Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.—The appellant original petitioner by way of this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent calls in question the legality, validity and propriety of the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 20th October 2010 in Special Civil Application No. 4778 of 2010 wherein the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition confirming the order passed by the competent authority removing the petitioner from the office of Sarpanch. 2. The brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal can be summarised as under:— 3. The appellant – original petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Vatadra Gram Panchayat. While holding the office of Sarpanch, he came to be served with a show-cause notice issued by the District Development Officer, Anand under Section 57(1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) calling upon the appellant to explain few charges of misconduct in discharge of his duties as a Sarpanch. It appears that detailed explanation at the end of the appellant – original petitioner was not found satisfactory and the District Development Officer, Anand vide his order dated 23rd July 2009, in exercise of his powers under Section 57(1) of the Act passed order of removal of the appellant from the office of Sarpanch, Vatadra Gram Panchayat. The appellant preferred an appeal to the State Government under the provisions of Section 57(3) of the Act. The appellate authority, namely, the Additional Development Commissioner, State of Gujarat vide order dated 9th March 2010 dismissed the appeal confirming the order of removal of the appellant from the post of Sarpanch passed by the District Development Officer, Anand. 4. The orders passed by the authorities under the Act were subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge in writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 4778 of 2010. The learned Single Jude came to the conclusion that as the both the authorities, namely, the District Development Officer, Anand and the appellant authority have concurrently held that the appellant is guilty of misconduct, no relief could be granted to the appellant-original petitioner and accordingly dismissed the petition. The order of the learned Single Judge is subject matter of the challenge in this present appeal. 5. We have heard learned advocate Mr Kaushal Pandya appearing for the appellant – petitioner, Mr H.S. Munsha, learned Counsel for Respondents Nos. The order of the learned Single Judge is subject matter of the challenge in this present appeal. 5. We have heard learned advocate Mr Kaushal Pandya appearing for the appellant – petitioner, Mr H.S. Munsha, learned Counsel for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and Ms Manisha Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and perused the record. 6. The orders of removal under Section 57 of the Act came to be passed against the appellant on the grounds as indicated below:— i. On 23rd October 2007 the Panchayat auctioned fruits which were reaped in gauchar land. In the auction proceedings one Mafatbhai Mangalbhai Thakor was the highest bidder. His bid for the entire lot of fruits was for the sum of Rs. 37,500/-. He deposited a sum of Rs. 22,000 on 23rd October 2007 with the Gram Panchayat. However, the balance amount of Rs. 15,500 is still to be recovered from said Mafatbhai Mangalbhai Thakor. It is alleged that said Mafatbhai Mangalbhai Thakor happens to be the relative of the present appellant and being a relative he could not have participated in the auction proceedings which were held by the Panchayat. Apart from this, the appellant, as a Sarpanch, has failed to take appropriate steps for the recovery of Rs. 15,000 balance amount and has thrown the entire burden on the shoulders of the Talati cum Mantri to recover the said amount and thereby has shirked himself from his responsibility. It is alleged that this amounts to abuse of power. ii. On 18th January 2008 some bavad trees grown on the land of Vatadra Gram Panchayat were put to auction. Out of 235 trees, 110 trees were felled. It is alleged that appropriate amount equivalent to the value of 110 trees has not been deposited with the Gram Panchayat and in this manner the appellant has committed financial irregularities by abusing his position. iii. The beneficiaries of BPL Scheme have been deprived of opportunity of taking the advantage of the scheme. It is alleged that the appellant, as a Sarpanch, could not have created obstruction in the implementation of the said Scheme as it is beyond his jurisdiction and power, and lastly, iv. Way back in the year 1983, to be precise, on 15th December 1983 the appellant was the highest bidder in one auction proceedings of 243 baval trees. It is alleged that the appellant, as a Sarpanch, could not have created obstruction in the implementation of the said Scheme as it is beyond his jurisdiction and power, and lastly, iv. Way back in the year 1983, to be precise, on 15th December 1983 the appellant was the highest bidder in one auction proceedings of 243 baval trees. He being the highest bidder was supposed to deposit Rs. 40,786. It is alleged that till today Rs. 11,000 are yet to be deposited by the appellant as outstanding balance amount. It deserves to be noted that so far as the last charge is concerned, the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that there is no evidence to substantiate this charge and secondly an incident of about 25 years could not have been taken account for the purpose of removal under Section 57(1) of the Act. However, charges (a), (b) and (c) were held to be proved and were believed by the appellate authority. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to the provisions of Section 57(1) of the Act and submitted that a person can be removed from the office of Sarpanch only if the State Government or its delegate is of the opinion that the Sarpanch has been guilty of :— (i) Misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or (ii) He is guilty of any disgraceful conduct, or (iii) He has abused his power, or (iv) Makes persistent defaults, or (v) Has become incapable of performing his duties and functions under the Act. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant would submit that none of the aforesaid five conditions indicated in the statutory provision is satisfied and therefore the impugned order dated 23rd July 2009 passed by the District Development Officer, Anand and order dated 9th March 2010 confirmed by the Additional Development Commissioner as an appellate authority are not only contrary to the provisions of the Act, but also destructive of democracy at the grass-root level. 9. Learned counsels for the respondents defended the orders by submitting that both the authorities viz. 9. Learned counsels for the respondents defended the orders by submitting that both the authorities viz. District Development Officer and the Additional Development Commissioner have come to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of misconduct and abuse of powers and the findings have been confirmed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore the appeal before us deserves to be dismissed. 