Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—Admit. Mr. NJ Shah, Ld. AGP waives service of notice of admission for the respondents. 2. With the consent of the Learned Counsel appearing for both the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 3. The present appeal arises against the order dated 12/10/2010 passed by the Ld. Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 12499 of 2010, whereby the petition is dismissed. 4. The only question to be considered in the present matter is whether the officer who acted as an appellate authority could hear the appeal against his own order in capacity as the disciplinary authority. 5. The relevant facts are that the petitioner – appellant was working as Sub Inspector and there were departmental proceedings against him in connection with the alleged misconduct. On 16/12/2005 show cause notice was issued and the petitioner submitted reply and thereafter, on 1/3/2006 ultimately in the departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority Shri K.R. Kaushik, Police Commissioner, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The petitioner preferred appeal against the said order to the Director General of Police, Gujarat State. The said appeal came to be heard by the Director General of Police, but at the relevant point of time, the post was held by Shri K.R. Kaushik, the very officer who had acted as the disciplinary authority in capacity as the Police Commissioner. The said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 24/10/2007. The petitioner, against the said order, preferred revision under Section 27-A of the Bombay Police Act before the State Government. It was inter-alia contended that the very officer Shri Kaushik in capacity as the Director General of Police, has decided the appeal. The State Government vide order dated 26/3/2009 dismissed the revision, but did not consider the said aspect that the very officer had heard the appeal in capacity as the Director General of Police. Under these circumstances, the petitioner preferred the petition before this Court challenging the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as of the appellate authority and also the State Government imposing the punishment and confirmation thereof. 6. The Ld. Single Judge found that hearing of the appeal by the very officer was by way of mere coincidence and, therefore, ultimately for the reasons recorded therein, dismissed the petition. Under these circumstances, the present appellant is before us. 7. We have heard Mr. Upadhyay with Mr. 6. The Ld. Single Judge found that hearing of the appeal by the very officer was by way of mere coincidence and, therefore, ultimately for the reasons recorded therein, dismissed the petition. Under these circumstances, the present appellant is before us. 7. We have heard Mr. Upadhyay with Mr. Dagli, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. N.J. Shah, Ld. AGP for the respondents. 8. As such on the aspects of basic principles of natural justice and bias, the position of law is settled. No-one can be a judge of his own cause nor a person can be permitted to be a judge in which he himself is interested by way of a bias. The bias does not mean that he should have any particular interest or particular tangible interest. But in certain cases where there will be a question of deemed bias. Not only that but the basic principles of natural justice would also require that there is fair consideration independently by the authority other than those who had directly or indirectly involved itself in the litigation. The only exception is the principle of doctrine of necessity. If the doctrine of necessity is to apply, the question of deemed bias would not arise and would be within the power of the person concerned, who is the only person holding the post to exercise his power, might be that while working in the lower cadre, he had played any role in the disciplinary proceedings. 9. If the facts of the present case are examined, it is admitted position that Shri Kaushik in capacity as the disciplinary authority being Police Commissioner, had imposed punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner vide order dated 1/3/2006. Rule 9 of the Bombay Police [Punishment and Appeals] Rules, 1956 provides for right of appeal to the delinquent officer upon whom the punishment has been imposed. Rules 10 to 15 provide for hearing and the mode of deciding the appeal. Against the decision of the appellate authority, there are revisional power with the State Government under Section 27-A of the Bombay Police Act. It appears that the petitioner did prefer appeal, but when the appeal came up for hearing, Mr. Kaushik, who was the disciplinary authority at the first instance, was holding the post of the Director General of Police may be by way of promotion in the meantime. It appears that the petitioner did prefer appeal, but when the appeal came up for hearing, Mr. Kaushik, who was the disciplinary authority at the first instance, was holding the post of the Director General of Police may be by way of promotion in the meantime. But the fact remains that the appeal came to be heard and decided by Shri Kaushik in the capacity as the Director General of Police. Under these circumstances, it is undisputed position that the officer, who acted as the disciplinary authority, was the very officer who has heard the appeal and decided the appeal. It is not the case of the respondents that there are no other officers of the cadre of the Director General of Police. 10. It has been stated that as per the schedule, in the column of appellate authority, it is mentioned as Inspector General of Police, but the Director General of Police is the same nomenclature used in alternative when one is posted for administration and the post of Inspector General of Police and the Director General of Police are inter-changeable. It is not case of the respondents that no other officer of the same cadre of the Director General of Police was available in the State, who could hear the appeal. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of necessity could not be applied to the normal principles that one cannot be a judge of his own cause. It is hardly required to be stated that in the proceedings of the appeal, the disciplinary authority would be one of the parties to the proceedings, who may submit the case to the appellate authority for supporting the decision of imposing punishment. Therefore, if the appeal is heard by the very person who had acted as the disciplinary authority, it cannot be said that the exercise of powers of the quasi-judicial authority in a fair manner would be satisfied. In such circumstances, the appeal was required to be heard by the officer other than the very officer who acted as the disciplinary authority, but of the cadre of the Director General of Police / Inspector General of Police. Unfortunately, the said aspect is not at all considered by the State Government while hearing the revision against the order of the appellate authority under Section 27-A of the Act. Unfortunately, the said aspect is not at all considered by the State Government while hearing the revision against the order of the appellate authority under Section 27-A of the Act. Under these circumstances, we find that the order passed by the appellate authority cannot be sustained and it would be just and proper to restore the appeal by setting aside the order of the State Government in revision as well as the order of the Ld. Single Judge in the main Special Civil Application so that the appeal can be heard afresh in accordance with law by the person holding post of the Director General of Police / Inspector General of Police. It has been stated by Mr. Upadhyay, Learned Counsel for the appellant that Shri Kaushik, who acted as the disciplinary authority, has retired from service and, therefore, as now such circumstances are not to arise for hearing the appeal by the same person who acted as the disciplinary authority, we find that the specific order for hearing of the appeal by any other person in capacity of the Director General of Police / Inspector General of Police is not required to be provided. 11. In view of the aforesaid observation and discussion, the impugned order passed by the appellate authority dated 24/10/2007 and its further confirmation by the State Government vide order dated 26/3/2009 as well as the order of the Ld. Single Judge are set aside with the further direction that the appeal of the original petitioner shall stand restored to the file of the Director General of Police and it is further directed that the appeal shall be heard as early as possible, preferably within six months from the receipt of the order of this Court, afresh and the decision shall be rendered in accordance with the law. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. D S permitted. P P P P P