Judgment :- 1. The writ petition, in W.P.No.3854 of 2006, has been filed praying for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the award of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, dated 26.11.2002, made in I.D.No.697 of 2001, and to direct the second respondent management to reinstate the workman concerned in service, with backwages and continuity of service. 2. The writ petition, in W.P.No.3855 of 2006, has been filed praying for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the award of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, dated 16.8.2002, made in I.D.No.64 of 2001, and to direct the second respondent management to reinstate the petitioner in service, with backwages and continuity of service. 3. It has been stated that the petitioner Association, in W.P.No.3854 of 2006, has been registered, under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, with registration No.1316/MDS. The petitioner Association has filed the present writ petition, in W.P.No.3854 of 2006, on behalf of one B.Neelakandan, who had been engaged, originally, as a Sub-staff, in the Bank of Thanjavur, from 24.7.1986. He was employed in the International Division of the said bank, at Chennai, and in its various branches, continuously. 4. The Bank of Thanjavur was amalgamated, with the Indian Bank, with effect from 20.2.1990. Even thereafter, he had been engaged as a Sub-staff, on daily wages, in the Lattice Bridge Road branch of the Indian Bank, from 15.10.1990. He had worked for more than 240 days, till the date of his non-employment. 5. It has also been stated that B.Neelakantan was denied employment from the month of March, 1997. The petitioner Union had raised a dispute, with regard to his reinstatement and regularisation in service before the concerned conciliation officer. Since, no settlement could be arrived at, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour had submitted a failure report to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. Thereafter, the dispute had been referred for adjudication. The matter was taken up as an industrial dispute, on the file of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, in I.D.No.697 of 2001. 6. Since, no settlement could be arrived at, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour had submitted a failure report to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. Thereafter, the dispute had been referred for adjudication. The matter was taken up as an industrial dispute, on the file of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, in I.D.No.697 of 2001. 6. It has been further stated that the first respondent had passed an award, dated 26.11.2002, rejecting the claims made by the petitioner association on behalf of B.Neelakantan, stating that he had been engaged only as a casual employee in the second respondent bank, on daily wages and that, by itself, would not confer any right on him to make a claim for being absorbed in service, as a permanent Sub-staff. As such, the first respondent had held that the action of the management of the Indian Bank, denying employment to B.Neelakandan, is legal and justified. 7. The first respondent Labour Court had held that the concerned workman had not been engaged by the respondent Bank, as per the norms prescribed for the recruitment of sub-staff and as he had been engaged only as a casual sub-staff, on a day-to-day basis, unauthorisedly, it cannot be said that his service had been terminated, by the second respondent bank, arbitrarily and illegally. 8. In the writ petition, in W.P.No.3855 of 2006, it has been stated that the petitioner had joined the Bank of Thanjavur Ltd., at Srinrangam Branch, on 1.6.1987, as a Sub-staff, on a daily wage of Rs.15/-. The Bank of Thanjavur was amalgamated, with the Indian Bank, with effect from 20.2.1990. Even thereafter, he had been engaged as a Sub staff, on daily wages, in the Srirangam Branch of the Indian Bank, between the years 1992 and 1995. He had worked for more than 240 days, till the date of his non-employment. 9. It has also been stated that the petitioner was denied employment, from 1.1.1997. The petitioner had raised a dispute, with regard to his termination from service, before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Tiruchirapalli. Since, the conciliation proceedings had ended in failure, the matter was taken up as an industrial dispute, on the file of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, in I.D.No.64 of 2001 10. The petitioner had raised a dispute, with regard to his termination from service, before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Tiruchirapalli. Since, the conciliation proceedings had ended in failure, the matter was taken up as an industrial dispute, on the file of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, in I.D.No.64 of 2001 10. The first respondent had passed an award, dated 16.8.2002, rejecting the claims made by the petitioner, stating that he had been engaged only as a casual employee in the second respondent Indian Bank, on daily wages and that, by itself, would not confer any right on him to make a claim, for being absorbed in service, as a permanent sub-staff. As such, the first respondent had held that the action of the management of the Indian Bank, denying employment to the petitioner, is legal and justified. 11. The first respondent Labour Court had held that the concerned workmen had not been engaged, by the respondent Bank, as per the norms prescribed for the recruitment of sub-staff and as they had been engaged only as a casual sub-staff, on a day-to-day basis, unauthorisedly, it cannot be said that they had been terminated by the second respondent Bank, arbitrarily and illegally. The present writ petition had been filed by the petitioner challenging the award of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, dated 16.8.2002, made in I.D.No.64 of 2001. 