Omway Build Estate (P) Ltd. v. Divisional Commr. , Jaipur
2011-12-20
AJAY RASTOGI
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. - Since both the petitions involve common questions, and are directed against the order Dated 29/12/2008 passed by Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur setting aside order Dated 31/10/2008 of the Authorised Officer (Land Resumption) & Land Acquisition Officer. UIT, Alwar. in exercise of powers under Section 90-B(7) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. 1956 ("LR Act"), hence are being decided by present order. 2. In order to appreciate grievance of the petitioners, facts leading to file instant petitions are necessarily to be indicate out of CWP-195/2009 (M/s. Omway Build Estate (P) Ltd v. Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur & Ors) . In respect of agricultural lands situated in village Bailaka Diwakri (Alwar district) which is subject matter of dispute, initially vide resolution No.23 in meeting held on 16/08/1988. Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar ("UIT") proposed to set up a residential colony "Rohini Nagar" and taking note thereof, State Government issued proposed notification Dated 25/07/1995 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("LA Act") and after taking note of the objections raised by land owners/persons interested under Sections 5A. declaration under Section 6 of LA Act was made & published vide Notification Dated 20/01/1997 and the Award came to be passed under Section 11 of LA Act on 25/06/98. 3. It is relevant to record that the Award was passed on 25/06/1998, but neither possession of the subject land was taken nor any compensation was offered nor paid either to the land owners (predecessors-in-interest) or to the present petitioners. 4. However, on 10/08/2000, the UIT took a decision to de-acquire the subject land keeping in view availability of other land with the UIT. slow speed of disposal of land, non-availability of funds for the compensation be paid and its poor financial conditions and in order to follow up action, letter Dated 12/ 04/2001 (Ann.14) was written by Director, NCR & Secretary of the UIT. Alwar. and sent to the State Government to de-notify the acquisition and reminder was also issued on 29/08/2001 (Ann. 15) and that apart, the UIT further resolved to re-affirm its policy to de-acquire the land and pursuant thereto, notices Dated 16/10/2004 (Ans.16 & 17) were published in news papers inviting persons interested to file objections thereto. 5.
Alwar. and sent to the State Government to de-notify the acquisition and reminder was also issued on 29/08/2001 (Ann. 15) and that apart, the UIT further resolved to re-affirm its policy to de-acquire the land and pursuant thereto, notices Dated 16/10/2004 (Ans.16 & 17) were published in news papers inviting persons interested to file objections thereto. 5. It appears that after publication of notices (supra), the UIT in its later meeting reviewed its decision regarding Rohini Nagar Scheme but ultimately, notification Under section 48 of LA Act was published in the Gazette on 01/12/2006 (Ann.10) for withdrawal of subject land from acquisition. However, during the interregnum period, the petitioners purchased subject land vide registered sale deed Dated 22/03/2006 & 10/11/2006 from various khatedars/land owners of subject land. 6. After withdrawal of subject land from acquisition vide notification Dated 01/12/2006 under Section 48 of LA Act, Ghanshyam (petitioner-CWP-129/09) filed application under Section 90B(3) of LR Act in respect of 3.45 hectares of land on 09/03/2007 (Ann.1-CWP-129/09) while M/s. Omway Build Estate (P) Ltd for 9.37 hectares of land for proposed development as residential township in their joint ventures. 7. After submission of their applications filed under Section 90B(3), notices thereof were published on 30/03/2007 in daily news paper - "Rajasthan Patrika" inviting objections. However, taking note of objections having been submitted by persons interested, both the applications under Section 90B(3) of LA Act were allowed by Authorised Officer (respondent-4) vide order Dated 14/06/2007 (Ann.3) and their subject land was mutated in the name of UIT, Alwar on 19/06/2007 and accordingly, layout plan was approved by the UIT (Ann.4) alongwith road network plan (Ann.6). 8. One of applicants who was person interested, as alleged, having raised objections before the Authorised Officer, namely Shri Rajesh Agrawal & feeling aggrieved by order Dated 14/06/2007 passed under Section 90-B(3), preferred appeal under Section 90B(7) of LR Act before the Divisional Commissioner. Jaipur who after taking note of submissions, set aside the order Dated 14/06/2007 of the Authorised Officer and remitted back to the authorised officer, vide order Dated 21/08/2007 with the direction to examine the matter afresh in the light of what has been observed by the appellate authority. 9.
