Hon'ble JOSHI, J.—This civil second appeal preferred by appellant-defendant State is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.5.2007 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Rajsamand in Civil Appeal No. 34/2007 (50/1998), whereby the learned first appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant-defendant State on the ground of limitation, which was filed against the judgment and decree dated 27.3.1998 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajsamand in Civil Original Suit No. 30/1997, whereby the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the respondent-plaintiff Hasan Ali and granted permanent injunction order to the effect that the appellant-defendants are restrained from recovering Rs.15,81,926.40 from the respondent-plaintiff in pursuance to notice Ex.1 and the learned trial Court also granted costs. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit before the trial Court on 26.9.1991 for permanent injunction averring therein that the plaintiff is a mine owner lease holder having mining lease No. 35/1981 for mine situated near village Kotdi. It is further averred that though the plaintiff never excavated minerals beyond the permissible boundary line of the mining area, yet the Mining Engineer, Rajsamand vide notice dated 5.6.1991 asked the plaintiff to deposit Rs. 15,81,926.40 averring therein that the plaintif has carried on illegal mining operation outside the mining area and he should deposit the aforesaid amount within 15 days else the said amount would be recovered as arrears of land revenue. It is the case of the plaintiff that no prior notice was served upon him before asking the cost by the aforesaid notice. Being aggrieved by the said notice, the plaintiff-respondent filed the suit. 3. The appellant defendants refuted the averments made in the plaint by filing the written statement. The case as set forth in the written statement is that the respondent-plaintiff illegally excavated the marble minerals to the tune of 1647.84 tons and as such the demand has been legitimately raised. As per the written statement, the appellant-defendants before serving the notice on the respondent-plaintiff prepared the site inspection note in the presence of the authorized representative of the plaintiff, namely, Altaf Hussain, on 19.4.1991 and 20.4.1991. Thus, the appellant-defendant raising the objection of jurisdiction and non-maintainability of the suit in view of availability of remedy of appeal under the Mines and Mineral Concession Rules, 1986, prayed to dismiss the suit. Thus, the appellant-defendant raising the objection of jurisdiction and non-maintainability of the suit in view of availability of remedy of appeal under the Mines and Mineral Concession Rules, 1986, prayed to dismiss the suit. The learned trial Court framed the following six issues: 1- vk;k izfroknh ls 1581926-40 :i;s olwy djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSa\ 2- vk;k voS/k [kuu ds fujh{k.k dh oknh dks dksbZ lwpuk ugha Fkh vkSj oknh dks lqus fcuk o iwNs fcuk gh fujh{k.k fjiksVZ rS;kj dh gS] tks ekU; ugha gSa\ 3- vk;k oä fujh{k.k ekSds ij vyrkQ gqlSu ekStwn feyk tks oknh dk izfrfuf/k Fkk\ 4- vk;k oknh us yht ua- 175@82 o 35@81 dh lhek ls ckgj voS/k [kuu dk;Z fd;k tks jkt- viz/kku [kuu fu;ekoyh 1986 dh /kkjk 48 dk mYya?ku gS\ 5- vk;k U;k;ky; dk nkok lquus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS\ 6- vuqrks"k\ 4. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties and considering the material available on record, held that the appellant-defendant could not prove that Altaf Hussain was the representative of Hasan Ali and further held that before asking the cost by the aforesaid notice, no prior notice was served on the lessee, hence, the demand raised by the defendants remains without jurisdiction. Thus, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the respondent-plaintiff and granted permanent injunction vide judgment and decree dated 27.3.1998. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appellant-defendant State filed an appeal before the first appellate Court. The said appeal was time barred and the reason for the alleged delay was given that on account of administrative procedures, it took some time in obtaining sanction and then taking copy as also in getting the appeal drafted. The learned first appellate Court vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.5.2007 dismissed the appeal of the defendant-appellant State on the ground of delay, holding that even the copying application was filed after expiry of the limitation and as such refused the delay condonation prayer and as a consequence thereof, the appeal itself was dismissed. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, the appellant-defendant State has filed the present second appeal before this Court. 7. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, the appellant-defendant State has filed the present second appeal before this Court. 7. This appeal was admitted on 29.11.2007 and following three substantial questions of law were framed: (1) Whether the two courts below failed to read the evidence of the plaintiff so far as it relates to the statement about Altaf Hussain who took the Rawana on behalf of the plaintiff and can be treated to be his representative as per Rule 71 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986? (2) Whether the courts below committed error or law in granting injunction when alternate remedy was available to the plaintiff under the provisions of the Rules of 1986? (3) Whether the first appellate Court committed error by rejecting the appeal of the appellant on the ground of limitation. 8. In spite of the service of notice of admission on the respondent, no one has appeared on his behalf. 9. Although the matter was listed on stay, but with the consent of the learned counsel for the appellants, today the matter was heard finally for disposal of the second appeal itself. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendants contended that the present case involving huge amount of public exchequer money amount to Rs.15,81,926.40 concerning to revenue is not to be thrown on petty technicalities. The delay caused in preferring the appeal was definitely on account of procedural ceremonies and the time taken in obtaining sanction and applying copy etc. and in it nothing mala fides can be attributed to anyone. At least the State was not going to be benefited by deliberately late preferring the appeal. The delay, until the unless it can be attributed to mala fide, the same remains bona fide and in such cases the technicalities ought not have been permitted to be pitted with rendering of substantial justice and the meritorious matter was deserving meritorious hearing at the hands of learned first appellate Court, yet the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal have wrongly been dismissed by the learned first appellate Court, as such the judgment rendered by the learned lower appellate Court has got no legs to sustain the same the deserves to be set aside. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the interpretation of the words "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally and in case of such a meritorious appeal, it should not be thrown merely on the ground of delay. 12. I have considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. A plethora of decisions lay down that the expression "sufficient cause" is to be liberally construed, so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence or inaction or bona fides is imputable to the parties. It is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice. 13. It is settled position of law that the ultimate anxiety of the Court, while dealing with an application of condonation of delay has been to see that ordinarily no meritorious matter is thrown overboard on the technical grounds of delay. The purpose and design incorporating the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to see that ordinarily substantial justice is required to be given and ordinarily, unless there are circumstances running counter to the spirit of he provision of Section 5, the meritorious matters are required to be dealt with an adjudicated upon on merits. 14. My view finds support from the judgment of this Court in Urban Improvement Trust vs. Poonam Chand (AIR 1997 Rajasthan 134) and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. (AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1623). 15 . In Urban Improvement Trust vs. Poonam Chand ( AIR 1997 Raj. 134 ), the Single Bench of this Court held that before rejecting applications under Section 5 and dismissing the appeals as barred by lapse of time, the courts of law are required to put a glance as a condition precedent on the merits of the appeals and unless the appeals are found to be hopelessly devoid of merits ordinarily efforts should be made to decide the appeal on merits. 16. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. 16. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. (AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1623), wherein it has been held in para Kroc as follows: "It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. 17. Now coming to the facts of the present case, it is admitted position that the suit was filed against the State of Rajasthan and the State of Rajasthan filed the first appeal which was barred by limitation and an application under Section 5 of the limitation Act was filed along with the appeal, which was rejected by the first appellate Court. Indisputably, the dispute was regarding he recovery of the money from plaintiff-respondent Hasan Ali, who obtained the decree under appeal from the learned trial Court on 27.3.1998 and the appeal was filed with some delay. The learned first appellate Court without going into the merits of the case, simply dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay. 18. In the present case, the aforesaid factual and legal position was sufficient to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and to decide the appeal on merits. The learned first appellate Court without going into the merits of the case, simply dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay. 18. In the present case, the aforesaid factual and legal position was sufficient to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and to decide the appeal on merits. If the learned lower appellate Court would have put a glance on the merit of the case as stated in the preceding para, it would have never arrived at a conclusion by any stretch of imagination that the appeal filed by the defendant-appellants before it was hopelessly devoid of merit. 19. A close scrutiny of the judgment and decree under appeal leads me to conclude that while rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the learned lower appellate Court has not addressed itself to the merit of the case. The first appellate Court has taken hyper technical reason to dismiss the application, which is not permissible under law and has not properly applied his mind to the various principles laid down, which should weight with the court considering the question of condonation of delay in filing appeals or any other proceedings and judging the issue concerning sufficiency or otherwise of the cause so pleaded in support of or justification of the claim for condonation. The case in hand involve substantial rights to land revenue and that too public property and adjudication on merits of the claim at least by one appellate Court cannot be allowed to be defeated by taking a harsh or too technical view of the matter in appreciating the genuineness as well as sufficiency of the *********** shown in the case. 20. In my considered opinion, the controversy involved in the present case is squarely covered by the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Harayna vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. (supra) and the judgment of this court in Urban Improvement Trust vs. Poonam Chand (supra), therefore, the delay in filing the appeal before the learned first appellate Court deserves to be condoned and the State is entitled to receive all the benefits available to it while interpreting the expression "sufficient cause" used under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 21. 21. In view of the various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, it must be taken to be well-settled principle that before rejecting applications under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and dismissing the appeals as barred by lapse of time, the courts of law are required to put a glance as a condition precedent on the merits of the appeals and unless the appeals are found to be hopelessly devoid of merits, ordinarily efforts should be made to decide the appeals on merits. Failure to do so in the present appeal by the learned lower appellate Court has resulted in miscarriage of justice and as such, its judgment and decree under appeal is liable to be set aside. Three substantial questions of law have been framed by this Court while admitting this appeal, but as the first two questions may affect the judgment of the first appellate Court on merits. I am going to decide this appeal on the question No.3 only. 22. In view of the discussion made above, the instant second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 10.5.2007 passed by the learned lower appellate Court is hereby set aside. The case is remanded back to the learned lower appellate Court with a direction to decide the appeal afresh expeditiously on merits without being influenced with any observation made in the body of the judgment relating to the merits of the case. No order as to costs.