Judgment :- 1. Since common and identical prayers have been sought in these writ petitions, they have been heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. In these writ petitions, the petitioners have sought a declaration that the Notification issued under Section 17(1) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter, referred to as the “BDA Act”) dated 15/12/1984 and the Notification issued under Section 19 of the said Act, dated 28/11/1986, stand vitiated due to the inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceedings, in so far as the petitioners’ lands are concerned. The petitioners have also sought a declaration to the effect that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed on account of the abandonment of the scheme in respect of the petitioners lands. 3. The petitioner in W.P.No.32652/2010 claims to be the owner of the land bearing House List Khata No.79/1 (Old) and New Khata No.80/1 carved out of Sy.No.53/3A, measuring 6300 sq. ft. situated at Bommanahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. 4. The petitioner in W.P. No.26849/2010 claims to be the owner and original khatedar of the land bearing Sy.No.52/3A. measuring 2 Acres 11 Guntas situated at Bommanahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. 5. The petitioners in W.P.No.26850/2010 claims to be the co-owners of industrially converted land bearing Sy.No.52/3A, measuring 11,560 sq. ft. situated at Bommanahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. 5. The petitioners in W.P.No.30279/2010 claim to be the owners of land bearing Sy.No.52/4, measuring East to West 256 ft. 3 inches, North to South on the Eastern side 295 ft, 7 inches, on the Western side 292 ft. 5 inches, totally measuring 72,963 sq. feet, situated at Bommanahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. 6. The petitioners in W.P.No.3695-96/2009 claim to be the legal heirs of one Smt.Papakka, w/o.Marappa, who was the original khatedar of the land bearing Sy.No.44/4A, measuring 23 Guntas situated at Bommanahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that their lands were the subject matter of acquisition under the provisions of the Act along with other lands for the purpose of formation of layout called “Between Hosur Road and Sarjapura Road” and more popularly called as “Hosur Road”. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that their lands were the subject matter of acquisition under the provisions of the Act along with other lands for the purpose of formation of layout called “Between Hosur Road and Sarjapura Road” and more popularly called as “Hosur Road”. The notifications which have been issued have not been challenged by them but however, the awards have not been passed till the date of filling of the writ petitions in their cases and under the circumstances, they have sought a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed in so far as their lands are concerned. Elaborated their contentions they state that on 15/12/1984 Notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act was issued and the same was gazetted on 17/1/1985. Subsequently, declaration was made by virtue of Notification issued under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act on 28/11/1986, which was gazetted on 25.12.1986, that in respect of the lands acquired, awards have been passed in the year 1986-87. But in so far as the petitioner’s lands are concerned, no awards have been passed. Consequently, possession of the lands also vest with the petitioners and the respondent-authorities have not taken possession from the petitioners. 8. It is their case that in terms of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafer, referred to as the “Act”), if an award is not passed within two years from the date of publication of the final notification under Section 11-A of the Act, acquisition would lapse under the said Act. It is the case of the petitioners that despite Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act not being applicable to the Bangalore Development Authority Act, the inordinate delay in not passing the award for over 21/2 decades would imply that the respondent-authorities have no intention of making use of the petitioners lands for the purpose of the layout and under the circumstances, they have sought the aforesaid reliefs.9. In response, the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter, referred to as ‘BDA’) has filed statement of objections in W.P.Nos.32652/10, 31850/10 and 3695-3696/09. In the statement of objections filed by the BDA it is contended that the petitioners in W.P.Nos.32652/10 and 26850/10 are the subsequent purchasers who had purchased the property subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification and therefore, they have no locus standi to file these writ petitions. In the statement of objections filed by the BDA it is contended that the petitioners in W.P.Nos.32652/10 and 26850/10 are the subsequent purchasers who had purchased the property subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification and therefore, they have no locus standi to file these writ petitions. It is also contended that the writ petitions are belated and therefore hit by the principles of delay and laches inasmuch as the petitioners have approached this court after nearly 21/2 decades have lapsed since the issuance of the notifications and at this belated point of time, they cannot challenge the notifications of acquisition by indirectly seeking a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed insofar as their lands are concerned. It is also contended that there is no specific time fixed for passing of the award under the BDA Act. The acquisition has lapsed in terms of Section 36 of the Act. It is also stated that steps have been taken for the passing of the award and therefore, the reliefs claimed by the petitioners cannot be granted in these writ petitions and hence, they have sought dismissal of the same. 10. I have heard he learned counsel for the petitioners and respondent-BDA as well as the Learned Government Pleader who has represented the state. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act was issued as early as on 15.12.1984 followed by the final notification issued under Section 19 of the said Act on 28.11.1986. That for the last 21/2 decades no awards have been passed insofar as the petitioners’ lands are concerned. Although the Apex Court has held in the case of Munithimmaiah V/s. Bangalore Development Authority ( AIR 2002 SC 1574 ) that Section 11A of the Act is not applicable to the provisions of the BDA Act, it is contended that within the reasonable time awards have to be passed, that on account of the long delay in the making of the award it would imply that the acquisition in so as petitioners’ lands are concerned have lapsed. He has referred to certain decisions of the Apex Court in support of his submission. He has referred to certain decisions of the Apex Court in support of his submission. While elaborating the aforesaid contention, he submitted that when no awards have been passed, it would imply possession of petitions’ lands have also not been taken by the BDA till date but in view of the embargo of the acquisition notifications no third party rights have been created also. That in the statement of objections filed by the respondents, there is no explanation whatsoever to explain the delay in passing of the award. In the absence of there being any explanation to that effect, the Apex Court has held in certain decisions that the acquisition itself would lapse and the petitions would have to be granted the relief. In support of his submission he had relied upon the decision of the Apex court in the case of Ramchand V/s. Union of India ( 1994(1) SCC 44 and D.V.Lakshman Rao V/s. State of Karnataka (ILR 2001 Kar.638) contending that in these decisions both the Apex Court and this court have considered the aspect of long delay in passing of the awards and have granted the relief despite the strict provision of Section 11-A not been applicable. Referring to the case of D.V.Lakshman Rao, it is submitted that the said case arose under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act which to an extent is in part material with the provisions of BDA Act and even though Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act does not apply, nevertheless, this court granted relief by following the decision of the Apex Court in Ramchand’s case. He therefore, submitted that he prayers made by the petitioners ought to be granted in these writ petitions. 12. Countering the argument of the petitioners, counsel for the BDA submitted that insofar as W.P.Nos. 32652/10, 31850/10 and 3695-3696/09 are concerned, the petitioners have no locus standi to the writ petitions since they are the subsequent purchasers who have purchased the lands subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notifications and therefore, when the earlier khatedars had not challenged the acquisition, they cannot be in a better position to seek any relief by filing these writ petitions. It is also submitted that insofar as W.P.No.32652/10 is concerned, award has been passed on 12.5.2010 and possession has also been taken and therefore, the petitioner in the said writ petition cannot be granted any relief. It is also submitted that insofar as W.P.No.32652/10 is concerned, award has been passed on 12.5.2010 and possession has also been taken and therefore, the petitioner in the said writ petition cannot be granted any relief. Insofar as the other writ petitions are concerned, it was submitted that the draft awards have been made and it is pending approval from the State Government and therefore, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the acquisition is lapsed on account of the award is not being passed can no longer be sustained. In support of his contention he has relied upon AIR 2000 SC 1574. ILR 2009 Kar. 446, ILR 1998 Kar.1441 and the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Pvt, Ltd. V/s. Bangalore Development Authority & others (Civil Appeal No.711/2011). 13. Relying on the preliminary objections raised by the respondent-BDA that the subsequent purchasers can have no right to file the writ petitions and that there has been a delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this court it is contended that, the writ petitions have to be dismissed in limine. Alternatively, he contended that if at all this court comes to a conclusion that there has been a delay in passing of the award, then in that case, petitioners need not seek a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed insofar as the lands are concerned, there are other compensatory reliefs which could be considered by this court. However he submitted that the writ petitions have to be dismissed. Counsel for respondent-BDA in W.A.Nos.3695-3696/09 has also submitted that the award has been passed on 7-1-2009 and subsequently, possession has been taken on 5-2-2009 and that the writ petition has been filed subsequently and therefore, claimed by the petitioners in the said writ petitions cannot be granted. 