Judgment : This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to set aside order, dated 02.02.2011, of respondent No.1, whereby he has purportedly suspended the petitioner’s authorization. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies. Following an inspection of the petitioner’s fair price shop, show-cause notice, dated 27.01.2011, was issued by respondent No.1 faming three charges. After considering the explanation submitted by the petitioner, respondent No.1 passed order, dated 02.02.2011, whereby he has suspended the petitioner’s authorisation with the direction to the Tahsildar to make alternative arrangements for distribution of the essential commodities. While dealing with an identical situation, this Court in Palle Peeraiah v. District Collector, Warangal and others 2011(2) ALT 30 held as under: “It is axiomatic that an order of suspension can be either interim or final in nature. In contrast to an order of cancellation, an order of suspension can be for a limited period irrespective of whether such an order is interim or final in nature. In the light of the stand taken by respondent No.3, the impugned order passed by him can be construed as final in nature. However, curiously respondent No.3 failed to indicate the period for which the petitioner’s authorization is suspended, even if the same was intended to be as a measure of penalty. The impugned order thus suffers from a serious flaw rendering itself illegal and unenforceable. If respondent No.3 felt that suspension is the appropriate substantive penalty, he could have limited the same for a limited period. Conversely, if he felt that cancellation is the appropriate penalty, he should have imposed such a penalty.” The present case is one which is identical to the facts of the case disposed of by this Court in the above re-produced order. Having followed the entire gamut of procedure for completion of enquiry and passing a final order, respondent No.1 surprisingly suspended the petitioner’s authorisation. For making an interim suspension all this procedure was quite unnecessary. The very fact that respondent No.1 has rendered a conclusive finding that the petitioner’s irregularities in running the shop shows that he wanted to impose substantive penalty. As held by this Court, while penalties of suspension and cancellation can be imposed substantively, in the event of suspension being a substantive penalty, its period should be specified. The very fact that respondent No.1 has rendered a conclusive finding that the petitioner’s irregularities in running the shop shows that he wanted to impose substantive penalty. As held by this Court, while penalties of suspension and cancellation can be imposed substantively, in the event of suspension being a substantive penalty, its period should be specified. As respondent No.1 failed to indicate the period for which the authorisation is suspended, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set aside. Respondent No.1 is left free to pass a fresh order in the light of the ratio laid down in Palle Peeraiah (supra) and the observations made herein. Subject to the above directions, the writ petition is allowed. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.8423 of 2011 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous.