Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—Aggrieved by the judgment dated 23.05.2011 passed by the Special Judge, Designated Court, Ajmer, whereby the learned Judge has acquitted the accused respondent of offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act'), the State has filed this criminal leave to appeal. 2. The brief facts of the case are that Ramratan (P.W.1) went to the office of Additional Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ajmer and submitted a written report. He claimed that three years ago, his wife, Reena, had met with an accident and had suffered injuries on her jaws. Consequently, plates and wires were inserted in the jaws. Due to the said wires, she was beginning to have certain difficulties. Therefore, the wires needed to be taken out. For this purpose, on 14.06.2008, he met Dr. Padam Chand Jain (the accused-respondent before this court) and paid a fees of Rs.100/-. Dr. Jain had admitted her in his unit at the J.L.N., Hospital. He further claimed that although he had met Dr. Jain many a times, but he has been postponing the replacing of the plates. Eventually, he has promised that he will operate on Reena either on 23.06.2008 or 24.06.2008. The complainant further claimed that the doctor has asked for certain illegal gratification and has asked him to come to his house on 22.06.2008. However, he does not wish to pay any illegal gratification to Dr. Jain, and wishes to ensure that he is caught red handed. 3. On the basis of the written report, a trap proceedings was carried out on 24.06.2008. During the course of the trap proceedings, after receiving the agreed signal from the complainant, the Deputy Superintendent of Police entered the room of Dr. Jain. He found him sitting at his table. When he asked the person his name, he informed the officer that he is known as Dr. Padam Chand Jain. Rs. 700/- were recovered from his drawer and the trap proceedings was completed. A charge-sheet for offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act was submitted. 4. In order to buttress its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses, and submitted sixteen documents. In turn, the defence examined two witnesses, and submitted fifteen documents. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide judgment dated 23.05.2011, as mentioned above, the learned Judge acquitted Dr. Jain. 4. In order to buttress its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses, and submitted sixteen documents. In turn, the defence examined two witnesses, and submitted fifteen documents. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide judgment dated 23.05.2011, as mentioned above, the learned Judge acquitted Dr. Jain. Hence,this criminal leave to appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. Javed Chaudhary, the learned Public Prosecutor has raised the following contentions before this Court : firstly, the learned Judge has failed to apprecaite the evidence in proper perspective. Secondly, the learned Judge has erred in concluding that there was no demand made by the accused respondent for illegal gratification. Thirdly, the learned Judge has equally erred in concluding that there was no acceptance of the illegal gratification. Forthly, the learned Judge has overlooked the fact that the operation had to be performed by the accused respondent. Thus, "work" was pending before the accused-respondent. Therefore, the judgment deserves to be set aside. 6. Heard the learned Public Prosecutor, examined the record submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the judgment. 7. Before dealing with the facts of the case, it is pertinent to summarize the settled principles of law which would govern the decision of this case. Firstly, every man is presumed to be innocent till proven the guilty. Moreover, this presumption is strengthened by a judgment acquitting the offender. Further, there are certain principles which govern the jurisdiction of the appellate court while dealing with a judgment of acquittal: if, there are two views possible of the evidence, then the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal. For, the appellate court should not substitute its decision for the decision of the learned trial Court, especially, when the learned trial Court has opted for one of the two possibilities before it (Ref. to Bhaiyamiyan vs. State of M.P. ( (2011) 6 SCC 394 ), Rukia Begum vs. State of Karnataka ( (2011) 4 SCC 779 ), State of U.P., vs. Mohd. Iqram ( (2011) 8 SCC 80 ) and State of Rajasthan vs. Gangasahay & Ors. ((2010) 1 R.Cr.D. 309 (Raj.) = 2010(2) RLW 1180). 8. Secondly, the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. No matter how strong the suspicion, it cannot take the place of proof. 9. Iqram ( (2011) 8 SCC 80 ) and State of Rajasthan vs. Gangasahay & Ors. ((2010) 1 R.Cr.D. 309 (Raj.) = 2010(2) RLW 1180). 8. Secondly, the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. No matter how strong the suspicion, it cannot take the place of proof. 