JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition has been filed by the tenant Gulabi Devi for quashing the order dated 24th February, 2010 passed by the Prescribed Authority by which the application filed by the landlord Kamlesh Kumar Pal under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for release of the tenanted accommodation was allowed. The petitioner has also sought the quashing of the judgment dated 17th July, 2010 of the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Varanasi by which the appeal filed by the tenant against the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority was dismissed. 2. The release application was filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act claiming himself to be the owner of the accommodation in dispute with the petitioner as his tenant who was residing in a portion of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. It was inter alia stated that the family of the landlord consisted of himself, his wife, his father, one son and two daughters; that the applicant was a lawyer practicing in the District Court; that his son was a student of B.A.M.S. and was studying in second semester; that his elder daughter was married but was staying with him as she was studying in B.Sc. Final Year and his younger daughter was studying in B.Com. First Year; that the landlord bona fide required the tenanted accommodation for his chamber, room for his old father, drawing room and guest room. On the other hand, the tenant had sufficient accommodation in the city and the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship than the tenant in case the tenanted accommodation was not released. 3. Initially, the application filed by the landlord was allowed ex parte by the order dated 31st May, 2004 but the recall application filed by the tenant was allowed. The tenant thereafter filed objections to the release application filed by the landlord. It was stated that the landlord was not the owner of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and the sale-deed dated 9th February, 2001 by which the landlord claimed ownership was void ab initio. The petitioner also asserted that her daughter Gita Devi was the owner and landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and as such the application filed by the landlord was not maintainable and liable to be rejected. The petitioner also asserted that her daughter Gita Devi was the owner and landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and as such the application filed by the landlord was not maintainable and liable to be rejected. It was also asserted that the landlord did not bona fide require the accommodation. 4. The Prescribed Authority by the order dated 24th February, 2010 allowed the application filed by the landlord for release of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and the appeal filed by the tenant against the said order was dismissed. 5. The Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority both have found as a fact that the claim of the tenant that her daughter was the owner of the tenanted property was not correct. It has been found that the landlord purchased the property by the registered sale deed dated 9th February, 2001 and thereafter served notices upon the tenant on 17th January, 2003 and 1st August, 2003 requiring the tenant to vacate the house within six months. The notice was returned with the endorsement made by the Postman that the addressee refused to accept it. It has also been found as a fact that in Original Suit No. 448 of 1998 which the tenant Gulabi Devi had filed against the erstwhile owners-landlords Govind Krishna Das and others, she had described herself as a tenant of Govind Krishna Das and others; in Original Suit No. 412 of 1999 filed by Gulabi Devi against Ajay Kumar and others, she also stated that she was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi; in Original Suit No. 277 of 2001 filed by Gulabi Devi against Kamlesh Kumar Pal, she stated that she was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and in Writ Petition No. 44261 of 2008 filed by Gulabi Devi against Kamlesh Kumar Pal, the High Court in its judgment also observed that the applicant-Kamlesh Kumar Pal was the landlord of the disputed property. Certain other documents were also filed by the landlord to show that the petitioner Gulabi Devi admitted that she was the tenant of the disputed property. It is on the basis of these voluminous documents available on the record that the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority held that Gulabi Devi was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and that her daughter was not the owner/landlord. It is on the basis of these voluminous documents available on the record that the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority held that Gulabi Devi was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and that her daughter was not the owner/landlord. After having recorded these findings, the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority found the need of the landlord to be genuine and bona fide and have also recorded a finding that the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship than the tenant in case the tenanted house was not released. House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi has, therefore, been released in favour of the landlord-Kamlesh Kumar Pal. 6. It has vehemently been urged by Sri S.