Judgment 1. This writ petition by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation – a State owned Transport Corporation operating stage carriers on routes covered by permits issued under Chapter-VI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is directed against the orders passed by the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal in terms of the order dated 30.11.2007 passed in common in revision petition Nos.83 to 86 of 2006 which were revision petitions filed by the present petitioner and another revision petition No.159 of 2006 which had been filed by a private operator, being aggrieved by the order insofar as it relates to the result/outcome of revision petitions filed by the Corporation which has come to be dismissed as being not maintainable. 2. In this petition, notice had been issued to respondents, namely, the Regional Transport Office, Kolar, the authority which has renewed permits, which had been issued in favour of respondents 2 and 3 and two other private operators. 3. The very grant of permits had been opposed by the Corporation before the Regional Transport Authority by pointing out that portions of the routes in respect of which respondents 2 and 3 had applied for grant of stage carriage permits, overlap portions of scheme routes covered by the nationalization scheme formulated, published and in operation by the petitioner – Corporation: popularly described as Kolar Pocket Scheme and the scheme prohibited operation by private operators on sectors overlapping the scheme routes and therefore no fresh permit can be issued by the authority. 4. This proceeding had a checkered career as the authority granted the permit. It appears the grant was subject matter of revision by the Corporation and others and such revision petitions were allowed, grant was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the original authority to examine as to whether the routes in respect of which permits had been applied for by respondents 2 and 3, overlapped to any extent of sectors of the notified routes. But the remand order passed in revision petition Nos. But the remand order passed in revision petition Nos. 1419, 1420, 1421 and 1422 of 1992 was called in question by private operators which order came to be challenged in writ petitions and while writ petitions were dismissed, the Corporation pursuing the matter by way of writ appeal, a division Bench of this court while passing Judgment in writ appeal Nos.5615-5618 of 1997, did make certain observations but dismissed the appeal as per the Judgment dated 11.1.1999. 5. While the Division Bench of this court did not disturb the order passed by the learned Single Judge in sustaining the permit, nevertheless, after noticing the factual position that the question of renewal of permit granted in favour of Sri Saleem Khan and Sri Khyum Khan, as to whether it is valid or not, was pending before the state transport authority [STA] and when the STA was required to go into all aspects of the matter in such proceedings for renewal of the permits, while observed that for the same reason, the writ appeals do not survive for further examination, taking cue from the earlier observation made in a like situation by another Division Bench of this court in WA No 73 of 1992, reading as under: “Though we cannot sustain the impugned order, it is not necessary to remit proceedings back to the learned single Judge to examine the grievance of the appellant on merit. We are not adopting that course because permit was renewed for a duration of five years and the renewal expired at the end of June 1991. Counsel for Respondent No. 4 stated that permit was renewed even after that period. In view of the expiry of period of renewal order dated August 14, 1986, in our judgment, no valid purpose would be served by remitting the proceedings back to the learned single Judge.” and the following the same pattern, the Division Bench further observed as under: 5. In view of the observation of the learned single Judge in the order under Appeal that, “I need to clarify however that there is one aspect of the matter on which this Court has held that the matter would require reconsideration. It is unnecessary for the Corporation to wait until the permits in question have expired and it is open to the Corporation to reagitate the issue with regard to suitability of the road before the initial authority. It is unnecessary for the Corporation to wait until the permits in question have expired and it is open to the Corporation to reagitate the issue with regard to suitability of the road before the initial authority. If the Corporation produces conclusive material, the authorities concerned shall certainly be entitled to reconsider that aspect of the case.” It is evident that the entire case in respect of all contentions has been reopened and it is for the parties to produce material in support of their case. Sri. Prakash Shetty, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, has contended that, in view of the decision of this Court the route is a notified route. 7. Without expressing any opinion on the said submission, we observe that it is always open for the parties to produce the material in support of their respective cases and in that view of the matter it is for the Corporation to place the material before the Regional Transport Authority that the said route is a notified route, and it is for the authorities to decide the question in controversy in accordance with law. These Appeals are accordingly disposed of. 8. All contentions are kept open. 9. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. It is thereafter that the question was required to be examined before the STA on the aspect of the grant itself. 6. These Appeals are accordingly disposed of. 8. All contentions are kept open. 9. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. It is thereafter that the question was required to be examined before the STA on the aspect of the grant itself. 6. However, it is submitted at the Bar by Sri B Phalakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner-corporation that the question of renewal came up before the authority when the permit having been renewed on many occasions by mere circulation of papers but not by inviting objections and giving opportunity to the corporation, it is submitted that the corporation has taken up the contentions at the first available opportunity when the matters were notified by the authority in respect of subject No 124/2002-02 and the questions having been raised when the matters had come up for renewal of the subject permits before the STA and that the petitioner having put forth its objections in writing and having contended that the portion of the route in respect of which permit was granted to respondents 2 and 3 is one overlapping portions of the notified routes under the Kolar pocket scheme and the respondents 2 and 3 - permit holders are also not saved operators, as permits themselves had been granted for the first time on 6-11-1991 onwards, there was a total bar for the grant of such permits and therefore the original grant as well as the renewal are bad in law and the revision petitions filed by the petitioners before the state transport appellate tribunal having been dismissed with hyper-technicality of the challenge in the revision petition being only to the endorsement and not to the proceedings and such orders are questioned in this petition. 7. I have heard at some length both Sri B Phalakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M R V Achar along with Sri Sreekanth, learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3. 8. 7. I have heard at some length both Sri B Phalakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M R V Achar along with Sri Sreekanth, learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3. 