Jaipur who after taking note of submissions, set aside the order Dated 14/06/2007 of the Authorised Officer and remitted back to the authorised officer, vide order Dated 21/08/2007 with the direction to examine the matter afresh in the light of what has been observed by the appellate authority. 9. It has come on record that after the matter was remanded back to the Authorised Officer, Rajesh Agrawal did not appear before the Authorised Officer and ultimately, notice came to be published in daily news papers on 18/02/2008, yet he did not appear and ex parte proceedings were initiated against him. But in course of proceedings, the order initiating ex parte proceedings was re-called and at one stage, when the matter could not be proceeded further by Authorised Officer. CWP-4599/2008 came to be filed by M/s. Omway Build Estate (P) Ltd. and this Court vide order Dated 26/05/2008 directed the authorised officer to dispose of the application within time scheduled fixed by the Court. 10. It has been averred by petitioner (Ghan Shyam) that Rajesh Agrawal & one Suresh Mangla were all hand in glove and were raising objections at the instance of M/s. Ozone Builders & Developers (P) Ltd. in which Praveen Mangla was its Director who had at one point of time collaborated with M/s. Omway Build Estate (P) Ltd. in regard to the present project but disputes arose between M/s Omway Build Estate (P) Ltd. with M/s. Ozone Builders & Developers (P) Ltd. which was referred to Arbitration to the Former Chief Justice of India. Mr.Y. K. Sabharwal which proceedings are pending. It has further been averred that before matter could be referred for arbitration, M/s. Ozone Builders raised the matter before Delhi High Court wherein order was passed to reserve ⅓rd plots for M/s. Ozone Builders. 11. It has been alleged by the petitioners that Shri Praveen Mangla who had initially filed objections alongwith Rajesh Agrawal, Inder Mangla & Jethmal Jain, withdrew his objections before the Authorised Officer but thereafter Rajesh Agrawal tiled his objections.
11. It has been alleged by the petitioners that Shri Praveen Mangla who had initially filed objections alongwith Rajesh Agrawal, Inder Mangla & Jethmal Jain, withdrew his objections before the Authorised Officer but thereafter Rajesh Agrawal tiled his objections. Further, a public interest litigation (DB CWP-4810/2008) was filed by one Ashok Agarwal being hand in glove with Rajesh Agrawal (respondent-2 herein and one Praveen Mangla & Ors) assailing notification Dated 01/12/2006 issued under Section 48 of LA Act regarding withdrawal of the subject land from acquisition: but that PIL came to be dismissed vide order Dated 16/12/2008, apparently on the ground of their locus, That apart, at the same time. one Khatedar-Hazruddin also filed a civil suit in regard to the subject land praying for an injunction, that came to be rejected against which Misc. appeal was filed but rejected and Special Appeal filed before the Division Bench wherein the suit, itself was withdrawn. 12. However, after the matter was remitted back, the Authorised Officer, taking note of objections raised by respondent-2 allowed application of petitioners filed under Section 90-B(3) of LR Act vide order Dated 31/10/2008 - against which Rajesh Agrawal (respondent-2) preferred appeal under Section 90-B(7) of I.R Act before the Divisional Commissioner and the order of the Authorised Officer was set aside and the matter was again remitted back to the Authorised Officer, vide order Dated 29/12/2008 which is subject matter of challenge herein. 13. This Court has heard the learned Senior Counsel for the parties at length and with their assistance, scanned the material on record. 14. Shri Kamlakar Sharma & Shri Abhay Kumar Bhandari, both the Senior Counsel appearing for petitioners vehemently contended that appeal preferred by respondent-2 (Rajesh Agrawal) under Section 90B(7) of LR Act before Division Commissioner was not maintainable and the order impugned being without authority & competence, without going into merits of the issues raised for consideration, the order impugned Dated 29/12/2008 passed by Divisional Commissioner deserves to be set aside. In support, reliance has been placed upon judgments of this Court in Gajendra Singh v. Divisional Commissioner ( 2009(2) WLC 668 ) & Smt. Meena Sharma v. Rajendra Kr. Porwal (2011 (4) WLC 524) . 15. To support the impugned order of the Divisional Commissioner, Shri Bharat Vyas & Shri Abhinav Sharma.
In support, reliance has been placed upon judgments of this Court in Gajendra Singh v. Divisional Commissioner ( 2009(2) WLC 668 ) & Smt. Meena Sharma v. Rajendra Kr. Porwal (2011 (4) WLC 524) . 15. To support the impugned order of the Divisional Commissioner, Shri Bharat Vyas & Shri Abhinav Sharma. Counsel for respondents jointly submit that appeals preferred by respondents were maintainable and both the Counsel have tried to convince that judgments of Co-ordinate Bench on which reliance has been placed by Counsel for petitioner requires re-consideration and further submit that sub-section (1) & (3) of Section 90-13 of LR Act, both are inter-dependent and a reference has been made of "such land" in these two sub-sections and that being so, person aggrieved by an order passed by Authorised Officer. u/sub-ss.(1) or (3) of Section 90B. statutory remedy of appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 90B is available to the person aggrieved. 16. Counsel further submits that under the Scheme of LR Act, matters have been broadly divided into two categorized, judicial & non-judicial as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 23 and as regards judicial matters, cases have been specified in 1st Schedule appended to the LR Act and a mechanism has been provided of filing appeal or revision as per the hierarchy provided therein and an order of Authorised Officer under Section 90B(3) is admittedly a non-judicial matter not being specified under 1st Schedule. Supervisory jurisdiction u/ Section 24 is vested with Divisional Commissioner; and all the officers being subordinate are under supervisory jurisdiction, the veracity of the non-judicial order can always be examined by Divisional Commissioner; but that has not been considered by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the judgment cited by Counsel for petitioner. 17. Co-ordinate Bench at principal seat Jodhpur examined the scope of Section 90B(3) & (7) in Gajendra Singh v. Divisional Commissioner ( 2009 (2) WLC 668 ) and held that remedy of appeal is available in regard to order passed by authorised officer in exercise of its powers under Section 90-B(5). The Court observed ad infra: "29.
17. Co-ordinate Bench at principal seat Jodhpur examined the scope of Section 90B(3) & (7) in Gajendra Singh v. Divisional Commissioner ( 2009 (2) WLC 668 ) and held that remedy of appeal is available in regard to order passed by authorised officer in exercise of its powers under Section 90-B(5). The Court observed ad infra: "29. In this case the main question raised by the petitioner that pattas were under Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 by the U.I.T. to the petitioner on the basis of order passed by competent authority under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 but no appeal is provided before the Divisional Commissioner under sub-section (7) of the Section 90-B of the Act of 1956. According to the petitioner the Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction while entertaining such appeal because as per sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, appeal can he filed against the order made under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B and not against the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 because under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B, agricultural land can be surrendered for resumption by the tenant or the holder of such land whereas under subsection (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, land can be resumed upon surrender by any interested party and for which the Collector or the officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf can form opinion that the land is liable to be resumed under sub-section (1) and they can resume the land after recording the reasons in writing, meaning thereby according to sub-section (7) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, appeal can be filed against the order made under sub-section (5) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956 but there is no provision for filing any appeal against the order made under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956, Therefore. the Divisional Commissioner has illegality entertained the appeal against the order so made by the Authorised Officer for resumption of the land under subsection (3) of Section 90-B of the Act of 1956." It has further been considered by another Co-ordinate Bench at principal seat Jodhpur in Anjana Kothari v. Divisional Commissioner (SB CWP-1389/2009 decided vide judgment dated 06/05/2011) and later on in Smt. Meena Sharma v. Rajendra Kr.
