Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 2858 (MAD)

Dhanalakshmi v. Chandran

2011-06-17

T.MATHIVANAN

body2011
JUDGMENT ( 1. ) CHALLENGE is made in this first appeal to the judgment and decree dated 22/12/2002, and made in O.S. No. 1770 of 1999 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC-V) Chennai by the plaintiff therein. ( 2. ) THE facts which giving rise to the memorandum of this first appeal may be summarised as under: "THE suit property was originally belonged to Madurai Naicker. He died some 50 years ago leaving behind his three sons namely: (1) Guruswami Naicker (2) Subramania Naicker (3) Govindaraja Naicker. Madurai Naicker had gifted the suit property being his self acquisition in favour of his third son, Govindaraja Naicker born through his second wife. THE terms of the gift deed runs as follows: i. If the donee dies issueless after being married, his widow shall enjoy the property till her death, ii. THEreafter it shall devolve on the other two sons viz; Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker." Govindaraja Naicker had been enjoying the suit property till his death i.e., till 29.03.1994. He died as a bachelor and therefore, the property should have devolved on the said Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. Guruswami Naicker had died on 21.12.1995 leaving behind his four daughters and two sons namely; (1) Kuttiammal (2) Seethammal (3) Dhanalakshmi (4) Shakunthala (5) Natarajan (6)Sambandham as his heirs. Subramania Naicker being the second son of Madurai Naicker had died on 15.12.1982 leaving behind his four sons and two daughters viz; (1) Madurai Naicker (2)Kamala Nathan (3) Palani (4) Manickkam (5) Jayalakshmi (6)Prema Kumari as his heirs. "THE plaintiff is the third daughter, whereas the second defendant is the first daughter of Guruswami Naicker. THE third defendant is the widow of Natarajan who is the son of Guruswami Naicker. THE fourth defendant is the wife of Madurai Naicker who is the first son of Subramania Naicker and the fifth defendant is the daughter of Subramania Naicker. Besides the parties namely the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 5 the other legal representatives of the deceased Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker have not been evincing any interest in the subject matter of the suit. Besides the parties namely the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 5 the other legal representatives of the deceased Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker have not been evincing any interest in the subject matter of the suit. However, each branch namely the branch of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker are represented as reversioners." During the life time of Govindaraja Naicker, he had settled the suit property in favour of the first defendant on 18.10.1989 through a registered settlement deed who claims to be the adopted son of the said Govindaraja Naicker. Govindaraja Naicker has no right whatsoever to adopt any person and as such the first defendant cannot have any legal right or claim over the property in his capacity as an alleged adopted son. "THErefore, the settlement deed alleged to have been executed by the said Govindaraja Naicker in favour of the first defendant is not valid in law and as such he cannot derive any right under the settlement deed and hence, his possession in respect of the suit property is wrongful and illegal and he is bound to deliver the same to the reversions viz., the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 5 as the settlement is not binding on the reversions. Hence this suit." THE defendants 2 to 5 did not contest the suit as they remained ex parte. THE first defendant alone has contested the suit. In his written statement he has contended that at the time of executing the gift deed it could not be presumed that the donor under the gift deed was under any disability to transfer. THEre is no stipulation in the gift deed prohibiting the adoption by the donor. Guruswami Naicker had died about 40 years ago and it is not correct to say that he had died on 21.12.1995. Similarly, Subramania Naicker had also not died on 15.12.1982. "Plaintiff is an impostor claiming as one of the heirs of Guruswami Naicker. THE plaintiff has not furnished correct details of the family of late Subramania Naicker. THE plaintiff has also not given material particulars regarding the details of the family with a view to mislead the Court. Without impleading all the heirs of late Subramania Naicker and Guruswami Naicker, this suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. THE plaintiff has not furnished correct details of the family of late Subramania Naicker. THE plaintiff has also not given material particulars regarding the details of the family with a view to mislead the Court. Without impleading all the heirs of late Subramania Naicker and Guruswami Naicker, this suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. THE plaintiff and defendants 2 to 5 have no right to claim on behalf of the legal representatives of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. THE plaintiff has also not obtained any leave of this Court or permission to file this suit in the representative capacity as reversioners and the same is fatal to the suit." THE adopted son under a legal fiction ceases to be a member of the family of the natural parents and becomes the member of the adopted parents family. Whatever rights that a naturally born son of adopted parents gets in the property of the adopted parents, the adopted son, ipso facto automatically as a matter of right is entitled to the properties of the adopted parent as a naturally born son. THE defendant was adopted by late Govindaraja Naicker by a deed of adoption dated 10.2.1983, which was registered as Document No. 161 of 1983 S.R.O. Mylapore. THE adoption deed clearly states that the object of adoption was to propagate his lineage. THErefore as the adopted son, the first defendant has got every right to succeed the interest of his adopted father as a naturally born son. "When the settlement deed was executed by Madurai Naicker, Guruswami Naicker, Subramania Naicker and Govindaraja Naicker were very young and unmarried and not possessed of any family of their own and so the donar?s intention was that if Govindaraja Naicker died unmarried, issueless, then Guruswami and Subramania Naicker would be entitled to the property. In those days the female heirs were not entitled to claim any shares in any property. THE intention of the donor was made clear by omitting the heirs/successors of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. It was also not the intention that if Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker died before Govindaraja Naicker, heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker will have any rights. THE intention of the donor was made clear by omitting the heirs/successors of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. It was also not the intention that if Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker died before Govindaraja Naicker, heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker will have any rights. As Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker had predeceased Givindaraja Naicker, according to Law, as it stood at the time of execution of the settlement deed, the plaintiff or the alleged reversioners are also prohibited to make any claim. THE late Govindaraja Naicker alone was entitled to the property absolutely and hence, the settlement deed executed by Govindaraja Naicker in favour of the first defendant is valid and the plaintiff and the alleged reversioners are not entitled to claim any share in the property. THE vested right of Govindaraja Naicker cannot be diverted as claimed by the plaintiff." During the life time of Subramania Naicker and his brother Guruswami Naicker, they had not claimed any rights as reversioners. Even during their life time, Govindaraja Naicker was a bachelor and likewise, the heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker never made any claim during the life time of Govindaraja Naicker. "Under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, registration of the document is notice of the title to the property. Thus the registration of the adoption and the settlement vests the property and title in favour of the first defendant. As long as the adoption deed remains valid, the plaintiff and the alleged reversioners are not entitled to make any claim in respect of the suit properties and hence, without setting aside that document, the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit. THE settlement deed dated 18.10.1989, executed by late Givindaraja Naicker, in favour of the first defendant is valid and binding on the plaintiff and the alleged reversioners. Hence, this suit is also not maintainable without setting aside the settlement deed. THE claim of the plaintiff is hopelessly barred by limitation. THE death of Govindaraja Naicker will not extend the limitation by any stretch of imagination. THE suit has also not been properly valued as per the provisions of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act. According to the plaintiff, it is not a case of succession, but a case of reversion. THE plaintiff may be a santhathi which is hereby denied expressly but not a heir at that time. THE suit has also not been properly valued as per the provisions of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act. According to the plaintiff, it is not a case of succession, but a case of reversion. THE plaintiff may be a santhathi which is hereby denied expressly but not a heir at that time. THE settlement deed executed by Govindaraja Naicker in favour of the first defendant does not prohibit adoption." THE old law of succession was given a good-bye by the passing of the 1956. THE Act itself says that all the customs and rulings stand superseded by the provisions of the New Act. Based on the pleadings of the parties to the suit the trial Court has framed as nearly as eight issues for the better adjudication of the suit. They are; 1. Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable under Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C.? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties? 3.Whether the adoption of the first defendant is valid? 4.Whether the settlement deed is valid? 5.Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? 6.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to reliefs of declaration as prayed for? 7.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the suit property? 