Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has stated that he had joined in the Police service, as a Grade-II Police Constable, on 25.10.1984. He had been promoted as a Grade-I Police Constable in the year, 1997. He was further promoted as a Head Constable in the year, 2002. He had received nearly 21 rewards for his efficiency in service and he had not been imposed with any punishment during his service. However, on 14.10.2005, he had been placed under suspension from service, on contemplation of enquiry relating to certain alleged grave charges. On 12.11.2005, the departmental proceedings had been initiated, in P.R.160/2005. 2. The petitioner has further stated that the first charge alleged against him is that he had not informed his Superior Officers about one Jayapal, son of Shunmugam and Bala @ Balasubramanaiam of Thumbaikadu, situated within the limits of Polur Police Station, regarding their activities connected with distilling of illicit arrack, on 14.10.2005, and for encouraging them in their illegal activities. The second charge against the petitioner is that he had received illegal gratification from Jayapal and Anandan of Sengundram Village, with regard to distillation of illicit arrack and for conniving with them. 3. The petitioner has further stated that none of the crucial witnesses mentioned in Annexure-3 of the charge memo had been cited as prosecution witnesses. He had also stated that the charges framed against him are vague in nature, as sufficient details had not been given, contrary to Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. 4. The petitioner has further stated that he had submitted a detailed explanation to the charges levelled against him. However, in the oral enquiry conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police, Crime, Tiruvannamalai District, it had been held, on 29.12.2005, that the charges levelled against the petitioner had been proved. The petitioner has claimed that the report of the enquiry officer is perverse and based on no evidence. 5. It has been further stated that based on the said enquiry report, the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay by two stages, for two years, with cumulative effect, had been imposed on the petitioner, by the Superintendent of Police, Tiruvannamalai, on 17.2.2006, and the consequential order had also been passed, on 20.2.2006, awarding the said punishment. The petitioner had preferred an appeal petition to the second respondent, on 27.3.2006. The petitioner had preferred an appeal petition to the second respondent, on 27.3.2006. The appeal petition filed by the petitioner had been rejected by the appellate authority, the first respondent herein, by his order, dated 6.4.2006. In such circumstances, the petitioner had preferred the present writ petition before this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted, inter alia, that the charges levelled against the petitioner are vague in nature, as they are bereft of the necessary details. He had further submitted that the charges had been framed in violation of Rule 3 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The crucial witnesses had not been examined to establish the charges. Further, the enquiry had not been held in a proper manner, in accordance with the procedures established by law and by following the principles of natural justice. Further, the findings of the enquiry are perverse in nature. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner had further submitted that the Enquiry Officer had not applied his mind properly before arriving at his conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner, regarding the receiving of illegal gratification and in conniving with the persons, who were involved in distilling of illicit arrack, had been proved, by sufficient evidence. The findings of the enquiry officer is perverse in nature, as it is based on no evidence. The petitioner had been denied the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses, who had been examined during the enquiry proceedings. 8. He had further submitted that the impugned order passed by the second respondent is a non speaking order and as such, it is liable to be quashed. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in KULDEEP SINGH Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND OTHERS (1999) 2 SCC 10 ). The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are as follows: 6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority. 7. In Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 SC 1277 = (1978) 3 SCC 366 = 1978 (3) SCR 708 , it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which, and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would be perverse. 8. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of A.P.vs. Rama Rao. 1964 2 LLJ 150 = AIR 1963 SC 1723 = 1964 (3) SCR 25 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of A.P.vs. Rama Rao. 1964 2 LLJ 150 = AIR 1963 SC 1723 = 1964 (3) SCR 25 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. Prakash Chand Jain, 1969 2 LLJ 377 (SC) = AIR 1969 SC 983 and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. 1976 Labour & Industrial Cases 4 (SC) = AIR 1976 SC 98 = 1976 (2) SCR 280 = (1976) 1 SCC 518 . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others. AIR 1984 SC 1805 = 1985 (1) SCR 866 = (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. 9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent, the averments and allegations made by the petitioner had been denied. It has been stated that the petitioner had been encouraging illicit trading in liquor, by receiving illegal gratification from various offenders, including one Jayapal, who has been involved in prohibition offences. Therefore, the second respondent had placed the petitioner under suspension and had ordered an enquiry, based on the charges levelled against him. 11. It has been further stated that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the charge memo framed against the petitioner is vague is not correct. In fact, specific charges had been levelled against the petitioner giving all the necessary details. Thereafter, an enquiry had been conducted, as per the procedures established by law and by following the principles of natural justice. In fact, specific charges had been levelled against the petitioner giving all the necessary details. Thereafter, an enquiry had been conducted, as per the procedures established by law and by following the principles of natural justice. A reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioner to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. Sufficient evidence was available for the enquiry officer to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him. 12. It has been further stated that the punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate in nature. Further, sufficient reasons have been given by the respondents, in their impugned orders, to hold that the petitioner was the guilty of the charges levelled against him. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 13. In view of the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent and in view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties concerned and on a perusal of the records available, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause or reason to grant the relief, as prayed for by the petitioner. 14. From the records placed before this Court, it is seen that the charges levelled against the petitioner are sufficiently clear and therefore, it cannot be said that it is vague in nature. A fair and proper enquiry had been held, based on which the second respondent had imposed the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay, by two stages, for two years, with cumulative effect, on the petitioner. 15. The petitioner has not been in a position to show that sufficient opportunity had not been given to him to defend himself during the enquiry proceedings. There was sufficient evidence available before the enquiry officer to arrive at his conclusion in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The allegation of the petitioner that the enquiry had been conducted without following the principles of natural justice and contrary to the procedures established by law has not been substantiated with sufficient evidence. 16. The concept of principles of natural justice cannot be strictly applied as a straightjacket formula in all circumstances and in all situations. The allegation of the petitioner that the enquiry had been conducted without following the principles of natural justice and contrary to the procedures established by law has not been substantiated with sufficient evidence. 16. The concept of principles of natural justice cannot be strictly applied as a straightjacket formula in all circumstances and in all situations. It can neither be like an unruly horse, nor like a run-away train sans control or direction. It should rather be, atleast to a reasonable extent flexible and elastic to suit the varying exigencies of the situation providing the healing touch needed in the application of the law and in serving the ends of justice. It would suffice if the principles of natural justice had been complied with, substantially. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is a case of no evidence. Further, it cannot be said that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate in nature. As such, the writ petition is devoid of merits. Hence, it stands dismissed. No costs. Connected M.P.M.P.No.154 of 2008 is closed.