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2011 DIGILAW 240 (GUJ)

Saurabh Builders v. District Panchayat Thr’ President/DDO

2011-03-23

H.K.RATHOD, K.A.PUJ

body2011
Judgment H.K. Rathod, J.—The petitioner, by this petition, challenges the letter dated 9.8.2006, whereby, on account of the audit objection, the petitioner was called upon to deposit the amount of Rs. 5,51,888/-, failing which he has been informed that the amount shall be recovered from the other bills payable in respect of other contracts. 2. The relevant facts appear to be that the petitioner was granted contract by the District Panchayat for improvement of Khandevav, Sarnej, Rajpura Singaliya Road, Taluka Baghodia, District Vadodara in the year 1995-96. It is the case of the petitioner that the work was required to be completed and the same was completed well in time and after completion of the contract final bill was paid and the security deposit was also refunded as back as in the year 1996. 3. It appears that thereafter in the audit some objection was raised on the ground that the contract was not completed well in time and, therefore, as 0.01% was the rate of liquidated damages, without any adjudication, impugned communications were addressed to the petitioner, calling upon him to deposit the amount of Rs. 5,51,888/-. It is also stated in the said communication that if he fails to deposit the amount, the said amount shall be recovered from other bills in respect of other contracts with District Panchayat. It is under these circumstances, the present petition. 4. It is undisputed position that the contract in question was completed 10 years back and the finally payment was also made. The security deposit was also refunded. It is also undisputed position that no adjudication is made on the aspects as to whether damage should be recovered or not. Under these circumstances, in absence of any adjudication on the aspects of entitlement to recovery damage or liability to pay damages, straightaway the order or the decision could not be communicated to recover the amount of damage by invoking the clause 4.4 of the contract which had come to an end as back as in the year 1996. We may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1359 , more particularly the observations made at Paragraphs 7, which read as under:— “7. On a consideration of the matter we find ourselves unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Iyenger. We may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1359 , more particularly the observations made at Paragraphs 7, which read as under:— “7. On a consideration of the matter we find ourselves unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Iyenger. The terms of Clause 12 do not afford scope for a liberal construction being made regarding the power of the Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate upon a disputed question of breach as well as to assess the damages arising from the breach. The crucial words in clause 12 are “and for any breach of conditions set forth hereinbefore, the first party shall be liable to pay damages to the second party as may be assessed by the second party”. On a plain reading of the words it is clear that the right of the second party to assess damages would arise only if the breach of conditions is admitted or if no issue is made of it. If it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording of Clause 12 would have been entirely different. It cannot also be argued that a right to adjudicate upon an issue relating to a breach of conditions of the contract would flow from or is inhered in the right conferred to assess the damages arising from a breach of conditions. The power to assess damages, as pointed out by the Full Bench, is a subsidiary and consequential power and not the primary power. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the terms of Clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the officer of the State to decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the Officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests or justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. Interests or justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case the Officer of the State, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of Clause 12. (Emphasis supplied) 5. Under these circumstances, in absence of any adjudication by the competent authority or the competent forum, the impugned communications or the letters cannot be sustained. Hence, the same are quashed and set aside, but with the observations that it would be open to the authority to resort to appropriate proceedings, if permissible in law for recovery of the damage after proper adjudication or by filing appropriate suit, if otherwise permissible in law. 6. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.