8.What relief the plaintiff is entitled to? In order to substantiate their respective cases, the parties to the suit went on trial. The plaintiff had examined herself as P.W.1 and during the course of her examination Exhibits A-1 to A-6 were marked. On the other hand, two witnesses, which includes the first defendant, were examined on behalf of the first defendant and during the course of their examination Exhibits B-1 to B-12 were marked. ( 3. The plaintiff had examined herself as P.W.1 and during the course of her examination Exhibits A-1 to A-6 were marked. On the other hand, two witnesses, which includes the first defendant, were examined on behalf of the first defendant and during the course of their examination Exhibits B-1 to B-12 were marked. ( 3. ) ON evaluating the evidences both oral and documentary, the trial Court has found that: a) the suit is maintainable under Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C. b) the suit is not bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties, c) the adoption of the first defendant by Govindaraja Naicker is valid, d) the settlement deed under Exhibit B-6 executed by Govindaraja Naicker in favour of the first defendant dated 18.10.1999 is valid, e) the suit has been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction of trial Court, f) the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs of declarations as prayed for, and g) the plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of possession of the suit property, Ultimately, the trial Court has dismissed the suit with the costs of the first defendant. ( 4. ) BEING aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff stands before this Court with this appeal. Heard Mr. A.R. Karunakaran, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Mr. B.Thanikachalam, learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant. ( 5. ) COMPETENCY of the plaintiff to bring the suit on behalf of the heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker: The proviso to Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is more relevant to be extracted here. A.R. Karunakaran, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Mr. B.Thanikachalam, learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant. ( 5. ) COMPETENCY of the plaintiff to bring the suit on behalf of the heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker: The proviso to Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is more relevant to be extracted here. The proviso to Sub-rule 1 to Rule 8 of Order 1 enacts as follows: "Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,- (a)one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested; (b)the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons, so interested." The proviso to Sub-rules 2 to 6 to Rule 8 of Order 1 enacts as follows: "(2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-rule (1), at the plaintiff?s expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. (3)Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under sub-rule (1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit. (4)No part of the claim in any such suit shall be abandoned under sub-rule (1), and no such suit shall be withdrawn under sub-rule (3), of Rule 1 of Order XXIII, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit under Rule 3 of that Order, unless the Court has given, at the plaintiff?s expenses notice to all persons so interested in the manner specified in sub-rule (2). (5)Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. (5)Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. (6)A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be. Explanation-For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be." ( 6. ) THE scope and applicability of Rule 8 to Order 1 of Code of Civil Procedure is that it provides an exception to general rule that all interested persons should be made parties to the suit. In a case where there are numerous persons having same interest in one suit, the rule enables a party to represent such numerous persons in common cause of action. THE essential conditions for application of the rule are: (i) the parties are numerous, (ii) they have same interest, (iii) necessary permission be obtained and (iv) notice must be given or published as mentioned in the rule. THE Rule 8 applies only to the representative suits. Option given under the rule is not only to sue but also to defend. THE object of the rule is that where it is practically difficult to implead all persons as parties and they are not small in number one or more of such persons may sue or be sued in the representative capacity. Such person representing others should have the same interest with those who are not added in the array of parties and he need not to show any authority to represent others. On coming to the instant case on hand, the appellant/plaintiff has contended in the plaint that barring the parties namely the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 5 the other legal representatives of the deceased Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker have not been evincing any interest in the subject matter of the suit. However, each branch namely the branch of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker are represented as reversioners. However, each branch namely the branch of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker are represented as reversioners. Insofar as the wordings "besides the parties namely the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 