10. Section 57 of the Act, which mandates five conditions for removal from office reads as under:— “57. Removal from office. The competent authority may remove from office any member of the panchayat, the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, thereof, after giving him an opportunity of being heard and giving due notice in that behalf to the panchayat and after such inquiry as it deems necessary, if such member, Sarpanch, or, ast he case may be, Upa-Sarpanch has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or abuses his powers or makes persistent default in the performance of his dtuies and his duties and functions under this Act. The Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, so removed may at the discretion of the competent authority also be removed from the membership of the panchayat.” 11. On close reading of the provisions of Section 57, it appears that a mere irregularity or even an illegality in the discharge of duties or causing loss to the Gram Panchayat does not by itself empower the State Government or its delegate to remove a Sarpanch from the elected office. There must be a finding supported by evidence to show that the concerned Sarpanch has been guilty of misconduct in discharge of his duties or of his disgraceful conduct or is incapable of performing his duties under the Act persistently. We take notice of the fact, more particularly considering the nature of the charges levelled against the appellant that the authorities are equating misconduct or disgraceful conduct or persistent defaults to that with dereliction of duty. There is a vast difference between misconduct in the discharge of duties and dereliction of duty. We take notice of the fact, more particularly considering the nature of the charges levelled against the appellant that the authorities are equating misconduct or disgraceful conduct or persistent defaults to that with dereliction of duty. There is a vast difference between misconduct in the discharge of duties and dereliction of duty. Again, at the cost of repetition, we say that the charges as levelled against the appellant and said to have been proved are not of such a nature which can be termed as misconduct in the discharge of duties or disgraceful conduct. Apparently, it is not a case of persistent default in the performance of duties. 12. Section 57 does not speak about dereliction of duty. Misconduct is a violation of definite law. Dereliction of duty or carelessness is an abuse of discretion under a definite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act whereas dereliction of duty is forbidden quality of an act and is necessarily indefinite. However, lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a public post or office like Sarpanch would not by themselves constitute misconduct. Person may be negligent in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating a developing situation, may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to the negligence would be such as to the repairable or so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. 13. In a recent pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in the matter of Sharda Kailash Mittal vs. State of M.P. reported in 2010 (1) GLH 744 while considering the analogous provision under the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act where the case was of removal of President, the Honourable Supreme Court in Paragraphs 18 and 19 has observed as under:— “18. For taking action under Section 41-A for removal of President, Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, power is conferred on the State Government with no provision of any appeal. The action of removal casts a serious stigma on the personal and public life of the concerned office-bearer and may result in his/her disqualification to hold such office for the next term. The exercise of power, therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status of an office bearer. The action of removal casts a serious stigma on the personal and public life of the concerned office-bearer and may result in his/her disqualification to hold such office for the next term. The exercise of power, therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status of an office bearer. There are no sufficient guidelines in the provisions of Section 41-A as to the manner in which the power has to be exercised, except that it requires that reasonable opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the office-bearer proceeded against. Keeping in view the nature of the power and the consequences that flows on its exercise it has to be held that such power can be invoked by the State Government only for very strong and weighty reason. Such a power is not to be exercised for minor irregularities in discharge of duties by the holder of the elected post. The provision has to be construed in strict manner because the holder of office occupies it by election and he/she is deprived of the office by an executive order in which the electorate has no chance of participation.” “19. In the present case, the actions of the appellant, even if proved, only amount to irregularities, and not grave forms of illegalities, which may allow the State Government to invoke its extreme power under Section 41” 14. In the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 260 = (2001 AIR SCW 2689), the Honourable Supreme Court while dealing with the removal of a President of the Council under Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, held in Paragraph 6 as under: “6. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his elections set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law... Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office, a stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held” In Paragraph 11 the Honourable Supreme Court has further observed as under: “11. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office, a stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held” In Paragraph 11 the Honourable Supreme Court has further observed as under: “11. A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving, dishonesty of intention is...The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision.” 15. We are of the view that on the basis of the material on record and the findings recorded by the authorities under the Act and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 20th October 2010 it is not possible to hold that the case of the appellant – original petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 57 of the Act. So far as order of the learned Single Judge is concerned, the learned Single Judge has proceeded solely on the footing that as both the authorities under the Act have found the appellant guilty of misconduct, no interference was necessary. Except this, there is no other independent finding in this regard by the learned Single Judge. 16. For the reasons recorded above, we are left with no other option but to disturb the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The order dated 23rd July 2009 passed by respondent No. 3 and order dated 9th March 2010 passed in appeal by the Additional Development Commissioner are quashed and set aside. Order passed by the learned Single Judge is also quashed and set aside and we allow Special Civil Application No. 4778 of 2010. The appellant – original petitioner is allowed to resume his office of Sarpanch. Appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. P P P P P