JUDGMENT :- D. MURUGESAN, J. 1. The review applicant seeks to review the order dated 22.10.2010 passed in Writ Petition No.16933 of 2009. The review application arises under the following circumstances. The review applicant (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner") entered into the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service as a Judicial Magistrate on 22.2.1982. After his promotion to the post of Subordinate Judge, he was promoted to the next cadre of District Judge on 3.5.2000 and he also served from 28.10.2002 to 31.12.2005 as District Judge cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Uthagamandalam. As per the Rules applicable to the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service, his performance was reviewed during the year 2007 for continuance in service beyond the age of 58 years and he was not permitted to continue. On a challenge to the said order, this Court set aside the same in a writ petition. Thereafter, he was re-instated into service on 17.10.2008 and posted as First Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai. On attaining the age of superannuation, he was allowed to retire on 31.1.2009 without prejudice to the pending disciplinary proceedings. On the date of retirement, a charge memo dated 20.1.2009 was pending. The above charge memo was questioned by the petitioner in W.P.No.1633 of 2009 and the said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn by the following order dated 28.1.2009. "In view of the representation/endorsement made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the Writ Petition is dismissed as withdrawn. Consequently, Miscellaneous Petition Nos.1 and 2 of 2009 are also dismissed. But, there shall be no order as to costs." 2. Thereafter, the petitioner once again filed Writ Petition No.16933 of 2009 questioning the very same charge memo, which was dismissed by the following order dated 22.10.2010. "The petitioner seeks for issuance of writ of certiorari to call for the records from the first respondent connected with the impugned charge memo in C.No.66/2005/2005-VC (in ROC No.555/2005/2005/VC dated 20.01.2009 and order C.No.26/2005/VC (in Roc.No.259/2005/VC vide ROC No.803/2003/VC dated 20.1.2009, quash the same and grant such other reliefs. 2. The order, which the petitioner seeks to impugn in this writ petition, is a charge memo and as many as six charges have been levelled against the petitioner. At the relevant point of time, with regard to which charges have been framed against the petitioner, he was functioning as District Judge, Nilgris at Udhagamandalam. 2. The order, which the petitioner seeks to impugn in this writ petition, is a charge memo and as many as six charges have been levelled against the petitioner. At the relevant point of time, with regard to which charges have been framed against the petitioner, he was functioning as District Judge, Nilgris at Udhagamandalam. One of the charges relates to demand of Rs.5 lakhs as bribe from one of the persons by name Naharmal Bafna, who was arrayed as first accused in Sessions Case No.25 of 2002. Even the other charges were serious in nature. 3. According to the petitioner, earlier he was allowed to retire at the age of 58 years, that when he approached this Court by filing a writ petition in W.P.No.16317 of 2007 challenging the order dated 25.01.2007 retiring him from service at the age of 58 without granting extension for two years, a Division Bench in its order dated 22.07.2008, examined the past records of the petitioner and found his service records as an unblemished one, that based on the said order of the Division Bench, the petitioner was re-employed by order dated 14.10.2008 and in the circumstances, it would be travesty of justice, if the petitioner were to face the enquiry in relation to the charges now levelled against him in the impugned charge memo dated 20.01.2009. 4. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the first respondent however brought to our notice that the very same charge memo dated 20.01.2009 was subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No.1633 of 2009 and that the said writ petition was unconditionally withdrawn by the petitioner by making an endorsement in the writ petition and that based upon the said endorsement, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 28.01.2009. The learned senior counsel would therefore contend that the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate the very same issue once over again in this writ petition. 5. The learned senior standing counsel appearing for the first respondent is well justified in making such a submission, inasmuch as we also find in the order dated 28.01.2009, no reservation has been made by the petitioner to re-agitate the issue under any circumstances. Therefore, the petitioner once having chosen to challenge the very same impugned order earlier and decided to withdraw the writ petition unconditionally, the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the issue. 6. Therefore, the petitioner once having chosen to challenge the very same impugned order earlier and decided to withdraw the writ petition unconditionally, the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the issue. 6. In any event, on a perusal of the charges levelled against the petitioner in the impugned charge memo, we find that in view of the seriousness of the charges levelled against the petitioner, by relying upon the earlier order dated 22.07.2008 in W.P.No.16317 of 2007, which writ petition was concerned with the non-extension of the petitioner's service beyond 58 years, the impugned charge memo cannot be quashed without being examined in detail. We, therefore, do not wish to go into the details of the charges or other aspects relating to the said issue. We are however convinced that the petitioner should only come out unscathed by participating in the enquiry, which is stated to have already commenced and it is being enquired by a learned sitting Judge of this Court. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner will have to participate in the enquiry proceedings. It is contended that after the petitioner was being allowed to superannuate from service on 31.10.2009 without prejudice to the charge memo proceedings initiated against him, he has not been paid the provisional pension. 7. While dismissing the writ petition and directing the petitioner to participate in the enquiry, we only request the learned Judge holding the enquiry to conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. The first respondent shall also consider the grievance of the petitioner relating to payment of provisional pension and pass appropriate orders expeditiously. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed." This order dated 22.10.2010 is sought to be reviewed in this application. 