Hon'ble RATHORE, J.—This writ petition of the year 1997 has come up today for final hearing. The learned counsel for the petitioner had informed that during the pendency of the writ petition in due course, the petitioner has taken away the brief from him. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the petitioner even in the second round. Therefore, this Court had directed Mr. M.K. Kaushik, Advocate to assist the Court in the case which had been initially filed by him and got admitted on 26.5.2005. 2. The writ petition had come to be filed before this Court as the petitioner was aggrieved of the orders passed by the respondents on 28.1.91 (Annex. 7) and 28.10.91 (Annex. 8). Therefore, it has been prayed by the petitioner that the impugned orders be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to award all consequential benefits. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable and subsequently he was confirmed on the said post after his services having been found satisfactory. In the year 1988, the petitioner was posted as a Constable in District Dholpur. It was on 2.4.1988 that a Parchabayan of Smt. Sumita Chakrawati came to be recorded by the police and a First Information Report No. 111/88 was registered at Kotwali, Dholpur for the offence under Secs. 366, 368 and 376 IPC. The usual investigation commenced thereafter and on conclusion of the same, a charge-sheet was filed before the Court concerned, against petitioners Rajendra Singh and Shiv Karan Singh. The learned Magistrate then committed the case for trial before the Court of Sessions. The learned trial Court i.e., Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dholpur, on conclusion of trial, decided the sessions case No. 44/90 by his judgment dated 9th August, 1990 (Annex. 1) holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Therefore, the accused persons were acquitted. It is to be noted that against the said judgment, no appeal was filed by the State or the complainant, as such the same had attained finality. 4. Later on a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner by issuance of a charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules on 5.9.88 and the same was served upon the petitioner (Annex. 2). The petitioner then submitted a representation before the Director General of Police, Rajasthan (Annex. 4. Later on a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner by issuance of a charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules on 5.9.88 and the same was served upon the petitioner (Annex. 2). The petitioner then submitted a representation before the Director General of Police, Rajasthan (Annex. 3) with the request that as the charges against the petitioner in departmental proceedings are same and similar to the one in the criminal case, the proceedings of the department pending before the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur be stayed. The charge-sheet issued by the department was based on the allegation levelled against the petitioner in the aforesaid criminal case (FIR 111/88). The petitioner had then filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet before the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur on 22.9.88 (Annex. 4). Thereafter, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dholpur was appointed as the enquiry officer, vide order dated 5.10.88. The petitioner also requested that the copies of the documents may be supplied to him. During the course of enquiry, the enquiry officer had recorded the statements of the witnesses including that of the prosecutrix Smt. Sumita Chakrawati, Rambabu, Raghuveer Singh S.I., SHO Maniya, Parmal Singh, Kamod Singh. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Deputy Superintendent of Police sent his report to the Superintendent of Police on 17.5.1989 wherein it was held that no charge has been found to be proved against the delinquent. It was also mentioned that the charges levelled in the charge-sheet of the departmental enquiry were similar to the one in the criminal case pending in a competent court. 5. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Police Distt. Dholpur who was the disciplinary authority remanded the matter to the Enquiry Officer for holding the enquiry afresh. The petitioner had then submitted an application before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dholpur requesting that he may be made aware about the reasons on which the enquiry once concluded is being reopened so that his case can be effectively pleaded. Subsequently, the enquiry was again concluded and a report was submitted to the Superintendent of Police on 21st August, 1990. Thereupon, the Superintendent of Police, the disciplinary authority, considered the matter and passed the impugned order dated 28.1.91 (Annex. 