Porwal (2011(4) WLC 524) and held that appeal against order under Section 90B(3) is not maintainable before Divisional Commissioner under Section 90B of LR Act. Relevant observation reads thus: " 8. It is clear that sub-section (3) has to be read with sub-section (6), whereas, subsections (1), (2), (4) and (5) have to be read together as these are two separate streams for operating Section 90-B of the Act. The remedy by way of appeal to the Divisional Commissioner under sub-section (7) is available to a 'person aggrieved' only. If the land is resumed under sub-section (1) read with sub-sections (2), (4) and (5) of the Act any person aggrieved of such resumption can file appeal before Divisional Commissioner under Section 90-B(7) of the Act. The purpose of providing such remedy of appeal to the Divisional Commissioner and excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Court in such cases is obvious. When the State Government initiates such action an in-house departmental remedy of appeal appears to have been provided under sub-section (7) of the Act. However, if such surrender takes place at the instance of tenant or land holder under subsection (3), the land is made available to such person himself for planned development and there cannot be any question of such person being aggrieved of such order." Having considered the citations (supra), this Court is also in full agreement with the view expressed by the Co-ordinate Bench in Smt. Meena Sharma v. Rajendra Kr. Porwal & Gajendra Singh v. Divisional Commissioner (supra) and would further like to record that a bare look at the Scheme of Section 90-B of LR Act discloses that under its sub-section (1), a person holding any land for agricultural purposes in urbanisable limits has either used or allowed to be used such land or part thereof for non-agricultural purposes or has parted with its possession or part thereof, for a consideration through sale or agreement to sell and/or by executing power of attorney and/or Will, for purported non-agricultural use and violation has been committed by him by utilising agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose, that too before commencement of Rajasthan amendment laws Ord.
3 of 1999 (which came into force w.e.f. 17/06/1999), rights & interest of such person in such land or holding or part thereof, is liable to be terminated & resumed and that certainly causes adverse consequences and before initiating process of resumption, it has been provided of serving him a notice and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the tenant or holders of such agricultural land or persons duly authorized, and a summary procedure has to be followed by Authorised Officer u/sub-S.(4) and after hearing the parties, the Collector or Authorised Officer appointed by State Government in its behalf, after recording reasons in writing may pass such orders u/sub-s.(5) of Section 90-B regarding resumption of such land. 18. Thus. sub-ss.(1), (2), (4) & (5) of Section 90-B is a complete mechanism provided under Scheme of LR Act regarding termination of rights & resumption of land held for any agricultural purpose, if being utilised for non-agricultural purposes or having part with its possession by a tenant or holder of such land. 19. However, at the same time, if an application u/sub-S.(3) of Section 90B is being submitted by holder of such land or any person authorised by land holder, showing his will-ingness to surrender his rights with an intention to develop such land for use either of housing or commercial purpose, what is required for an Authorised Officer is to examine and record its satisfaction regarding willingness of such person interested, holding rights over agricultural land. at the stage upon order for resumption of the land being passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B. 20.
at the stage upon order for resumption of the land being passed under sub-section (3) of Section 90-B. 20. However, the land so resumed under sub-section (3) vests with the State Government, free from all encumbrances from date of passing of such orders for resumption but the Legislature was very much conscious that expressing willingness with a view to plan for development for housing or commercial purposes while the land being surrendered by tenant or holders of such land under sub-section (3), upon being stood resumed, has to be made available to the person who surrendered the land for its planned development and if Authorised Officer failed to record reasons/ satisfaction, he alone could be said to be aggrieved and there is no requirement under sub-section (3) to issue public notice and at the same time, there is no bar that application once rejected u/sub-s.(3) on account of changed circumstances fresh application could not have been filed by him but this Court would like to record that there may not be a requirement of public notice under law but like sub-section (1) there may be a dispute among the co-sharers or holders of land or the person authorised while the application is submitted to submit their objection before the Collector/Authorized Officer under Section 90B(3) is examined, public notice like of sub-section (1) is required to be published and opportunity has to be afforded to the person aggrieved/ person interested to avoid further litigation amongst holder of land inter-se. 21. But, under sub-section (1) if the land is finally resumed, after affording an opportunity of hearing under sub-section (5) to the land holder, certainly it causes adverse consequence and is required to be examined and that is the purpose, for which person aggrieved by order made under sub-section (5), has a right of opportunity of filing appeal before Divisional Commissioner under sub-section (7) of Section 90B of LR Act. That being so, this Court is also of the considered opinion that order passed by Authorised Officer under sub-section (3) is not appealable u/sub-s.(7) of Section 90B of LR Act. 22.