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority are perverse and that the landlord has not been able to establish that he is the owner/landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. In this connection he has submitted that the burden was on the applicant-Kamlesh Kumar Pal to establish that he was the owner of the disputed house and no benefit can be taken by him on the basis of certain statements made by the petitioner in other proceedings. It is also his contention that mere entries in the assessment register of the Nagar Nigam Varanasi cannot be relied upon for the purposes of establishing that predecessor-in-interest of Kamlesh Kumar Pal were the owners and landlords. In support of these contentions, he has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Thiru John v. Subramhamanyan, AIR 1977 SC 1724 ; Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil (dead) by LRs. and another, AIR 1977 SC 1712 ; Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and others, AIR 1960 SC 100 ; Nagubai Ammal and others v. B. Shama Rao and others, AIR 1956 SC 593 ; R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and another, AIR 2003 SC 4548 ; Smt. Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kau and others, AIR 1996 SC 2823 ; Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., JT 2011 (11) SC 222; Basant Singh v. I. Janki Singh and others, AIR 1967 SC 341 and Mulchand and Company v. Jawahar Mills Limited, Salem, AIR 1953 SC 98 . 7. 7. Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has submitted that the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority, on the basis of the evidence available on record, have recorded a categorical finding that Kamlesh Kumar Pal was the owner and landlord of the disputed house and this finding does not call for any interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He has also placed before the Court the pleadings in various suits and certain documents on the basis of which the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority have arrived at such a conclusion and has submitted that in the face of these voluminous documents, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to assert that Kamlesh Kumar Pal is not the owner/landlord and that Gita Devi, daughter of the petitioner, is infact the owner of the disputed house. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Kaur and another v. Subhash Paliwal and others, (2010) 2 SCC 124 ; Radha Devi v. Deep Narayan Mandal and others, (2003) 11 SCC 759; Bhogadi Kannababu and others v. Vuggina Pydamma and others, (2006) 5 SCC 532 and Shamim Akhtar v. Iqbal Ahmad and another, (2000) 8 SCC 123 . 8. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. 9. The submission of Sri S.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the application filed by the respondent-Kamlesh Kumar Pal under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was not maintainable as she was not the tenant of House No. B-27/5 situated in Mohalla Durgakund, Varanasi. 10. It has, therefore, to be examined whether the petitioner is justified in making this submission, which has not been accepted by the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority. The case of the landlord Kamlesh Kumar Pal is that he and his wife Meera Pal purchased the entire House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi through two registered sale deeds both dated 9th February, 2001 from its owners Govind Krishna Das and others. The eastern constructed portion occupied by the tenants was purchased by Kamlesh Kumar Pal, while the western open land was purchased by his wife Meera Pal. The eastern constructed portion occupied by the tenants was purchased by Kamlesh Kumar Pal, while the western open land was purchased by his wife Meera Pal. It will, therefore, be appropriate to refer to the various documents and pleadings placed by the applicant-respondent Kamlesh Kumar Pal, who had purchased the tenanted property by a registered sale-deed dated 9th February, 2001 from the previous owners Govind Krishna Das and others : (i) The previous owners Govind Krishna Das and others had filed Small Causes Court Suit No. 39 of 1998 on 1st April, 1998 against the petitioner Gulabi Devi for release of arrears of rent and decree of ejectment. In the said suit, a written statement was filed by the petitioner-Gulabi Devi and in paragraph 15 of the written statement, she admitted that her father Sunder Bhuja was a tenant in House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and after his death, she became the tenant and in paragraph 22 of the written statement, she stated that she had deposited the rent. (ii) Petitioner-Gulabi Devi also filed an injunction Suit No. 448 of 1998 on 12th May, 1998 against the previous owners/landlords Govind Krishna Das and others with the relief that she may not be evicted from the tenanted House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi except in accordance with law. In paragraph 2 of the plaint she stated that her father Sunder Bhuja was a tenant of the accommodation in question namely House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and after his death she became the tenant. (iii) In the available records of the Nagar Nigam Varanasi from 1927 to 2001, the names of previous owners Govind Krishna Das and others and their ancestors were recorded as owners of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and in the assessment years 1927-35, 1951-59 and 1959-67, the name of Sunder Bhuja, father of the petitioner, was recorded as a tenant. (iv) In paragraph 1 of plaint filed in Suit No. 412 of 1999 (Smt. Gulabi Devi v. Ajay Kumar Khanna and others), the plaintiff stated that she was a tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. (v) In paragraphs 