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2011 DIGILAW 2759 (RAJ)

Suresh v. State of Rajasthan

2011-12-14

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2011
Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—Having been convicted for offence under Section 376 IPC, having been sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and having been imposed with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and further directed to undergo three months' simple imprisonment in default thereof, vide judgment dated 31.8.2007, passed by the Upper District & Sessions Judge No. 1, Deeg (Bharatpur), the appellant has approached this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 17.10.1996, Smt. Vimla (PW.3) lodged a criminal complaint before the Judicial Magistrate Deeg, wherein she claimed that the appellant, Suresh was running a photo studio in the name and style of Kamlesh Photo Studio. She further claimed that in January 1996, he had called her daughter, the prosecutrix (name withheld) (PW.4), who was thirteen years old at that time, to his photo studio on the pretext that he will take good pictures of her. When she reached the photo studio, he have her a Barfi (a sweet meat). After eating the Barfi, her daughter became unconscious. According to her, he took off her daughter's clothes and committed rape upon her. He also took photographs of her in nude and semi-nude positions. Subsequently, he threatened her that in case she went not to come to his studio, he would make these photographs public. Due to this threat, her daughter continued to visit the studio. On 20.8.1996, the prosecutrix (PW.4) went to her sister's place and came back on 26.9.1996. Upon her return, the appellant again called her to the studio and threatened her that in case she does not come to his studio, he would publicise the photographs. On 11.10.1996, he came to their house and verbally fought with them. On 16.10.1996 and 17.10.1996, he again came to their house and assaulted both the complainant and the prosecutrix. He also showed the indescent photographs to the complainant and threatened her that he would make them public. The complainant further claimed that when she went to the police station, the police refused to register a case against the appellant. Therefore, she has filed the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement of the complainant under Sec. 200 Cr.P.C., and that of the prosecutrix and other two witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C. 3. Meanwhile, on 2.11.1996, the complainant again lodged a complaint before the same Magistrate. Therefore, she has filed the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement of the complainant under Sec. 200 Cr.P.C., and that of the prosecutrix and other two witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C. 3. Meanwhile, on 2.11.1996, the complainant again lodged a complaint before the same Magistrate. Under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C, the learned Magistrate sent the complaint for further investigation to thee Police Station Deeg. On the basis of this complaint, the police chalked out a formal FIR, FIR No. 526/1996. The appellant challenged the filing of the second FIR on the basis of the same set of facts before this Court. This Court quashed and set aside the FIR No. 526/1996. However, it directed that the investigation made in the said FIR, the relevant papers thereof, should be submitted before the Judicial Magistrate who shall take these documents on record in the complaint filed by the complainant. Subsequently, the Magistrate book the cognizance against the appellant for offences under Sections 376 IPC and for offence under Section 3/8 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act 1986. 4. In order to buttress its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses and submitted twelve documents. But, the defence did not examine any witness. It did, however, submit two documents (both of documents have been marked inadvertently as Ex. D.2). After going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide judgment dated 31.8.2007, the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned. Hence, this appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. Rakesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently raised the following contentions before this Court; firstly, it is a case of consent rather than of rape. Secondly, according to Dr. Govind Singh (PW.1) and Dr. Madan Tripathi (PW.6), the prosecutrix is between the ages of 16 to 17 years. Thus, she was major enough to give her consent for sexual intercourse. Moreover, according to her medical report, she was used to sexual intercourse. The medical report does not show any injury marks on her body. Hence, the medical evidence does not corroborate the prosecutrix's testimony. Furthermore, there is a delay of almost nine months in lodging of the complaint. The silence on the part of the prosecutrix clearly shows that it is a case of consent and not of rape. The medical report does not show any injury marks on her body. Hence, the medical evidence does not corroborate the prosecutrix's testimony. Furthermore, there is a delay of almost nine months in lodging of the complaint. The silence on the part of the prosecutrix clearly shows that it is a case of consent and not of rape. Thirdly, the prosecutrix (PW.4) has changed her version from her statement given under Section 161 Cr.P.C., to her statement given under Section 164 Cr.P.C., to her testimony before the Court. Hence she is not a reliable witness. Therefore, the learned Judge should have sought corroboration in this case. Lastly, the complaint was filed only after the family was informed about the illicit relationship that existed between the prosecutrix and the appellant. Therefore, the complaint has been filed only to save the honour of the family. Thus, the appellant is being falsely implicated in a case under Section 376 IPC. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Javed Choudhary, the learned Public Prosecutor, has strenuously contended that it is not a case of consent, but is a case of rape. The prosecutrix (PW.4) has maintained silence as she was repeatedly threatened by the appellant that he would make her indecent pictures and the video tape public. Moreover, he had threatened her that he would have her brother and sister kidnapped. Therefore, in order to save the honour of the family, in order to protect her siblings, she had maintained silence and suffered repeated rapes. Moreover, since she had been subjected to sexual intercourse under duress, obviously the element of "consent" does not exist. Therefore, even if the prosecutrix is major, the element of consent is conspicuously missing. Moreover, it is a clear cut case of taking, enticing and seeking sexual favours under duress. Secondly, the prosecutrix (PW.4) has given a consistent story in her statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., and in her statement recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., as well as in her testimony before the Court. She had clearly stated that on the first occasion, she was offered a Barfi. After eating the Barfi, she had became unconscious and lost her power to resist the moves of the appellant had assaulted her and her mother and threatened to publicise the indecent photographs. She had clearly stated that on the first occasion, she was offered a Barfi. After eating the Barfi, she had became unconscious and lost her power to resist the moves of the appellant had assaulted her and her mother and threatened to publicise the indecent photographs. Thirdly, since the prosecutrix was subjected to repeated rapes that too over a period of ten months, naturally the doctors were justified in claiming that the prosecutrix is habitual to sexual intercourse. Although her testimony may not have been corroborated by medical evidence, but her testimony has been corroborated by Vimla (PW.3) and by Dheeraj (PW.5). Hence, there is sufficient corroboration in the present case. Lastly, the learned Judge has meticulously examined the evidence and critically analyzed it. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, examined the record and perused the impugned judgment. 8. The moot question before this Court is whether it is a case of consent or of rape? Section 375 IPC defines rape as under: "375. Rape-A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:- First.- Against her will. Secondly- Without her consent. Thirdly - With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Forthly.- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly.- With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly.- With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation.- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception.- Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. 9. Sixthly.- With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation.- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception.- Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. 9. A bare perusal of the above provision clearly reveals that if sexual intercourse has been done either against her will or without her consent, or with her consent- a consent given under fear, or a consent under intoxication or under the influence of stupefying then such a sexual intercourse is rape. 10. Relying upon the case of State vs. Schwab 143 NE 29 in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Chhotey Lal ( 2011 2 SCC 550 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: Will is defined as wish, desire, pleasure, inclination, choice, the faculty of conscious, and especially of deliberate action. It is purely and solely a mental process to be ascertained, in a prosecution for rape, by what the prosecuting witness may have said or done. It being a mental process there is no other manner by which her will can be ascertained, and it must be left to the jury to determine that will by her acts and statements, as disclosed by the evidence. It is not natural, therefore, that in charging the jury upon the subject of rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, the courts should have almost universally, and, in many cases, exclusively, discussed `consent' and resistance. There can be no better evidence of willingness is a condition and state of mind no better evidence of unwillingness then resistance. No lexicographer recognizes `consent' as a synonym of willingness, and it is apparent that they are not synonymous. It is equally apparent, on the other hand, that the true relations between the words is that willingness is a condition or state of mind and `consent' one of the evidences of that condition. Likewise, resistance is not a synonym of unwillingness, though it is an evidence thereof. In all cases, therefore, where the prosecuting witness has an intelligent will the Court should charge upon the elements of `consent' and resistance as being proper elements from which the jury may infer either of a favourable or an opposing will. Likewise, resistance is not a synonym of unwillingness, though it is an evidence thereof. In all cases, therefore, where the prosecuting witness has an intelligent will the Court should charge upon the elements of `consent' and resistance as being proper elements from which the jury may infer either of a favourable or an opposing will. It must, however, be recognized in all cases that the real test is where the assault was committed against the will of the prosecuting witness. 11. The prosecutrix (PW.4) tells the court in her examination-in-chief that about eleven years ago, she had suffered an electric shock for which she had to be taken to the hospital. The appellant had accompanied her to the hospital. After she came back from the hospital, the appellant used to visit her house. Suresh had told her that in case she were to come to his studio, he will take good pictures of her. When she reached his studio, he offered her Barfi. When she ate the Barfi, she felt weak and started to faint. According to her, he kissed her and then started removing her clothes. He also removed his clothes and then proceeded to ravish her. When she came back to her senses, he told her to come back to his studio after seven days and get her photographs. After seven days when she went to the studio, he showed her indecent photographs of her where she was depicted without any clothes and where she was shown having sexual intercourse with the appellant. He offered a cup of tea. Again she became unconscious and again he ravished her. He threatened her that in case she were not to come to his studio, he would publicize her photographs. He also threatened her that he would have her brother and sister kidnapped. Because of these threats, she continued to visit the studio and continued to have sexual intercourse with him. Subsequently, she went to her sister's place at Gangapur and stayed there for one and a half months. When she came back, Suresh sent a girl, called Rajo, to her house and threatened her that in case she were not to visit him at his studio, he would kidnap her brother and sister. This time, she refused to go to the studio. Thereafter, Suresh came to her house and assaulted her and her mother. When she came back, Suresh sent a girl, called Rajo, to her house and threatened her that in case she were not to visit him at his studio, he would kidnap her brother and sister. This time, she refused to go to the studio. Thereafter, Suresh came to her house and assaulted her and her mother. He also showed the indecent photographs to her and her mother. Subsequently, her mother and she went to the police station to lodge a report. Even thereafter when she lost her grandmother, Suresh came to her house and threatened her that he would publicly display her photographs. Subsequently, they went to a lawyer and started the proceedings before the criminal court. 