JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Shukla, J.—Writ Petition No. 33988 of 2004 has been filed by the M/s Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratory, Meerut Road, Ghaziabad questioning the validity of the order dated 7.8.2004 wherein orders have been passed for recovery in exercise of authority vested under Section 6-H(1) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for ensuring payment of wages due to the workmen. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36724 of 2008 has been filed by Irshad Mohd Khan and others questioning the validity of the order dated 30.1.2008 refusing to pass order of reinstatement and rejecting and disposing of the application dated 15.11.2006 moved by petitioners in this behalf accordingly. 2. Issue in both the writ petitions are arising out of common facts, in such a situation both the writ petitions have been taken up together and are being decided together accordingly. 3. Brief background of the case is that in the District of Ghaziabad there is company known M/s Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratory, Ghaziabad. Petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36724 of 2008 have been performing and discharging their duties in the aforementioned establishment. In the establishment concern, there has been strike w.e.f. 2.6.1983 and it appears that petitioners of the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36724 of 2008 as per employer indulged in strike. In respect of the same, Labour Department started conciliation proceeding between representative of workmen and employer before the Deputy Labour Commissioner at Ghaziabad and conciliation was arrived at before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. at Ghaziabad, wherein workmen were required to resume their duties w.e.f. 18.8.1983 and said date was extended to 1.9.1983. Employers have come up with the specific case that various workmen reported for their duty w.e.f. 1.9.1983 and as far as petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36724 of 2008 are concern, they did not report for their duty nor did they move application for leave and in this background services of the striking workmen were terminated w.e.f. 9.9.1983. Employers have come up with the specific case that various workmen reported for their duty w.e.f. 1.9.1983 and as far as petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36724 of 2008 are concern, they did not report for their duty nor did they move application for leave and in this background services of the striking workmen were terminated w.e.f. 9.9.1983. Workmen at the said point of time raised Industrial Dispute and accordingly on reference being made by the State Government under Section 4-K of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Labour Court considered the matter and passed award holding therein that termination w.e.f. 9.9.1983 was improper and illegal and Labour Court gave award directing reinstatement of 17 workmen, on the same post and on the same pay-scale, inasmuch as out of 37 workmen, 19 workmen had settled their dispute with the management and one workman namely Komal Singh had died in October, 1991, hence there was no question of his reinstatement. As regard payment of back wages, Labour Court took view that 17 workmen would be entitled to 50% of their wages and allowance w.e.f. 1.8.1987 till the date of their reinstatement as were admissible to them on 2.6.1983 and the said amount had been directed to be paid within two months from the date of publication of the award. Against the said award passed by the Labour Court, M/s Hamdard preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45663 of 1993 and this Court on 3.11.1995 proceeded to dismiss the aforementioned writ petition. Against the same Special Leave to Appeal was filed and said appeal was dismissed on 26.5.1993 and said order in question attained finality. 4. After the matter had been finalised upto the level of Apex Court and validity of the award has been upheld inspite of the same there was no attempt or endeavour on the part of the employer to comply with the directives given in the award. In such a situation as award in question had become enforcible, in this background workmen filed an application for execution of the award under section 6H of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In such a situation as award in question had become enforcible, in this background workmen filed an application for execution of the award under section 6H of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The employers paid wages upto June, 1996 during pendency of said proceeding and refused to pay wages from 1.7.1996 till 31.7.1996 and thereafter plea had been taken that 17 workmen have been suspended w.e.f. 1.7.1996 for misconduct and further plea was taken that workmen at the best would be entitled for subsistence allowance and not wages. Issue of bonus was also raised by the workmen and thereafter requisite orders were passed and two sets of writ petitions were filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 41961 of 1996, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35708 of 1996 and this Court on 9.4.2003 taking note of the fact that workmen were not permitted by the employer to join on their respective post, proceeded to uphold the order for grant of full wages for the month of July, 1996 as well as the order passed for ensuring bonus