Judgment 1. The relief sought for in this Writ Petition is to declare the action of the respondents in not delivering possession of the lands, after granting ryotwari pattas, pattadar pass books and title deeds to the petitioners under the provisions of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Abolition of Inams and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1956 and the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, even after clearance of the subject lands from the provisions of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 as per the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal in C.C. No.356 of 1975 dated 09.09.2003, as arbitrary and illegal. A consequential direction is sought to the respondents to deliver possession of the lands, situated in T.D. No.1277 of Thandrangi Village, Jami Mandal, Vizianagaram District, to the petitioners as per the demarcation and identification contained in their ryotwari pattas. 2. A consequential direction is sought to the respondents to deliver possession of the lands, situated in T.D. No.1277 of Thandrangi Village, Jami Mandal, Vizianagaram District, to the petitioners as per the demarcation and identification contained in their ryotwari pattas. 2. It is the petitioners’ case that late P.V.G. Raju, erstwhile Maharaja of Vizianagaram, was the owner of various extents of lands including T.D. No.1277 of Thandrangi Village, Jami Mandal, Vizianagaram District; he had filed a declaration under the provisions of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 in L.C.C. No.3456 of 1975 before the Revenue Divisional Officer declaring the said land as part of his estate; the lands in Thandrangi village were assumed to be an estate village and, in the final computation, these lands admeasuring 678 acres of wet land and 303 acres of dry land were declared surplus; possession of these lands was taken over by the Government consequent upon its determination as surplus by the Land Reforms Tribunal; the petitioners purchased 1/3rd share of the erstwhile Maharaja, from his wife, of an extent of 211.90 acres of wet land and 77.30 acres of dry land; subsequently the lands in the said village were held not to form part of an estate, but to be an inam village; the petitioners applied for issuance of ryotwari pattas before the 1st respondent who, vide proceedings dated 12.11.1998, passed orders holding that the petitioners were entitled for ryotwari pattas in respect of the lands; all the petitioners were issued ryotwari patas in Form – VIII; individual pattas were issued in their favour by order of the 1st respondent dated 15.11.1998; they were, however, not put in possession of the lands as possession was taken over by the State earlier on the premise that it formed part of the surplus land of the erstwhile Maharaja under the provisions of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973; when they approached the 1st respondent, for issuance of pattadar pass books and title deeds, they were asked to regularize the unregistered document executed, by the widow of the late Maharaja, in 1967; they had requested the 2nd respondent to pass appropriate orders excluding the land in T.D. No.1277 of Thandrangi village from the ceiling declaration of the Maharaja; the Land Reforms Tribunal, by order dated 27.04.2001 in L.C.C. No.356 of 1975, had excluded the land that was sold to the petitioners, and for which ryotwari pattas were issued to them, from the ceiling declaration and surplus computation of the erstwhile Maharaja; the Government filed L.R.A. No.1 of 2001 before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal; the appeal in L.R.A. No.1 of 2001 was allowed on 09.09.2002, and the matter was remanded for fresh enquiry by the Land Reforms Tribunal; they filed C.R.P. No.4305 of 2002 against the remand order and, since this Court did not interfere, the 2nd respondent passed orders afresh confirming exclusion of the petitioners patta lands from the declaration of erstwhile Maharaja; against the said order the Government did not prefer any appeal; the ryotwari pattas granted to the petitioners, under the Inams Abolition Act, was valid as the lands, covered by ryotwari pattas, were excluded from the holding of the declarant; and, as possession of the lands had been taken over by the Government, long prior to determination of the tenure of the land, they were entitled for delivery of possession of the lands, more so as the lands had already been demarcated, and the lands covered by each ryotwari patta identified. The petitioners would further submit that, since proceedings under the Ceiling Act continued upto 09.09.2003, they did not take any steps earlier for recovery of possession of the land from the respondent; the 1st respondent, by order dated 10.10.2003, had regularized the unregistered sale transaction, and had issued a certificate in their favour under Section 5-A(4) of the Act read with Rule 22(5); consequently the 1st respondent had issued pattadar pass books and title deeds to the petitioners; though they were holding the certificates, they were not delivered possession of the lands; and they submitted a representation on 25.11.2003 seeking delivery of possession of the lands, but to no avail. Apprehending encroachments over the said lands, a direction is