8. While learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when there is a total embargo on issue of fresh permits either a grant or renewal of permits on the notified routes covered by Kolar Pocket Scheme illegally issued permit does not sustain in law; that both the STA and the tribunal have glossed over this basic question; that the permit as originally granted and now renewed are both not sustainable in law, are not valid in the eye of law and therefore the writ petition should be allowed and the orders of the STA and the tribunal set aside. 9. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the provisions of the scheme, provisions of Chapter-VI-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Chapter-VI of Motor Vehicles Act,1988. 10. On the other hand, the submission on behalf of the respondents is that in the first instance the revision petitions before the tribunal themselves were not tenable inasmuch as the revision petitions under Section 90 of the Act can only be against a proceeding or order passed by the STA and not merely against an endorsement issued by the secretary to the STA and therefore the tribunal has rightly dismissed the revision petitions. 11. Joining issue on merits, learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 have very vehemently urged that the Kolar pocket scheme though was originally implemented through a gazette notification and order dated 25-1-1968, issued under the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the 1939 Act, it had undergone several modifications, the first of which was on 10-1-1980 providing for saving of the existing operators not only on the Kolar pocket scheme but in respect of several nationalized routes also, but with the condition that there cannot be any pick up or get down of passengers on the areas overlapping the notified route and it has also undergone further modification in terms of final notification dated 7-11-2003 issued under Section 102 of the Act, whereunder the operations by the existing operators who had valid permits even on and after 10-1-1980 have been saved. 12. 12. By drawing attention to the modified scheme and based on the rulings issued by many judgments of this court interpreting the scheme, submission of Sri M R V Achar is that as the respondents 2 and 3 were persons issued with permits in the year 1991 and which has already been renewed from time to time, they are persons in whose favour permits granted during the period can be sustained, as they become existing operators on the route and therefore come within the category of ‘saved operators’. 13. Such contentions were urged even before the Division Bench of this court even at the time of examination of the validity or otherwise of the grant made in favour of respondents 2 and 3 in the year 1991 and it was in the course of examination of this question, the Division Bench has observed, as quoted above, in WA No 5615-18 of 1997. 14. Though learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 have drawn my attention to the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of U P State Road Transport Corporation vs. State of U P [AIR 2005 SC 448], to contend that the principles of res judicata is equally applicable to the proceedings under the Act, the STA and the tribunal, the ratio of this judgment cannot come in the way of examination of questions in this writ petition, for the simple reason and as observed by the Division Bench earlier, this question had been left open to be examined again at the time of renewal and the petitioner corporation having taken these objections at the time of renewal and if the authorities have lost over this issue and if there is a basic impediment or prohibition under the statutory provision for grant of permits by the STA, mere fortuitous fact that the permits might have been issued in favour of respondents 2 and 3 cannot be made capital to contend that the matter inter se between the objector and the mandate has attained finality and it was expressly left open by the division bench in the earlier round of litigation between the same parties and it is therefore that the judgment is not applicable or relevant to the present situation. 15. 15. The other objections raised on behalf of the respondents viz., that the challenge before the tribunal was merely to the endorsement and to the proceedings of the STA is nothing short of a hyper-technical objection, which does not merit much examination. However, on a perusal of the revision petitions and the pleadings in the petition, I have noticed that what is questioned is only the proceedings and not merely the endorsement, though in the preamble portion. It is stated that the endorsement is challenged. 16. Endorsement is one issued by the secretary following the resolution passed by the STA i.e. renewal of permits and not merely the endorsement to contend that it is only an endorsement which was questioned before the tribunal, is nothing short of taking shelter under a hyper-technical ground and in my opinion it is nothing short of gross dereliction of duty on the part of the tribunal in effecting the issue of validity or otherwise of the renewal based on the validity or otherwise of the original grant itself. 17. When this court had expressly left open the question of validity of the very grant made in the year 1991 itself, and such questions having been raised by the corporation, it was the bounded duty of the STA as well as the tribute to have considered these questions and to give a finding on them. 18. The question as to whether the permit can be granted or otherwise in respect of portions overlapping of notified nationalized route is a question, which is very basic and as it constitutes an embargo even on the authorities to grant permit, the mere fact that the authorities might have granted a permit and would have renewed the same cannot come in the way of the tribunal examining such questions or this court examining that question in the wake of the tribunal having not examined it. 19. The basic question in this case was as to whether the original grant of the year 1991 was valid grant? 19. The basic question in this case was as to whether the original grant of the year 1991 was valid grant? It is obvious that it not a valid grant, as at the time when the permit was granted, it was for the first time and it is not as though the respondents 2 and 3 were existing saved operators, who alone had been saved in terms of the modification order of the year 1980, which is continued by the subsequent modification of the scheme in the year 2003. 20. What is not valid originally, what is illegal and contrary to the statutory provisions, cannot be saved and even what is saved under the modifications of the year 2003 on which is placed reliance, and even assuming that a reference is made to this modification, the saving can only be in respect of the valid legal permits which had been issued in a proper manner and which, if had been renewed from time to time. At the very inception, grant of permit in the year 1991 was not valid and in fact is illegal and contrary to the statutory provisions of Chapter-VI of the 1988 Act. It is, therefore, that the renewal is also equally bad and there was absolutely no scope for renewing an illegal, invalid permit by further renewals, as was sought for by respondents 2 and 3. 21. It is for this reason, this writ petition is inevitably allowed and the grant in favour of the respondents 2 and 3 in terms of the original grant of the year 1991 and as renewed from time to time are all quashed by issue of writ of certiorari. The STA is hereby directed to ensure that the vehicles which were being operated on such illegal permits are stopped forthwith and if need be and if it is in the public interest to provide such services to make alternative arrangements as is provided in law and not otherwise. 22. Writ petition allowed. Rule made absolute.