That being so, this Court is also of the considered opinion that order passed by Authorised Officer under sub-section (3) is not appealable u/sub-s.(7) of Section 90B of LR Act. 22. As regards submission made by Counsel for respondents regarding scope of Section 23 & 24 of LR Act, suffice is to say that Section 23 only provides controlling powers being vested for non-judicial matters while Section 24 provides a hierarchy of subordination on the Revenue Courts and its officers; and the Authorised Officer appointed by State Government or Collector, as the case may be, sub-ordinate in hierarchy, but that will not provide supervisory jurisdiction to Divisional Commissioner in re-appreciating/ reviewing and examining orders passed by Authorised Officer exercising powers being vested with the authority under a statute (LR Act) unless there is express provision being provided; in absence whereof, submission made by respondents' Counsel regarding scope of Sections 23 & 24 of LR Act for holding jurisdiction of Divisional Commissioner, does not hold good or give any assistance to their case. 23. Further submission made by Counsel for respondents that at one stage, the order was passed by Authorised Officer under Section 90B(3) of LR Act and the appeal came to be preferred by respondent-2 and after hearing the parties, the matter was remitted back to the Authorised Officer and that being not assailed, petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of Divisional Commissioner under Section 90B(7) of LR Act. is otherwise bereft of merit for the reason that there cannot be any estoppel against statute and the right of appeal being a creature of statute, such right can always be determined only from statute. itself. In Rajkumar Shivhare v. Asstt. Director Enforcement ( 2010 (4) SCC 772 ) : ( AIR 2010 SC 2239 ) Apex Court while holding that if language of statute is unambiguous, no statutory interpretation is warranted; further observed ad infra: "29. By referring to the aforesaid schemes under different statues, this Court wants to underline that the right of appeal, being always a creature of a statute, its nature, ambit and width has to be determined from the statute itself.
By referring to the aforesaid schemes under different statues, this Court wants to underline that the right of appeal, being always a creature of a statute, its nature, ambit and width has to be determined from the statute itself. When the language of the statute regarding the nature of the order from which right of appeal has been conferred is clear, no statutory interpretation is warranted either to widen or restrict the same." In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner did not challenge the order of remand Dated 21/08/2007 of the Divisional Commissioner, before any higher forum rather on the contrary, appeared and participated in the proceedings before Authorised Officer but that will not waive its right to question the appellate jurisdiction of Divisional Commissioner provided under Section 90-B(7) of LR Act. 24. Since the parties have made submissions on merits, as well, this Court considered it appropriate to examine. Question arose for consideration & having prevailed upon Divisional Commissioner for setting aside order of the Authorised Officer Dated 31/10/2008 appears to be on the premise that the petitioners purchased the subject land through registered sale deed admittedly much after passing of the Award dated 25/06/1998 under Section 11 of LA Act, but before Notification Dated 01/ 12/2006 under Section 48 of LA Act came to be published in Gazette by State Government for withdrawal of subject land & released from acquisition, the question is as to whether transfer of subject land during interregnum period will remain void for all practical purposes in view of Section 4 of Rajasthan Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act. 1976. 25. It is settled legal position of law that powers under Section 48 of LA Act could be exercised at any stage even after passing of the Award but before taking possession of the subject land. In the instant case, the possession of subject land under acquisition admitted was not taken by State Government even after the Award under Section 11 of LA Act came to be passed or at the stage when State Government took decision to withdraw the subject land from acquisition, which is not under challenge in pending proceedings. 26. The Act.
In the instant case, the possession of subject land under acquisition admitted was not taken by State Government even after the Award under Section 11 of LA Act came to be passed or at the stage when State Government took decision to withdraw the subject land from acquisition, which is not under challenge in pending proceedings. 26. The Act. 1976 appears to have been enacted with an object to prevent transaction of purported transfers or transfer of such land to unwary public and it halts in preventing unauthorized transaction and rather to overcome the difficulties cause in the way of acquisition of lands. 27. What is to be examined by this Court is as to what will he the effect of Section 4 of Rajasthan Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act. 1976 ("Act. 1976") which has been enacted to impose restrictions on transfer of lands proposed to he acquired or under acquisition for public purposes. Relevant provision of Sections 3 & 4 being relevant are reproduced ad infra: "3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by State Government.-No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the State of Rajasthan, which has been acquired by the Government under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, or under any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose." 4. Restriction on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings have been initiated. No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or put-port 'to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the State of Rajasthan, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the State Government under section 6 of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act.