to workmen. Against the said order passed by the Single Judge, Special Appeal No. 443 and 444 of 2003 had been filed and said appeal, has been dismissed on 25.7.2006 and 5.9.2006 respectively. Against the said order in question, Special Leave to Appeal No. 17526 of 2006 had been filed and same had also been dismissed on 4.4.2007. Civil Appeal No. 2204 of 2007 in reference to Bonus has been allowed by order dated 24.4.2007. See Humdard Wakf Laboratories v. Dy Labour Commissioner, 2007(5) SCC 231 . This much has come on record that workmen have not been actually reinstated and to the contrary by means of letter dated 1.7.1996 workmen have been sought to be placed under suspension and reference of charges levelled against them was also mentioned therein and further workmen have been asked to report for duty on every working day. Employer have come with specific case that thereafter, pursuant to the aforementioned charge-sheet in question, disciplinary proceedings have been undertaken and thereafter, dismissal order has been passed and same has been communicated to the workmen as well as the respective Union. Ignoring the said order, in proceedings under section 6-H, directives were given for payment of entire wages, at the said point of time Civil Misc. Ignoring the said order, in proceedings under section 6-H, directives were given for payment of entire wages, at the said point of time Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 33888 of 2004 had been filed by Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories, and therein subject to employers depositing salary upto 10.10.1998, recovery was stayed. Thereafter, workmen moved an application for issuing direction for ensuring of joining and thereafter, Deputy Labour Commissioner has proceeded to pass order holding therein that as order of termination has been passed on 10.10.1998 and same has not been challenged, as such workmen are entitled for wages only for the period prior to it. At this juncture Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36724 of 2008 had been filed and as already mentioned above, said writ petition has been taken up alongwith Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 33988 of 2004. 5. Pleadings inter-se parties have been exchanged, thereafter, present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing /disposal with the consent of the parties. 6. Ms. Bushra Maryam, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners contended with vehemence that in the present case once award has been affirmed upto Apex Court and at no point of time workmen in question have actually been reinstated back, then in this background undertaking of disciplinary proceedings is neither here nor there and as such workmen are entitled for all consequential benefit ignoring alleged termination order which is nothing but a pretence and a deliberate attempt to over come award, which has been affirmed upto Apex Court, as such writ petition in question filed by workmen in question deserves to be allowed. 7. Countering the said submission Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri. A.A. Khan, Advocate and Sri R.M. Saggi, Advocate on the other hand contended that services of workmen have been terminated in accordance with law and in such change of circumstances, once said termination order is still holding the field, then no directives can be issued for making payment of wages. beyond the said order of termination, and further employer has no objection whatsoever in making payment of wages due till date of termination, in view of this relief as has been claimed by the workmen cannot be accorded in the fact of the present case. 8. beyond the said order of termination, and further employer has no objection whatsoever in making payment of wages due till date of termination, in view of this relief as has been claimed by the workmen cannot be accorded in the fact of the present case. 8. Factual position, which has so emerged and on which there is no dispute that there has been strike in the establishment concern w.e.f. 2.6.1983 and thereafter conciliation proceedings inter-se workmen and employer had been undertaken and workmen were required to report for their duty w.e.f. 1.9.1983. In respect of workmen who are before this Court, plea has been taken that they had not reported for their duties, hence according to the standing order holding the field their services had been accepted to have been abandoned and terminated w.e.f. 9.9.1983. Labour Court on reference being made under Section 4-K of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 disapproved the action dated 9.9.1983 and clear cut directives were issued directing reinstatement of 17 workmen and 50% of the wages was allowed w.e.f. 1.8.1987 till date of their reinstatement as such rate as were admissible on 2.6.1983. Said award has been subject-matter of challenge before this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45663 of 1993 and this Court on 3.11.1995 dismissed the writ petition and said order has been affirmed in Special Leave Petition on 26.4.1996. 9. This much is fully reflected that employers were not at all in mood to ensure compliance of aforementioned award and for this reason the workmen in question took recourse of the proceedings under Section 6-H(1) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. During pendency of the proceedings in question, wages for the month of June, 1996 had been paid, and employer in their turn proceeded to pass order dated 1.7.1996 proceedings to place the workmen under suspension and further clearly mentioning therein that on every working day workmen would present themselves in between 11.