2 and 5 of plaint filed in Suit No. 412 of 1999 (Smt. Gulabi Devi and others v. Kamlesh Kumar Pal and another, the plaintiff also stated that she was a tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. (v) In paragraphs 2 and 5 of plaint filed in Suit No. 412 of 1999 (Smt. Gulabi Devi and others v. Kamlesh Kumar Pal and another, the plaintiff also stated that she was a tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. (vi) The petitioner Gulabi Devi filed an application under Section 28(4) of the Act against the landlord Kamlesh Kumar Pal for making repairs in her tenanted House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi of which she was a tenant on rent of Rs.100 per month. (vii) The petitioner had also filed Special Leave to Petition in the Supreme Court against the order dated 24th July, 2009 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 44261 of 2008 filed by Gulabi Devi against Kamlesh Kumar Pal for setting aside the order dated 16th January, 2008 passed by the Prescribed Authority and in the said Special Leave to Petition, Gulabi Devi stated that she is in occupation of part of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi on a monthly rent of Rs.100/- and that respondent Kamlesh Kumar Pal was a practicing advocate and landlord. 11. It is on the basis of the aforesaid statements made by the petitioner in various proceedings before the Court that the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority recorded a finding that the petitioner is a tenant of respondent-Kamlesh Kumar Pal. 12. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is an illiterate old Hindu Pardanasin lady of 90 years and her counsel have surreptitiously colluded with the landlord and have stated a version contrary to the instructions given to them. It is, therefore, his contention that such statements made by the petitioner in the various suits should not have been relied upon and it was for the landlord to independently establish that he was a owner/landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Thiru John (supra) and Basant Singh (supra). 13. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Thiru John (supra) and Basant Singh (supra). 13. Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, submitted that Kamlesh Kumar Pal became the owner/landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi on the basis of the registered sale-deed dated 9th February, 2001 and though Gita Devi, daughter of the petitioner, had filed Original Suit No. 190 of 2004 against Kamlesh Kumar Pal and others alleging therein that she is the owner of entire House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi but so long as the registered sale-deed dated 9th February, 2001 is not set aside by a Competent Court, Kamlesh Kumar Pal continue to remain the owner/landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. He has also pointed out that the case now set up by the petitioner is not only false but the petitioner also appeared in the witness box in Misc. Case No. 37 of 2004 arising out of P.A. Case No. 17 of 2004. The restoration application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte order passed against the petitioner was registered as Misc. Case No. 37 of 2004 and she stated in cross-examination that she was residing in a tenanted house and that she had rightly filed Original Suit No. 448 of 1998. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord also pointed out that even the sons of the petitioner, who had filed Original Suit No. 192 of 2001, had admitted that their mother Gulabi Devi was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi and the said house was in the tenancy of defendant Nos. 1 to 7 since long. 14. It is not possible to accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the counsel for the petitioner in all these proceedings either in the plaint or in the written statement had deceived the petitioner by falsely stating that she was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. The petitioner in her cross-examination also admitted that she was the tenant and her sons, whom the petitioner does not claim to be illiterate, have also stated that their mother was a tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. The petitioner in her cross-examination also admitted that she was the tenant and her sons, whom the petitioner does not claim to be illiterate, have also stated that their mother was a tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nagubhai Ammal and others (supra) in support of the contention that counsel had colluded with the landlord and had wrongly stated in the proceedings that Gulabi Devi was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted as only a bald statement regarding the collusion has been made without there being any evidence on the record to establish it. 15. In Thiru John (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court observed : “15. It is well settled that, a party’s admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence proprio vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that “what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established”. 16. The above principle will apply with greater force in the instant case. Here, there are a number of clear admissions in prior declarations precisely and deliberately made in solemn documents by Shri John. These admissions were made ante litem motam during the decade preceding the election in question. These admissions were entitled to great weight. They had shifted the burden on the appellant (Shri John) to show that they were incorrect. The appellant had miserably failed to show that these admissions were incorrect.” 