12. In her cross-examination , she claimed that when she ate the Barfi, she felt weak and started to faint. He kissed her and then started removing her clothes. When he removed her clothes, they were not torn. He also removed his clothes. He lay her down on a dari in the photo studio and ravished her. At that time, no one was present in the studio. She further claimed that he used to call her when no one was present there. She did not see Gopal and Ravi in the Studio. She admitted the fact that there were shops around the studio, but she did not know the owners of the shops. She claimed that when she raised hue and cry, Suresh had closed her mouth. She claimed that she had told the Magistrate in her statement recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., (Ex. P.8) that the accused had spread a dari. However, this fact was not mentioned in Ex. P. 8. Similarly, she had informed the Magistrate that she had raised hue and cry. But she does not know as to why this fact has not been mentioned in Ex. P.8. She further claimed that since she felt weak and semi-conscious, therefore, she does not remember whether the clothes were removed or not? She could not tell the court as to how the photographs were taken. However, there were two cameras in the studio. She further claimed that the photographs were given to the police. She further claimed that after a year, she was married of, she further claimed that at the time of deposition, she was twenty-three years old. She could not tell the court as to how the photographs were taken. However, there were two cameras in the studio. She further claimed that the photographs were given to the police. She further claimed that after a year, she was married of, she further claimed that at the time of deposition, she was twenty-three years old. She denied the fact that at the time of incident, she was sixteen years old and claimed that actually she was thirteen years old. She further claimed that he age as sixteen years as given by the doctors is incorrect. She further claimed that since the appellant treated her as a sister, she had gone to the studio. Moreover, she did not think that he would do anything indecent with her. She further claimed that once she was assaulted by him at her house, she told everything to her parents. She further claimed that she had told the police in her statement (Ex. D.2) that she had fainted when she had been offered a cup of tea. However, all these facts have not been mentioned; she does not know the reason for their non-mentioning. She further claimed that she had informed the police that she felt weak when the appellant had kissed her. She cannot tell the reason, why again this fact has not been recorded. In her cross-examination, there is a note recorded by the Court that "the witness has informed the Court that even just outside the Court she has been threatened by the accused that he will deal with her, when he comes out of the jail." She further claimed that she had told the police, in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that she had tried to raise hue and cry. But this fact has not been recorded in the statement. She further claimed that when the appellant had sexual intercourse, he had ejaculated; part of the ejaculation, had fallen on her thigh and on her clothes. According to her, the appellant had sent Rajo to her house. She further claimed that Dheeraj used to come to her house and treated her as a sister. She denied the fact that Surendra had come to her house. She further denied the fact that she knew Surendra by his name. She denied the fact that when she was hospitalized, Suresh had spent any money upon her. She further claimed that Dheeraj used to come to her house and treated her as a sister. She denied the fact that Surendra had come to her house. She further denied the fact that she knew Surendra by his name. She denied the fact that when she was hospitalized, Suresh had spent any money upon her. She further claimed that at the time of incident, Suresh was a bachelor. She further denied the fact that her parents wanted her to marry Suresh. Therefore, she fabricated a case against him. 13. A bare perusal of her testimony clearly reveals that the prosecutrix (PW.4) has clearly stated that she was subjected to threats. Her consent was given either under duress or under a threat that the appellant would make her indecent photographs public or he would have her siblings kidnapped. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the consent was given without fear is clearly unacceptable. Since the consent was given under duress, it cannot be said to be free and without fear. Since the sexual intercourse was under a threat, obviously it is a case of rape. 14. Considering the fact that the prosecutrix (PW.4) had been subjected to sexual intercourse over a number of months, naturally one does not expect any medical sign of rape. Therefore, it is not surprising that the medical report does not corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix. However, in catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is adding insult to injuries to require corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony. Such corroboration is required only when the prosecutrix is found to be an untrustworthy witness. However, in the present case the prosecutrix has given a consistent story. As far as the rape is concerned, the contradictions pointed out in the cross-examination are on minor points. Therefore, the contradictions do not weaken her story. Once this court is of the opinion that the prosecutrix is a trustworthy witness, the question of seeking corroboration of her testimony does not even arise. 15. The learned Judge has noticed the fact that the testimony of the prosecutrix is corroborated by her mother, Smt. Vimla (PW.3). Smt. Vimla in her examination-in-chief claims that about ten years ago while her daughter was sitting outside the house, the appellant came and assaulted her daughter as her daughter did not go to her studio. 