Judgment :- 1. The rejection of plaintiff’s IA-8 invoking Sections 32 and 33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 for short ‘Act’, to impound Ex.D29 and direct defendants to pay duty and penalty thereon, by order dt.14.12.2010 in O.S.6616/2006 of the 5th City Civil Court, Bangalore, is called in question in this petition. 2. In the suit instituted by the petitioner for the reliefs of specific performance of an agreement dt.23.5.2002; to direct the defendants to execute an affidavit and registered lease deed of the suit schedule property for the period 1.1.2001 to 31.12.2009 and for permanent injunction in respect of the said property, the respondent-defendant, on notice, entered appearance, resisted the suit by filing written statement and counter claim to direct delivery of possession, as also to recover penal rents until delivery of possession of the suit schedule property. On the closure of the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant called upon to adduce evidence on its side, made an application to produce and mark an attested copy of the memorandum of understanding entered into between the respondent and one Nitin Bagmane which the trial court allowed in part by not permitting the marking of the said document. There afterwards the respondent filed I.A.No.7 to produce the original memorandum of understanding and mark it in evidence. That application was allowed since the court had allowed IA-6 to produce the copy of the memorandum of understanding following which on 6.12.2010 the document was introduced in the evidence of DW-1 marked as Ex.D29 without objection or opposition, though counsel for the petitioner was present before court and sought time to cross-examine the witness. The petitioner on 6.12.2010 filed IA-8 under Sections 32 and 33 of the ‘Act’ to impound Ex.D29 and direct the defendants to pay duty and penalty on the document. In the affidavit accompanying the application sworn to be one Sanjay Kocchar, said to be the Director of the petitioner, it is stated that the plaintiff filed objections to IA-6 for permission to produce photocopy of the memorandum of understanding dt.12.8.2010 which was allowed subject to proof and admissibility, on production of the original. In the affidavit accompanying the application sworn to be one Sanjay Kocchar, said to be the Director of the petitioner, it is stated that the plaintiff filed objections to IA-6 for permission to produce photocopy of the memorandum of understanding dt.12.8.2010 which was allowed subject to proof and admissibility, on production of the original. In para 3 of the affidavit it is stated that the petitioner objected to the document as it was not admissible in evidence and that the court had summarily allowed the application and further at the time of marking of the said document, objection was raised nevertheless the document was marked as Ex.D29. According to the deponent the contents of Ex.D29 in unmistakable terms being a joint development agreement entered into between the parties was insufficiently stamped in view of schedule 5 of the Stamp Act and hence the application to impound the same and to collect duty and penalty. 3. That application was opposed by filing statement of objections dt.7.12.2010 of the respondent terming it as frivolous, highly contumacious, not credible and that the document being sufficiently stamped does not call for interference. 4. The court below having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings observed that the facts set out in the affidavit accompanying the application were not true and correct. The memorandum of understanding Ex.D29 disclosed an endorsement of the Sub-registrar for having collected the stamp duty of Rs.20,000/- and the covenants neither disclose delivery of possession of suit schedule property nor passing of title of the immovable property to the developer except a sharing pattern of 50:50 on development. The allegation in paragraph 3 of the affidavit accompanying the application was held to be incorrect in the light of the order dt.30.11.2010 allowing IA-6 whence an attested copy of Ex.D29 was not permitted to be marked in evidence following which on 1.12.2010 IA-7 was filed to produce the original of memorandum of understanding. The petitioner’s counsel though sought time to file objections, was rejected since there was a mandate of the court in W.P.26066/2010 to complete the recording of evidence of the parties by 18.12.2010, and further that IA-7 deserved to be allowed in view of the order allowing IA-6. The petitioner’s counsel though sought time to file objections, was rejected since there was a mandate of the court in W.P.26066/2010 to complete the recording of evidence of the parties by 18.12.2010, and further that IA-7 deserved to be allowed in view of the order allowing IA-6. DW-1 when examined two documents were marked as Exs.D28 and D29, unopposed and cross-examination deferred to 6.12.2010 at the request of the learned counsel for the plaintiff whose initials are shown as ‘JT’. That counsel having not objected to the marking of Ex.D29, nevertheless the court below noticed that the endorsement on the document relating to stamp duty paid and accepted by the registering authority, did not call for impounding under the ‘Act’ and accordingly rejected the application by the order impugned. 5. Chapter III of Stamp Act deals with adjudication as to the proper stamp and Section 31(1) states that when an instrument whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not is brought to the Deputy Commissioner, and the person bringing it applies to have the opinion of that officer as to the duty (if any) with which it is chargeable, and pays a fee of Rs. One hundred the Deputy Commissioner shall determine the duty (if any) with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable. 6. Section 32(1) states that when an instrument is brought to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 31 in his opinion is one of the description chargeable with duty and (a) the Deputy Commissioner determines that it is already fully stamped or (b) the duty determined by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 31 or such a sum as, with the duty already paid in respect of the instrument, is equal to the duty so determined, has been paid, under Subsection(2) when such instrument is not chargeable with duty, is required to certify in the manner aforesaid that such instrument is not so chargeable. 7. Having regard to the aforesaid provisions of law, it is needless to state that Ex.D29 introduced in evidence by the respondent not being an instrument brought before the Deputy Commissioner for this opinion under Section 31, consequently Section 32 is inapplicable. In other words, neither Section 31 nor 32 in Chapter III of the Stamp Act are attracted in the matter of marking of the document Ex.D29. 8. In other words, neither Section 31 nor 32 in Chapter III of the Stamp Act are attracted in the matter of marking of the document Ex.D29. 