Hon'ble BHAGWATI, J.—Reportable Challenge in the instant writ petition is to the order dated 17th August, 2007, whereby the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, dismissed the application of the petitioner-plaintiff filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC. 2. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the relevant material on record, it is noticed that the petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of contract against the respondents-defendants. The respondents-defendants filed the written statement of defence and in Para 1 whereof, it was stated that out of total land in question, 3 bigha and 1.5 biswa land, had already been sold to the society Bhankrota Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') by their predecessor Kalu Ram on 1st May, 1995. Having come to know about the fact of the said sale to 'the Society', the petitioner-plaintiff filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC, imploring the court to allow him to implead 'the Society' as party defendant. The learned trial court dismissed the application, hence, this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that 'the Society' is a necessary party in the suit, as a part of the suit land was sold by the defendant-vendor to 'the Society' and in the absence of 'the Society', the suit cannot be adjudicated. In case, 'the Society' is not impleaded as party defendant, will have to file a separate suit for cancellation of the sale-deed, which will give rise to the multiplicity of litigation. The learned trial court dismissed the said application arbitrarily sans assigning any cogent reason. The finding recorded by the learned trial court is arbitrary and perverse, hence, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. He has cited the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal & Others reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 2813, in support thereof. 4. E converso, the learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned order and stated the same to be just and proper and contended that it did not warrant any intervention. Learned counsel further canvassed that 'the Society' does not exist and its registration has been cancelled. The Society has not been functioning. 4. E converso, the learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned order and stated the same to be just and proper and contended that it did not warrant any intervention. Learned counsel further canvassed that 'the Society' does not exist and its registration has been cancelled. The Society has not been functioning. Apart this, 'the Society' was not a party to the contract and a third party or a stranger claiming the independent title and possession of the contracted land is neither a necessary party nor a proper party, hence, the same is not entitled to join as a party defendant in the suit. Learned counsel for the respondents-defendants also has placed reliance on the same judgment of Kasturi (supra), which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Having reflected over the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and carefully scanned the relevant material on record including the impugned order, it is relevant to record that 'the Society's' registration has been cancelled and no officer thereof has been functioning. 'The Society', as of today, does not possess any status. Otherwise too, 'the Society' is not found to be a party to contract. It is a third party, who is stranger to the contract, hence, 'the Society' is neither found to be a necessary party nor proper party, who can be allowed to join as a party defendant in the suit. 6. In the case of Kasturi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus:- “In a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale the lis between the appellant-purchaser and the respondent-vendor shall only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide whether the third party have acquired any title and possession of the contracted property as that would not be germane for decision in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Two tests by which a person who is seeking addition in a pending suit for specific performance of the contract for sale must be satisfied. Two tests are -(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. Two tests are -(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. Applying the said two tests in the present case the third party or strangers to contract are not necessary parties as effective decree could be passed in their absence as they had not purchased the contracted property from the vendor after the contract was entered into. They were also not necessary parties as they would not be affected by the contract entered into between the appellant-purchaser and the respondent-vendor. Therefore order of Courts below allowing the application for addition of parties in the pending suit for specific performance of contract for sale filed at the instance of third party to contract would be illegal and liable to be set aside. (Para 18, 19, 21) In a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant-purchaser and the respondent-vendor and whether contract was executed by the appellant and the respondent for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against the respondent. It is an admitted position that the third party or stranger to contract did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is therefore, obvious that in the event, they are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. Therefore, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. Therefore, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of the third party in respect of the contracted property they would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Moreover, the appellant, who has filed the present suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is dominus litus and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner took me through Para 7, 13, 15 and 17 of the said judgment of Kasturi (supra) and contended that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the person, who has purchased the contracted land from the vendor, is a necessary party in the suit, hence, he should be impleaded as a party defendant. Having read the judgment in toto, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are found to be totally contrary to the judgment, as the said submission do not find any place in the judgment of Kasturi (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has relied upon so many judgments of the same court and reproduced relevant extract of the judgment of the case of Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker Versus Small, 1834 (40) English Report 848, which reads thus:- “It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract for sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a Court of law, giving damages only for the non-performance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequiate remedy. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a Court of law, giving damages only for the non-performance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequiate remedy. But in equity, as well as in law, the contract constitutes the right and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the party complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract and therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. Placing reliance on the case of Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra Alias Gadasa Guru, reported in 1995(3) SCC 147 , the Hon'ble Apex Court made the following observations:- “Since the respondent is not a party to the agreement of sale, it cannot be said that without his presence the dispute as to specific performance cannot be determined. Therefore, he is not a necessary party.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is found that the learned trial court dismissed the said application of the petitioner on the ground that in case, the petitioner-plaintiff was allowed to implead 'the Society' as a party defendant in the suit, the scope of suit for specific performance of contract for sale shall be enlarged from the specific performance of contract to suit for title, possession and declaration. Needless to say, that the addition of 'the Society' if allowed, it would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of suit would have been gone into. Hence, I find that the learned trial court has committed no error in dismissing the said application of the petitioner-plaintiff. The impugned order is found to be just and proper and suffers from no infirmity and same warrants no intervention. 10. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and the same being bereft of any merit stands dismissed.