16. In Basant Singh (supra), which has also been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court observed : “5. ............. An admission by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is an admission within the meaning of Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and may be proved against him in other litigations. The High Court also relied on the English law of evidence. ............. An admission by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is an admission within the meaning of Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and may be proved against him in other litigations. The High Court also relied on the English law of evidence. In Phipson on Evidence, 10th Edn., Article 741, the English law is thus summarised : “Pleadings, although admissible in other actions, to show the institution of the suit and the nature of the case put forward, are regarded merely as the suggestion of counsel, and are not receivable against a party as admissions, unless sworn, signed, or otherwise adopted by the party himself.” Thus, even under the English law, a statement in a pleading sworn, signed or otherwise adopted by a party is admissible against him in other actions. In Marianski v. Cairns, (1852) 1 Macq. 212, the House of Lords decided that an admission in a pleading signed by a party was evidence against him in another suit not only with regard to a different subject-matter but also against a different opponent. Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English law. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.” 17. The said decisions in Thiru John (supra) and Basant Singh (supra) do not help the petitioner as the facts are entirely different. In any case, the application was filed by the landlord on 2nd April, 2004 and, as noticed hereinabove, even in proceedings filed earlier to the filing of the aforesaid release application, the petitioner had stated in various other proceedings that she was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the paragraph of 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Bhau (supra). 19. This decision also does not help the petitioner. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the paragraph of 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Bhau (supra). 19. This decision also does not help the petitioner. The proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act are summary in nature and even otherwise, the applicant claimed to be the landlord by virtue of the sale deed executed on 9th February, 2001. 20. The decision in Himani Alloys Ltd. (supra) relied upon learned counsel for the petitioner also does not come to the aid of the petitioner as the statements made by the petitioner in various proceedings referred to above are clear and unambiguous. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed emplasis on various paragraphs of the writ petition in support of his contention that infact Gita Devi, daughter of petitioner, was the owner and landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on paragraphs 25 and 44 of the Supreme Court decision in Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale (supra). 22. As seen above, Kamlesh Kumar Pal claims to be the owner/landlord on the basis of the registered sale-deed dated 9th February, 2001 and so long it is not set aside by a Competent Court or Law, it is not open to the petitioner to claim that Gita Devi is the owner/landlord of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi merely because she has filed a suit claiming herself to be the owner. The decision in Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale (supra), therefore, does not help the petitioner as the facts were entirely different. 23. It has also been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that entries in the Municipal records do not confer title and relate only to payment of taxes. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder (supra) and Smt. Sawarni (supra). 24. It is true that entries in the assessment register do not relate to title but only for payment of taxes but these are not the only documents that have been relied upon by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. 24. It is true that entries in the assessment register do not relate to title but only for payment of taxes but these are not the only documents that have been relied upon by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. These documents only support the statements made by the petitioner in various suits and the learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified in asserting that findings have been recorded only on the basis of these entries. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent is justified in contending that in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act, title is not to be seen and only the relationship between the landlord and the tenant has to be seen in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Lata Sharma v. Raj Pal and another, 2004 (2) ARC 524 (SC) and the decision of this Court in Smt. Kora and others v. IVth Additional District Judge, Nainital and others, 1988 (2) ARC 545. 26. Thus, for all the reason stated above, the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority that the petitioner was the tenant of House No. B-27/5, Durgakund, Varanasi of which respondent-Kamlesh Kumar Pal was the landlord cannot, therefore, be said to be perverse. There is, therefore, no merit in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. ——————