1953 or under the corresponding provision of any other law providing for acquisition of law for a public purpose, and the State Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under section 48 of that Act or under any such law." It emerges from the provisions (supra) that Section 3 provides a complete prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by State Government for public purpose, which vests free from all encumbrances under LA Act and such transfer of lands becomes void for all purposes qua State Government. At the same time, Under section 4 restrictions have been imposed on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings having been initiated and the transfer may be by way of sale, mortgaged, gift or any other mode provided by law and declaration to that effect has been made under Section 6 that the land is required for public purpose but State Government has not withdrawn the land from acquisition under Section 48 of LA Act. 28. Provisions under the Scheme (supra) clearly indicates that where acquisition proceedings having been commenced for public purposes and declaration being made under Section 6, if any transfer of land is undertaken without previous permission in writing with the competent authority, such transaction/transfer of the lands will not be recognised and would be void qua State Govt., but not in general with a further rider that State Govt has not withdrawn such land from acquisition under Section 48 of LA Act. 29. A converse position would have been that the case where State Government has withdrawn the land from acquisition under Section 48 of LA Act which as per judgment of Apex Court in Shansi Sports Club v. Union of India. ( 2009 (15) SCC 705 : ( AIR 2010 SC 433 ) has to be duly published in Gazette so that it may be made widely known to the public at large that such lands stands withdrawn from acquisition and transfer of lands can be recognised in general for all practical purposes. 30.
( 2009 (15) SCC 705 : ( AIR 2010 SC 433 ) has to be duly published in Gazette so that it may be made widely known to the public at large that such lands stands withdrawn from acquisition and transfer of lands can be recognised in general for all practical purposes. 30. In the instant case, admittedly land was purchased by petitioners through registered sale deed before withdrawal of the subject land from acquisition under Section 48 of LA Act vide Notification Dated 01/12/2006 but the Divisional Commissioner in the order impugned observed that since on the date when transaction/transfers took place, may be by registered sale deed, it was restricted under Section 4 of the Act, 1976, latter development having taken place regarding withdrawal of subject land from acquisition by State Government in exercise of powers under Section 48 of LA Act, will not make the transaction to be valid for future course of action. 31. Effect of Section 48 of LA Act has been considered by Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Pd. Sharma ( AIR 1966 SC 1593 ) ad infra: "19. Then reliance is placed on Section 48 which provides for withdrawal from acquisition. The argument is that Section 48 is the only provision in the Act which deals with withdrawal from acquisition and that is the only way in which Government can withdraw from the acquisition and unless action is taken under Section 48(1) the Notification under Section 4(1) would remain (presumably forever). It is urged that the only way in which the Notification under Section 4(1) can come to an end is by withdrawl under Section 48(1). We are not impressed by this argument. In the first place, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. (No.10 of 11897), the power to issue a notification in eludes the power to rescind it. Therefore, it is always open to Government to rescind a notification under Section 4 or under S.G. and withdrawal under Section 48(1) is not the only way in which a notification under Section 4 or Section 6 can be brought to an end. Section 48(1) confers a special power on Government of withdrawal from acquisition without cancelling the notifications under Sections 4 & 6. provided it has not taken possession of the land covered by Notification under Section 6.
Section 48(1) confers a special power on Government of withdrawal from acquisition without cancelling the notifications under Sections 4 & 6. provided it has not taken possession of the land covered by Notification under Section 6. In such circumstances, the Government has to give compensation under Section 48(2). This compensation is for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice under Section 9 or of any proceedings thereafter and includes costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under the Act relating to the said land. The notice mentioned in sub-section (2) obviously refers to the notice under Section 9(1) to persons interested. It seems that Section 48 refers to the stage after the Collector has been asked to take order for acquisition under Section 7 and has issued notice tinder Section 9(1). It does not refer to the stage prior to the issue of the declaration under S.G. Section 5 says that the officer taking action under Section 4(2) shall pay or tender payment for all necessary damage done by his acting under Section 4(2). Therefore the damage if any, caused after the Notification under Section 4( 1) is provided in Section 5. Section 48(2) provides for compensation after notice has been issued under Section 9(1) and the Collector has taken proceedings for acquisition of the land by virtue of the direction under Section 7. Section 48(I) thus gives power to Government to withdraw from the acquisition without cancelling the Notifications under Sections 4 & 6 after notice under Section 9(I) has been issued and before possession is taken. This power can be exercised even after the Collector has made the award under Section 11 but before he takes possession under Section 15. Section 48(2) provides for compensation in such a case. The argument that Section 48(l) is the only method in which the Government can withdraw from the acquisition has therefore no force because the Government can always cancel the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 by virtue of its power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and this power can he exercised before the Government directs the Collector to take action under Section 7.
