 10 of the Act and having believed the misconduct, the Tribunal ought not to have disturbed the order of penalty as imposed upon by the Corporation. 8. No exhaustive discussion is necessary in the present case as the law is well-settled. The Supreme Court has, in the matter of Shriji Vidyalaya and another v. Patel Anil Kumar Lallubhai and another, reported in (1998) 9 SCC 561 , observed in paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 as under : "3. The Tribunal while deciding the issue found that some of the charges were proved. However, it went further and reappreciated the evidence as if it was sitting in appeal and reversed the findings given on other charges. Ultimately, the Tribunal substituted the punishment of dismissal by reducing two increments for a period of one year. The High Court also declined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances, the present appeal has been filed by special leave. 4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the Tribunal exceeded its review jurisdiction and the power to award appropriate punishment vests normally with the management and the Tribunal cannot exercise that power. According to him the High Court failed to appreciate. He further contended that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to reduce or award lesser punishment substituting its own punishment in the place of punishment given by the Disciplinary Authority. 7. This Court has consistently held that the tribunal/court normally cannot substitute its punishment in the place of punishment given by the disciplinary authority vide Union of India v. Parma Nanda, and B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India. Applying the said principle, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court which confirmed the order of the Tribunal. No costs." 9. In the matter of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court in paragraphs 12, 17 and 18 held as under : "12. Applying the said principle, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court which confirmed the order of the Tribunal. No costs." 9. In the matter of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court in paragraphs 12, 17 and 18 held as under : "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or whether the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 17. The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 17. The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable. The order of the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty. It was further held that if the order was supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct for which punishment "can lawfully be imposed", it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court had no jurisdiction, if the findings prima facie made out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur. It is true that in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, a Bench of two Judge of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function as a court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High Court could always interfere with the same. In that case, the finding was that the appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer marked. The Government had recovered from the contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu, a Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down that in no case, the High Court/Tribunal has the power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Bank of India's case, where the Court elaborately reviewed the case law on the scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the appellate authority had not adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment. 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact- finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 10. In the matter of Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court has explained the Wednesbury principle applicable on the subject of punishment and proportionality. 11. In the matter of Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court has explained the Wednesbury principle applicable on the subject of punishment and proportionality. 11. The Division Bench of this High Court has, in an unreported decision rendered in the matter of J.H. Joshi v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No. 5691/2002, decided on 10th May 2005), observed as under : "The doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule evolved in England in Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for Civil Services (1983) 1 AC 768 and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation - 1948 2 All England Reporter 680 have been applied by the Courts in India in various decisions. In Union of India v. C.G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , the Supreme Court considered the ambit and scope of the doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule in the light of various judicial pronouncements and laid down the following propositions : "(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith, as long as the European Human Rights Convention (Contention) is not incorporated into English Law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgement to find out if the decision maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgement on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgement as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgement of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. The secondary judgement of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms." In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra - (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court reiterated the otherwise well settled principles of law on the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the employer and laid down the following propositions :- "It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgement for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." In Om Kumar v. Union of India - (2001)2 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court traced the history of the principle of proportionality, referred to the propositions culled out in Ganayutham's case (supra), noticed the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Chief Constable of Sussesc ex.p. International Trader's Ferry Ltd. (1999) 1 All England Reporter 129, wherein the principles of Wednesbury and proportionality were almost equated and held that where the decision of an administrative authority is attacked being arbitrary, the principle of secondary review will have to be kept in mind. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgement which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below : "28. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgement which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below : "28. By 'proportionality' we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the Legislature or the Administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the Legislature and the administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties, or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve. The Legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality." "29.The above principle of proportionality has been applied by the European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and in particular, for considering whether restrictions imposed were restrictions which were 'necessary' - within Articles 8 to 11 of the said Convention (corresponding to our Article 19(1) and to find out whether the restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more excessive than required. (Handyside v. UK (1976) 1 EHR p.737) Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention contain provisions similar to Article 21 of our Constitution relating to life and liberty. The European Court has applied the principle of proportionality also to questions of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention (corresponding to Article 14 of our Constitution). (See European Administrative Law by J. Schwaze, 1992. Pp.677-866)." "66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the Administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a primary reviewing authority." "67. But where, an administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the Administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors in to consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. (In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 at p. 111, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that 'reasonableness' of the Administrator under Article 14 in the context of Administrative Law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 at Pp. 679-680, Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 at p.691 : Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 at p.241 and U.P. Financial Corporation v. GEM CAP (India) Pvt.Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 , at p. 307, while judging whether the administrative action is 'arbitrary' under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise than being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always." "71.Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the Administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the Administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rate cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and (in) such extreme or rate cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment." In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 SCC 605 , the Supreme Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as under : "The Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go in to the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) In Director General, RPF v. Ch. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) In Director General, RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu (2003) 4 SCC 331 , the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court should ordinarily not interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority in the matter of imposition of punishment and observed : "Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of the charges proved, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works." 12. The above noted decisions give a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose the particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court as well as this High Court has repeatedly emphasised that the Tribunal cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinion by the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has also been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproportionate or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. In this view of the matter, I am left with no other option but to disturb the order passed by the Tribunal. I am not at all convinced and satisfied with the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal while partly allowing the reference and disturbing the order of penalty by reducing the same. 13. In this view of the matter, I am left with no other option but to disturb the order passed by the Tribunal. I am not at all convinced and satisfied with the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal while partly allowing the reference and disturbing the order of penalty by reducing the same. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the penalty of withholding of one increment with future effect would, in any manner, be termed as "shockingly disproportionate" or "so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case". 14. The petition is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal dated 1st September 2009 in Reference (ITC) No. 23/2002, Reference (CGITA) No. 1208/2004, Reference (ITC) No. 996/2008 is hereby quashed and set-aside to the extent that it has reduced the penalty. The orders which have been passed by the authorities of the Corporation stand revived with the punishment of withholding of one increment with future effect. 15. Rule made absolute accordingly. No cost. Petition allowed.