Judgment In both the writ petitions, the parties are common, and the subject-matter is interrelated. Hence, they are disposed of through a common order. An extent of Ac.19.19 guntas of land owned by the petitioners in Sy.No.41/2/1 of Kanchanbagh Revenue Village, Bandlaguda Mandal, Hyderabad District was requisitioned by the Union of India, Ministry of Defence, the 1st respondent herein, in the year 1978, in exercise of power under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952 (for short ‘the RAIP Act’). Lands belongs to certain others were also acquired. Uncertainty prevailed, as to whether the respondents ought to have invoked the provisions of the RAIP Act, or those, of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.5200 of 1992 and batch, and resultant Writ Appeals, the respondents ultimately have chosen to invoke the provisions of the RAIP Act. A notification under Section 7(1) of the RAIP Act was issued on 11-07-2009. W.P.No.22780 of 2009 was filed by the petitioners, challenging the said notification. This Court refused to interfere with the notification, but disposed of the writ petition, directing that the proceedings initiated through the notification be concluded within a period of six months. Though with some delay, the District Collector, who is conferred with the power under the RAIP Act, passed an order dated 11-07-2009, awarding the compensation. The petitioners filed W.P.No.22776 of 2009. The writ petition was disposed of, directing the 1st respondent to pass orders on the representation dated 24-07-2009, made by the petitioners for appointment of an Arbitrator, within a period of three months. W.P.No.4060 of 2011 is filed for a declaration that the inaction on the part of the 1st respondent to appoint Arbitrator, as directed by this Court, and not arranging for determination of just and proper compensation, is illegal and arbitrary. The Government of Andhra Pradesh is conferred with the power to appoint Arbitrator. It has issued G.O.Ms.No.597, dated 24-06-2010, appointing the IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Trial Court’), as arbitrator. W.P.No.22128 of 2010 is filed challenging the G.O., on several grounds. It is urged that a regular Court cannot be appointed as Arbitrator and that the trial Court is not designated for any exclusive purpose, that too, as Arbitrator, under Section 8 of the Act. Other grounds are also urged. W.P.No.22128 of 2010 is filed challenging the G.O., on several grounds. It is urged that a regular Court cannot be appointed as Arbitrator and that the trial Court is not designated for any exclusive purpose, that too, as Arbitrator, under Section 8 of the Act. Other grounds are also urged. Heard Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud, learned Assistant Solicitor General for respondents 1 and 4, and learned Government Pleaders for Revenue and Land Acquisition, for respondents 2, 3 and 5. For all practical purposes, W.P.No.4060 of 2011 has become infructuous, once the 2nd respondent has issued G.O.Ms.No.597, dated 24-06-2010, appointing an Arbitrator. The only question that remains for consideration is, as to whether the appointment of the Trial Court, as Arbitrator, can be sustained in law. Section 8(1) of the provides for appointment of Arbitrator to decide the claims of the owner of the land, which is requisitioned under the RAIP Act, if he is not satisfied with the compensation awarded under Section 7(1) of that Act. It is similar to the mechanism of reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The word “Arbitrator” connotes that it is something different from a regular Court. It may be incidental that sometimes the Presiding Officer of a particular Court is chosen as an Arbitrator, by agreement of parties. The Government or statutory authority cannot treat a Trial Court as an institutionalized arbitrator. The occasion to approach the Trial Court in matters of this nature arises, when the award is challenged by any of the parties to it. Appointing a Trial Court, as Arbitrator is, in a way, an antithesis to the very institution of Arbitration. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the Trial Court, which is appointed as Arbitrator, is refusing to entertain the reference on the ground that it is not conferred with the jurisdiction under any statute, nor reference was made to it, with its consent. Learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, who appeared for the 2nd respondent, submits that the steps are initiated for seeking approval from the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court, for appointment of the Trial Court as Arbitrator. Even if any permission or approval is accorded, no arbitrator can be appointed, except with the consent of the parties, unless the agreement provides otherwise. Even if any permission or approval is accorded, no arbitrator can be appointed, except with the consent of the parties, unless the agreement provides otherwise. The petitioners did not give their consent for appointment of a Court as Arbitrator, nor there exist any agreement, that provides for it. The inescapable conclusion is that an Arbitrator has to be appointed with the consent of both the parties. The matter has been pending for the past several decades. In the ordinary course of the things, the G.O.Ms.No.597, dated 24-06-2010 has to be set aside, and it should be left to the parties to choose an Arbitrator. Both the parties expressed the view that an Arbitrator may be appointed by this Court. For the foregoing reasons, W.P.No.4060 of 2011 is dismissed as infructuous. W.P.No.22128 of 2010 is allowed, and G.O.Ms.No.597, dated 24-06-2010 is set aside. Sri Justice Vaman Rao, a Retired Judge of this Court, is appointed as the Arbitrator to decide the claim made by the petitioners, under Section 8(1) of the RAIP Act, against the respondents 1 and 4. It is left to the learned Arbitrator and the parties herein to fix the fee. The learned Arbitrator shall endeavour to dispose of the matter, as early as possible, and preferably, within six months from the date of first appearance of the parties, before him. There shall be no order as to costs.