3. Mr.Vijay Narayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the dismissal of Writ Petition No.1633 of 2009 was not on merits, as it was withdrawn by an endorsement made by the counsel. In that view of the matter, the subsequent Writ Petition No.16933 of 2009 cannot be considered to be a res judicata and, for that reason, this Court should have considered the grievance of the petitioner on merits. In that view of the matter, the subsequent Writ Petition No.16933 of 2009 cannot be considered to be a res judicata and, for that reason, this Court should have considered the grievance of the petitioner on merits. Merely because an endorsement was made by the learned counsel without reserving the right of liberty, the petitioner should not be non-suited, particularly when the earlier writ petition was withdrawn with the fond hope that the respondents would drop the charges by considering the representations. As the charges were not withdrawn and the respondents had proceeded even after the withdrawal of the writ petition, the petitioner was constrained to once again file a similar writ petition before this Court. Hence, the order dated 22.10.2010 should be reviewed, as no reason is given to dismiss the writ petition except placing reliance on the earlier order dismissing the writ petition as withdrawn. 4. We have considered the submissions. In our opinion, the review application cannot be entertained for more than one reason. As far as the submission as to the non-application of mind to the grievance espoused by the petitioner in the subsequent writ petition is concerned, we may point out that though the Division Bench in its order dated 22.10.2010 has referred to the submission of the learned senior counsel for the first respondent as to the unconditional withdrawal of the earlier writ petition, nevertheless, observed that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge memo impugned were serious, particularly when the petitioner was not earlier given extension beyond the age of 58 years. Only for the above reason coupled with the reason that the earlier writ petition was withdrawn without liberty, the Division Bench had dismissed the writ petition. Though the finding is not elaborate for dismissal of the writ petition, still we find that the Court had gone into the charges and was inclined to dismiss the writ petition considering the seriousness of the charges. 5. That apart, the core question that falls for our consideration is as to whether the petitioner would be entitled to file the subsequent writ petition questioning the very same charge memo, when the writ petition filed by him on an earlier occasion was withdrawn by him without even seeking liberty. On the above question, we may refer to the following judgments of the Apex Court, as the issue is not res integra. 6. On the above question, we may refer to the following judgments of the Apex Court, as the issue is not res integra. 6. In Hulas Rai Baij Nath v. Firm K.B.Bass and Co., AIR 1968 SC 111 , the Apex Court considering the provision of Order XXIII, Rule 1 of CPC, and particularly sub-rule (3) thereof in crystal clear words held that where plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the permission of the Court, he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit in same subject matter against the same parties. 7. In Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others, (1987) 1 SCC 5 = AIR 1987 SC 88 , the Apex Court held as follows:- "8. The question for our consideration is whether it would or would not advance the cause of justice if the principle underlying R.1 of O.XXIII of the Code is adopted in respect of writ petitions filed under Art.226/227 of the Constitution also. It is common knowledge that very often after a writ petition is heard for some time when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the Court is not likely to pass an order admitting the petition, request is made by the petitioner or by his counsel, to permit the petitioner to withdraw from the writ petition without seeking permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A Court which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit the withdrawal of the petition. It is plain that when once a writ petition filed in a High Court is withdrawn by the petitioner himself he is precluded from filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court..." 9. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 is of no assistance. On this point the decision in Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying R.1 of O.XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Art.32 of the Constitution since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject matter since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. We, however, make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We, however, leave this question open." 8. In Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1999) 1 SCC 81 , the Apex Court has emphasized to apply the principle enshrined under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of CPC, being based on public policy, and held that the principle was applicable also in case of filing the Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court under Art.136 of the Constitution. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1999) 1 SCC 81 , the Apex Court has emphasized to apply the principle enshrined under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of CPC, being based on public policy, and held that the principle was applicable also in case of filing the Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court under Art.136 of the Constitution. It was further clarified by the Court that liberty to file a fresh petition can be granted only in certain contingencies as provided under the said provision. See also Staff Association and others v. State Bank of India and ors. (1996) 4 SCC 378 and Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti and Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 534 . 9. In Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors. v. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58 , the Apex Court after referring to the judgment in Sarguja Transport Service case (supra) held as follows:- "From the above case law, it is clear that it is open to the petitioner to withdraw a petition filed by him. Normally, a Court of law would not prevent him from withdrawing his petition. But if such withdrawal is without the leave of the Court, it would mean that the petitioner is not interested in prosecuting or continuing the proceedings and he abandons his claim. In such cases, obviously, public policy requires that he should not start fresh round of litigation and the Court will not allow him to re-agitate the claim which he himself had given up earlier." 10. In view of the above categorical pronouncements of the Apex Court, we are of the considered view that in the event a writ petition is withdrawn without preserving the liberty, subsequent petition on the same issue is not maintainable. 11. There is one more question to be considered and answered, namely, in the given facts and circumstances, whether the petitioner will be entitled to seek for review of the subsequent order and the power of the Court to review. The power of the Court to review an order came up for consideration in various judgments and we may usefully refer to the following judgments of the Apex Court. 12. The power of the Court to review an order came up for consideration in various judgments and we may usefully refer to the following judgments of the Apex Court. 12. In Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , the Apex Court held as follows:- "There is nothing in Art.226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it." 13. In S.Nagaraj and others v. State of Karnataka and another, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, the Apex Court has held as follows:- "19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice." 14. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai, (1941) 1 MLJ Supp 45, the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajinder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh, (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: "....nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common law, the same power which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in..... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies." Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard." ...... 15. In Parison Devi v. Sumita Devi, 1998 (1) CTC 25, the Apex Court held as follows: "9. Under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 10. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the later only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction." 16. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650 , the Apex Court held as follows:- "55. That the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise. That the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review." 17. In Deepa Gourang Murdeshwar Katre v. The Principal, V.A.V. College of Arts and Ors., 2007 (2) Supreme 252 , the Apex Court held as follows:- "30. It is well settled by catena of decisions of this Court that if a case of fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension is discovered that the very basis of the order passed by a Court of law is affected, the Court can recall its order. The power to recall an order founded upon fraud and mis-representation is an inherent power of the Court." 18. In Kabari (P) Ltd., v. Shivnath Shroff, (1996) 1 SCC 690 , the Apex Court held that the court cannot entertain an application for review if before making the review application, the superior court had been moved for getting the selfsame relief, for the reason that for the selfsame relief two parallel proceedings before the two forums cannot be taken. 19. In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1996) 3 SCC 463 , the Court held that when a special leave petition from the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by the Court. Thereafter, the power of review cannot be exercised by the Tribunal as it would be "deleterious to the judicial discipline". Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (1995) 2 Scale 23, Sree Narayana Dharmasangham Trust v. Swami Prakasananda, (1997) 6 SCC 78 , K.Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 and Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 . 20.In Abbai Maligai Parnership Firm v. K.Santhakumaran, (1998) 7 SCC 386 , the Court considered the issue afresh and held that filing of the review petition after dismissal of the special leave petition by it against the selfsame order amounted to an abuse of process of the court and the entertainment of such a review application was an affront to its order and it was subversive of judicial discipline. 21. 21. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 , the Court reconsidered all the above judgments and came to the conclusion that dismissal of special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for entertaining a review petition by the court below for the reason that this court may not be inclinedto exercise its discretion under Art.136 of the Constitution. 22. In K.Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N.Swamy, (2001) 5 SCC 37 , the Court considered the ratio in Kunhayammed and Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm cases and held that if a review application h as been filed before the High Court prior to filing the special leave petition before this Court and review petition is decided/rejected, special leave petition against that order of review would be maintainable. In case the review application has been filed subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition it would amount to abuse of process of the court and shall be governed by the ratio of the judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm. The said judgment has been approved and followed by the Court in Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, (2004) 4 SCC 122 . 23. In The Government of Tamil Nadu rep.by its Secretary, Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes Welfare Department, Chennai and another v. Registration Department SC/ST and MBC Employees General Welfare Sangam, Chennai and others, 2006 (1) CTC 161 , a Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "8. It is not in dispute that once an order has been made, a review thereof must be subject to Rules and practice of the Court and cannot be lightly entertained. Courts have held that a review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant to resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier judicial fallibility. As rightly pointed out, a mere repetition of the old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient for exercising jurisdiction under review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter and evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter and evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of record is found. It is not in dispute that the power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision is erroneous on merits. That would be the province of Court of appeal. A party is not entitled to seek a review of judgment delivered by a Court for the purpose of rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstacnes of substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. It is also settled law that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake, but not substitute a view. The review cannot be treated like an appeal is disguise. The error contemplated in the rule is an error apparent on the face of record and not an error, which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The words "any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C." must mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule." 24. The Division Bench, while considering the grievance of the petitioner, by not only placing reliance on the unconditional withdrawal of the earlier writ petition but also observing that the charges are serious in nature, dismissed the writ petition. In fact, the Division Bench observed that the petitioner being a Judicial Officer and served in the capacity of District Judge should come out unscathed by participating in the enquiry in view of the seriousness of the charges. Hence, the question of reviewing the above order does not arise. 25. For all the above reasons, we are not inclined to entertain the review application and accordingly, the review application is dismissed. No costs.