12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners had submitted that the impugned awards of the first respondent Labour Court are arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When the employment of the petitioners, as Sub-staff, had been admitted by the second respondent Bank, in the counter affidavit filed on its behalf, the decision of the first respondent that they were not entitled to claim reinstatement and regularisation in service is arbitrary and contrary to the well established principles of law. Since, the termination of the workmen concerned was void abinitio, as it was contrary to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the first respondent ought to have directed the second respondent Bank to reinstate the workmen in service, with backwages. The first respondent had wrongly proceeded on the basis that the claim of the workmen was for their absorption and regularisation in service. The first respondent had wrongly proceeded on the basis that the claim of the workmen was for their absorption and regularisation in service. In fact, the claim of the workmen was that their termination from service, by the second respondent Bank, without following the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is arbitrary and illegal. 13. It has also been stated that the finding of the first respondent Labour Court that the workmen were not entitled to be included in the temporary sub-staff panel, as per the Bank's Circular, dated 21.12.1992, is perverse in nature. The first respondent had failed to note that there is no distinction between a permanent employee and a daily paid, casual or temporary employee, as per the definition of `workman', under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Once it is established that the employee concerned is a `workman', his non-employment, without following the procedures prescribed under Section 25-F of the Act, would be arbitrary and illegal. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 14.1. In Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat [2010-III-LLJ-1 (SC)], it had been held as follows: "15. In State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money [1976-I-LLJ-478(SC)], the Court emphasised that the workman cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed in terms of Section 25-F(b). 16. The legal position has been beautifully summed up in Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar [2003-II-LLJ-23 (SC)] in the following words: The underlying object of Section 25-F is twofold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have one month's time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given one month's notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. Secondly, the workman must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation and the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his previous services rendered to the employer but is also a sustenance to the worker for the period which may be spent in searching for another employment. Section 25-F nowhere speaks of the retrenchment compensation being paid or tendered to the worker along with one month's notice; on the contrary, clause (b) expressly provides for the payment of compensation being made at the time of retrenchment and by implication it would be permissible to pay the same before retrenchment. Payment or tender of compensation after the time when the retrenchment has taken effect would vitiate the retrenchment and non-compliance with the mandatory provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy behind it would result in nullifying the retrenchment." 14.2.In Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation ( 2010(3) SCC 192 ), it had been held as follows: "14. A reading of the impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge did not find any jurisdictional error in the award of the Labour Court. He also did not find tht the award was vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record or that there was violation of rules of natural justice. As a matter of fact, the learned Single Judge rejected the argument of the Corporation that termination of the appellant's service falls within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, and expressed unequivocal agreement with the Labour Court that the action taken by the Managing Director of the Corporation was contrary to Section 25-G of the Act which embodies the rule of last come first go. Notwithstanding this, the learned Single Judge substituted the award of reinstatement of the appellant with compensation of RS.87,582 by assuming that the appellant was initially appointed without complying with the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the relevant regulations. While doing so, the learned Single Judge failed to notice that in the reply filed on behalf of the Corporation before the Labour Court, the appellant's claim for reinstatement with backwages was not resisted on the ground that his initial appointment was illegal or unconstitutional and that neither any evidence was produced nor any argument was advanced in that regard. Therefore, the Labour Court did not get any opportunity to consider the issue whether reinstatement should be denied to the appellant by applying the new jurisprudence developed by the superior courts in reent year that the court should not pass an award which may result in perpetuation of illegality. Therefore, the Labour Court did not get any opportunity to consider the issue whether reinstatement should be denied to the appellant by applying the new jurisprudence developed by the superior courts in reent year that the court should not pass an award which may result in perpetuation of illegality. This being the position, the learned Single Judge was not at all justified in entertaining the new plea raised on behalf of the Corporation for the first time during the course of arguments and overturn an otherwise well-reasoned award passed by the Labour Court and deprive the appellant of what may be the only source of his own sustenance and that of his family." 