7), awarding punishment to the petitioner of withholding three annual grade increments with cumulative effect. It was also ordered that the punishment so awarded would have repercussions on pension, gratuity etc. Thereupon, the Superintendent of Police, the disciplinary authority, considered the matter and passed the impugned order dated 28.1.91 (Annex. 7), awarding punishment to the petitioner of withholding three annual grade increments with cumulative effect. It was also ordered that the punishment so awarded would have repercussions on pension, gratuity etc. Being aggrieved of the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Director General of Police, Range Bharatpur but without any success as the same came to be dismissed on 28.10.91 (Annex. 8). Later on, the petitioner filed a review petition before His Excellency, the Governor of Rajasthan which was rejected on 6.12.1996. Hence the present writ petition has been filed. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders passed by the respondents are wholly illegal and not sustainable in law for the simple reason that they are neither in accordance to the relevant provisions nor they have been passed after following the settled principles in respect of holding of enquiry under the CCA Rules nor with any application of mind. Further, it has been submitted that the petitioner delinquent against whom a criminal case was also initiated on the same charges, as levelled in the departmental enquiry, had been honourably acquitted by the learned criminal court as the prosecution had totally failed to prove its case. As a matter of fact, according to the counsel for the petitioner, the prosecutrix had very categorically deposed during the course of trial that the petitioner was not the person who had committed the offence and it was Rajendra Singh S/o Atul Singh who was involved in commission of the crime. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that though the disciplinary authority had affirmed the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of other charges that they have not been proved but had disagreed with the findings in respect of charge No. 5, for which there was no basis, much less to say any legal evidence on record. He has also submitted that the finding of the disciplinary authority as regards charge No. 5, is per-verse and based on no legal evidence. He has also submitted that the finding of the disciplinary authority as regards charge No. 5, is per-verse and based on no legal evidence. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that on perusal of the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the punishment awarded by him, purporting to be under clause (4) of Rule 14, is nothing but an outcome of total non application of mind. Therefore, he has submitted that the impugned orders deserves to be quashed, after allowing the present writ petition. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has made an endeavour too support the impugned orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority. He has submitted that the disciplinary authority had rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of charge No. 5, which stands proved in the departmental enquiry. He has further submitted that from the evidence on record, it is apparent that the delinquent was involved in the case whereby Sumita Chakrawati was made to travel in the train, thereafter her bag was taken away etc. etc. and that the petitioner had committed the alleged offence. Therefore, he is guilty of the charges levelled against him. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the disciplinary authority had considered in detail the evidence on record in respect of charge No. 5, and furnished reasons for disagreement with the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer. Thus, the counsel for the respondents has submitted that no case for interference in the orders impugned is made out and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. Indisputably, at the instance of Smt. Sumita Chakrawati, the criminal case was initiated and thereafter the departmental proceedings were held against the petitioner. In the said criminal case, a report was lodged and FIR was registered for the offence, inter alia, 366, 368 and 376 IPC. After completion of investigation, the police had filed the charge-sheet in the matter