Section 48(1) is a special provision for those cases where proceedings for acquisition have gone beyond the stage of the issue of notice under Section 9(1) and it provides for payment of compensation under Section 48(2) read with Section 48(3). We cannot therefore accept the argument that without an order under Section 48(1), the Notification under Section 4 must remain outstanding. It can he cancelled at any time by Government under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and what Section 48 (1) shows is that once Government has taken possession it cannot withdraw from the acquisition. Before that it may cancel the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 or it may withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48(1). If no notice has been issued under Section 9(l) all that the Government has to do is to pay for the damage caused as provided in Section 5; if on the other hand a notice has been issued under Section 9(l), damage has also to he paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 48(2) & (3). Section 48(l ) therefore is of no assistance to the appellant for showing that successive declarations under Section 6 can he made with respect to land in the locality specified in the notification under Section 4(1). 32. In Jasraj v. State of Rajasthan (1976 RLW 660) this Court observed ad infra: "15. ...The effect of an order under section 48 of the Act is to completely take away Section 4 Notification. Once that order i.e. under section 48 of the Act has been passed. result is that the Government has withdrawn from the acquisition land which formed the subject matter of section 4 notification. "... The position under the law is that an order under section 48 of the Act has the result of withdrawing the notification issued under section 4. This means that there is a clean slate and subsequently the Government wants to acquire land which must start from the stage of issuing a fresh notification under section 4 of the Act." Taking note of judgments (supra), in the opinion of this Court, after issuance of Gazette notification under Section 48 of LA Act the very inception of acquisition proceedings stands withdrawn & effect of Section 4 of the Act.
1976 ceases to subsist and slate becomes cleats and such transaction/ transfers of lands which took place during the Interregnum period are held to be valid even against the State Government and in general for all practical purposes, however it will not preclude the State Govt., if intends to acquire the subject land afresh at a later stage, but that too by initiating acquisition proceedings afresh if required for public purposes. 33. As regards judgment on which Counsel for respondent placed reliance In Meera Sahnl v. Lt. Governor ( 2008 (9) SCC 177 ) : (2008 AIR SCW 5807) , it was a case where the land was purchased after declaration of acquisition under Section 6. but no notification under Section 48 which empowers State Government to withdraw the land from acquisition, was issued/ published in Gazette and in such circumstances, examining scope of restriction regarding transfer of land, imposed under Section 4, it was held that such transaction being void would not be recognised by State Government but in instant case, on the date when the subject land was purchased, such transfer of land might be void qua State Government, but after issuance of Notification under Section 48 of LA Act petitioners became holders of subject land & competent enough to submit their application under Section 90-B(3) of LR Act. Thus, the sale might be void qua State Government at one stage but after issuance of notification by State Government under Section 48 withdrawing subject land from acquisition, such transfer of lands certainly be considered to be valid in general for all practical purposes and whatever rights being available to the land owners are available to the land holders. 34. Further submission made by Counsel for respondents that even if the order of Divisional Commissioner is not sustainable but this Court would not like to restore the order which will perpetuate illegality having been committed by authorised officer while passing order Dated 31/10/1998, is wholly without merit for the reason that application was filed much after the subject land was withdrawn from acquisition vide notification Dated 01/12/ 2006 and that was maintainable under the law and will not affect the rights & title of the land holders in whose favour it stood transferred pendente acquisitior proceedings. 35. Consequently, writ petitions succeed and are hereby allowed. Order Dated 29/12/ 2008 of Divisional Commissioner is quashed and set aside.
35. Consequently, writ petitions succeed and are hereby allowed. Order Dated 29/12/ 2008 of Divisional Commissioner is quashed and set aside. No order as to costs.Petitions allowed. *******