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. at factory gate and furnish certificate at the end of the month that they are not employed else where. On account of passing of said suspension order, full wages was sought to be denied and insistence was being made that workmen are only entitled for subsistence allowance. On account of passing of said suspension order, full wages was sought to be denied and insistence was being made that workmen are only entitled for subsistence allowance. Deputy Labour Commissioner in his turn proceeded to pass order directing therein for making payment of the wages for the period till July to 31.7.1996 without deduction, and same has been subject-matter of challenge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 41691 of 1996 and in respect of payment of bonus also, orders has also been passed and same has been subject-matter of challenge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35708 of 1996. Both the writ petitions were taken up together and finally decided on 9.4.2003. Therein this Court dis-approved the stand taken by the employer that workmen are entitled only for subsistence allowance having been suspended w.e.f. 1.7.1996 and not wages awarded under the award on the ground that employers have failed to produce any evidence, in regard to reinstatement of 17 workmen. Said order has been affirmed in Appeal No. 443 of 2003 by dismissal of Special Appeal No. 25.7.2006 filed by the employer M/s Hamdard and therein categorical mention was made that if any amount become due to the employer because of payment not being made under the award, the employee would have to recover it afresh and employer cannot impede the execution process merely by setting up one suspension order after another. Against the same Special Leave Petition had been filed and same has been dismissed with the cost of Rs. 25,000 on 4.4.2007. The suspension order in the pith and substance has not been approved of. In proceeding under Section 6-H(1) initially order was passed on 7.8.2004 for making recovery of entire amount and against the same Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 33988 of 2004 had been filed, wherein this Court, by interim order, limited payment of wages till the date of dismissal, and thereafter, said order had been reviewed when workmen in question in their turn had filed an application for giving them work and their due and thereafter, order dated 30.1.2008 had been finally passed. 10. Writ Petition No. 33988 of 2004 had been filed, wherein this Court, by interim order, limited payment of wages till the date of dismissal, and thereafter, said order had been reviewed when workmen in question in their turn had filed an application for giving them work and their due and thereafter, order dated 30.1.2008 had been finally passed. 10. Entire emphasis of workmen is that at no point of time they have ever been reinstated back by putting them back in service whereas limited meaning of reinstatement means ‘put back person to his original status’ in view of this there being no actual reinstatement, termination order passed has to be ignored and they are to be given all the benefit to which they are entitled alongwith all other employees. 11. Here in the present case, workmen in question have not at all been actually reinstated back and whatsoever benefit has been given to the workmen is under the threat of coercive process or through coercive process provided for under Section 6-H(1) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Record in question reflects that in the present case there has been no actual reinstatement of workmen in question, but at the point of time when the order dated 1.7.1996 had been passed placing the workmen under suspension, therein precise order had been passed asking the workmen to present themselves at the gate of factory during particular hours and to submit certificate in the said regard. Workmen are contending that they have been presenting themselves at the gate, but at no point of time they were ever apprised of place wherein they have to append their signature, whereas from the side of employer it has been contended that workmen at no point of time reported for duties as mentioned in the order dated 1.7.1996 and never participated in the inquiry initiated and thereafter termination order has been validly passed on 10.10.1998. 12. At this juncture, the view point of Apex Court, qua the effect of order of reinstatement is being looked into. 12. At this juncture, the view point of Apex Court, qua the effect of order of reinstatement is being looked into. In the case of S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd, AIR 1958 SC 12 , Apex Court has ruled that effect of an order of reinstatement is merely to set at naught, the order of wrongful dismissal of the workmen by the employer and to reinstate him in service of employer as if the original contract of employment originally entered into had been continuing and monetary value of the benefit of such reinstatement is therefore, to be computed, but by reason of order of reinstatement. Said judgment has been followed by Apex Court in the case of Victor Oil Company v. Amar Nath Das, 1961 (2) LLJ 113 (SC) and in the case of Central Bank of India v. P.S. Raja Gopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 , and by Calcutta High Court in the case of Bengal Bus Syndicate v. M.K. Roy, AIR 1967(29) Cal 126. 