Manzar Khan @ Md. Manzar Khan @ Guddu v. State of Bihar
2011-12-21
MANDHATA SINGH
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL JUDGMENT Per Mandhata Singh, J.-F.I.R. was lodged basing fardbeyan of the victim of this case revealing the fact that after her marriage, her husband, appellant Manzar Khan alias Md. Manzar Khan alias Guddu, her father-in-law Md. Quamru Khan, mother-in-law Hamida Khatoon and sister-in-law Guddi Khatoon, were harassing the informant mentally and physically and were asking her to bring rupees twenty five thousand from her parents, otherwise, she would be killed. In that continuation, it is alleged that in the fateful night, the informant’s husband, the present appellant, her father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law poured kerosene oil on her and lit a matchstick resulting into her burning. At that time she was admitted to P.M.C.H. for her treatment. After conclusion of the trial, the case ended in conviction and sentence of the appellant only. 2. Now, accepting the conviction, only sentence part of the appeal is being pressed to minimize the same to the period undergone by the appellant. It is made clear that the appellant is sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, ten years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000/- for offence under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, five year’s rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 15,000/- for offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and six months’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. Specific submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that if the Bihar Amendment to Dowry Prohibition Act is taken into consideration, no sentence for five years can be awarded for the offence under Section 3 thereof and once appellant is sentenced for causing cruelty or physical and mental harassment for demand of dowry, sentence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act may not be justified. 4. For all the offences the submission is that the circumstance appearing in the case was justifying for a liberal view as after the incident of setting the victim on fire, she was taken to P.M.C.H. by the appellant and his other family members which has appeared in examination-in-chief of PW 7, the victim's mother, though the victim is stating about her bringing by her fufa Kaisar.
According to learned counsel, if that is disputed then also after the discharge from hospital the victim came to her matrimonial home. It has appeared in paragraph 2 of the statement of the victim herself that after her discharge from hospital she came to her sasural, though later on some dispute cropped up and she came to her maike but only four months ago to her examination in Court. Her statement was recorded by the trial Court on 4.5.2006. The appellant surrendered in the trial Court for the first time on 22.4.2004, allowed bail on 26.5.2004, taken into custody on 25.8.2009 and since then he is in custody till today. 5. In view of the above discussion, I find much substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant by his learned counsel that the appellant is entitled to a lenient view. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part on the point of sentence only. On the point of sentence it is observed that the period undergone by the appellant is sufficient towards his sentence as all the sentences were to run concurrently. Judgment of conviction is confirmed. 7. The appellant is in custody. He shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. Appeal allowed.