15. The learned Judge has noticed the fact that the testimony of the prosecutrix is corroborated by her mother, Smt. Vimla (PW.3). Smt. Vimla in her examination-in-chief claims that about ten years ago while her daughter was sitting outside the house, the appellant came and assaulted her daughter as her daughter did not go to her studio. He further threatened her that in case she does not come to the studio, he will make her indecent photographs public. When she was asked about the indecent photographs by the Court, she answered, "indecent photographs means naked photos". She further claimed that the appellant assaulted her daughter with fists and when she intervened he also assaulted her. When she asked her daughter as to what was the matter, her daughter informed her that he used to call her at the shop; he used to give drugs and then would proceed to ravish her. She further claimed that she and her daughter went to the police for lodging the report, but the police personnels refused to register the case. Although the police personnels assured that they would investigate the case, but they never did. She further claimed that her daughter informed her that Suresh had ravished her about four or five times. She further claimded that Suresh threatened that in case her daughter does not come to his studio, he would have killed the prosecutrix's brother and sister. 16. In her cross-examination, she claimed that Suresh along with Dheeraj and one another boy came to her house in the afternoon. She cannot remember the name of the other boy. She further claimed that two other boys, who belong to Scheduled Caste community, came with the appellant. She further claimed that she had informed the Magistrate that the appellant had shown the photographs at her house. But this fact has not been mentioned in the statement (Ex.D.1) recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. She further claimed that she has stated the same facts before the police in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D.2), but this fact has also not been mentioned in the statement. She further claimed that her husband used to live with her. But on the date of incident, he had gone to Delhi. She denied the fact that her daughter was sixteen to seventeen years old at the time of the incident. She further claimed that her husband used to live with her. But on the date of incident, he had gone to Delhi. She denied the fact that her daughter was sixteen to seventeen years old at the time of the incident. She further denied the fact that they wanted to marry her daughter with Suresh. Thus, the statements of Smt. Vimla (PW.3) corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix on the point of being assaulted by Suresh and on the point that he would publicise the indecent photographs public. 17. The learned Judge has also noticed the fact that although Dheeraj (PW.5) has turned hostile, but he has admitted his signatures in the statement given by him under Section 202 Cr.P.C., before the Judicial Magistrate (Ex.P/10). Although he has denied the statement given before the Magistrate, the learned Judge is of the opinion that the statement given before the court is a reliable witness. 18. In the case of Surendra Singh vs. State of Haryana (2006) 9 SCC 247 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court is of the opinion that even if a witness has turned hostile, but in case he were to admit his signatures on documents, then the contents of the documents should be held to be true. Therefore, the learned Judge is justified in holding that the Dheeraj's statement given before the Judicial Magistrate (Ex.P.10) should be taken to be true. 19. Although it is true that the complaint was lodged after a period of nine to ten months, but the nature of the case clearly shows that the prosecutrix had failed to inform the police as she was constantly under threat that her indecent photographs would be publicized. Thus, the delay is a reasonable one. Moreover, in catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court is of the opinion that rape is a crime which adversely affects the honour of the family and the prestige of the victim. Therefore, the family is reluctant to report the crime to the police. Therefore, the inordinate delay of nine to ten months is not fatal to the prosecution case. 20. As a last resort, Mr. Rakesh Kumar has vehemently pleaded that the sentence of the appellant should be reduced to as undergone. However, this Court is unable to accept such a plea. In the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors. 20. As a last resort, Mr. Rakesh Kumar has vehemently pleaded that the sentence of the appellant should be reduced to as undergone. However, this Court is unable to accept such a plea. In the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors. ( 1996(2) SCC 384 = RLW 1996(2) SC 97), the Hon'ble Apex Court opined that "Of late crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating woman's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. A rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault- it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murder destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity." 21. In the case of Dinesh vs. State of Rajasthan (2006) 3 SCC 771 ), the Apex Court has observed that "a social sensitised judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos." 22. While dealing with sentencing in cases of crime against woman, in the case of State of Punjab vs. Rakesh Kumar (2008) 12 SCC 33 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of `order' should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his `Law in Changing Society' stated that: `State of criminal law continues to be- as it should be- a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.' Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. 10. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal vs. State of T.N. (1991) 3 SCC 471 ). 11. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 12. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilised societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undersiable practical consequences. 13. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle McGautha vs. State of California (402 US 183) that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. * * * 15. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. * * * 15. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime .e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be resultwise counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. The imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the court responds to the society's cry for justice against the criminal. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime and the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. 23. Keeping these principles in mind, and considering the fact that the learned counsel has not made out any special case for reducing the sentence to as undergone, this Court declines the plea. 24. For the reasons stated above, this criminal appeal is devoid of any merit; it is, hereby, dismissed.