sought by the petitioners that possession of the lands, for which they were hitherto granted ryotwari pattas, be delivered to them. 3. Apprehending encroachments over the said lands, a direction is sought by the petitioners that possession of the lands, for which they were hitherto granted ryotwari pattas, be delivered to them. 3. In the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the 1st respondent, it is stated that the lands in Thandrangi Village, Jami Mandal, Vizianagaram District were originally under the control and ownership of late P.V.G. Raju, the brother of the erstwhile Maharaja, vide title deed No.1277 of Thandrangi village; initially the said lands were taken over by the State under the provisions of the A.P. Andhra Area Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act; Sri P.V.G. Raju had filed a declaration under the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and, as he was declared a surplus land owner, he surrendered the entire land in the village in favour of the Government in the year 1977; the 1st petitioner had raised a dispute contending that these lands were not covered by the Estates Abolition Act, and the provisions of the A.P. Andhra Area Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1956 were alone applicable; he claimed to have purchased the land, from the wife of Sri P.V.G. Raju and his two daughters, in the year 1967 through an agreement of sale which was an unregistered document; he claimed that the said document was validated in the year 1996 and in 2003 pattadar pass books and title deeds were issued to him; the purchase effected by the petitioner in the year 1967 was not a genuine transaction since, as on the date of the so-called agreement of sale of 1967, there was no electronic typing in the country, and it was not available in Andhra Pradesh; the said document was typed on an electronic typewriter allegedly in 1967; there were no entries in the revenue records; in the absence of any entry, the petitioners’ claims were misconceived; against the order apportioning 1/3rd and 2/3rd share, the authorized officer had preferred L.R.A. No.1 of 2007; likewise persons in actual possession and enjoyment of the land, in T.D. No.1277, had also filed L.R.A. No.2 of 2003; these ryots claimed that they were in possession and enjoyment of the lands in T.D. No.1277 for more than a century; the agreement of sale, or the unregistered sale document, said to have been executed in favour of the petitioner, is not binding on the Government, since the sale itself is not genuine; the original owner Sri P.V.G. Raju was alive, and he was the pattadar on the date of transaction; the executant was not the original owner of the land and, consequently, had no title to convey in favour of the petitioners; L.R.A. No.1 of 2007 and 2 of 2003 are pending adjudication; there were no entries in the revenue records with regards issuance of pattadar pass books and title deeds in favour of the petitioners, including the 1-B register; ryots are in possession and enjoyment of the land for the last nearly 100 years; in terms of Rule 26, of the Rules made under the A.P. Rights in Lands and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, no pattadar pass book can be granted without such person being in possession of the lands; it is not in dispute that the petitioners were never in possession of the lands; the pattadar pass books and title deeds, if any, issued in their favour is contrary to the provisions of the A.P. Rights in Lands and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971; if the petitioners have any grievance they should approach the competent Civil Court, and a Writ Petition is not maintainable; in 1967 the 1st petitioner had only one son and the agreement reflects the name of other sons also as purchasers of the land; it is evident that the document drafted and typed was an after thought, and was ante-dated only for the purpose of selfish gain; the land was treated as an estate when the land was surrendered by Sri P.V.G. Raju in 1977; had there been a genuine agreement of sale or an unregistered sale document alienating the lands in favour of the petitioners, these lands would have been deleted from the holdings of the declarants; the petitioners made no claim during the years 1967-80; the revenue and cist records disclose that ryots were paying land revenue to the Government and, prior thereto, they were making payment to the Estate holder; these documents establish that the ryots are in actual physical possession of the land; and, even after taking over the lands as surplus lands, the ryots continue to remain in occupation till date. 4. Eighty two ryots have impleaded themselves as respondents in the Writ Petition. It is their case that they are the absolute owners, and are in possession of agricultural lands in Thandrangi Village; they have been cultivating the lands from the time of their forefathers; this is their only source of livelihood; it is they who are in possession of the lands, and not the Government as erroneously contended by the petitioners; the so called ryotwari pattas, alleged to have been issued in favour of petitioner Nos.1 to 17, are ex facie illegal, and do not confer any right over the land in their favour; the erstwhile Maharaja of Vizianagaram was never in