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2011 DIGILAW 2530 (RAJ)

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amrutbhai Rambhai Prajapati

2011-11-22

K.S.JHAVERI

body2011
Hon'ble JHAVERI, J.—First Appeal No. 787 of 1997 is filed by the Insurance Company being aggrieved by the award dated 08.10.1996 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary), Ahmedabad (Rural) Mirzapur in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 687 of 1983 whereby the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 33700/- as compensation to the original claimant. 1.1 First Appeal No. 5175 of 1997 is filed by the original Claimant being aggrieved by the award dated 08.10.1996 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary), Ahmedabad (Rural) Mirzapur in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 687 of 1983 so far as the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 33700/- as compensation to the original claimant. The original claimant has prayed for compensation to the tune of Rs. 1 lakh. 2. It is the case of the original claimant that on 09.03.1982, the original opponent no. 2 had parked his matador van bearing registration no. GRT 5587 in 'Sutharvada'. The original opponent no. 1 had asked the original claimant and other boys to push the vehicle so as to start it. As the boys pushed the vehicle in a reverse direction, the matador all of a sudden started and ultimately dashed with the original claimant. He was admitted in a hospital as he received various injuries which resulted in the form of permanent disability. The original claimant had filed claim application for Rs. 1 lakh which was eventually increased to Rs. 2 lakhs. The Tribunal after hearing the parties awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 33700/-. Being aggrieved by the same, the insurance company as well as the original claimant have preferred the aforesaid appeals. 3. Mr. Sunil Parikh, learned advocate appearing for Mr. Rajni Mehta for the Insurance Company submitted that the Tribunal gravely erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant Insurance Company would be liable to satisfy the award inspite of the fact that there was ample evidence on record to show that the vehicle had been transferred on the date of accident. He submitted that the Tribunal gravely erred in coming to the conclusion that the Insurance Company had not proved transfer of the vehicle. 4. On the other hand, Ms. Vasavdatta Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the original claimant contended that the Tribunal has erred in appreciating that the original claimant had suffered serious economic loss as due to the accident he had to leave his studies. 4. On the other hand, Ms. Vasavdatta Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the original claimant contended that the Tribunal has erred in appreciating that the original claimant had suffered serious economic loss as due to the accident he had to leave his studies. She submitted that the Tribunal ought to have awarded more on account of pain, shock and suffering and under the head of loss of study. 5. I have heard learned advocates for the parties. It is the case of the insurance company that the original opponent no. 2 had sold the offending vehicle to the original opponent no. 1 and therefore the policy lapsed on sale of the vehicle. The Tribunal after appreciating the evidence on record has come to the conclusion that the opponent no. 2 had put up a false and frivolous defence. It is required to be noted that the original opponent no. 1 did not step into the witness box nor did he mention about the aforesaid purchase of the vehcile on 20.04.1981. Even the original opponent no. 2 did not mention any such transaction in the written statement by him. 6. Even otherwise the issue is squarely covered by a decision of the Apex Court in the case of G. Govindan vs New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. Reported in AIR 1999 SC 1398 wherein the Apex Court has confirmed the view taken by a full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on an identical issue and held as under: "9. In Madineni Kondaiah and Ors. etc. vs. Yaseen Fatima and Ors. etc. AIR (1986) A.P. 62 a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had occasion to consider an identical question. The leading judgment was by Raghuvir. J. Kodandaramayya, J., in his separate concurring judgment, had also analysed the relevant provisions of the Act, compared the provisions of the Act with the provisions in English Act and after noticing the judgments of the Courts in India and England, held as follows: It is incorrect to assume that the moment the title of the vehicle passes to the transferee the statutory obligation under Section 94 ceases and the original owner is no longer guilty of causing or allowing the purchaser to use the vehicle. The question is when does the statutory liability cease? The question is when does the statutory liability cease? The mere passing of title in the vehicle to the transferee will not put an end to this liability. For this purpose we must examine two more provisions of the Act. Under Section 31 the transferor shall within 14 days of the transfer report the fact of transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee and within forty five days of the transfer forward to the registering authority no objection certificate obtained by him under Section 29-A. Section 29-A contemplates issuing of no objection certificate both on the occasion of assignment of a new registration mark and also while transferring the motor vehicle. The registering authority is enjoined to issue a certificate within a period of thirty days and if no orders are passed the registering authority shall be deemed to have granted the no objection certificate. The failure to comply with Section 31 is made punishable under Section 112. However, as an alternative measure it also provided under Section 31(1-A) that if the transferor or transferee fails to comply with the requirements of Section 31 they have to pay a fine of No. 100 or the prescribed amount considering the period of delay on their part by way of penalty. It is pertinent to note that Section 31 was amended by Act 100 of 1956. Under Section 31 as it stood prior to this amendment in 1956 only the transferee was required to report the transfer of the ownership and was expected to forward a certificate of registration to the registering authority within thirty days of the transfer prior to this amendment their was no statutory obligation on the transferor as is now provided in Sub-clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 to notify the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is effected. Thus we see till the transferor fulfils the statutory obligation under Section 31 his liability continues. Further he is the ostensible owner of the vehicle so long the registration is not changed. The liability to pay tax continues irrespective of his rights against the transferee for reimbursement. Thus we see till the transferor fulfils the statutory obligation under Section 31 his liability continues. Further he is the ostensible owner of the vehicle so long the registration is not changed. The