14.3. In The President, Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai and another (1996 II LLJ 216), it had been held as follows: "4. We find it very difficult to accept these contentions. Firstly, the bank, which had appointed the petitioner, had taken his services, and paid wages during the period he worked, cannot now be permitted to say that the appointment was bad in law, therefore it was entitled to terminate the services without following the procedure prescribed under the I.D.Act. The bye-law referred to above, does not require that the appointment to be approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Further the petitioner was not appointed as regular employee. He was appointed only on daily wage basis. The services contemplated under the bye-laws are the regular appointments and not the appointments on daily wage basis, therefore, the contentions based upon the special bye-law and the circular of the Registrar, which cannot be applied to the present case, as it is a pure and simple case of appointment on daily wage basis, cannot be accepted. When once the workman is appointed on daily wage basis and if he works for 240 days in a year, he must be said to be in continuous service as per Section 25B of the Act, as such he is entitled to be made permanent. However, we do not propose to enter into this aspect of the matter and record any finding on this because it is not one of the points raised in the dispute referred to the Labour Court. However, we do not propose to enter into this aspect of the matter and record any finding on this because it is not one of the points raised in the dispute referred to the Labour Court. The dispute referred to the Labour Court was only with regard to the non- employment of the petitioner and the computation of relief in term of money if it is held that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with back wages. For the purpose of this case it is sufficient to point out that the writ petitioner worked for over two years. Thus, he was in continuous service for more than one year as such he was entitled to the benefit of Section 25F of the Act. The expression 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act means the termination by the employer of service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action as long as such termination does not fail within the category of the voluntary retirement of a workmen or retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf. Thus, Section 2(oo) does not make any difference between regular appointment or temporary appointment or appointment on daily wage basis or appointment of a person not possessing requisite qualification. Clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) came to be inserted only with effect from August 18, 1984, therefore the said provision is not applicable to the present case. The present case also does not fall under Clause (c) because the services of the petitioner have not been terminated on the ground of continued ill-health. Clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) came to be inserted only with effect from August 18, 1984, therefore the said provision is not applicable to the present case. The present case also does not fall under Clause (c) because the services of the petitioner have not been terminated on the ground of continued ill-health. Similarly, Section 25F of the Act specifically provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice (b) the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous Service or any part thereof in excess of six months. This is a case in which the petitioner was in continuous service for more than one year under the bank irrespective of the fact whether the appointment made by the bank was valid one or not. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was temporarily appointed by the Board of the Bank on August 1, 1980 as it is specifically stated in the counter filed by the bank before the Labour Court, Madurai which reads thus: "The Board of respondent bank decided on July 25, 1980 to appoint the petitioner temporarily with effect from August 1, 1980 on wages at Rs. 5/- per day and to request the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to exempt the case of appointment of the petitioner from the circular of the Registrar dated September 17, 1977 as the appointment would be against that circular". It is also further stated in paragraph 13 of the center that the petitioner was to be confirmed on the date of termination of the employment, but the bank could not help terminating his employment instead of confirming him. 5. From the impugned order of termination of the petitioner, it is clear that the same has been done pursuant to the direction issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tiruchy in the report made by him in RC. No. 14755/81-B5 (i) dated April 9, 1982. 5. From the impugned order of termination of the petitioner, it is clear that the same has been done pursuant to the direction issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tiruchy in the report made by him in RC. No. 14755/81-B5 (i) dated April 9, 1982. It may be pointed out here that even though the termination was made pursuant to the direction of the Joint Registrar, nevertheless such a termination was required to be made in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 25F of the Act in as much as the said section does not make any difference whether the appointment has beer made in accordance with law or not. The expression used in that section is, 'workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer', therefore the factum of employment is relevant and not the legality or otherwise of it. 14.4. In an unreported judgment, made in W.P.No.16768 of 2000, dated 27.12.2009, this Court had held as follows: "18. The contention raised by the petitioners before the Labour Court was rejected mainly on the ground that their appointment was not as per the service regulations framed by the Corporation and it was nothing but a back door entry. It is true that such back door entry assumes significance when a plea for regularization was made. However, the question of retrenchment stands in a totally different position. The principles which have to be followed in the case of regularization cannot be applied mechanically with respect to a case of retrenchment. The entire award of the learned Judge proceeds on the basis that the request was for regularization and the same cannot be entertained in view of the method adopted by the petitioners for entry into service. Therefore, the learned Judge proceeded on a wrong footing which resulted in non-considering the issue regarding retrenchment. In such circumstances, necessarily the matter requires reconsideration by the learned Judge." 15. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the second respondent Bank, it has been stated that the petitioners had never been appointed by the Bank of Thanjavur. Therefore, the learned Judge proceeded on a wrong footing which resulted in non-considering the issue regarding retrenchment. In such circumstances, necessarily the matter requires reconsideration by the learned Judge." 15. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the second respondent Bank, it has been stated that the petitioners had never been appointed by the Bank of Thanjavur. Only those employees, who had been appointed and who were holding various posts in the Bank of Thanjavur and who were on the rolls, as on the date of its amalgamation, had been absorbed into the services of the second respondent Indian Bank. Since, B.Neelakantan, and R.Ramesh had never been appointed in the Bank of Thanjavur Limited, the question of absorbing them into the services of the respondent bank did not arise. 16. It had also been stated that the second respondent Bank was maintaining a panel of temporary sub-staff, who were engaged in the leave vacancies, when the permanent sub-staff in the branches, under the control of the Zonal office, go on leave. They had been engaged, only as ‘casual employees’, occasionally, on a day-to-day basis, depending upon the availability of work. Both, B.Neelakantan and R.Ramesh, were never in the panel of temporary sub-staff, which was in existence. 17. It had also been stated that, on 30.9.1978, the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs, had issued certain directives to all the Public Sector Banks and financial institutions stating that all vacancies arising, irrespective of the nature and duration of the vacancies, are to be notified and filled up only by calling for names from the employment exchanges. In terms of the Government Guidelines, the respondent Bank, by its circular, dated 4.3.1983, had set out the norms for the engagement of the persons, during the leave vacancies of sub-staff, by putting them in the panel of temporary sub-staff. Only the persons, who had been sponsored through the employment exchanges and conforming to the age, educational and other qualifications, prescribed as per the Government Guidelines, could be selected to be included in the panel of temporary sub-staff, after getting the necessary approval from the zonal manager concerned. The petitioners had never been included in the panel of temporary sub-staff, as they did not fulfill the norms and the procedures prescribed for the selection of candidates to be included in the panel of temporary sub-staff, after the amalgamation had taken place, on 20.2.1990. 18. The petitioners had never been included in the panel of temporary sub-staff, as they did not fulfill the norms and the procedures prescribed for the selection of candidates to be included in the panel of temporary sub-staff, after the amalgamation had taken place, on 20.2.1990. 18. The engagement of both, B.Neelakantan and R.Ramesh, had been done, unauthorisedly, at the branch level, without the knowledge and the permission of the higher authorities. When their unauthorised engagement had been found out, by the zonal office, they were disengaged from the position of casual workers. Their unauthorised engagement was on a day-to-day, casual basis and it was only for a limited number of days, when the permanent sub-staff attached to the branch office were on leave. They had never worked for a period of 240 days, as falsely alleged by them. Therefore, the question of their non- employment, contrary to the procedures prescribed under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would not arise. 19. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 19.1. In Ravichandran N.S. Vs. Management of Thanthai Periyar Periyar Transport Corporation and others (2003(I) LLJ 1015), it had been held as follows: "7. In this case, the workman is clearly a person who had been given casual employment by a branch manager who had no power to appoint him on regular service, but could appoint persons during emergency. There is no order appointing the petitioner to any permanent post, nor is there any record to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days. 8. When an employee claims protection under Section 25-F of the Act by pleading that he had worked for 240 days, the burden is clearly on the workman, and unless he discharged the burden, he cannot expect to have his case for protection under Section 25-F of the Act accepted......." 19.2. In Union of India and others Vs. Ilango (2005-I-LLJ 343), it had been held as follows: "40. When it is the case of the appellant, namely, the Government of Pondicherry that the writ petitioners' initial entry was unauthorised and they were not given the job as against the sanctioned post, which cannot be disputed by the counsel for the respondents, then, this Court cannot give such a direction for regularisation, promotion etc., even under sympathy. 41. When it is the case of the appellant, namely, the Government of Pondicherry that the writ petitioners' initial entry was unauthorised and they were not given the job as against the sanctioned post, which cannot be disputed by the counsel for the respondents, then, this Court cannot give such a direction for regularisation, promotion etc., even under sympathy. 41. Once we hold that the posts are non-existing or not subsisting, the question of termination without notice and without enquiry or the principle 'Last come, First go' would not arise, as they may not be the legal grounds to decide that the termination order is legal or not, especially, when the appointment order, as indicated above, would show that their job is purely temporary and they can be terminated at any time without notice and without assigning any reason." 