14. In reply counsel for the petitioners stated that the Division Bench of this court in the case of Smt.Nagubai and others V/s. State of Karnataka (ILR 2001 Kar.1169) has categorically held, that he subsequent vendees though may not be entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings can seek a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed if the award has not being passed in time. Therefore , it is stated that the petitioners who are subsequent vendees have locus standi to file these writ petitions. Therefore , it is stated that the petitioners who are subsequent vendees have locus standi to file these writ petitions. He has also stated that in the decisions which have been relied upon by the counsel for the BDA though there is a categorical finding by the Apex Court that the provision of Section 11-A was not applicable, the Apex court has not stated that under the BDA Act the acquiring authority can pass the award after any length of time after the issuance of notifications and therefore, he submitted that more than reasonable time has lapsed in the instant case and the awards have not yet been passed and under the circumstances, the petitioners are entitled to relief. 15. At the outset, it is necessary to clear the decks with regard to the locus standi of some of the petitioners to file the writ petition. As far as the petitioners in W.P.Nos.32652/10 and 26850/10 are concerned, it is no doubt true that they are the subsequent purchases inasmuch as they have purchased the lands subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification. However, as far as the petitioners in W.P.No.30279/10 are concerned, it is their case that subsequent to dissolution of the partnership firm Sri. Palaniappa transport Company, the assets of the firm were divided between three partners by a dissolution deed dated 23-7-2011 and under the said division, the petitioners became the owners of their respective portions of the land and hence, it cannot be said that they have acquired title to the property subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification. It is to be noted that when there is a dissolution of a partnership joint interest in the partnership would be divided between the partners and therefore, it is analogous to a partition of joint family property wherein there is no transfer of interest and in the circumstances, it is held that insofar as the petitioners in W.P.No.30279/10 are concerned, they cannot be held to be subsequent purchasers. As far as the petitioners in other two petitions re concerned relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.Nagu Bai and others V/s. State of Karnataka (ILR 2001 Kar. As far as the petitioners in other two petitions re concerned relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.Nagu Bai and others V/s. State of Karnataka (ILR 2001 Kar. 1169) which is under the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 it is held that the subsequent purchasers though are not entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings are however, entitled to get a declaration that acquisition proceedings have lapsed and became void in a case where the award is not made in time, in the said case, it was held that since the award was not made within two years from the date of publication of the notification, the petitioners therein were entitled to raise such a contention in the writ petitions. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the Bangalore Development Authority that these petitioners are not entitled to maintain the writ petitions are rejected. 16. The undisputed facts in these cases, except in the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.26849/10, where the final award has been passed on 12.5.2010 and possession has been taken on 22.7.2010 and thereafter, the writ petitions have been filed are that the awards have not yet been passed and the possession of the lands been not taken from the petitioners. In order to appreciated the contention of the petitions that in the absence of he award being passed within a reasonable time and taking into consideration the peculiar facts of this case where for nearly 21/2 decades, the authorities have not passed awards, the acquisition would lapse, it would be of relevance to refer to the position of law as envisaged under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act i.e., under Section 11-A of the said Act since the petitioners draw sustenance from the said provision though not in terms of the strict time-frame provided therein in order to contend that acquisition of their lands have lapsed. Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows: “[11A. Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows: “[11A. Period within which an award shall be made,- (1) The Collector shall made an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation,- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.]” The said section was inserted by way of an Amendment Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24.9.1984. 17. In the case of Ramchand V/s. Union of India supra, the object of insertion of Section 11-A of the Act has been stated as follows: “14. The Parliament has recognized and taken note of the inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power on the part of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions of the Act to complete the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time and because of that now a time-limit has been fixed for making of the award, failing which the entire proceeding for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it be said that before the introduction of the aforesaid amendment in the Act, the authorities were at liberty to proceed with the acquisition proceedings, irrespective of any schedule or time-frame and to complete the same as and when they desired? It is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. This aspect of the matter can be examined in the light of second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous terms prohibits making of any law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value