5 the other legal representatives of the deceased Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker have not been evincing any interest in the subject matter of the suit" are concerned the appellant/plaintiff has not ascribed any valid reasons. ( 7. ) AS rightly contended that even as per the averments of the plaint, Guruswami Naicker, who had died on 21.12.1995 had left behind four daughters and two sons namely (1) Kuttiammal (2)Seethammal (3)Dhanalakshmi (4) Shakunthala (5) Natarajan (6)Sambandham as his heirs. Subramania Naicker being the second son of Madurai Naicker had died on 15.12.1982 leaving behind his four sons and two daughters viz; (1) Madurai Naicker (2)Kamala Nathan (3) Palani (4) Manickkam (5) Jayalakshmi (6) Prema Kumari as his heirs. ( 8. ) IT is also revealed from the plaint averments that the plaintiff is the third daughter and the second defendant is the first daughter of the Guruswami Naicker. The third defendant is the wife of Natarajan, son of Guruswami Naicker. The fourth defendant is the wife of Madurai Naicker, who is the first son of Subramania Naicker. The fifth defendant is the daughter of Subramania Naicker. Obviously, the other heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker are left out. Having come forward with this suit by saying that however each branch namely the branch of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker are represented as reversioners, it is the duty of the plaintiff to obtain necessary permission from the Court as contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue on behalf of other legal representatives. Having failed to comply with the ingredients of Rule 8 to Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court without any hesitation holds that the appellant/plaintiff is not having competency to file the suit for herself and on behalf of the other legal representatives of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker as reversioners. Admitted facts: The suit property was originally belonged to Madurai Naicker. He died some 50 years ago leaving behind his three sons namely; (1) Guruswami Naicker (2) Subramania Naicker (3) Govindaraja Naicker. Admitted facts: The suit property was originally belonged to Madurai Naicker. He died some 50 years ago leaving behind his three sons namely; (1) Guruswami Naicker (2) Subramania Naicker (3) Govindaraja Naicker. The third son Govindaraja Naicker was born to Madurai Naicker through his second wife and as such Madurai Naicker had gifted the suit property in his favour. The Gift Deed dated 8.8.1921 has been marked as Exhibit A-1. The following three conditions are stipulated in the gift deed: i. The said Govindaraja Naicker and the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns should lay out of the monthly rent accrued from the said house and ground No. 2, Barbers Bridge Lane, Krishnampet, Madras to Muniammal (the second wife of the donor Madurai Naicker and the mother of Govindaraja Naicker) Rs. 2 every month until her death, ii. If the said Govindaraja Naicker died without male issues after being married his widow should enjoy the income from the said house and ground until her death, and iii. After her death the property should go to his own brothers, Subramania Naicker and Guruswami Naicker. The said Govindaraja Naicker died as a bachelor on 29.03.1994. Till his death he had been enjoying the suit property. ( 9. ) FROM the above admitted facts, the execution of the gift deed under Exhibit A-1 in favour of the said Govindaraja Naicker by Madurai Naicker has not been disputed. What the appellant/plaintiff has contended is that after the death of the said Govindaraja Naicker, the property should have devolved on Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. As per the contention of the appellant/plaintiff, Guruswami Naicker died on 21.12.1995, whereas the Subramania Naicker had died on 15.12.1982. The date of death of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker has been disputed by the first respondent/first defendant. ( 10. ) ACCORDING to the first respondent/first defendant, he was adopted by Late.Govindaraja Naicker by a deed of adoption dated 10.2.1983. Exhibit B-1 is the deed of adoption, which was registered as document No. 161 of 1983 at the Sub-registrar Office Mylapore. It is also the case of the first respondent/first defendant that the adoption deed Exhibit B-1 clearly reveals that the object of adoption is to propagate the donor?s lieneage and that the adoption was performed with pomp and performing necessary ceremonies including dattahoma on 25.6.1970. It is also the case of the first respondent/first defendant that the adoption deed Exhibit B-1 clearly reveals that the object of adoption is to propagate the donor?s lieneage and that the adoption was performed with pomp and performing necessary ceremonies including dattahoma on 25.6.1970. It is also contended on behalf of the first respondent/first defendant that the adopted son under a legal fiction ceases to be a member of the family of the natural parents and he becomes the member of the adopted parents? family and that whatever rights that a naturally born son of adopted parents gets in the property of the adopted parents, the adopted son, ipso facto, automatically, as a matter of right, is entitled to the properties of the adopted parent as a naturally born son. It is