physical possession of the said lands; it is they and their ancestors who were continuously cultivated the land; the authorities could not have issued ryotwari pattas in favour of the petitioners, as they were never in possession of the land; the petitioners had suppressed and mis-represented material facts before this Court; and the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. Sri Vedula Venkataramana, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would submit that, as the petitioners have been issued ryotwari pattas, pattadar pass books and title deeds, and as possession of the lands was taken on its being declared surplus, the Government was duty bound to deliver possession of the said lands to the petitioners herein as they are the owners thereof; even if others are said to have encroached upon, and to be in physical possession of the lands in question, the Government should atleast grant symbolic possession to the petitioners, leaving it open to them to pursue their legal remedies; and, alternatively, this Court should declare that the petitioners are entitled to delivery of possession of these lands, and leave it open to them to take appropriate legal proceedings to have the persons, in illegal possession, evicted from the lands in question. 6. 6. On the other hand both the Learned Government Pleader for Revenue, and M/s. Bharadwaj Associates appearing on behalf of the unofficial respondents, would contend that the petitioners have suppressed and mis-represented material facts before this Court only with a view to grab vast extents of precious agricultural lands in Vizianagaram District; documents were created only to grab huge tracts of land; this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not adjudicate disputed questions of fact, more so as serious allegations of fraud and mis-representation are made; and the relief of delivery of possession can only be sought by way of a suit before the competent Civil Court, and not in summary proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. As noted hereinabove, the relief sought for in this Writ Petition is to direct the respondents to deliver possession of the lands, admeasuring Ac.211.90 cents of wet land and Ac.77.30 of dry land, in T.D.No.1277 of Thandrangi Village, Jami Mandal, Vizianagaram District, to the petitioners as per the demarcation and identification contained in their ryotwari pattas. In proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court would not, ordinarily, determine the title of any individual over immovable property nor would it put him in possession thereof. In cases relating to immovable properties, which are governed by the ordinary civil law, the High Court would not exercise its special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution unless circumstances are exceptional. (Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawade (Smt) v. Anwarali Hasanali Makani (1992)1 SCC 414 ). A regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights, and the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is not available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged and established. The High Court would not allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace ordinary remedies available to a litigant which is by way of a suit. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary, and should not be exercised casually or lightly. (Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria (Smt.) (1992)4 SCC 61 . It is not intended to replace ordinary remedies available to a litigant which is by way of a suit. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary, and should not be exercised casually or lightly. (Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria (Smt.) (1992)4 SCC 61 . This Court would not go into intricate questions relating to property rights as a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of such disputes, and the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, (which is summary in nature), is not available for such purposes. (Lambadi Pedda Bhadru Vs. Mohd. Ali Hussain (2003)4 ALT 611; Union of India rep. by its Secretary, Ministry of Defence, (ix) New Delhi Vs. S.M. Hussain Rasheed (2003)5 ALT 143 ; and Prince Shahamat Ali Khan v. Sultan-ul-Uloom Education Society (2003)6 ALT 307). 8. Disputes, regarding possession of immovable property, cannot be effectively resolved in summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution only on the basis of affidavits and counter-affidavits without tendering witnesses for cross-examination. The effective, alternative and comprehensive remedy is by way of private law review for declaration, injunction and damages before the Civil Court. (Syed Kazim Bahadur Vs. District Collector, Rangareddy District (2002)3 ALT 739 ). 