thereof. This aspect of the matter can be examined in the light of second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous terms prohibits making of any law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The Act is consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A, because it provides for payment of compensation at the market value of the land acquired. But, whether the constitutional and statutory requirement of the payment of the market value to the persons, whose lands have been compulsorily acquired, is not being circumvented and violated by keeping the land acquisition proceedings pending for more than a decade and half, without making the awards and paying the compensation, which has been pegged to the dates of notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, which in the present cases had been issued 14 to 21 years before the making of the 3 wards. If a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/1981 at the market rate, prevailing twenty years before, will that be compliance of the constitutional and statutory mandate? Ignoring the escalation of the market value of the lands, especially near the urban agglomeration or metropolitan cities, will amount to ignoring an earthquake and courts can certainly take judicial notice of the said fact. The interest and the solatium, which have to be paid under the provisions of the Act, re linked with the market value of the land with reference to the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act if a decision had been taken as early as in the year 1966 by issuance of declarations under Section 6, that the lands belonging to the different cultivators, who held those lands within the ceiling limit for cultivation, were needed for public purpose, respondent should have taken steps for completion of the acquisition proceedings and payment of compensation at an early date. 18. Under the BDA Act, the reference to the Land Acquisition Act is found in Section 36 and the same is extracted as follows:“36. 18. Under the BDA Act, the reference to the Land Acquisition Act is found in Section 36 and the same is extracted as follows:“36. Provisions applicable to the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement.- (1) The acquisition of land under this Act otherwise than by agreement within or without the Bangalore Metropolitan Area shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the authority shall be deemed to be the Local Authority concerned. (3) After the land vests in the Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the authority agreeing to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the authority, and the land shall thereupon vest in the authority. 19. While interpreting the said provisions and particularly while considering the contention as to whether any acquisition made under the provisions of the BDA Act would have to comply with the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the Apex Court in the case of Munithimmaiah V/s. State of Karnataka ( AIR 2002 SC 1574 ) has stated in paragraph 15 as follows: “15. So far as the B.D.A. Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilities and ensure a planned growth and development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. So far as the B.D.A. Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilities and ensure a planned growth and development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. In pith and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature under Entry 5 of List II of the VIIth Schedule and not a law for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 traceable to Entry 42 of List of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the field in respect of which is already occupied by the Central Enactment of 1894, as amended from time to time, If at all, the B.D.A. Act, so far as acquisition of land for its developmental activities are concerned, in substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the special purpose of the B.D.A. and the same was not also considered to be part of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894. It could not also be legitimately stared. On a reading of Section 36 of the B.D.A. Act that the Karnataka legislature intended thereby to bind themselves to any future additions or amendments, which might be made by altogether a different legislature, be it the parliament to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The procedure for acquisition under the B.D.A. Act vis-à-vis the Central Act has been analysed elaborately by the Division Bench as noticed supra, and in our view, very rightly too considered to constitute a special and self contained code of its own and the B.D.A. Act and Central Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to each other, or part material legislations. That apart, the B.D.A. Act could not be said to be either wholly unworkable and ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the Central Act are not also imported into consideration. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied wither due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the B.D.A. Act. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied wither due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the B.D.A. Act. When the B.D.A. Act, expressly provides by specifically enacting the circumstances under which and the period of time on the expiry of which alone the proceedings initiated there under shall lapse due to any default, the different circumstances and period of limitation envisaged under the Central Act. 1894, as amended by the amending Act of 1984 for completing the proceedings on pain of letting them lapse forever, cannot be imported into consideration for purposes of B.D.A. Act without doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by the enactment of its own special provisions in a special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State legislature. A scheme formulated, sanctioned and set for implementation under the B.D.A. Act, cannot be stultified or rendered ineffective and unenforceable by a provision in the Central Act. Particularly of the nature of Sections 6 and 11-A which cannot also on its own force have any application to actions taken under the B.D.A. Act. Consequently, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the reasoning of the Division bench of the Karnataka High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd, case (supra) to exclude the applicability of Sections 6 and 11-A as amended and inserted by the Central Amendment Act of 1984 to proceedings under the B.D.A. Act. The submissions to the contra on behalf of the appellant has no merit whatsoever and do not commend for our acceptance.” Therefore, it is clear that Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is not applicable to the provisions of the BDA Act. Further from a reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in Munithimmaiah’s case, it becomes clear that in the said judgment no where has it been stated that while Section 11-A of the Act is not applicable to BDA Act, under the latter Act awards could be passed after any length of time or no time frame is envisaged under the provisions of the BDA Act for passing awards. 20. 20. In this context it would be of relevance to refer to decision of this Court in D.V. Lakshman Rao’s case wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court while considering the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act in the context of Section 11-A of the Act has stated that in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain V/s. State of U.P. (AIR 2005 157) and Pratap V/s. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1996 SC 1296 ), the Apex Court has held that Section 11-A will have no application where the land vests with the Govt. absolutely in pursuance of an acquisition and there is no provision under the Act for divesting the title which has so vested in the Government and therefore, under the provisions of the KIAD Act, it was stated that Section 11-A of the Act has no application that Section 11-A of the Act has no application. But while holding so, it was observed that though Section 11-A of the Act may not be applicable it would not follow that the passing of the award can be unduly delayed. 21. In the said case, reference was made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chand’s case, supra, to hold that if there is any inordinate delay in making the award,. If such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the Court may either quash the acquisition proceedings or grant compensatory relief. In the said case, having regard to the fact that a large area was acquired for airport project, this Court granted additional amount of compensation for the delay in passing the award by granting interest at 6% p.a. two years from the date of final notification being published till the date of making the award and it was also made clear that the additional amount was not to be taken in to consideration for the purpose of Section 28-A of the Act. 22. It is necessary to observe that this court followed the decision in Ram Chand’s case, in order to come to such a conclusion, as the decision in Munithimmaiah, came subsequently. 22. As already stated, in Munithimmaiah’s case, the Apex Court held that Section 11-A of the Act is not applicable to the BDA Act but the said decision has not stated anything about the time when the award has to be passed under the provisions of the Act. 22. As already stated, in Munithimmaiah’s case, the Apex Court held that Section 11-A of the Act is not applicable to the BDA Act but the said decision has not stated anything about the time when the award has to be passed under the provisions of the Act. In this context, the question is as to whether the BDA is entitled to pass an award in respect of the lands acquired at any point of time in the absence of there being any time fixed under the said Act. Therefore, while strict compliance with Section 11-A of the Act is not mandated, nevertheless, it is necessary to hold that awards should be passed within a reasonable time. The question which then arises, is as to what would be the reasonable time for making an award under the provisions of the BDA Act., Having regard to the fact that the main object of BDA Act is for the purpose of the planning of the city of Bangalore and acquisition of the land is only incidental to the planning of the Metropolitan City of Bangalore, strict compliance with Section 11-A of the Act is not mandated under the provisions of the BDA Act. Nevertheless, awards would have to be made within a reasonable period so as to complete the process of acquisition in order to implement a particular scheme within a reasonable time. 23. On the question as to what is reasonable, it would be of relevance to refer to a decision of the Apex Court. In Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., and Another AIR 1989 SC 973 . while adverting to the meaning of the word “reasonable”, the Apex Court said that the word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. 24. while adverting to the meaning of the word “reasonable”, the Apex Court said that the word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. 24. In the context of BDA Act, in order to determine, what is reasonable time within which an award has to be made subsequent to issuance of the acquisition notifications the Act, under Section 27 of the said Act can be adverted to wherein, it is stated that where within a period of five years from the date of publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 9, the Authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme would lapse and the provisions of Section 36 would become inoperative. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the BDA to execute the scheme substantially within a period of five years from the date declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. In view of the said restriction placed on BDA, it can safely be concluded that a period of five years would be reasonable period within which awards have to be passed whenever the acquisition notifications are issued in terms of Section 17, and 19 of the BDA Act and that within a period of five years from the date of issuance of the final declaration, the awards have to be made. 25. On appreciation of the factual position in the instant case, it is very clear that even after two decades, the awards have not been made in these cases,. Therefore, the question that would arise for consideration is as to the nature of the relief that the petitioners are entitled to. 26. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the latest decision of the Apex Court in case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors., disposed of on 18/1/2011, which is a judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as Land Acquisition Act. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the latest decision of the Apex Court in case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors., disposed of on 18/1/2011, which is a judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as Land Acquisition Act. Though a reference was also made to the question as to whether all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act could be read into the provisions of Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, in the said case after making elaborate references to the decisions rendered under the BDA Act, their Lordships said that the primary object of the BDA Act was to provide for establishment of the Development Authority for development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for the matters connected therewith. While adverting to Section 27 of the Act, it is stated that it places an obligation upon the Authority to complete the scheme within a period of five years and if the scheme is not substantially carried out within that period, it shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative. Section 27 is a provision which provides for serious consequences in the event requisite steps are not taken within the specified time by the BDA to substantially implement the scheme. While holding so, it was clarified that the intention of the Legislature is to take recourse to the provisions of the Act to the limited extent and subject to the supremacy of the provisions of the BDA Act (State Act) and it was hence, reiterated that the scheme of the said Act does not admit any necessity for reading the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act as part and parcel of the BDA Act for attaining of the aforesaid object. In the context of Section 36, it was stated that provisions of Section 27 have a direct nexus with the provisions of Section 36 which provide that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, so far as they are applicable to the BDA Act, shall govern the cases of acquisition otherwise than by agreement. In the context of Section 36, it was stated that provisions of Section 27 have a direct nexus with the provisions of Section 36 which provide that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, so far as they are applicable to the BDA Act, shall govern the cases of acquisition otherwise than by agreement. The Apex Court has further held that acquisition stands on a completely distinct footing from the scheme formulated which is the subject matter of execution under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. On a conjunct reading of the provisions of Sections 27 of BDA Act and 36 of the Act. It is held that where a scheme lapses the acquisition may not and that is of course, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where, upon completion of the acquisition proceedings, the land has vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition would not lapse or terminate as a result of lapsing of the scheme under Section 27 of the BDA Act. It was further held as follows:- “Both these Acts do not contain any provision in terms of which, property once and absolutely, vested in the State can be reverted to the owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and possession of the State. However, this may not be true in cases where acquisition proceedings are still pending and land has not been vested in the Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. What is meant by the language of Section 27 of the BDA Act, i.e., “provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative”, is that if the acquisition proceedings are pending and where the scheme has lapsed, further proceedings in terms of Section 36(3) of the BDA Act, i.e, with reference to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act shall become inoperative. Once the land which, upon its acquisition, has vested in the State and thereafter vested in the Authority in terms of Section 36(3) such vesting is incapable of being disturbed except in the case where the Government issues a notification for re-vesting the land in itself, or a Corporation, or a local Authority in cases where the land is not required by the Authority under the provisions of Section 37(3) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. This being the scheme of the acquisition