ORDER This Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Cr.P.C.') is to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner/accused in C.C.No.11 of 2006 on the file of Special Judge for CBI Cases, Hyderabad for the offence punishable under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) (e) of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("PC Act" for brevity) and Sections 109, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC). 2. The petitioner while working as Additional Director of Income Tax (Investigation) in Mumbai was found to be in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. Basing on the said information, the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Hyderabad directed the Inspector of Police, CBI/SPE, Hyderabad to register a case and investiga te into the same. After thorough investigation, the Inspector of Police filed the charge sheet, which was taken on file in C.C.No.11/2006. To quash the same the present petition has been filed contending that the prosecution has not obtained authorization of the designated officer as required under Section 17 of the provisions of PC Act. Therefore, taking cognizance of the offence by the Investigating Officer, who is not authorized to investigate the crime, suffers from incurable defects and the Special Judge ought not to have taken the same on file. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be forced to undergo trial, which is not valid, and the same is liable to be quashed. 3. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner/ accused contends that no authorization, authorizing the Inspector of Police for registering the crime and investigate into• the same, is filed along with FIR. Therefore, charge sheet filed by the Inspector of Police, who is not authorized under Section 17 of the PC Act, cannot be taken on file. As per CBI manual, the Superintendent of Police is in charge of the police station. Under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate' empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report. In this case, the petitioner is a Commissioner of Income Tax in the cadre of DIG and the Inspector of Police, who is lower in rank to the petitioner, did the investigation. Therefore, the same has caused prejudice to the petitioner and the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. In this case, the petitioner is a Commissioner of Income Tax in the cadre of DIG and the Inspector of Police, who is lower in rank to the petitioner, did the investigation. Therefore, the same has caused prejudice to the petitioner and the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. In support of his submissions, strong reliance is placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in state of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1) 1992 Suppl (2) SCC 335; State Inspector of Police v. Surya Sankaram Karri (2) 2007 (2) ALT (Crl.) 50 (SC)=2007 (2) SCJ 867 = (2006) 3SCC (Cri) 225; M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (3) 2007 (3) ALT 20 .2 (DN SC) = 2007 (1) SCJ 791 = (2007) 1 SCC 110 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Singh (4) (2000) 5 SCC 88 . Learned senior counsel also contends that in the absence of any proceedings number, authorizing the Inspector of Police to investigate the crime, filed along with FIR, the same cannot be treated as authorization. More so, there is no need to authorize three Inspectors viz., K. Srinivasa Rao, B. Satish Prabhu and N. Aswini Kumar to investigate into the crime. It is relevant to notice that Sri K.Srinivasa Rao Inspector of Police, CBI, Hyderabad registered the case on 20-03-2003 at 10.30 hours, dispatched the same at 13.30 hours and it reached the Magistrate at 3.45 P.M. 4. On the other hand, Sri P, Kesava Rao, learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI produced an affidavit filed by the Inspector of Police dated 20-03-2003 before the Court of Special Judge for CBI cases and also the order of the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Hyderabad made under Section 17 of the PC Act to which a reference is made in his affidavit for issuing search warrants to conduct searches at the residential places of persons mentioned in the affidavit. The Superintendent of Police by proceedings dated 20-03-2003 authorized K. Srinivasa Rao, B.5atish Prabhu and N.Aswini Kumar, Inspectors of Police, C.B.I to conduct investigation. The Superintendent of Police by proceedings dated 20-03-2003 authorized K. Srinivasa Rao, B.5atish Prabhu and N.Aswini Kumar, Inspectors of Police, C.B.I to conduct investigation. The second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act only refers to prohibition of investigation referred to in clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 13 without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police and the Superintendent of Police alone has to file charge sheet is not correct, since the person investigated the crime can also file charge sheet. The CBI Manual is only a guide to administration among the officers. For the purpose of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Inspector of Police who investigated the crime can always file the charge sheet. In support of the same, strong reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suptd. of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas (5) (2008) 3 SCC (Cril) 587. 5. It is apt to extract here Section 17 of PC Act, which reads thus: "17 Persons authorized to investigate: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code. of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no police officer below the rank,- (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police, (b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under subsection (1) of Section 8 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 of an Assistant Commissioner of Police (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank, shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest there for without a warrant: Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorized by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest there for without a warrant: Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police." 6. In Bhajan Lal's case (1 supra) the Supreme Court enumerated 7 illustrations where the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised. Under illustration No.6 it was stated as under: "Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. U 7. In Surya Sankaram Karri's case (2 supra) it was held that the second proviso appended to Section 17 of the Act provides that an offence referred to in clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 13, shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. When a statutory functionary passes an order that too authorizing a person to carry out a public function like investigation into an offence, an order in writing was required to be passed. A statutory functionary must act in a manner laid down in the statute. Issuance of an oral direction not contemplated under the Act. 8. In Ram Singh's (4 supra) reference is made to three Judge Bench Judgment in H.N. Rishblid v. State of Delhi (AIR 1955SC 196) wherein the Supreme Court held that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Referring to the provisions of Sections 190, 195 to 199 and537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) in the context of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, it was held thus: “A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results .from an investigation is provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C. as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. No doubt a police report which results .from an investigation is provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C. as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190, Cr.P.C. is one out of a group of sections under the heading "conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings." The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, I.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190 (1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 190 (1) (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537, Cr. P. C. which is in the following terms is attracted: (Section 465 of New Code) "Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. " If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach , of a mandatory provision relating to investigation there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. " If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach , of a mandatory provision relating to investigation there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in- 'Prabhu v. Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 73 (1945 (46) Cri LJ 119) and 'Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, AIR 1950 PC 26: (1950 (51) Cri LJ 644). It further held: "In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the notice of the Court at any early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such investigation as may be called, for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5- A of the Act. It is in -the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section 5 (4) of the Act has to be decided and the course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined." After referring to the following observation made in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp.(l) 335), "....this Court had found on facts that the SP had passed the order mechanically and in a very casual manner regardless of the settled principles of law. The provisions of Section 17 of the Act had not been complied with. As earlier noticed the SP while authorizing the SHO to investigate had made only endorsement to the effect "'please register the case and investigate. " The SP was shown to be not aware either of allegations or the nature of the offences and the pressure of work-load requiring investigation by an Inspector. As earlier noticed the SP while authorizing the SHO to investigate had made only endorsement to the effect "'please register the case and investigate. " The SP was shown to be not aware either of allegations or the nature of the offences and the pressure of work-load requiring investigation by an Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in cases against the respondents in these appeals, even in the absence of the authority of the SP the Investigating Officer was in law authorized to investigate the offence falling under Section 13 of the Act with the exception of one as is described under sub-section (1) (e) of the Act. After registration of the FIR the Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals is shown to be aware and conscious of the allegations made against the respondents, the FIR registered against them and pending investigations. The order passed by the SP in case of Ram Singh on 12-12-1994 with respect to a Crime registered in 1992 was to the effect: "In exercise of powers conferred by the provisions on me, under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, IP.K. Runwal. Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Divisior.1 Lokayukt Karyalaya, Gwalior Division Gwalior (M.P.) authorised Shri D. S. Rana Insp- (SPE) Lak-Gwl (M.P.) to investigate Crime No. 103/92 u/s. 13 (1) (E), 23 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri Ram Singh - D.O. Excise Batul (MP)." and the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, on which basis crime is registered, distinguishing the facts of Bhajanlal's case, it was held that the Superintendent of Police appears to have applied his mind and passed the order authorizing the investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar circumstances of the case. The reasons for entrustment of investigation were obvious. The High Court should not have liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour of the accused resulting in closure of the trial of the serious charges made against the respondents in relation to commission of offences punishable under an Act legislated to curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the public officers. Holding so, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court quashing the investigation and consequent proceedings, with a direction to the lower court to proceed with the trial in accordance with the provisions of law. 9. In Suptd. Holding so, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court quashing the investigation and consequent proceedings, with a direction to the lower court to proceed with the trial in accordance with the provisions of law. 9. In Suptd. of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas (5 supra) the question relates to the alleged deficiency in authorization made by the Superintendent of Police authorizing the Inspector to investigate the case, wherein it was held the High Court failed to follow the decision in Ram Singh's case (4 supra) where the Supreme Court explained the view expressed in Bhajanlal's case (1 supra) and supported the order passed by the Superintendent of Police is more elaborate. Even otherwise the effect of Section 19(3) of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost sight of by the High Court. Holding so set aside the order passed by the High Court and allowed the appeal. 10. In view of the same, I do not see any merit in the contention advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Inspector of Police is not authorized to investigate the crime and charge sheet filed by him cannot be taken on file by the Special Judge. 11. It was nextly contended under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance on the report. Since the Superintendent of Police, who is the SHO, has not been forwarded the same, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the same. 12. Admittedly, in the case on hand, on coming to know that the petitioner/accused is in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, Smt. B. Radhika, IPS working as Superintendent of Police, CBI, Hyderabad on a careful consideration of the information found that there is prima facie case against the petitioner regarding the commission of offence punishable under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) of PC Act warranting investigation of the same. For the reasons mentioned in the order dated 20-03-2003, the Superintendent of Police, CBI/SPE Hyderabad authorized K.Srinivasa Rao, Inspector of Police to register a case and take up investigation apart from authorizing B. Sathish Prabhu and N. Aswini Kumar, Inspectors of Police, cm for conducting investigation. For the reasons mentioned in the order dated 20-03-2003, the Superintendent of Police, CBI/SPE Hyderabad authorized K.Srinivasa Rao, Inspector of Police to register a case and take up investigation apart from authorizing B. Sathish Prabhu and N. Aswini Kumar, Inspectors of Police, cm for conducting investigation. On the same day, K. Srinivasa Rao, Inspector of Police, registered a crime and dispatched the FIR to the Court on the same day along with the affidavit filed by him for issuing a warrant under Section 93 Cr.P.C. to conduct searches at the residential and office premises of S. Ramu and S. Murali Krishna and other relatives of the above accused, in which the Inspector of Police has categorically deposed that as per the speaking order of Superintendent of Police a case vide Rc.No.9(A)/2003-CBI-HYD has been registered on 20-03-2003 against Sri S. Ramu, Additional Director of Income Tax (Investigation) Unit-I, Mumbai and Sri S. Murali Krishna, Public Relations Officer, Singareni Collieries Company Limited, Singareni Bhavan, Hyderabad and for the purpose of investigation it is necessary to collect incriminating evidence and to the said extent they have to conduct searches at the places mentioned in the affidavit. On the same day they obtained permission from the Special Judge for CBI cases, Hyderabad for issuing search warrants. In view of the same, I do not see any merit in the contention advanced by the learned senior counsel that the Inspector of Police is not authorized under Section 17 of the PC Act to register the crime and investigate into the matter. 13. In M.C. Mehta's case (3 supra) the Supreme Court monitored the investigation, entrusted to CBI in M.C. Mehta (Raj Corridor Scam). The learned Amicus Curie advanced a contention that the officer in charge of the police station or the investigating officer is the sole person who has to form the opinion under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and file the police report. The Superintendent of Police has to file his report before the Supreme Court only and not before the entire hierarchy of CBI whose only role is to supervise investigation. The Superintendent of Police has to file his report before the Supreme Court only and not before the entire hierarchy of CBI whose only role is to supervise investigation. There for the issue which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court is: "whether on the facts and circumstance of that case, the Director, C.B.I. who has not given his own independent opinion, was right in referring the matter for opinion to the Attorney General for India, particularly when the en tire investigation and law officers' team was ad idem in its opinion on filing of the charge sheet and only on the dissenting opinion of the Director of Prosecution, who sea opinion is also based on the interpretation of the legal evidence, which stage has not even arrived. "The opinion of the Director, CBI is based solely on the opinion of the Attorney General after the reference. The Supreme Court after referring to its various earlier judgments on the powers and functions of hierarchy in CBI in Supreme Court monitoring cases reproduced the observation made by it in K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655) in para-27, which reads as under: "The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police officer under Section 173(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 173(2) provides that on completion of the investigation the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report. The report must be in the form prescribed by the State Government and stating therein (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he had been releilsed on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. As observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. As observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is an intimation to the Magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the investigating officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. In fact, the report under Section 173(2) purports to be all opinion of the investigating officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to procure sufficient material for the trial of the accused by the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5). Nothing more need be stated in the report of the investigating officer. It is also not necessary that all the details of the offence must be stated. The details of the offence are required to be proved to bring home the guilt of the accused at a later stage i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by adducing acceptable evidence." (Emphasis supplied) 14. The Supreme Court after quoting clauses 6.1 and 19.15 of the CBI (Crime) Manual, 2005 and also the judgment in R. Sarla v. T.S. Velu (2000) 4 SCC 459 ), wherein the Supreme Court stated the formation of opinion, whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial has to be of the officer in charge of the police station, held the result of the investigation by the police is not legal evidence and keeping in mind the scheme of Sections 168, 169, 170 and 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the Supreme Court cautiously stated in the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the entire material collected by CBI along with the report of the Superintendent of Police to be placed before the Court/Special Judge concerned in terms of Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. The decision to accept or reject the report of the SP shall be that of the Court/Special Judge concerned, who will decide the matter in accordance with law. 15. 15. In the case on hand, the Inspector, who investigated into the crime, was authorised to investigate the crime by the Superintendent of Police, cm, Hyderabad; the Inspector filed the charge sheet and the said report is an intimation to the Magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the investigating officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175 Cr.P.C. on which basis Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. 16. In M.C. Mehta's case (3 supra) the Supreme Court has not differed with the view taken by the Constitutional Bench in K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India (1991) 3SCC 655) where it was stated Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. provides that on completion of the investigation the police officer shall submit a report and cautiously it was stated that in Supreme Court monitoring cases the Superintendent of Police has to file his report. 17. In view of the same, I do not see any merit in the contention of the learned senior counsel that it is the Superintendent of Police alone has to file the report but not by the officer investigated the crime because, the Investigating Officer, who is authorised by Superintendent of Police, registered the case, forwarded the FIR and on completion of investigation submitted his report, on which basis the Special Judge found that there is sufficient material against the petitioner/ accused to proceed with the trial and issued summons. 18. The Criminal Petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. H.C REPORTS END