which came to be tried by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dholpur. After having considered the material on record which included the statements of Smt. Sumita Chakrawati as well as other prosecution witnesses, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Consequently, the acquittal was awarded to the accused petitioner. After having considered the material on record which included the statements of Smt. Sumita Chakrawati as well as other prosecution witnesses, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Consequently, the acquittal was awarded to the accused petitioner. Meanwhile, the departmental proceedings were initiated and at the initial stage, the petitioner had also made a request for staying the said proceedings till conclusion of criminal case. However, the departmental proceedings continued. The learned criminal court had arrived to the following findings: ^^vkxs c;ku esa Jherh pØorhZ us ;g Hkh dgk gS fd f'ko dj.k HknkSfj;k o o jktsUnz flag flikgh gkftj vnkyr vfHk;qDr x.k ugha gSA jktsUnz flikgh /kksyiqj dk Fkk ftlds firk dk uke vrqy flag o f'ko dj.k ds cki dk uke 'kfDr flag gSA vfHk;qDr x.k us mlds lkFk dqN ugha fd;k FkkA** Further, it held thus: ^^vU; xokgu jkts'k dqekj o lqjsUnz dqekj] th-vkj-ih- /kksyiqj ds flikgh gS ftUgksaus pksj pksj dh vkokt ij Hkkxdj vfHk;qDr jktsUnz flag dks idM+k gS vkSj idM+dj pkSdh bapktZ dks lqiqnZ fd;k FkkA bu xokgu ds dFku ls bl ckr dh iqf"V ugha gksrh gS fd vfHk;qDr jktsUnz flag rFkk f'ko dj.k HknkSfj;k nksuksa us Jherh lqferk pØorhZ ds lkFk cykRlax fd;k gks rFkk Jherh lqferk pØorhZ dks cgyk Qqlyk dj Qjkj fd;k gksA** 9. Ultimately, the learned criminal court came to the following conclusion whereby it had acquitted the petitioner on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case: ^^Jherh lqferk pØorhZ ds dFku dks ;fn v{kjl% lgh eu tk;s rks Hkh vfHk;qDr x.k }kjk mlds lkFk cykRlax fd;k tkuk vFkok mls cgyk Qqlyk dj Qjkj fd;k tkuk drbZ lkfcr ugha gSA Jherh lqferk pØorhZ ds lkFk xkSj vU;k; gqvk gS ysfdu mlds Lo;a ds dFkukuqlkj mDr vijk/k djus okys O;fDr dksbZ vkSj gh gS ftUgsa iqfyl ugha idM+ vkbZA cgjgky vfHk;kstu i{k dh lk{; ls vfHk;qDr jktsUnz flag ds fo:) Hkknl dh /kkjk 366] 368] 376 rFkk vfHk;qDr f'ko dj.k HknkSfj;k ds fo:) Hkknla dh /kkjk 368] 376 ds rgr tqeZ lkfcr ugha gSA** 10. The enquiry officer by his report dated 17.5.89 held that none of the charges are proved against the delinquent. The enquiry officer by his report dated 17.5.89 held that none of the charges are proved against the delinquent. In so far as charge No. 5 is concerned, the enquiry officer has held as follows: ^^jktsUnz flag ls lqferk dk dfFkr fNuk;k gqvk dksbZ cSx cjken ugha gqvk ftldh rkbZn thvkjih pkSdh ds jkstukepk fnukad 2-4-88 dh fjiksVZ ua- 16 o 17 Øe'k% bZ-,Dl-Mh- 1 o Mh- 2 ls c[kwch gksrh gSA jktsUnz flag lqferk ds jsyos iqfyl esa igqapus ls iwoZ gh pkSdh ij cSBk;k gqvk FkkA o mlds dksbZ cSx cjken ugha gqvkA** It also held that no bag was recovered from the petitioner. As regard the prosecutrix Sumita Chakrawati, the enquiry officer held that: ^^Jherh lqferk us foHkkxh; tkap esa fn;s c;ku esa jktsUnz flag ls fdlh izdkj dh f'kdk;r uk gksuk o iwoZ ijpk c;ku o iqfyl c;ku o vnkyr ds c;ku iqfyl }kjk djkuk o jktsUnz flag ds fo:) lqferk }kjk dksbZ c;ku uk nsus ls izkIr lk{; ls vkjksi la[;k 5 nks"kh dkfu- ds fo:) fl) ugha ik;k tkrkA** Therefore, the Deputy superintendent of Police, Dholpur on conclusion of the enquiry, submitted a detail report after discussing the evidence on record and came to the categorical findings in respect of each and every aspect of the case and the charges levelled against the petitioner. Even then the disciplinary authority felt dissatisfied with the report of the enquiry officer and remanded the matter for holding the enquiry afresh. 11. It is to be noted that the delinquent was never informed/conveyed about the reasons of disagreement of the disciplinary authority or the basis on which the matter was returned and the second enquiry was ordered to be held against the petitioner. The petitioner had also submitted an application on 11.9.89 (Annex. 