JUDGMENT P.P.BHATT,J. (1) THE present Revision Application is filed under Sec. 401 read with Sec. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as "the Code" for short) being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order dated 19-6-2007 passed by learned Special Judge, Sabarkantha at Himatnagar below Exh. 84 in Special Case No. 1 of 2001. (2) After preliminary hearing of this application, by order dated 28-6- 2007 notice to respondent No. 1 was ordered to be issued and meanwhile, interim relief in terms of Para 6(iii) qua the petitioner was granted. Thereafter, by order dated 26-7-2007, Rule was ordered to be issued and interim relief granted earlier was ordered to continue till then. Today, at the time of hearing this matter finally, learned Advocate for the applicant has submitted that the order passed by learned Special Judge impleading the petitioner as accused and directing the prosecuting agency to get sanction order to prosecute the petitioner is apparently illegal and unwarranted. 3.1. He further submitted that it is well settled law that no Court can take cognizance of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for short) without there being any sanction to prosecute a person concerned. 3.2. He submitted that in the instant case, before submission of the charge-sheet, the papers were sent to the competent authority to accord sanction to prosecute the petitioner and after careful consideration by the sanctioning authority, sanction was not accorded to prosecute the petitioner, and therefore, there was no question of taking cognizance of an offence so far as the petitioner is concerned. 3.3. He further submitted that the Inquiry Officer had also submitted the report under Sec. 169 of the Code and that was granted by learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Sabarkantha at Himatnagar. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate for the applicant has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh @ Iqbal Singh, reported in 2005 (12) SCC 709 and another decision in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1997 SC 3400 : [1998 (1) GLR 793 (SC)]. Lastly, it is requested to allow this application. 3.4. On the other hand, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 Mr. Lastly, it is requested to allow this application. 3.4. On the other hand, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 Mr. B. S. Khatana has submitted that learned Special Judge has not committed any error while passing the order below Exh. 84. Learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 has invited attention of the Court to Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the impugned order and submitted that learned Special Judge has passed the order after careful consideration of the evidence recorded by his predecessor and the material available on record. Lastly, it is requested to dismiss this application. (3) Likewise, learned A.P.P. Mr. Pandya while opposing this application has submitted that the order passed by learned Special Judge is based on the finding given in Paragraphs 3 and 4 which is suggestive of the fact that learned Special Judge has passed the order after careful consideration of the material available on record. Lastly, he requested the Court to dismiss this application. (4) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by learned Advocates for the parties. Considering the aforesaid rival submissions and on perusal of the Revision Application and the order dated 19-6-2007 passed by learned Special Judge below Exh. 84 as well as the order dated 31-3-2005 passed by the Special Judge, it appears that there is substance in the argument advanced by learned Advocate for the applicant because the Investigating Officer submitted the application Exh. 22 under Sec. 169 of the Code after collecting relevant material recorded in the case and in the said report, it has been stated that sanction is not given by the competent authority to prosecute the petitioner, and therefore, request was made before the Special Court to pass an appropriate order. It appears that, by order dated 31-3-2005 the Special Judge accepted the said report and discharged the accused - petitioner herein. Thereafter, the charge was framed vide Exh. 35 on 1-8-2005 and the evidence of the witnesses was recorded. It appears that after the evidence was closed by the prosecution, the statement of accused Virendrasinh Jhala was recorded, and thereafter, the said accused gave an application vide Exh. 84 stating so far as Virendrasinh Jhala is concerned, he is facing the charge under Sec. 12 of the Act for abetment of crime. It appears that after the evidence was closed by the prosecution, the statement of accused Virendrasinh Jhala was recorded, and thereafter, the said accused gave an application vide Exh. 84 stating so far as Virendrasinh Jhala is concerned, he is facing the charge under Sec. 12 of the Act for abetment of crime. The present petitioner was shown as accused in column No. 2 and as alleged, Virendrasinh Jhala abetted the accused No. 1 by accepting the amount. Before the learned Special Judge, it was contended that the evidence of complainant - P.W. 1 is corroborated by Exh. 40 i.e. complaint and so far as the present petitioner is concerned, there was direct involvement in the crime as he was present who demanded the money as per the talk which took place on phone. It was also contended that the evidence of the complainant was corroborated by the evidence of P.W. No. 2 and the Investigating Officer Exhs. 45 and 43 respectively and that is why it was pleaded to implead the present petitioner as one of the accused in the trial under Sec. 319 of the Code. Learned Judge, after considering the material on record, passed the order by allowing the application Exh. 84 and ordered to add the present petitioner as accused No. 2 and also ordered to issue summons accordingly. Learned Judge has also directed the prosecuting agency to obtain sanction to prosecute and to produce before the Court to enable the Court to proceed with the trial. 6.1. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that application vide Exh.22 to discharge the accused-petitioner herein under Sec. 169 of the Code was submitted, wherein, it is mentioned that sanction for prosecution was not granted by the authority competent to do so and for that, detailed reasons were also assigned as to why the authority concerned was not inclined to grant sanction to prosecute the present petitioner. At this stage, it would be fruitful to make reference to Sec. 19 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act is reproduced for ready perusal as under : "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution :- (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Secs. At this stage, it would be fruitful to make reference to Sec. 19 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act is reproduced for ready perusal as under : "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution :- (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Secs. 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-sec. (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-sec. (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-sec. (4) In determining under sub-sec. (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation :- For the purposes of this Section,- (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature." 6.2. On perusal of the above-referred provisions, it becomes clear that provisions contained in Sec. 19 of the Act are mandatory in nature. It is the sole discretion of the competent authority whether to grant sanction or not after careful consideration of the material produced before it and the said authority is not supposed to weigh with by any other extraneous consideration and decide objectively. In the case on hand, the report submitted under Sec. 169 of the Code specifically indicates that the authority competent to grant sanction has, after careful consideration, refused to grant sanction by assigning detailed reasons thereof. It has been stated by the Investigating Officer while submitting the report under Sec. 169 of the Code that the said reasons are justifiable reasons. As stated earlier, considering the evidence on record as well as facts and circumstances of the case discussed hereinabove, learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Himatnagar by order dated 31-3-2005 accepted the report filed under Sec. 169 of the Code by the Investigating Officer and ordered discharge of the petitioner herein. Subsequent thereto, by order dated 19-6-2007, learned Special Judge passed the order under Sec. 319 of the Code. It is relevant to make a reference to Sec. 319 of the Code which is reproduced for ready perusal as under : "319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence :- (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the enquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-sec. (1), then- (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced." 6.3. In view of the aforesaid provisions, the order cannot be passed only because one of the accused seeks permission to implead other person. Sufficient and cogent reasons are to be assigned by the Court. The power of summoning of additional accused under Sec. 319 of the Code is to be sparingly used. In the instant case, learned Special Judge has ordered to implead the present petitioner as accused No. 2 who has been discharged by his predecessor after careful consideration of the report under Sec. 169 of the Code and that too at belated stage after the evidence was closed by the prosecution. Invoking of power of addition of a person as co-accused at belated stage after the evidence was closed by the prosecution at the cost of de novo trial is not proper. This view has been endorsed by the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case reported in Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2000 SC 1127 . Moreover, to issue summons to discharged accused is also not permissible especially when the order of discharge is not challenged by either of the parties and when the said order has attained the finality, this Court is of the considered opinion that learned Special Judge has failed to consider very material and important aspect of the matter discussed hereinabove and has committed an error in passing the order dated 19-6-2007 below Exh. 84 in Special Case No. 1 of 2001, and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6.4. 84 in Special Case No. 1 of 2001, and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6.4. While making the submissions, learned Advocate for the petitioner invited attention of the Court to the decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Dilawar Singh (supra) wherein in Paragraph 8, it is observed as under : "....A Special Judge while trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, cannot summons another person and. proceed against him in the purported exercise of power under Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. if no sanction has been granted by the appropriate authority for prosecution of such a person as the existence of a sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence qua that person....." 6.5. Reliance is also placed on the decision in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (supra) wherein in Paragraph 19, it is observed as under : "19. Since, the validity of "sanction" depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since, the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution." (5) This Court has gone through the decisions referred to hereinabove and on perusal of the said decisions, it appears that the same are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In light of the principle enumerated in the aforesaid two decisions as well as in the facts of the present case, it appears that on the charge-sheet papers, the competent authority refused to accord sanction, and therefore, the petitioner was discharged from the case. However, later on, by passing the impugned order below Exh.84, learned Special Judge has directed the Investigating Officer to get the order of sanction to prosecute the petitioner and in the considered opinion of this Court, the same is not permissible. (6) In the result, this application succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned order dated 19-6-2007 passed by learned Special Judge, Sabarkantha at Himatnagar below Exh.84 in Special Case No. 1 of 2001 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. (NRP) Application allowed.