13. Under Section 6-A of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1047, an award becomes enforcible on the expiry of thirty days, from the date of its publication. Under the aforementioned Act and the Rules, framed thereunder, no machinery has been provided for to compel the employer to accept the work of reinstated employee except to ensure monetary benefit. 14. Under U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules framed there under there is no forum provided for getting actual reinstatement enforced, and very limited executionary forum has been provided for in the shape of Section 6-H of the Act. 14. Under U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules framed there under there is no forum provided for getting actual reinstatement enforced, and very limited executionary forum has been provided for in the shape of Section 6-H of the Act. Section 6-H reads as follows : “6-H. Recovery of money due from an employer.—(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under the provisions of Section 6-J to 6-R or under a settlement or award, or under an award given by an adjudicator or the State Industrial Tribunal appointed or constituted under this Act, before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Indusdtrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956, the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the State Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same as if it were an arrears of land revenue. 15. Proceeding under Section 6-H of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is in the shape of execution proceeding and in the proceeding under Section 6-H(1) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it has limited jurisdiction inasmuch as in proceeding under Section 6-H(1) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, computation for payment of money can be made but therein in said proceeding, Deputy Labour Commission does not possesses any authority to set aside the order of dismissal and to pass order of for reinstatement. 16. Section 6-H of U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, is parimateria to the provision of Section 33C of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the said provision has come up for consideration before Apex Court on numerous occasions, and consistent view has been that same is in the shape of execution proceedings wherein directives can be issued for recovery of the money due from employer. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Company v. Wormen, 1974 (4) SCC 696 , Apex Court has taken the view that proceedings under Section 33-C are generally in the nature of execution proceedings wherein Labour Court calculates the money due to workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in term of money. The calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its previously being judged or otherwise duly provided for. In proceedings under Section 33-C, while considering claim for computation of wages, Labour Court cannot be asked to disregard dismissal as being wrongful on that basis compute his wages. In proceedings under Section 33C, even if Labour Court makes investigation of dismissal being bad, the Labour Court would have no jurisdiction to direct investigation Relevant extract of said judgment paragraph 15 is as follows : 15. It is, however, interesting to note that in the same case the Court at page 156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim of a workman would fall outside the scope of Section 33(C)(2). It was pointed out that a workman who is dismissed by his employer would not be entitled to seek relief under Section 32(C)(2) by merely alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should be computed on the basis that he had continued in service. It was observed “His ... dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed ... him, a claim that the dismissal ... is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the Workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under Section 33(C)(2)”. By merely making a claim in a loaded form the workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2). The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under Section 33(C)(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as ‘incidental’ to the computation. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as ‘incidental’ to the computation. Moreover, if we assume that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under Section 33(C)(2). And yet if the jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many times as the workman comes before it without being reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern. 17. Said principle have again been reiterated in the case of Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. v. Additional Labour Commissioner and others, (2007) 11 SCC 756 and in Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and others, (2007) 5 SCC 281 . 