also contended that the first respondent/first defendant has got every right to succeed interest of the adopted father as a naturally born son. This deed of adoption under Exhibit B-1 has been vehemently challenged and attacked by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff while advancing his arguments. He would submit that in accordance with the gift deed under Exhibit A-1, the executor viz. Madurai Naicker wanted to retain the property within the family and therefore he had covenanted the document with the following two important conditions: 1. If the donee dies issueless after being I married, his widow should enjoy the property till her lifetime, and 2. Thereafter it should devolve on the other two sons namely Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. ( 11. ) FURTHER, the learned counsel would submit that the recital of the gift deed is very clear and definite by the employment of the phrases namely "dies without any issue after being married" and this language had totally exclude adoption and that the said Govindaraja Naicker had no right whatsoever to adopt any person. He would further submit that the first defendant, who had claimed as the adopted son of the said Govindaraja Naicker could not have any legal right or claim on the suit property in his capacity as an alleged adopted son. He has also added that the said Govindaraja Naicker had no right to deal with the suit property as he likes. ( 12. He has also added that the said Govindaraja Naicker had no right to deal with the suit property as he likes. ( 12. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has also made reference to Section 9 (i) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (herein after it may be referred to as ?Act?)- Section 9(1) of the Act reads as follows: "9. Persons capable of giving in adoption.-(1) No person except the father or mother or the guardian of a child shall have the capacity to give the child in adoption." The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of D.W.1. In his cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the first respondent/first defendant herein has stated that his mother had died in the year 1971. His father went missing and that his whereabouts were not known. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has adverted to that the first respondent/first defendant had not stated in his evidence as to who had given him in adoption. In support of his contention he has also sought the assistance of Section 10(iv) of the Act. Section 10(iv) reads as follows: "10. Persons who may be adopted.- No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: i................... ii.................. iii................. iv. he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption." ( 13. ) IN this regard, he would submit that since the adoption deed was aged about 24 years, it was hit under Section 10 (iv) of the Act and hence it must be discarded. With regard to the findings of the trial Court in respect of Issue No. 3, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the trial Court had observed that as per the evidence of DWl in his cross-examination, his father was found missing and his mother was also dead and when such being the case how the first respondent/first defendant could have been given in an adoption. Further, he has also vehemently attacked the execution of the settlement by Govindaraja Naicker in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. ( 14. Further, he has also vehemently attacked the execution of the settlement by Govindaraja Naicker in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. ( 14. ) IN order to substantiate his contention he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: 1. R. Jamuna Bai v. M.A. Anusuya and Others, in 2001 (2) CTC 277 : LNIND 2001 MAD 351 : (2001) 2 MLJ 355 , 2. P.S. Delvaprasan @ P.S. Veerabadran v. Dr. P.D. Balaji and Others 2001 (1) CTC 520 : LNIND 2001 MAD 66 : (2001) 2 MLJ 44 , In the first case viz, R. Jamuna Bai v. M.A. Anusuya and Others (supra), a question was arisen before this Court as to whether Exhibit A-1 was a Will or settlement when the appeal in S.A. Nos. 806 and 1271 of 1999 were coming up for hearing. On considering this question, this Court has held that the question regarding whether a document is a Will or a Settlement has been decided as seen from the decisions cited by both the 25 counsel, in various cases. Each case depends on the particular set of facts and the Court will have to consider the recitals in the particular document before it arrive at the decision. ( 15. ) IN the second case viz. P.S. Deivaprasan @ P.S.Veerabadran v. Dr. P.D. Balaji and Others (supra), this Court has made a distinction between the term Will and Settlement. It is held that though the document is styled as Settlement it is in the nature of Will and that the intention of parties both express and implied is only to execute Will and not Settlement. ( 16. ) ON coming to the instant case on hand, it is to be remembered that Madurai Naicker had executed Exhibit A-1 gift deed in favour of Govindaraja Naicker in respect of the suit property. Since he was a bachelor, he adopted the first respondent/first defendant as his son and Exhibit B-1 deed of adoption was executed to that effect on 10.2.1983. After adopting the first respondent/first defendant as his son, the said Govindaraja Naicker had