within the framework of the State Act, read with the relevant provisions of the Central Act, it will not be permissible to bring the concept of ‘lapsing of acquisition’ as stated in the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter IV of the Bangalore Development Authority Act.” 27. It was also stated that only in regard to the matters which are not specifically dealt with in the Bangalore Development Authority Act, reference to Land Acquisition Act, in terms of Section 36, has been made, for example determination and payment of compensation. The reason for holding that the concept of lapse of acquisition as envisaged under the Act cannot be read into the provisions of the BDA Act was that, one of the apparent and unavoidable consequences of reading the provisions of Section 11-A of the Central Act into the BDA Act would be that it is bound to adversely affect the ‘development scheme’ under the BDA Act and may even frustrate the same. 28. Hence, while considering the scheme of two Acts, the Apex Court concluded that they can be construed and applied harmoniously to achieve the object of the BDA Act and it is not the requirement of the same that provisions of Section 11A of the Central Act should be read into the BDA Act. Thus, these observations have been made in the context of applicability of Section 11-A to the BDA Act. What becomes clear is that while considering the said contention, the Apex Court has held that the concept of lapse of acquisition cannot be read into Chapter IV of the BDA Act. While saying so, the Apex Court relying upon the earlier decisions namely, Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H.Narayanaiah [ (1976) 4 SCC 9 ]. What becomes clear is that while considering the said contention, the Apex Court has held that the concept of lapse of acquisition cannot be read into Chapter IV of the BDA Act. While saying so, the Apex Court relying upon the earlier decisions namely, Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H.Narayanaiah [ (1976) 4 SCC 9 ]. Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 326 ], Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority [ (2010) 7 SCC 129 ], K.K. Poonacha v. State of Karnataka [ (2010) 9 SCC 671 ], held that the provisions relating to acquisition like passing an award, payment of compensation and the legal remedies available under Central Government would have to be applied to the acquisitions under the BDA Act but the bar contained in Sections 6 and 11A of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be made an integral part of the BDA Act as the BDA Act itself has provided specific time-frames under its various provisions as well as consequences of default thereto. The scheme, thus, does not admit such incorporation. Therefore, since the Apex Court has made a reference to Section 27 of the BDA Act, with regard to the time-frame that has been fixed under the Act for the execution of the scheme in substantial terms failing which such a scheme would lapse, it would be useful to draw sustenance from the said section itself to conclude that what is reasonable in terms of BDA Act, would be five years for the passing of an award. 29. The next question that would arise for my consideration is the nature of relief that the petitioners would be entitled to in these cases. As already stated, the concept of lapse of acquisition cannot be imported into the provisions of the BDA Act. Therefore, the relief sought by the petitioners seeking a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed in so far as their lands are concerned cannot be granted having regard to the ratio of the Apex Court’s judgments. That would however not mean that the petitioners would not be entitled to any other relief. In this context, it would be of relevance to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chand’s case where the Apex Court took notice of the fact that in the said case, 14 years had lapsed and no wards had been made. In this context, it would be of relevance to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chand’s case where the Apex Court took notice of the fact that in the said case, 14 years had lapsed and no wards had been made. Though possession of the lands had also not been taken by the authorities, the Apex Court also took note of the fact that there was no explanation given by the authorities for the delay in making of the awards. It was therefore held that the acquiring authorities had failed to perform their statutory duty within a time frame which could be held to be reasonable. Having regard to the fact that the Apex Court was considering the acquisition prior to insertion of Section 11-A a reasonable time for making an award was stated to be two years from the said date of order upholding the validity of acquisition by the Apex Court and that beyond two years from the said period was said to be unreasonable. Taking into consideration the interest of the cultivators and public interest instead of quashing the acquisition, the land owners were held to be entitled to additional compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12% p.a. after the expiry of two years from 23/8/1974 i.e., the date of the judgment of the Apex Court in Aflatoon’s case, relating to the challenge made to the acquisition. The said principle has also been followed by this Court in D.V.Lakshman Rao’s case and though in the said case, the dispute was with regard to acquisition of land for setting up of an International Airport, Additional compensation was granted at the rate of 6% from 8/8/1998 i.e., the expiry of two years from the date of final notification. Since it has already been noticed that the decision of this Court in D.V.Lakshman Rao’s case is prior to the decision of the Apex Court in Munithimmaiah’s case, however, the nature of relief granted in Ram Chand’s case, though under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be lost sight of. 30. Having perused the statement of objections filed by the respondents in these cases, I find that there is no explanation whatsoever given as to why there was a delay in making of the awards in so far as the petitioners herein are concerned. 