liability to pay tax continues irrespective of his rights against the transferee for reimbursement. In fact it was ruled in Northern India General Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Kanwarjit Singh that a registered owner would have sufficient interest to effect insurance because he is the ostensible owner. The question raised in that case was whether the registration in favour of benamidar is valid when the registered owner of the vehicle is only benamider when the real owner never obtained the insurance. It was held that the registered owner has sufficient interest to effect insurance because he is the ostensible owner and there is nothing in Section 94 which could be interpreted to mean that it is only the real owner who could effect the insurance. Any person who uses the vehicle or allows any other person to use the vehicle could also get the insurance effected. Thus, it is seen the public liability to notify the transfer and secures no objection certificate under Section 31 read with Section 94. would make the original owner retain the insurable interest. The insurable interest in this case is not the proprietary interest but the public liability, not to run the vehicle or cause or allow any person to run the vehicle without insurance and also to notify the transfer of such vehicle to the registering authority. So long such obligation continues notwithstanding the cession of proprietary interest the insurable interest which is the foundation for the continuance of the operation of the policy stands. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Thus, we are clearly fortified in our view that the insurable interest in the property is not necessary in the case of public liability insurance. The test is whether the liability under the statute ceased or not notwithstanding the passing of title and hence we respectfully dissent with the view expressed by various High Courts that on the sale of the vehicle the insurable interest ceases and the policy lapses. We agree that any claim of the transferee in respect of his property and his person cannot be enforced against the insurance company. He being a stranger he cannot have any claim against the insurance company. We agree that any claim of the transferee in respect of his property and his person cannot be enforced against the insurance company. He being a stranger he cannot have any claim against the insurance company. But the third partly risk is concerned so long the obligations under the statute are not fulfilled, as contemplated under Section. 31 read with Section 94, he continues to have the insurable interest till such obligations are fulfilled. Any prudent purchaser should take steps to get the policy transferred to him under Section 103. The insurer is bound to accept the transfer and can only refuse to consent on specified grounds. It is clearly an impracticable view to take that on passing of property in the vehicle, the policy lapses and the obligation under Section 94 of the Act ceases. In fact as observed by Supreme Court the policy is to the vehicle and hence normally it should run with the vehicle. It is just to expect a reasonable time for the transferor to make the necessary arrangement to notify the transfer under Section 31 and secure the certificate under Section 29-A within the time mentioned in those provisions. If this is not allowed, the moment the vendor receives the money and puts the vehicle in possession of the transferee, the latter is not in a position to uses the vehicle in view of Section 94 till a fresh policy is obtained. He cannot take the vehicle to his house passing through any public place. When the transferor is liable to pay penalty under Section 31 and also liable to be prosecuted under Section 112 for not notifying the transfer, we are clearly of the opinion such statutory liability makes him to retain the insurable interest as the liability subsists till he discharges the statutory obligation. We disagree with the view expressed in (1972) I APLJ 249. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... The registration of the vehicle in the name of the transferee is not necessary to pass title in the vehicle. Payment of price and delivery of the vehicle makes the transaction complete and the title will pass to the purchaser. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... The registration of the vehicle in the name of the transferee is not necessary to pass title in the vehicle. Payment of price and delivery of the vehicle makes the transaction complete and the title will pass to the purchaser. When the policy of insurance obtained by the original owner of the vehicle is composite one covering the risks for his person, property (vehicle) and the third party claim, on passing of title the transferee cannot enforce his claim in respect of any loss or damage to his person and vehicle unless there is a novation. So far the third party risk is concerned the proprietary interest in the vehicle is not necessary and the pubic liability continues till the transferor discharges the statutory obligation under Sections 29A and 31 read with Section 94 of the Act. Till he complies with the requirement of Section 31 of the Act, the public liability will not cease and that constitutes the insurable interest to keep the policy alive in respect of the third party risks are concerned. It must be deemed that the transferor allowed the purchaser to use the vehicle in a public place in the said transitional period and accordingly till the compliance of Section 31. the liability of the transferor subsists and the policy is in operation so far it relates to the third party risks. We answer the second question accordingly. 17. As between the two conflicting views of the full bench judgments noticed above, we prefer to approve the ratio laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kondaiah's case as it advances the object of the Legislature to protect (he third party interest. We hasten to add that the third party here will not include a transferee whose transferor has not followed procedure for transfer of policy. In other words in accord with the well-settled rule of interpretation of statutes we are inclined to hold that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kondaiah's case is preferable to the contrary views taken by the Karnataka and Delhi High Courts (supra) even assuming that two views are possible on the interpretation of relevant sections as it promotes the object of the Legislature in protecting the third party (victim) interest. The ratio laid down in the judgment of Karnataka & Delhi High Courts (supra) differing from Andhra Pradesh High Court is not the correct one. 7. The Tribunal has after adducing evidence on record, awarded Rs. 14400/- towards future economic loss and Rs. 15000/- towards pain, shock and suffering. The permanent disability of the whole body of the original claimant was assessed at 7.5% the Tribunal came to the figure of Rs. 960/- per annum qua future economic loss. The compensation awarded to the original claimant seems to be just and proper and no interference is called for. 8. In the premises aforesaid, both the appeals are devoid of any merits and are dismissed accordingly. No costs.