executed a settlement deed in favour of the first respondent/first defendant and thereby the suit property was settled in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. After adopting the first respondent/first defendant as his son, the said Govindaraja Naicker had executed a settlement deed in favour of the first respondent/first defendant and thereby the suit property was settled in favour of the first respondent/first defendant. As discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the plaintiff has not disputed the gift deed, but she has disputed the adoption deed under Exhibit B-1 as well as the settlement deed under Exhibit A-6 (Exhibit B-2). In this connection, the learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant would submit that unless and until the adoption deed under Exhibit B-1 and the settlement deed under Exhibit A-6(B2) are set aside by a competent Court of law they are valid as they were accepted and acted upon. ( 17. ) FURTHER, the learned counsel would submit that Exhibit B-1 adoption deed has not been questioned in the plaint by the plaintiff and that the claim of "reversionery right" made by the plaintiff on the basis of Exhibit A-1 gift deed did not arise in this case. He has also contended that the case of the plaintiff was not testamentary succession and he has also maintained that the terms and conditions stipulated in Exhibit A-1 gift deed did not confer any reversionery right either to the plaintiff or to the defendants 2 to 5 or to any other legal heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker. ( 18. ) THE learned counsel has also made reference to the averments of Exhibit B-1 adoption deed. In this connection he would submit that the gift deed under Exhibit A-1 did not prohibit adoption and that the gift deed had unambiguously been covenanted that the property should go to his own brothers Subramania Naicker and Guruswami Naicker and did not give any further directions. He would submit further that if both the Subramania Naicker and Guruswami Naicker predeceased Govindaraja Naicker the right given to the brothers under the gift deed was only personal and not to the alleged heirs, who claimed as reversioners. The learned counsel has also contended that the suit property was dealt with by Govindaraja Naicker by mortgaging the property as evident from Exhibit B-3 (B8) and therefore the plaintiff had no right to question the deed of adoption as well as the settlement. The learned counsel has also contended that the suit property was dealt with by Govindaraja Naicker by mortgaging the property as evident from Exhibit B-3 (B8) and therefore the plaintiff had no right to question the deed of adoption as well as the settlement. The learned counsel in support of his argument has also sought the assistance of Sections 4 , 5 Sections 4 , 5 and 6 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and submitted that since the appellant/plaintiff had not questioned the adoption, she could not maintain the suit for the reliefs claimed by her. He has also made reference to the evidence given by DW2. DW2 both in chief as well as in cross-examination has spoken to in favour of the first respondent/first defendant as he had signed the adoption deed as a witness. He has also deposed that he had participated in the adoption ceremony and that the facts of adoption were known to him pretty well. Apart from this, the learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant had adverted to that to obtain a relief of declaration that the alleged adoption is invalid the period of limitation is three years and that the present suit is certainly barred by limitation. ( 19. ) IN support of his argument he has made reference to Articles 57 and 58 of Limitation Act. Article 57 of the Limitation Act contemplates that to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place, the period of limitation is three years when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff. Article 58 of the contemplates that to obtain any other declaration, the period of limitation is three years when the right to sue first accrues. ( 20. ) THE learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision in Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas, (2007) 3 MLJ 721 (SC) in support of this contention. In this case, a Division Bench of the Hon?ble Supreme Court of India headed by His Lordship Hon?ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha has held in Paragraph No. 14 as follows at p. 724 of MLJ : "14. THE 1st defendant was a friend of the 2nd defendant. Admittedly, the usual stipulations were knowingly not made in the agreement of sale dated 11.4.1983. Justice S.B. Sinha has held in Paragraph No. 14 as follows at p. 724 of MLJ : "14. THE 1st defendant was a friend of the 2nd defendant. Admittedly, the usual stipulations were knowingly not made in the agreement of sale dated 11.4.1983. THE 1st defendant may or may not be aware about the agreement entered by and between the respondent herein. But he cannot raise a plea of absence of notice of the deed of sale dated 4.9.1985, which was a registered document. Possession of the suit land by the appellant also stands admitted. Registration of a document as well as possession would constitute notice, as is evident from Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is in the following terms: "a person is said to have notice? of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation I.-Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated. Provided that - (1)the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian , 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2)the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under Section 51 of that Act, and (3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under Section 55 of that Act. Explanation II. Explanation II. -Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title,, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. Explanation III -A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud." On coming to the instant case on hand, the said Govindaraja Naicker, as per the averments of the plaint, had died on 29.3.1994. During his lifetime, he had adopted the first respondent/first defendant as his son. In this regard, the first respondent/first defendant has stated in his written statement that he was adopted by Late. Govindaraja Naicker by a deed of adoption dated 10.2.1983 (Exhibit B-1) registered as document No. 161 of 1983 S. R.O. Mylapore. He has also stated that the said adoption deed clearly states that the object of adoption was ?to propogate the lieneage? of Late. Govindaraja Naicker and according to usual customary rites and religious formalities the adoption was effected with pomp and performing necessary ceremonies including ?Datta Homa? on 26.5.1970. As per the averments of the written statement, it is seen that the first respondent/first defendant was adopted by the said Late. Govindaraja Naicker as early as on 26.5.1970 and to that effect a deed of adoption was executed on 10.2.1983, which was registered at the Sub-registrar Office Mylapore as document No. 161 of 1983. The said Govindaraja Naicker had also settled his property in favour of the first respondent/first defendant under a deed of settlement dated 18.10.1989, which has been marked as Exhibit A-6 (Exhibit B-2). ( 21. ) ON coming to the evidence of D.W.1, he would state in his chief-examination that at the time of death of Govindaraja Naicker, he was prevented from taking the dead body for funeral ceremony. ( 21. ) ON coming to the evidence of D.W.1, he would state in his chief-examination that at the time of death of Govindaraja Naicker, he was prevented from taking the dead body for funeral ceremony. He has also stated that the relatives of Govindaraja Naicker had called the Police and after the arrival of Police D.W.1 had disclosed the facts that he was the adopted son of Govindaraja Naicker and then only he was permitted to take the dead body of Govindaraja Naicker. In this connection, the learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant would submit that even during the obsequies of Late. Govindaraja Naikcer, the alleged reversioners including the plaintiff were informed about the adoption as well as the settlement deed and even in spite of that they had not evinced any interest to challenge the adoption as well as the settlement. Since the suit was filed belatedly after the expiry of three years as contemplated under Articles 57 and 58 of the , this suit was hopelessly barred by limitation and on that ground alone the suit could be dismissed. ( 22. ) FROM the evidence of PW1 and D.W.1, it is learnt that the heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker had never made any claim during the lifetime of Govindaraja Naicker. Exhibit B-1 is the registered adoption deed dated back to 10.2.1983. Exhibit A-6 is the registered settlement deed dated back to 18.10.1989. It is also relevant to note here that during the obsequies of Late. Govindaraja Naicker the appellant/plaintiff and the other relatives of the Govindaraja Naicker had made a claim. Police was called to pacify both the parties and they were informed that the first respondent/first defendant is the adopted son of Govindaraja Naicker and he has every right to perform the last ceremony to Govindaraja Naicker. As contemplated under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and as decided by the Division Bench of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the above said decision viz. Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas (supra), registration of the document is the notice of title to the parties. Therefore, it is thus clear that the appellant/plaintiff and the other heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker were having knowledge about the adoption deed as well as the settlement deed even at the time of the death of Govindaraja Naicker. Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas (supra), registration of the document is the notice of title to the parties. Therefore, it is thus clear that the appellant/plaintiff and the other heirs of Guruswami Naicker and Subramania Naicker were having knowledge about the adoption deed as well as the settlement deed even at the time of the death of Govindaraja Naicker. Obviously they have not instituted any legal proceedings to set aside the adoption as well as the settlement and for the first time that too after the period of limitation the appellant/plaintiff has conveniently come forward with this suit claiming right over the suit property and therefore her claim is definitely barred by limitation. ( 23. ) DURING the lifetime of Govindaraja Naicker, he had dealt with the property as evident from Exhibit B-3(B8) by mortgaging the same and hence the rights if any claimed by the appellant/plaintiff are extinguished by the nature of possession and claim made by the Govindraja Naicker. On this? ground also this suit is not maintainable. ( 24. ) FURTHER, in the cause of action paragraph also, the appellant/plaintiff has given different dates contrary to the averments of the plaint. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant the date of death of Govindaraja Naicker will not in anyway extend the period of limitation. Regarding the valuation of the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction: Originally the appellant/plaintiff had filed the petition under XXXIII Rule 1 of the to declare that she is an indigent person to file the suit as informa pauperis. After due enquiry, the trial Court had permitted he plaintiff to file the suit as informa pauperis and consequently converted the petition as suit and numbered as O.S. No. 1770 of 1999. The suit is filed by the appellant/plaintiff for the following reliefs: a) to declare her as an indigent person, b) to declare that she is one of the reversioners of the deceased Guruswami Naicker, c) to declare the settlement dated 18.10.1989 as void and not binding on her, and d) to direct the first respondent/first defendant to deliver possession of the suit property to the appellant/plaintiff. ( 25. ) INSOFAR as the relief under (a) is concerned, she was already declared as an indigent person and permitted to file the suit as informa pauperies. ( 25. ) INSOFAR as the relief under (a) is concerned, she was already declared as an indigent person and permitted to file the suit as informa pauperies. INSOFAR as the reliefs under (b) and (c) are concerned they are not consequential to the relief under ?a? and therefore they have to be valued separately. INSOFAR as the relief under (d) is concerned it is also to be valued separately. But the reliefs have not been valued separately. It is seen from the plaint that the suit has been valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 4,00,000/-. As stated above, the suit has been instituted seeking the following two declarations: i. to declare the plaintiff as one of the reversioners of the deceased Guruswami Naicker, and ii. to declare the settlement deed dated 18.10.1989 as void and not binding on the plaintiff. ( 26. ) UNDER Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, the relief for the two declarations should be valued separately with a fee on the aggregate of the valuation. The market value of the property as on the date of the settlement deed was Rs. 3,55, 000/-. The suit seems to have been filed in the year 1997. UNDER Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, the suit shall have to be valued on the market value of the property as on date of the plaint. No details have been furnished in the plaint as to how the market value of the suit property had been arrived at Rs. 4,00,000/-. Since all the reliefs claimed in the suit fall under Section 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, the reliefs (i) and (ii) should have been separately valued and the Court fee paid thereon. But, it has not been done in this case. The learned Trial Judge also had lost sight on this issue. Though an issue with regard to the Court fee and jurisdiction has been framed under Issue No. 5, the trial Court has simply stated that since no arguments were advanced on this issue, the Court was of view that the suit was properly valued and the Court had got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Though an issue with regard to the Court fee and jurisdiction has been framed under Issue No. 5, the trial Court has simply stated that since no arguments were advanced on this issue, the Court was of view that the suit was properly valued and the Court had got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The finding of the Trial Court with regard to Issue No. 5 is absolutely erroneous and liable to be set aside. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs and the Judgment and Decree dated 2.12.2002 and made in O.S. No. 1770 of 1999, on the file of the Fast Track Court No. V, Chennai are confirmed with slight modification by setting aside the finding in respect of Issue No. 5. ( 27. ) THE appellant herein had originally filed a petition under Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on 14/8/1997, before the Trial Court seeking permission to institute the suit as informa pauperis. ( 28. ) THE Trial Court had accorded permission and subsequently that petition was registered as suit on 9/12/1998. THE Trial Court, after the trial, had dismissed the suit with costs of the first defendant and the Trial Court had calculated the costs of the first defendant at Rs. 30,151.50. Since the plaintiff had lost the suit, she was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000.50 (Rupees Thirty thousand and fifty paise only) to the State of Tamil Nadu towards the Court fee payable on the plaint. Even before this Court also the appellant being the plaintiff had lost the appeal. As contemplated under Rule 11 to Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant shall have to pay the necessary Court fee both on the valuation of the appeal as well as on the valuation of the suit. Hence, Registry is directed to collect the appropriate Court fee and pay the same to the State of Tamil Nadu.