19.3. In State of U.P. Vs. Neeraj Awasthi and others (2006-I-LLJ 721), it had been held as follows: "75.The fact that all appointments have been made without following the procedure or services of some persons appointed have been regularised in past, in our opinion, cannot be said to be a normal mode which must receive the seal of the court. Past practice is not always the best practice. If illegality has been committed in the past, it is beyond comprehension as to how such illegality can be allowed to perpetrate. The State and the Board were bound to take steps in accordance with law. Even in this behalf Article 14 of the Constitution of India will have no application. Article 14 has a positive concept. No equality can be claimed in illegality is now well- settled. [See State of A.P. v. S.B.P.V. Chalapathi Rao and Others,(1995) 1 SCC 724, para 8, Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh (1999) 3 SCC 494 , para 13 and State of Bihar and Others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another (2000) 9 SCC 94 , para 30]. 76. In the instant case, furthermore, no post was sanctioned. It is now well-settled when a post is not sanctioned, normally, directions for reinstatement should not be issued. Even if some posts were available, it is for the Board or the Market Committee to fill-up the same in terms of the existing rules. They, having regard to the provisions of the regulations, may not fill up all the posts. 77. It is now well-settled when a post is not sanctioned, normally, directions for reinstatement should not be issued. Even if some posts were available, it is for the Board or the Market Committee to fill-up the same in terms of the existing rules. They, having regard to the provisions of the regulations, may not fill up all the posts. 77. .......The officers of the local authorities had a bounden duty not only to act within the four-corners of the statute but having regard to the constitutional scheme in mind. They failed and/ or neglected to do so. As appointments had been made de'hors the rules and without following the procedures known in law and in flagrant violation of constitutional scheme as laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the appointments although might have been made in exigencies of services, they must be held to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction....... 19.4 In National Fertilizers Ltd and others Vs. Somvir Singh (2006-II-LLJ 1113), it had been held as follows: "13.The Respondents herein were appointed only on applications made by them. Admittedly, no advertisement was issued in a newspaper nor the employment exchange was notified as regard existence of vacancies. It is now trite law that a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is bound to comply with the constitutional requirements as adumbrated in Articles 14 and 16 thereof. When Recruitment Rules are made, the employer would be bound to comply with the same. Any appointment in violation of such Rules would render them as nullities. It is also well-settled that no recruitment should be permitted to be made through backdoor. 25. It is true that the respondents had been working for a long time. IT may also be true that they had not been paid wages on a regular scale of pay. But, they did not hold any post. They were, therefore, not entitled to be paid salary on a regular scale of pay. Furthermore, only because the respondents have worked for sometime , the same by itself would not be a ground for directing regularization of their services in view of the decision of this Court in UmaDevi [2006-II-LLJ 722 (SC)]" 19.5. In Reserve Bank of India Vs. Gopinath Sharma and another ( 2006(6) SCC 221 ), it had been held as follows: "17. In Reserve Bank of India Vs. Gopinath Sharma and another ( 2006(6) SCC 221 ), it had been held as follows: "17. In our opinion, the High Court has committed a patent error in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent herein who is a daily wage worker when it was not established that he was working on regular basis. The High Court, in our opinion, is not justified in directing that respondent No.1 must be reinstated and appointed to similar post. The High Court has also clearly erred in examining the legality of the policy and giving relief solely on the ground that it found the policy and actions of the appellant contrary to Arts. 14 & 16 of the constitution. It is pertinent to notice that the High court has taken into consideration an entirely new aspect which was neither pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition before the High Court nor was claimed in the claim statement filed before the Tribunal without giving an opportunity to the parties to effectively reply to the same. Likewise, the High Court also failed to consider that the system of engagement of 'Ticca Mazdoors' has since been abolished in November, 1993, while this fact was brought on record of High Court in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank.... 22. In our view, respondent 1 was not appointed to any regular post but was only engaged on the basis of the need of the work on day-to-day basis and he has no right to the post and that his disengagement cannot be treated as arbitrary. The High Court, in our view, has totally misdirected itself in holding that non-consideration of the name of respondent 1 on acquiring higher qualification is not misconduct, hence, dismissal of the workman on this ground is wrongful within the meaning of Item 3, Schedule II to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, without giving any reason as to how non-inclusion of name for day-to-day appointment amounts to wrongful dismissal. The High Court completely erred in replying on section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, while not holding that the workman has been retrenched within the meaning of Section 25-F and thus misdirected itself about the applicability of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act even if it does not involve retrenchment." 