JUDGMENT: Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.- Heard Mr. Arun Prasad Ambastha for the petitioner, and Mr Kumar Uday Singh for respondent no. 6. 2. The present batch of writ petitions arise out of a common order passed in Revision Case Nos. 317 to 325 of 1990, dated 7.12.1992, by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna. The said Revision cases were filed by respondent no. 6 of the present nine writ petitions, who were the purchasers. 3. The brief facts necessary of the disposal of the present batch of cases is noted hereinbelow. Respondents NO.7 to 11, by a deed 'of sale executed on 22.11.1985, and registered on 4.12.1985, transferred certain portion of land in favour of the respondent no. 6, situated in Village-Maranga., P.S.-Khajanchi Hat, District-Purnia, appertaining to Khata No. 1599, and Plot No. 1143, having area of two kathas. The petitioner claiming to be co-sharer of the vendors and also adjoining raiyat of the transferred land filed a case for pre-emption u/s 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), before the learned Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Sadar, Purnea against the purchaser which was registered as Case NO.72 of 85-86. Respondents No. 7 to 11 also transferred portions of lands of plot nos.1143 and 1144 by further eight separate registered deeds of sale to different persons, who are respondent no. 6 in the connected eight writ petitions. 4. Separate cases of pre-emption were filed by the petitioner with respect to those eight registered deeds of sale which were numbered as 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 75, 76 and 77 of 1985-86. All the nine cases were heard together and were allowed by order dated 24.4.1986/28.4.1986. The concerned respondent no. 6 preferred Ceiling Appeals before the learned Collector, Purnea, which were numbered as 71 to 79 of 1986-87. All the nine Appeals were transferred to the Court of learned Additional Collector, Purnea, for disposal and were made analogous. By a common order dated 26.3.1990/27.3.1990, the Appeals were rejected, and the order dated 24.4.1986/28.4.1986 was confirmed. Thereafter, the concerned respondent no. 6 preferred 9 sets of revision applications before the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar which were numbered as Board Case Nos. 317 to 325 of 1990. By a common order dated 26.3.1990/27.3.1990, the Appeals were rejected, and the order dated 24.4.1986/28.4.1986 was confirmed. Thereafter, the concerned respondent no. 6 preferred 9 sets of revision applications before the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar which were numbered as Board Case Nos. 317 to 325 of 1990. The said cases were heard and decided together by a common order on 7.12.1992 by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna. As per the order passed in the revision cases, i• was held that in the absence of partition in the family of the Vendors, transfer of the lands in question itself was illegal and thus preemption could not be claimed and the same were held as not maintainable. 5. While admitting these cases, this Court by order dated 23.3.1993, had formulated the following questions of law:- " Whether in view of the fact that by reason of a transfer of his undivided interest by a co-sharer, his vendee acquires a right to sue for partition as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of M.V.S. Manikayala Rao vs. M. Narsimha Swami and Others (A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 4709 para 15), an application for pre-emption will be maintainable as by reason of such transfer the transferee even does not acquire a right to obtain possession of his purchased land without the consent of the other co-sharer; whereas the scheme and object of the Act inter alia is to prevent fragmentation of land?" 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken •us through the orders dated 24.4.1986/28.4.1986 and 26.3.1990/ 27.3.1990, in which the matter has been dealt in detail on facts and the relevant law with reference to various decisions as also been mentioned. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that both the original authority as well as the appellate authority have concurrently held that the petitioner was cosharer as well as adjoining raiyat and thus the claim of pre-emption was allowed in his favour. Learned counsel submits that the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, in his order dated 7.12.1992, has gone on a tangent inasmuch as he has held that there was no partition and accordingly, the sale in favour of the vendees (respondent no. 6 in the writ petition) was bad, and thus the claim for pre-emption was not maintainable. 8. Learned counsel submits that the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, in his order dated 7.12.1992, has gone on a tangent inasmuch as he has held that there was no partition and accordingly, the sale in favour of the vendees (respondent no. 6 in the writ petition) was bad, and thus the claim for pre-emption was not maintainable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that from the stand of the respondent no. 6 in the counter affidavit, it is clear that even they admit that there was partition and in this view of the matter such reasoning for holding the preemption claim not maintainable in the absence of partition cannot be sustained. He further submits that by obvious implication and import of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M.V.S. Manikayala Rao VS. M. Narsimhaswami and Others reported in AI R 1966 Supreme Court 470, sale of a property without actual partition cannot De held to be illegal and without any basis. In fact, noticing such decisions, the present writ petition was admitted as would be clear from the order dated 23.3.1993. He lastly submits that in the case of Suresh Prasad Singh VS. Dulhin Phulkumari Devi reported in (2010)6 SCC 441 [: 2010(2) PLJR (SC)167], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has now settled the issue with regard to preemption by holding that where a right of pre-emption is recognized by statute, it has to be treated as mandatory and not discretionary. He states tha1 the said order is also applicable on the facts and circumstances of the case inasmuch as it has been held that a complete stranger, who was not originally raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred, cannot be allowed to defeat the right of preemption of a co-sharer by first purchasing an adjoining plot of land and thereafter claiming to be the raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred. He states that in the present case the different respondent no. 6 in these writ applications were complete strangers. He sums up his arguments by stating that in any view of the matter, the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, has not disturbed the finding of facts recorded by the original authority as well as the appellate authority with regard to the petitioner being co-sharer and adjoining raiyat and the land being agricultural in nature. He sums up his arguments by stating that in any view of the matter, the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, has not disturbed the finding of facts recorded by the original authority as well as the appellate authority with regard to the petitioner being co-sharer and adjoining raiyat and the land being agricultural in nature. Thus, the order dated 7.12.1992, in any view of the matter cannot be sustained either in law or on facts. 9. Learned counsel for respondent no. 6 has defended the order impugned by submitting that the reasoning given by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, may be misplaced but the conclusion arrived is sound in the background of the facts of the case and the law applicable. Though learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 has referred to various decisions but in view of the order which this Court proposes to pass, the same are not relevant and therefore not being dealt with. 10. In fact, various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are also not being referred to in this order for the same reason. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is persuaded by the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner. By the order impugned the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, has misdirected himself and made out a case which was not canvassed by either side. Further, he has not at all dealt with the merits of the case either in law or on facts. In fact, to a large extent he has concurred with the findings of fact recorded in the order of the Original Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. He has accepted the fact that the lands were agricultural and that the different fragments of portions of adjoining plots transferred required to be taken as a block of land. This was in accordance with the aims and objects of the Act. 12. We are also in agreement with the findings of the fact recorded in the original as well as the appellate orders, the inference drawn therefrom, and applicability of the law to the set of facts. This was in accordance with the aims and objects of the Act. 12. We are also in agreement with the findings of the fact recorded in the original as well as the appellate orders, the inference drawn therefrom, and applicability of the law to the set of facts. We are fortified in our view by the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shri Suresh Prasad Singh (supra), which has a direct bearing on the facts of the present cases and the ratio laid therein supports the case of the writ petitioners. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also rightly relied on the judgment of the. Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of M.V.S. Manikayala Rao (supra). 13. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the order dated 7.12.1992, passed by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna, in Cases No. 317 to 325 of 1990, cannot be sustained, and the same is hereby set aside. The writ petitions stand allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. S.K. Katriar, J.-I agree.