18. This Court in context of provision of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules framed thereunder, approves the principle enunciated and compiled by European Industrial relations glossaries qua reinstatement as follows : “Actual resumption of employment relationship which is obligatory on an employer who has carried out a dismissal judged by the Courts to be invalid, in cases where the employment relationship enjoys guaranteed reinstatement, it is recognised that it is impossible to enforce the obligation to reinstate and compel the employer to accept the work of reinstated employee, however, in cases where de facto reinstatement fails to take place, employers are obliged to pay enumeration to the employees due to them from the time of judges reinstatement order until actual reinstatement or failing this, until the end of employment relationship”. 19. 19. Once authority under Section 6-H of Labour Court under U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is explicit and it cannot go into validity of the dismissal order dated 10.101998 and Labour Court cannot direct for reinstatement of the workmen in question, then in such a situation and in this background order which has been passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner refusing reinstatement cannot be faulted. 20. As to whether termination order passed by the employer on subsequent occasion dated 10.10.1998 is merely pretence with the objective to over come and over reach the order passed by the Apex Court and is in violation of natural justice is essentially question of fact to be adjudicated by Industrial Court once employer has chosen to exercise its authority of undertaking disciplinary proceeding giving right for fresh Industrial adjudication. In this background as accepted position is that till today no steps whatsoever has been taken in the direction of getting said dismissal order set aside and the fact of the matter is that said order stands, in this background request of workmen that said order is nullity and should be ignored as such cannot be accepted, in view of judgment of Apex Court, in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, AIR 1991 SC 991, that dismissal order has at least de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by a competent body or Court, and further in view of the fact, as from the side of employer it has been stated that earlier proceeding had culminated in favour of workmen as there was no inquiry and employer in their turn have exercised their discretion to take regular disciplinary proceeding wherein workmen have chosen not to participate. 21. There being no concept of actual reinstatement, and admittedly on the strength of the award, contract of service had been subsisting, and monetary benefit has been extended, though under the umbrella of Section 6H, then as to whether subsequent disciplinary proceedings are good or bad has to be answered by Industrial Court, and in proceedings under Section 6H, Labour Court, cannot afford to ignore the same. The principle laid down in the case of Management Nilpur Tea Estate v. State of U.P., 1996 (2) FLR 79, would apply with full force, in the fact of present case also. The principle laid down in the case of Management Nilpur Tea Estate v. State of U.P., 1996 (2) FLR 79, would apply with full force, in the fact of present case also. On account of the view taken above, the judgment cited at the Bar, on behalf of workmen, namely : 1. Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar and others, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , Para-7(V). 2. Management of Ritz Theater (Private) Limited Delhi v. Its Workmen, AIR 1962 (5) FLR 216. 3. Central Bank of India Limited v. P.S. Rajgopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 , Para 19. 4. Kays Construction Company (Private) Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1965, paras 5 and 7. 5. Director General (Works), C.P.W.D. v. Ashok Kumar and others, 1999(9) SSC 167, Para-3. 6. Harjindar Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 2010(124) FLR 700 , Paras -19, 20, 22 and 23. 7. Sant Ram v. Rajendar Lal, AIR 1978 SC 1601 , Para 7. 8. Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, 1985(51) FLR 481, Para-4. 9. Khushal Mani v. Collector Uttar Kashi and others, 2005(106) FLR 1196, paras 7 and 8. are of no assistance and will not at all apply to the facts of present case, as in none of the cases, the issue as is involved in the present case has been involved, or has been answered. 22. Dismissal order dated 10.10.1998 is subject-matter of another Industrial adjudication which is to be answered by the Industrial Court, in such a situation as it has been stated before this Court by Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate that M/s Hamdard would make entire payment good till the date of termination as per the earlier award, as such entire payment be made good within two months from the date of this order after adjusting the amount already paid. As far as termination order is concern qua the same it is hereby directed that State Government or authority exercising delegated power should consider the request of workmen to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court within one month in exercise of its authority under Section 4-K of U.P. Industrial Act, 1947 and thereafter in case of reference being received concern Industrial Court shall decide the said dispute strictly as per time frame provided in the Rules, with the outer limit of six months after giving opportunity of hearing to parties concern. 23. With these observations and directions, writ petitions stands disposed of. 24. No order as to cost. ——————