ORDER 1. I have heard Mr. Aaditya Narayan Singh No.1 on behalf of the petitioner and the learned counsel, Mr. Jitendra Kishore Verma on behalf of the respondent. 2. This application has been filed by the tenant-defendant-petitioner challenging the order dated 29th July, 2009 passed by Munsif IIIrd, Patna in eviction suit No.22 of 2007 directing he petitioner to deposit arrears of rent as well as current rent at the rate of Rs.2000/- per month. 3. The only question raised by the petitioner is that in a suit for personal necessity under Section 11 (1) (C) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent, Eviction) Control Act, 1982, the Court has no jurisdiction to direct the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent prior to institution of the suit. The plaintiff is subsequent purchaser of the suit property and became the landlord since 29.01.2007 and the suit has been filed on 07.09.2007. According to the learned counsel, the learned Court below could not have directed the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent prior to date of institution of the suit. However, it is submitted that the petitioner has already deposited the rent as directed by this Court by terms of order dated 24.06.2011 from the date of institution of the suit. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that due to non-compliance of the order whereby the petitioner was directed by the trial Court to deposit the rent, the defence of the petitioner has already been struck off but the petitioner suppressed this fact in the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The defence has been struck off by terms of order dated 12.07.2010 but the petitioner obtained the order of interim stay on 24.06.2011 and keeping in dark by playing fraud upon this Court the order was obtained. Moreover, against the order striking out the defence, the petitioner has filed review application. 5. Admittedly, the defence of the petitioner has been struck off because of non-compliance of the impugned order passed by the Court below by terms of order dated 12.07.2010. Review application has been filed by the petitioner against the said order before the Court below which is still pending.
5. Admittedly, the defence of the petitioner has been struck off because of non-compliance of the impugned order passed by the Court below by terms of order dated 12.07.2010. Review application has been filed by the petitioner against the said order before the Court below which is still pending. It is also admitted fact that when the order dated 24.06.2011 was passed by this Court, the petitioner never brought to the notice of the Court about the aforesaid fact, and, thereby, the petitioner has intentionally suppressed the fact. In such circumstances even if he has deposited the rent as directed by this Court on 24.06.2011, the same shall be construed as compliance of the order of this Court which was obtained suppressing the fact. 6. So far the question that the Court has no jurisdiction to direct the petitioner to deposit rent prior to institution of suit in a case filed under Section 11 (1) (C) of the B.B.C. Act is concerned, this question has been answered by Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1996 (1) P.L.J.R. 732 Priyanka Varte Mehta Vs. Amrendu Bannerjee. The Full Bench has held that no distinction can be made between the suit of one nature or the other for the purpose of deciding the period of limitation under Section 15 of the Act. Section 15 of the Act applies to the suit filed for eviction on all the grounds. It does not make any differences as to the nature of the suit. It may be mentioned here that this Full Bench decision has been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bindeshwary Chadhary Vs. Ajay Kumar A.I.R. 1997 (SC) 2561. It appears that the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was also filed by the plaintiff-landlord under Section 11 (1) (c) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent, Eviction) Control Act, 1982. 7. In view of the settled position of law, I find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, the writ application is dismissed.