9. Thirdly, the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not an inviolable presumption, but is a rebuttable one. The presumption can be invoked only after the prosecution has established the bare facts of the Case. Undoubtedly, Sections 7 and 13 of the Act require the prosecution to establish three basic facts, namely, prior to the lodging of the complaint with the Bureau, there was a demand made by the accused person. Secondly, there was acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused. Thirdly, the amount was duly recovered from the accused. 10. Forthly, while dealing with these elements, the court should also be alive to the explanation offered by the accused at the time of the trap proceedings. The Court should also consider whether the explanation has been corroborated or strengthened by any evidence available on record, or not? In case the bare facts of the case have not been established properly by the prosecution through cogent evidence, then the presumption should not be invoked. 11. Fifthly, the defence evidence has to be treated on par with prosecution evidence (Ref. to Thankachand vs. State of Kerala ((2008) 17 SCC 760). 12. Sixthly, the burden of proving the defence is not as onerous as it is on the prosecution. While the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the defence has to merely probablise its case by preponderance of probability (Ref. to C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 )). 13. Lastly, in case, the defence evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the learned trial Court, then it should acquit the accused person. 14. According to the complainant, he had first met Dr. Jain on 14.06.2008 and had sought time for his wife's operation. According to Dr. Vinod Prakash Goyal (P.W.2), on 14.06.2008, Reena Devi was admitted by Dr. P.C. Ajmerra, and not by Dr. Jain. This fact is also obvious from Ex.D/1. According to the prosecution, from 18.06.2008, she was subjected to certain tests as admitted by the complainant himself. Jain on 14.06.2008 and had sought time for his wife's operation. According to Dr. Vinod Prakash Goyal (P.W.2), on 14.06.2008, Reena Devi was admitted by Dr. P.C. Ajmerra, and not by Dr. Jain. This fact is also obvious from Ex.D/1. According to the prosecution, from 18.06.2008, she was subjected to certain tests as admitted by the complainant himself. These tests lasted from 18.06.2008 till 23.06.2008. It is on 23.06.2008, when the anesthesist certified that Reena is fit for an operation, that the said operation was scheduled to be conducted on 24.06.2008. 15. As mentioned above, the prosecution had to firmly establish three basic facts in the present case: demand, acceptance and recovery. As far as the demand is concerned, Ramratan (P.W.1), the complainant, has himself admitted in his cross-examination that "till the filing of the report with the ACB, i.e. till 21.06.2008, Dr. Jain did not make any demand for any illegal gratification". Moreover, in his cross-examination he has admitted that "he does not remember whether Dr. Jain had demanded any money from him at the time when the trap proceedings were carried out". Although the prosecution does claim that there is a taped conversation and transcription of the same is available, but, the prosecution has not proven the fact that the voice in the tape was, indeed, that of Dr. Jain. Moreover, although the prosecution claims that Dr. Jain had refused to give a sample of his voice, even the said document showing his refusal has not been proved either by Mansur Ali (P.W.5) or by Lokesh Tripathi (P.W.6), the Investigating Officers. Therefore, the alleged refusal can neither be accepted in evidence, nor can be used as an evidence against the accused respondent. Most importantly, in the absence of proof, no adverse inference can be drawn by the learned trial Court. These facts have been noticed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the learned trial Court has correctly concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove the element of "demand" in the present case. 16. As far the acceptance and recovery are concerned, according to the complainant when he had entered the room, he had handed over the money to Dr. Jain in his chamber. Thus, according to him, there was an acceptance of the amount. 16. As far the acceptance and recovery are concerned, according to the complainant when he had entered the room, he had handed over the money to Dr. Jain in his chamber. Thus, according to him, there was an acceptance of the amount. However, according to an independent witness, Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3), he admits, in his cross examination, that "when he went with the complainant to the doctor's house, he met Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2), a friend of his. He asked Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2) as to why he was there? Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2) told him that since doctor has gone into the bathroom, he was waiting of the doctor to come back". Moreover, according to this independent witness, when the ACB officials asked the doctor about the bribe given to him, immediately, he stated that "he had gone to the bathroom, during his absence, the complainant has left the rupees on his table which he kept in the drawer". Moreover, he denied the fact that he ever demanded or accepted any money from the complainant. 17. Interestingly, the testimony of Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3) has been corroborated by Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2). Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2) clearly claims that "when it was his turn to go inside the consultancy room, the doctor asked him to wait for a while as he was going to the bathroom. While, he was waiting outside the room, Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3)came with a man and asked him as to why he was there. He told Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3) that he is waiting for the doctor to come out from the bathroom". He further claimed that "the person who had come with Praveen Agarwal, suddenly entered the doctor's chamber and came out immediately. Thereafter, officers of the ACB Department entered the doctor's chamber and asked him about the bribe money". According to this witness also, the doctor told the ACB officials that "when he had gone to the bathroom, someone had left Rs.700/- on his table, which he has kept in the drawer". 18. Thus, against the testimony of complainant, the trial court has before it the testimonies of two independent witnesses, namely Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3) and Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2). Both these witnesses clearly contradict Ramratan (P.W.1), the complainant. Obviously, these witnesses raise a doubt about the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. 18. Thus, against the testimony of complainant, the trial court has before it the testimonies of two independent witnesses, namely Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3) and Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2). Both these witnesses clearly contradict Ramratan (P.W.1), the complainant. Obviously, these witnesses raise a doubt about the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. Both these witnesses, would have the court believe that when the complainant entered the doctor's room, the doctor was in the bathroom and the complainant left Rs.700/-, the bribe money, on the table and immediately came out. These testimonies are sufficient to raise doubt about the element of "acceptance" as presented by the prosecution. 19. It is also pertinent to note that the first explanation given by the Dr. Jain is corroborated by Praveen Agarwal (P.W.3) and Nauratmal Agarwal (D.W.2). Therefore the said explanation is not an after- thought to protect his interest. Since the explanation has also been supported by the testimonies of two independent witnesses, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and validity of the said explanation. Therefore, the said explanation also creates a chink in the armour of the prosecution story. These facts were also noticed by the leanred Judge. Therefore, the learned Judge was equally justified in con-cluding that the element of acceptance is rightly missing in the present case. 20. In the case of Banarsi Dass vs. State of Haryana ( (2010) 4 SCC 450 = 2010(2) RLW 1395 (SC)), and in C.M. Girish Babu (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed that mere recovery of money would not make an accused liable for offence under Sections 7 & 13 of the Act. Thus, in the present case, the mere recovery of Rs.700/- from the drawer of the accused respondent would not make him liable for offence under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. 21. Lastly, the learned Judge has also noticed the fact that even the sanction order loses its significance. For, while the sanction order was given by the Secretary, he was not produced as a prosecution witness. One Shiv Kumar Sharma (P.W.4) was produced as a witness in order to prove the sanction order. However, in his cross-examination, Shiv Kumar Sharma (P.W.4) has admitted that "the sanction order was passed by his higher officers". He has further stated that "he has merely signed the sanction order on behalf of the higher officer". One Shiv Kumar Sharma (P.W.4) was produced as a witness in order to prove the sanction order. However, in his cross-examination, Shiv Kumar Sharma (P.W.4) has admitted that "the sanction order was passed by his higher officers". He has further stated that "he has merely signed the sanction order on behalf of the higher officer". Therefore, the prosecution has withheld a material witness. 22. The learned Judge has meticulously examined and critically analyzed the prosecution case. Although a lurking doubt may exist, it cannot take the place of proof. Furthermore, once the accused respondent has been acquitted, the presumption of innocence in his favour is strengthened. Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 23. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the criminal leave to appeal. It is, hereby, dismissed.