Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, J.:— By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 17.8.2007 passed by the respondent no. 8, whereby his selection on the post of constable ( Provincial Armed Constabulary ) has been cancelled. I have heard Sri Vijay Gautam learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent. The brief facts leading to the present writ petition is that the petitioner was selected as a constable in the Provincial Armed Constabulary ( hereinafter referred to as the 'P.A.C.') on 28.8.2006. He joined P.A.C. in 8th Bn. at Bareilly on the same day. While, he was under training at Bareilly, his selection was cancelled by the impugned order dated 17.8.2007 on the sole ground that he has made a false declaration in his application form. In the said application form, he had made a declaration that no criminal case was pending against him. It is noteworthy that one of the columns in the application form was with regard to the pendency of the criminal case. Against the said column, the petitioner categorically mentioned that no criminal case was pending against him at the time of submission of the application. The police verification revealed that a criminal case no. 655 of 2005, under section 323, 504, 324 and 325 IPC was registered against him at the time of submission of application for recruitment. Apart from the said form, the candidate was required to submit an affidavit also. The said affidavit is a proforma affidavit. Paragraphs 3, 7, 9 and 15 of the affidavit are with regard to the pendency of the cases and the character. The petitioner has sworn the affidavit that no criminal case was pending against him. The petitioner has not only made a false declaration in his application, he has also submitted a false affidavit with regard to the pendency of the case. Sri Vijay Gautam submitted that the impugned order has been passed in flagrant violation of the principle of natural justice as no show cause notice has been given to him. He further submits that Regulation 541 of the U.P. Police Regulations requires that before termination/dismissal, an explanation must be called for from the employee during the probation period. Sri Vijay Gautam submitted that the impugned order has been passed in flagrant violation of the principle of natural justice as no show cause notice has been given to him. He further submits that Regulation 541 of the U.P. Police Regulations requires that before termination/dismissal, an explanation must be called for from the employee during the probation period. For the sake of convenience, the aforesaid Regulation is quoted hereunder ; "541- (i) A recruit will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. The period of probation will be two years except in the following cases: (a) those recruited directly in the Criminal Investigation Department or District Intelligence Staff will be on probation for three years, and (b) those transferred to the Mounted Police will be governed by the directions in paragraph 84 of the Police Regulations. If at the end of the period of probation conduct and work have been satisfactory and the recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment. (2) In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police officer he may dispense with his service. Before, however this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit must furnish his representation in writing and it will be duly considered by the Superintendent of Police before passing the order of discharge. (3) Every order passed by a Superintendent under sub- paragraph (2) above shall subject to the control of the Deputy Inspector General be final. Learned Standing Counsel invited the attention of the Court of the para no. 15 of the declaration submitted by the petitioner, wherein, it is provided that in case any information is found to be incorrect, then without giving any opportunity, the selection shall be cancelled. It is undisputed fact that the criminal case no. 655 of 2005 under sections 323, 504, 324 and 325 IPC was pending against the petitioner at the time of submission of his application form. It is undisputed fact that the criminal case no. 655 of 2005 under sections 323, 504, 324 and 325 IPC was pending against the petitioner at the time of submission of his application form. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Vijay Gautam emphasizes the fact that no opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioner. The order is passed in violation of principle of natural justice and is void. In the present case, I am of the firm view that inspite of the fact that no opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioner, the order is not illegal. In the recent years. the subject of natural justice had undergone a great deal of change. The underlying of principle of natural justice is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State and its authorities. Earlier, the non- observance of the natural justice itself was treated as a prejudice to a man and it was not necessary for him to prove that the action/order has caused him prejudice. However, in recent time there is change in the trend and it is now necessary to prove that prejudice has been caused. In the case of S.L.Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and another AIR (1981) SC 136, one of the exception carved out for the observance of the natural justice was that if only one conclusion was possible, it would be useless formality to afford the opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The useless formality theory had first time received the attention of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 237 , wherein, the Supreme Court has held as follows'. "Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 237 , wherein, the Supreme Court has held as follows'. "Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of 'real substance' or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn: (1971)2 All ER 1278, HL) (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University: (1971) 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority: (1980) 2 All ER 368, CA) and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p. Fannaran (1996 (8) Admn. LR 351, 358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be 'demonstrable beyond doubt' that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan (1987 (1) All ER 1118, CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014) however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is 'real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice'. On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271- 72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees ( 1969 (2) All ER 274) stating that there are always 'open and shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the 'useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that 'convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms'. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the 'useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that 'convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms'. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the 'useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article 'Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the 'useless formality theory' has been made much earlier in 'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their 'discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their 'discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma ( 1996 (3) SCC 364 ), Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. ( 1996 (5) SCC 460 ) that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the 'useless formality theory' and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us, 'admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J." The same principle has been followed in the Aligarh Muslim University in (2000 ) 7 SCC 529 and in (2009) 14 SCC 253 , City Montessori School. It is admitted fact that the petitioner had submitted a false declaration not only in his form but also in his affidavit. Learned standing Counsel as stated above, has pointed out that the petitioner had made a declaration that in case any of his declarations is found false, his services may be terminated without giving any opportunity. In view of the aforesaid fact, in my view, this case falls under the exception of the natural justice as mentioned herein above and the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. No interference is called for. The writ petition is dismissed without imposing any costs. _____________