19.6. In Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. In Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umadevi (3) and others (2006 (4) SCC 1), it had been held as follows: "Persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages have been approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the posts concerned. The Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual be regularised or made permanent, the Courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for sometime and in some cases for a considerable length of time. Such an argument fails when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in article 14 of the Constitution. merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain- not at arm's length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to check out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain- not at arm's length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to check out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that that the parties are not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to the employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After, all innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not, therefore, ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of the Court, under 'litigious employment' he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of the Court, under 'litigious employment' he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. The power of a State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Public employment in a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic has to be as set down by the constitution and the laws made thereunder. Our constitutional scheme envisages employment by the government and its instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that behalf. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark, and the constitution has provided also for affirmative action to ensure that unequals are not treated as equals. Thus, any public employment has to be in terms of the constitutional scheme. Adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public employment. Adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Inspite of the constitutional scheme governing public employment there may be occasions when the sovereign state or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, impose which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the union or of the State Government cannot but be recognised and there is nothing in the constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. However, consistent with the scheme for public employment the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. Therefore, if it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment." 19.7. In Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Workman, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited ( 2007(1) LLJ 580 ), it had been held as follows: "13. It may be mentioned that a daily rated or casual worker is only a temporary employee, and it is well settled that a temporary employee has no right to the post vide State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla 1991(1) SCC 691 . The term 'temporary employee' is a general category which has under it several sub-categories e.g. casual employee, daily rated employee, ad hoc employee, etc. 14. The distinction between a temporary employee and a permanent employee is well settled. Whereas a permanent employee has a right to the post, a temporary employee has no right to the post. The term 'temporary employee' is a general category which has under it several sub-categories e.g. casual employee, daily rated employee, ad hoc employee, etc. 14. The distinction between a temporary employee and a permanent employee is well settled. Whereas a permanent employee has a right to the post, a temporary employee has no right to the post. It is only a permanent employee who has a right to continue in service till the age of superannuation (unless he is dismissed or removed after an inquiry, or his service is terminated due to some other valid reason earlier). As regards a temporary employee, there is no age of superannuation because he has no right to the post at all. Hence, it follows that no direction can be passed in the case of any temporary employee that he should be continued till the age of superannuation.... ......... 17. Admittedly, the employees in question in Court had not been appointed by following the regular procedure, and instead they had been appointed only due to the pressure and agitation of the union and on compassionate ground. There were not even vacancies on which they could be appointed. As held in A. Umarani vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies & Ors. 2004(7) SCC 112 , such employees cannot be regularized as regularization is not a mode of recruitment. In Umarani's case the Supreme Court observed that the compassionate appointment of a woman whose husband deserted her would be illegal in view of the absence of any scheme providing for such appointment of deserted women." 19.8. In MD.Ashif and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2010) (5) Scale 217), it had been held as follows: "8. The law regarding regularization of employees was on a comprehensive review authoritatively declared by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 . This Court in that case drew a distinction between an irregularity and an illegality in the making of an appointment and declared that where the due process of appointment has been deviated from, the Court can regularize the same. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 . This Court in that case drew a distinction between an irregularity and an illegality in the making of an appointment and declared that where the due process of appointment has been deviated from, the Court can regularize the same. In cases where the process itself is completely violative of the constitutional scheme underlying public employment and no procedure has been followed while granting such appointments the Court cannot allow such an illegality to continue irrespective of the length of time for which it has continued. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Ashwani Kumar's case (supra) this Court in Uma Devi's case (supra) observed: Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates." 19.9. In Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana ( 2010(2) SCC 543 ), it had been held as follows: "17. We are conscious of the fact that an appointment on public post cannot be made in contravention of recruitment rules and constitutional scheme of employment. However, in view of the materials placed before the Labour Court and in this Court, we are satisfied that the said principle would not apply in the case on hand. As rightly pointed out, the appellant has not prayed for regularization but only for reinstatement with continuity of service for which he is legally entitled. 18. It is to be noted in the case of termination of casual employee what is required to be seen is whether a workman has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months or not. As rightly pointed out, the appellant has not prayed for regularization but only for reinstatement with continuity of service for which he is legally entitled. 18. It is to be noted in the case of termination of casual employee what is required to be seen is whether a workman has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months or not. If sufficient materials are shown that workman has completed 240 days then his service cannot be terminated without giving notice or compensation in lieu of it in terms of Section 25-F. The High Court failed to appreciate that in the present case the appellant has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months and no notice or compensation in lieu of it was given to him, in such circumstances his termination was illegal. All the decisions relied on by the High Court are not applicable to the case on hand more particularly, in view of the specific factual finding by the Labour Court." 20. In view of the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions and in view of the contentions raised on behalf of the parties concerned and on considering the decisions cited supra, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners have not shown sufficient cause or reason to grant the reliefs, as prayed for by them, in the present writ petitions. 21. There was nothing on record before the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-labour Court to establish the claims made on behalf of B.Neelakantan and R.Ramesh that they had been engaged as sub-staff in the concerned branches of the Bank of Thanjavur, which had been, subsequently, amalgamated with the second respondent Indian Bank. There was no evidence to establish the fact that they had been in continuous service for a period of more than 240 days in a year, to claim the status as ‘workmen’, under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 22. The first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court had found that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would not be applicable to the present case. The first respondent Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court had found that both, B.Neelakantan and R.Ramesh, had not been engaged, as per the norms prescribed for the recruitment of sub-staff in the second respondent bank. Their engagement had been only as casual sub-staff, intermittently, on a day-to-day basis. The first respondent Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court had found that both, B.Neelakantan and R.Ramesh, had not been engaged, as per the norms prescribed for the recruitment of sub-staff in the second respondent bank. Their engagement had been only as casual sub-staff, intermittently, on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, the question of termination of their services, by the management of the second respondent bank, does not arise. It is also noted that no witness had been examined and no document had been marked as an exhibit in favour of the claimants. No order of appointment had been filed to show that the claimants had been appointed as sub-staff, either under the bank of Thanjavur, or under the second respondent Indian Bank. No evidence had been let in to substantiate their claims that they had been engaged in the service of the second respondent bank, for more than 240 days in a year, as claimed by them. 23. It is for the claimants to have shown, by sufficient evidence, that they had been engaged by the bank concerned, as casual employees, on a continuous basis, to be considered for regularisation of their services. The claimants had not been in a position to show that they had been selected to be included in the panel of temporary sub-staff, who had been engaged in the leave vacancies in the branches of the second respondent bank. Since, the claimants had not been engaged in the Bank of Thanjavur, during the period 1.1.1982 and 31.12.1989, they could not be absorbed, as per the settlement, dated 6.7.1992, concluded under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The one time measure of absorbing the candidates, as per the norms prescribed by the Government of India, is not applicable to the claimants in the present writ petitions, as they were not qualified to be covered under the clauses of the said settlement. 24. It is for the claimants to have shown, by sufficient evidence, before the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court that they had been qualified to be engaged as sub-staff, under the second respondent bank, as per the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 24. It is for the claimants to have shown, by sufficient evidence, before the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court that they had been qualified to be engaged as sub-staff, under the second respondent bank, as per the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Since, they had failed to do so, the first respondent had passed the award, dated 16.8.2002, in I.D.No.64 of 2001, and the award, dated 26.11.2002, in I.D.No.697 of 2001, rejecting the claims made by the petitioners and holding that they were not entitled to the reliefs sought for by them. In such circumstances, this Court does not find sufficient cause or reason to interfere with the award of the first respondent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, dated 16.8.2002, in I.D.No.64 of 2001, and its award, dated 26.11.2002, in I.D.No.697 of 2001. Hence, the writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs.