Hon'ble Dilip Gupta, J.: - The tenant has filed this petition for quashing the order dated 6th September, 2010 passed by the Prescribed Authority by which the application filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act') for release of the shop was allowed. The petitioner has also sought the quashing of the order dated 22nd October, 2011 passed by the District Judge, Bulandshahar by which the appeal filed by the petitioner for setting aside the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was dismissed. The landlord had filed the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for release of the shop for the need of his son Ankit Maheshwari who had passed the M.Com. Examination but was unemployed. The shop was, therefore, required to establish Ankit Maheshwari in cloth business since he had interest in it. It was stated that the tenant resides at Khurja but was doing a Cigarette Agency business in the shop in question. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority finding the need of Ankit Maheshwari to be genuine and bona fide. The tenant filed an appeal which has also been dismissed by the order dated 22nd October, 2011. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was necessary for the landlord to have served a notice on the tenant in terms of the first Proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act for the reason that the landlord had purchased the property in 2002 from the earlier owner and since this notice was not served upon the tenant, the application could not have been filed and the orders passed on the application should, therefore, be set aside. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been dealt with and rejected by the Appellate Court with the following observation:- "Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that the respondent purchased the house in question in March 2002 and before filing the petition u/s 21(1) of the Act it was necessary for the land-lord to give a notice to the tenant and allowing the tenant a six month time and after the expiry of six months the petition should have been presented. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the land-lord has not followed the mandatory provision of the Act and therefore learned Lower Court should not have allowed the petition. It is to be noted that this plea has not been taken by the appellant in the written statement filed by him. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that he had moved an amendment application 27B before the learned Lower Court through which he sought to amend the written statement by inserting the plea of six months' notice. Learned Lower Court did not allow the amendment application and against the order rejecting the amendment the appellant moved a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court which was also rejected, though, for default of the respondent. It is true that the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed not on merit but for default of the appellant but the facts remain established that the writ petition filed by the appellant against the order rejecting the amendment has been dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that even if the amendment application was rejected by the Lower Court he has right to raise the issue before the Appellate Court. .......................... It is true that appellant has right to raise the question of amendment in the appeal but it does not mean that merely because he has right to reagitate the matter in appeal the amendment will be allowed. The grounds on which the learned Lower Court has rejected the amendment is perfectly withing the four corners of law. It is admitted fact by the appellant that the respondent/petitioner is not original land-lord of the shop and the respondent purchased the shop in March 2002. After that the appellant started paying rent to the respondent. Thus it was well within the knowledge of the appellant that the ownership of the disputed shop has been changed. The respondent filed this petition u/s 21(1) of the Act after 5 years he had purchased the building. This Act was very much within the knowledge of the appellant. The petition was filed on 4.3.2008 and the appellant has filed his written statement on 26.5.2008. Affidavit of witness Mr. Ratan Lal on behalf of appellant Jagan Nath was filed on 14.8.2008. The rejoinder affidavit by petitioner Mukesh Kumar Maheshwari was filed on 8.9.2008. Thus the hearing concluded in the proceeding on 8.9.2008. The petition was filed on 4.3.2008 and the appellant has filed his written statement on 26.5.2008. Affidavit of witness Mr. Ratan Lal on behalf of appellant Jagan Nath was filed on 14.8.2008. The rejoinder affidavit by petitioner Mukesh Kumar Maheshwari was filed on 8.9.2008. Thus the hearing concluded in the proceeding on 8.9.2008. The amendment application was moved by the appellant on 10.11.2008 on the day when the file was fixed for final argument. Proviso to Order VI rule 17 CPC clearly provides that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial is commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that inspection of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. By perusal of amendment application 27B which the appellant moved before the learned Lower Court it is apparent that there is not even mention of reason that what prevented the appellant to move the amendment before the trial started. Simply saying that something has been left out from being mentioned in the written statement is not sufficient for allowing the application. Thus the learned Lower Court has rightly rejected the application. Nirbhai Kumar versus Maya Devi and others (2009 (1) ARC 767) which was decided by three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that view given in Martin and Harris Ltd. Vs. VIth Addl. District Judge and others (1998) (1) SCC 732 expressed the correct way. In Martin and Harris Ltd's case (supra) it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- "Six months' breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realise that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived." Thus in the light of the afore-mentioned observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the giving of notice provides a protection which personal to the tenant can be waived, therefore, it may be concluded that by not mentioning the plea of six months notice in the written statement the appellant waived his right in respect of six months' notice." Sri Atul Dayal, learned counsel for the respondents has, however, submitted that this plea about notice under the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was not raised by the tenant in the written statement and, therefore, he had waived the service of notice and in support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Martin & Harris Ltd. Vs. VIth Additional District Judge & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 732 and Nirbhay Kumar Vs. Maya Devi & Ors., (2009) 1 ARC 766. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. What transpires from the record of the writ petition is that the plea about the notice was not taken by the petitioner in the written statement. The petitioner subsequently moved an amendment application for introducing this plea in the written statement but this was rejected. He thereafter filed Writ Petition No.39913 of 2009 which was dismissed on 21st April, 2010 with the following observations:- "This petition is directed against an order rejecting an amendment application filed by the petitioner tenant at the time of hearing the release application and has obtained an interim order on 10th of August 2009. However, none appears to press this petition even in the revised list, though counsel for the respondent landlord is present. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed and the interim order is vacated." The Appellate Court has not only rejected this plea for the reason that that the writ petition filed against the order rejecting the amendment application had been dismissed but it has also examined the correctness of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority by which the amendment application was rejected and has not found any fault with the order. The order of the Appellate Court has been referred to above. The order of the Appellate Court has been referred to above. The plea raised by the petitioner cannot be accepted as there is no illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Court in holding that the amendment application was rightly rejected by the Prescribed Authority and that the plea could be waived. In the end, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that some time may be given to him to vacate the premises. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is ordered that the petitioner may be permitted to occupy the premises in dispute for a period of four months from today provided the petitioner furnishes an undertaking to this effect before the Prescribed Authority with the following conditions:- 1. That the petitioner will handover peaceful possession of the disputed premises to the landlord on or before 1st April, 2012. 2. That the petitioner shall pay compensation at the rate of Rs.1000/- per month. 3. That the petitioner shall not induct any other person during this period. If the petitioner furnishes such an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority within a period of three weeks from today, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority shall not be given effect to upto 1st April, 2012. The writ petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.