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2011 DIGILAW 2395 (PAT)

Ramjanam Mishra v. Pramod Kumar Mishra @ Pramod Kumar

2011-12-01

V.NATH

body2011
ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party. This revision application has been filed against the ORDER :dated 30.01.2007 passed by Sub Judge V, Muzaffarpur in Miscellaneous Case No. 03/97 by which he has set aside the compromise decree dated 25.01.1997 passed in Title Suit No. 35/96. 2. There is no dispute that the Title Suit No. 35/96 between the parties had been disposed of in accordance with the compromise petition dated 16.12.96 which had been accepted by the ORDER :dated 08.01.1997. However the present petitioner who was defendant in the said title suit filed a petition challenging the validity of the said compromise petition on the ground that he had neither been a party to the compromise nor had accepted the said compromise petition and directed his counsel to put signature on the same. It is his case that he never agreed for the compromise and he had never deposed in respect of the compromise before the Court and had also not put his signature on such deposition. In nutshell, the petitioner/defendant challenged the validity of the compromise petition and the decree passed thereupon as tainted by fraud perpetrated by the opposite party/plaintiff. 3. On the basis of this petition Misc. Case No. 03/97 was instituted and after notice the opp.party/plaintiff appeared and denied the allegations and has asserted that the compromise petition had been duly executed by the defendants who had also accepted the same by putting his signature and there is no fraud committed in preparing the compromise petition and getting a decree on that basis. 4.Both the parties led their respective evidence in support of their assertions and were heard at length by the learned court below. The core issue raised by the defendant is that the compromise petition did not bear his signature and he had never deposed before the Court in respect of the same and he had never put his signature below his deposition. The core issue raised by the defendant is that the compromise petition did not bear his signature and he had never deposed before the Court in respect of the same and he had never put his signature below his deposition. It has been accepted by the defendant that he had bona fidely given a Vaklatnama and a plain Paper containing his signature to the plaintiff for the purpose of making Pairvi in an encroachment case but it has been alleged that these documents had been used by the plaintiff for the purpose of fabricating the compromise petition and obtaining the compromise decree fraudulently. The plaintiff has denied these assertions and claimed that the signatures of the defendant on compromise petition are genuine and in support of his contention the plaintiff, besides other evidence, has exhibited the Vaklatnama in Title Suit No. 35/96 as Ext.A, the signature of the defendant on the same as Ext.B, compromise petition in Title Suit No.35/96 as Ext.C and defendant’s signature on the compromise petition as Ext. B/1. 5. The learned court below considered the evidence of the parties in detail and also examined the signatures of the defendant appearing on the aforesaid exhibited documents i.e. Vaklatnama and compromise petition and has come to the finding that the signature on the two documents do not tally with each other and there has been overwriting in one of the signatures of the defendant appearing on the compromise petition. The learned court has also described the details of the discrepancies in the handwriting. Further after taking notice of the case of the plaintiff that the compromise was recorded with the intervention of the Panches and all the five Panches had put their signatures on the compromise petition, the learned court below has found that the alleged compromise petition does not bear the signature of any of the Panches. On the basis of the findings, after appreciation of the evidence of the rival parties, the learned court below has come to the conclusion that the defendant has succeeded in establishing the fact that the compromise petition has not been executed by him and does not bear his signature as claimed by the plaintiff. As a result the Misc.Case No.03/97 was allowed and the compromise decree was set aside and thereafter the title suit has been restored to its original file and number. 6. As a result the Misc.Case No.03/97 was allowed and the compromise decree was set aside and thereafter the title suit has been restored to its original file and number. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the learned court below has committed error of jurisdiction in passing the impugned ORDER :and has committed material irregularity in embarking upon examining the disputed signatures without taking resort to an expert opinion. It has been urged that the learned court below could not have acted as an expert and examine the disputed signature himself which practice has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court. Further it has also been submitted that it was for the defendant petitioner to establish the case of fraud as pleaded by him and he has not led any substantial evidence to establish the case but the learned court below has wrongly placed the burden of proof in this regard upon the plaintiff/petitioner. The learned counsel has also submitted that there was sufficient evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff establishing that the compromise petition was a genuine document but the same has been ignored by the learned court below. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned ORDER :and the learned court below was well within its jurisdiction to examine and give a verdict on the disputed signature appearing upon the compromise petition. It has also been submitted that burden of proof was clearly upon the plaintiff/petitioner who has asserted the valid execution and genuineness of the signatures of the defendant appearing on the compromise petition. The learned counsel has further urged that the question of burden of proof loses its significance when both the parties lead their respective evidence on an issue and the court records the finding after considering the evidence of both the parties.8.From the impugned ORDER :, it appears that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has prayed for examination of the disputed signature on the compromise petition by a handwriting expert but both have adduced their evidence to corroborate their respective cases. The learned court below has himself examined the disputed signatures appearing on the compromise petition and the Vaklatnama and has come to the finding that the signatures appearing on the Vaklatnama and the compromise petition do not tally with each other. With regard to the jurisdiction of a Court to compare the signatures himself, Section 73 of the Evidence Act may be taken notice of, the relevant part of which is as follows:- “In ORDER :to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose”. The scope of Section 73 has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (Murarilal-Appellant Vs.The State of M.P.-Respondent) AIR 1980 SCC 531 and their lordships have held as follows:- “The argument that the Court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force. Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the Court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. Where there is none, the Court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the Court’s own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with other evidence…” 9. The apex court in (Fakruddin-Appellant Vs. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. Where there is none, the Court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the Court’s own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with other evidence…” 9. The apex court in (Fakruddin-Appellant Vs. The State of M.P.-Respondent) AIR 1967 SCC 1326 has also considered the value of a report by a handwriting expert but has held that even in presence of such a report, the Court has to come to its own conclusion regarding the genuineness of a disputed signature and the expert report has been treated to be only by way of assistance to the Court for reaching to its own conclusion. 10. Thus the emphasis in case of disputed handwriting is always upon the court to form its opinion after being satisfied on its own observation and it cannot be said, as a rule, that the expert opinion is mandatory. In the present case, none of the parties made a prayer for seeking a report from a handwriting expert with regard to the disputed signature and in such a circumstance the court below has acted within its jurisdiction in examining the disputed signatures appearing on the compromise petition by comparing the same with the admitted signature on the Vaklatnama. Moreover, the impugned ORDER :passed by the leaned court below is not based solely upon this comparison rather the other evidence and circumstances have also been considered while recording the finding on the validity of the compromise petition. The absence of signature of any of the Panches on the compromise petition contrary to the claim of the plaintiff and further the absence of the award by the Panches claimed by the plaintiff to have been filed in the Court have also weighed with the Court in disbelieving the genuineness of the compromise petition as asserted by the plaintiff. The submission with regard to the burden of proof is also of not much significance in view of the fact that both the parties have led their evidence on the disputed issue and the learned court below has recorded its finding after considering the evidence of both the parties. The legal principle in this regard has been illumined by the apex court in (Arumugham Vs. The legal principle in this regard has been illumined by the apex court in (Arumugham Vs. Sundarambal)1999(4)SCC 350 as follows: “6…On the question of burden of proof we are of the view that even assuming that burden of proof is relevant in the context of the amended provision of Section 100 C.P.C., the same would not be relevant when both sides had adduced evidence. It would be relevant only if a person on whom the burden of proof lay failed to adduce any evidence altogether. 11. The conclusion reached by the learned court below in the impugned ORDER :is based upon the appreciation of evidence on the record and there is no error of jurisdiction or material irregularity committed by the court below in the said process. As such there is no infirmity in the impugned ORDER :. The civil revision application is, accordingly, dismissed.