6) after referring to clause (9) of Rule 16 of the CCA Rules that he should be conveyed the reasons/basis for remanding the case for de novo enquiry but nothing transpired in respect of the said application and the enquiry officer had again submitted a report before the disciplinary authority on 21st August, 1990. The Superintendent of Police, Dholpur-respondent No. 3 who was the disciplinary authority in the present case, had also agreed to the finding of the enquiry officer on the charges against the petitioner, except charge No. 5. The Superintendent of Police, Dholpur-respondent No. 3 who was the disciplinary authority in the present case, had also agreed to the finding of the enquiry officer on the charges against the petitioner, except charge No. 5. However, as regards charge No. 5, respondent No. 3 has sought to be in disagrement with the enquiry officer and held that: ^^eSa tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr tkap izfrosnu ls iw.kZr% lger ugha gwa vkSj vkjksiksa ds fo'ys"k.k ls nks"kh vf/kdkjh ds fo:) vkjksfir vkjksi la[;k 5 dks iw.kZr% LkUnsg ls ijs fl) ekurk gwa ftldk fo'ys"k.k mij fd;k tk pqdk gSA** 12. Therefore, holding the petitioner guilty for charge No. 5, the disciplinary authority awarded punishment, under Rule 14(4) of the CCA Rules, of withholding three grade increments with cumulative effect. In consequence thereof, the pension, gratuity etc. of the petitioner were also to be effected. 13. A close look to the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority, in respect of charge No. 5, goes to show that in he has primary placed reliance on the statements of the prosecutrix recorded in the criminal case under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., without taking note of the fact that she has during the course of trial, not only denied the allegation that the petitioner has committed any offence but has categorically stated that Rajendra Singh who had commenced the crime is totally different person. She has also stated that the accused Rajendra Singh is the son of Atul Singh. The disciplinary authority has also failed to take notice of the fact that on the basis of aforesaid evidence on record, the learned criminal Court had acquitted the petitioner, specifically on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. In other words, the learned trial Court had arrived to a conclusion that it is a case of no evidence against the petitioner. It is also to be noted that even in the departmental proceedings, the prosecutrix has not made any statement against the delinquent petitioner. 14. In face of these facts, the findings given by the disciplinary authority that charge against the petitioner is proved to the extent of his taking the prosecutrix to railway station on 2.4.88 and thereafter he being caught by some persons cannot be sustained. 14. In face of these facts, the findings given by the disciplinary authority that charge against the petitioner is proved to the extent of his taking the prosecutrix to railway station on 2.4.88 and thereafter he being caught by some persons cannot be sustained. The disciplinary authority has grossly failed to take into account the fact that charge No. 5 related to the incident of 2.4.88 for which a complaint was made by Sumita Chakrawati and the offences alleged included 366, 368 and 376 IPC etc. When the substantial part of the prosecution story, particularly in respect of offence of rape etc., had been held by the disciplinary authority to be not proved against the petitioner then there was no reason for him to have held that charge No. 5 is proved against the delinquent officer. In fact, the finding arrived at by the disciplinary authority is based on surmises and conjunctures without there being any corroborating evidence on record. 15. It would also be relevant to mention here that the respondents had also failed it discharge its legal obligation by not conveying the reasons of disagreement by the disciplinary authority to the report submitted by the enquiry officer on 17.5.89 and also the reasons for holding fresh/de novo enquiry against the petitioner, without any notice/intimation to him whatsoever. The delinquent petitioner has been punished under clause (iv) of Rule 14 with punishment of stoppage of three annual grade increments which is provided under sub-clause (ii) of Rule 14 of the CCA Rules. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussions as well as the material on record and the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, on occasions more than one, I am of the considered opinion that the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner has merit and the impugned orders passed by the respondents are not sustainable in law. Therefore, this writ petition has to be allowed and impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. 17. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders passed by respondent No. 3 on 28.1.91 (Annex. 7) and the order dated 28.10.91 (Annex. 8) passed by respondent No. 2, are hereby quashed and set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.