30. Having perused the statement of objections filed by the respondents in these cases, I find that there is no explanation whatsoever given as to why there was a delay in making of the awards in so far as the petitioners herein are concerned. The fact that the awards have not been finalized in some cases cannot be lost sight of. Under the circumstances, the petitioners would be entitled to additional compensation. Since it is held that having regard to the object of Section 27 of the BDA Act in my view, five years would be a reasonable period within which all awards could have to be made when the scheme is substantially implemented. Therefore, it is just that he petitioners be given additional compensation. The said additional compensation will be by way of payment of additional amount at the rate of 12% p.a. on the market value of the land, after the expiry of five years from the date of issuance of the final notification. Therefore, the petitioners would be entitled to the said additional compensation of 12% p.a. on the market value w.e.f. 25/12/1986 till the date of passing of the award. The said relief is granted even to the petitioners in W.P.No.26849/2010 and W.P.Nos.3695-96/2009. 31. As far as the petitioner in W.P.No.30279/2010 is concerned, despite there being no award passed and neither possession having been taken, the respondent – BDA nevertheless went ahead and demolished the construction put up on the said property and the same is evident from Annexure “G”, which is a press release dated 25/8/2010 wherein, it is stated that 8 Sheds, 5 Godowns and a compound wall in various survey numbers including 52/4 which belong to the petitioners at Bommanahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore, have been demolished and that the land had been recorded. The high-handed manner in which BDA has proceeded in this case is deprecated. The right of the BDA to acquire the property is only under a statute and not in the realm of eminent domain. Even when the state exercises its power as a right of eminent domain the fact that the owners of lands are protected by Article 300-A of the Constitution and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be lost sight of. Any acquisition which has to be made by the BDA has to be made solely in accordance with law. Even when the state exercises its power as a right of eminent domain the fact that the owners of lands are protected by Article 300-A of the Constitution and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be lost sight of. Any acquisition which has to be made by the BDA has to be made solely in accordance with law. The BDA cannot claim to have recovered property when possession of the property does not vest in the State Government under the acquisition proceedings. In the absence of making any award, BDA cannot enter into any property belonging to the land owner. In its enthusiasm to acquire property and form layouts, BDA cannot lose sight of the fact that it has to act within the four corners of the statute. He action of the respondent – BDA in demolishing the structures and buildings on the petitioners property is indeed to be condemned when on the one hand, BDA is unable to complete execution of its various schemes on time, it cannot rest on false laurels by claiming to have recovered property belonging to it when that is not the truth. The publicity made by the BDA in this case by issuing a wholly untrue and false press release is also deprecated. 32. Petitioners in W.P.Nos.30279/2010 are therefore, entitled to additional compensation apart from the compensation which has already been granted in the aforesaid terms. However the modalities in which the said compensation can be claimed by the petitioners and the manner it should be considered and paid are left open having regard to the fact that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot go into the nitty-gritty of the facts and the claim which would be made by the petitioners while seeking such a compensation. Therefore, by holding that the petitioners in these writ petitions are entitled to seek additional compensation in respect of the demolition which has taken place in their lands apart from the relief as stated in para 31, liberty is reserved to the petitioners to seek such compensation in accordance with law. 33. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed in part. Respondents are directed to pass the final awards in those cases where the awards have not been passed, as expeditiously as possible. 33. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed in part. Respondents are directed to pass the final awards in those cases where the awards have not been passed, as expeditiously as possible. From 25/12/1991 (five years from the date of issuance of the final notification date of 25/12/1986 till the date of passing awards, the petitioners are entitled to additional compensation at the rate of 12% p.a. on the market value which is determined. The same however cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of Section 28A of the Act. 34. The petitioners in W.P.No.30279/2010 are entitled to seek additional compensation in respect of the demolition that has taken place and as is evident from Annexure “G” to the writ petitions. The modality of seeking such compensation is left open. Parties to bear their own costs.