9. In Sohan Lal v. Union of India 1957 SCR 738 , the Supreme Court held:- “……..We do not propose to enquire into the merits of the rival claims of title to the property in dispute set up by the appellant and Jagan Nath. If we were to do so, we would be entering into a field of investigation which is more appropriate for a civil court in a properly constituted suit to do rather than for a Court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. There are questions of fact and law which are in dispute requiring determination before the respective claims of the parties to this appeal can be decided. Before the property in dispute can be restored to Jagan Nath it will be necessary to declare that he had title in that property and was entitled to recover possession of it. This would in effect amount to passing a decree in his favour. In the circumstances to be mentioned hereafter, it is a matter for serious consideration whether in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution such a declaration ought to be made and restoration of the property to Jagan Nath be ordered……..” (emphasis supplied). 10. This would in effect amount to passing a decree in his favour. In the circumstances to be mentioned hereafter, it is a matter for serious consideration whether in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution such a declaration ought to be made and restoration of the property to Jagan Nath be ordered……..” (emphasis supplied). 10. The petitioners’ claim to have been granted ryotwari pattas, and pattadar pass books and title deeds, is on the basis of the agreement of sale of the year 1967. Since the genuineness of the alleged sale deed of 1967 is put in doubt by the State Government, and the unofficial respondents, terming it as a concocted document it becomes necessary for the Court to decide the factual controversy as to whether the said document is real or has been concocted by the petitioners for a clandestine purpose. As the said controversy is purely factual, it is not proper for this Court to take up investigation of such disputed facts, and record its finding thereupon. Under Article 226 this Court would not take up resolution of factual controversies, and would leave the parties to work out other legal remedies available to them. (Revenue Divisional Officer, East, Ranga Reddy Dist. Vs. Kasula Sathaiah (2002)3 ALT 389 ). Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are ill suited for the purposes of enquiry into disputes which involve adjudication of disputed questions of fact. (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Ali Jafaar (2004)3 ALT 371 ). The question is one of exercise of discretion, and not of lack of jurisdiction. This Court will not, normally, exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 where the facts in disputes are complex and may, for their determination, require evidence to be let in by the parties to the dispute. (Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation rep., by its Managing Director, Lucknow v. M/s. K.L. Hi-Tech Secure Print Ltd., rep. by its Managing Director (2004) 4 ALT 498 (DB). One of the reasons for refusal to exercise discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution is where disputed facts have to be investigated. In such cases the rights claimed are not capable of being established, in summary proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution, as it requires a detailed examination of the evidence as may be had in a Suit. One of the reasons for refusal to exercise discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution is where disputed facts have to be investigated. In such cases the rights claimed are not capable of being established, in summary proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution, as it requires a detailed examination of the evidence as may be had in a Suit. A petition under Art.226 of the Constitution cannot be converted into a Suit to resolve factual controversies. The same principle has been extended even to mixed questions of fact and law by Courts. This Court cannot be converted into a trial court while exercising its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution, particularly when the party approaching this Court under Art.226 can work out his/its remedy by approaching the competent and jurisdictional Civil Court. In general, a disputed question of fact is not investigated in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution, particularly where an alternative efficacious remedy is available, and where no effective and conclusive decision can be taken on the basis of the pleadings, and the documents filed in the writ petition. (Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited, New Delhi Vs. Sree Krishna Oil Complex Limited, Hyderabad (2002)3 ALT 168 ). 11. The relief sought for in this writ petition, of delivery of possession, when examined in the light of the submission that the land was in occupation of other ryots for the past 100 years, would necessarily mean that the petitioners seek their eviction from the lands in question. Such a relief has neither been sought for, nor can any such relief be granted in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners did not choose to array the ryots, who would be effected by any such order being passed, as respondents in the Writ Petition and it is they who have impleaded themselves as respondents in these proceedings. 12. Viewed from any angle, I see no reason to exercise discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to grant the relief sought for i.e., of delivery of possession of lands which the petitioners claim to be the owners of. Leaving it open to the petitioners, if they so choose, to avail the remedy of a suit before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.