8. Section 33 of the Stamp Act in Chapter IV provides for examination and impounding of the instrument wherein every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in-charge of a public office, except an office of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable in his opinion, with duty is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same. 9. Sri Shekar Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has no grievance over the marking of Ex.D29 but that Ex.D.29 is insufficiently stamped and that the petitioner having brought that fact to the notice of the Court below, failed to comply with the mandate of Section 33 to impound the same and transmit it the Deputy commissioner for determining the stamp duty and penalty. Learned counsel places reliance upon the decision in Chilakuri Gangulappa –v- Revenue Divisional Officer, Madanapalle (Para 13), to contend that the court below ought to have asked the respondent whether it would remit the deficient portion of the stamp duty together with penalty amounting to ten times the deficiency and if the respondent agrees to remit the same, then to proceed with the trail after admitting the document in evidence, failing which it is the duty of the court to forward a copy of the document to the Collector for adjudicating on the question of deficiency of stamp duty under the Act. 10. Per contra Sri.Srivatsa, learned Sr.Counsel for the respondent places reliance upon several reported opinions of this court and that of the Supreme Court to contend that Ex.D.29 having been marked in evidence without any objection/opposition, the petitioner cannot call in question its admissibility on the premise that it is insufficiently stamped, as such admission becomes final and cannot be reopened. In addition, learned counsel submits that once the court below has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Act to mark the document Ex.29 does not permit the court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act. Learned Sr. In addition, learned counsel submits that once the court below has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Act to mark the document Ex.29 does not permit the court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act. Learned Sr. Counsel places reliance upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in N.S.Lakshmaiah Setty –v- R. Govindappa and another to contend (i) that the document once marked in evidence without opposition the original court loses the power not merely to review its decision expressed or implied but also to levy any stamp duty or penalty in respect of that instrument and (ii) that Section 58(1) of the Act indicates that the court which either suo motu or on the application of the Collector takes into consideration the order made by the trial court is the ‘the court to which the appeal lies from or references are made by the first mentioned Court i.e. trial court and therefore, the application under Section 33 filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. Learned Sr.counsel also places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Shyamal Kumar Roy –v- Sushil Kumar Agarwal. 11. Lastly learned Sr.Counsel submits that the statements of the deponent in the affidavit accompanying IA-8 being contrary to record, neither the litigant nor the counsel could claim to contradict matters on record which were conclusive and places reliance upon the decision in State of Maharashtra –v- Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak. 12. I find considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. Indisputably the position in law as regards the power of the original court to review its order marking the document when introduced in evidence, is unavailable in the light of the provisions of the Act and hence does not call for further elaboration. 13. The question therefore is whether the trial court after having admitted the document in evidence of DW1 and marked it as Ex.D29, could exercise a jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act to impound Ex.D29 as insufficiently stamped and forward it for adjudication over determination of stamp duty and penalty, as sought for by the petitioner in IA-8? 14. Having regard to Section 58 of the Act, in my considered opinion, the court below has no jurisdiction to impound Ex.D29 after receiving it in evidence without any objection either by the plaintiff or counsel. 14. Having regard to Section 58 of the Act, in my considered opinion, the court below has no jurisdiction to impound Ex.D29 after receiving it in evidence without any objection either by the plaintiff or counsel. The observations of this court, in similar though not identical circumstances, in Lakshmaiah Setty’s case (supra2) is apposite: “It is clear therefore that once S.35 comes into operation, the original court loses the power not merely to review its decision, express or implied, to receive the document in evidence but also to levy any stamp duty or penalty in respect of the instrument. Xxxxxx xxx Sub Section (1) of S.58 indicates that the Court which either suo moto or on the application of the Collector takes into consideration the order made by the trail court, is the court to which appeals lie from or references are made by the first mentioned court i.e. trial court.” 15. In the facts of this case, the trial court denuded of jurisdiction to impound the document Ex.D29 after its admission in evidence, the petitioner–plaintiff was disentitled to invoke Section 33 of the Act for the relief of impounding Ex.D29. 16. The contention that the trial court before marking the document in evidence ought to have asked the respondent if it would remit the deficient portion of the stamp duty together with a penalty amounting to ten times the deficiency, I am afraid, in the facts and circumstances, pales into insignificance. I say so for two reasons, (i) Ex.D29 being a registered instrument, the sub-registrar exercising jurisdiction under the ‘Act’ accepted the stamp duty paid and registered the document and if found to be insufficiently stamped, it is for the Deputy Commissioner to invoke Section 47(A) of the Act, which is apparently not done, (ii) neither the petitioner nor his counsel by initials “JT” present in the court when Ex.D29 was introduced in the evidence of DW-1 having not been objected to on the premise that it was insufficiently stamped, there was no necessity for the court to have called upon the respondent to pay stamp duty. 17. 17. The facts in Chilakuri Gangulappa’s case (supra) were that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh impounded the document (agreement of sale of property) insufficiently stamped and forwarded the same to the Collector for taking action on it and called for a report from the subordinate revenue officer regarding the real market value of the property mentioned in the document. On these facts the Apex Court held that it was for the trail court having found the instrument insufficiently stamped to call upon the party presenting the document to either remit the deficient portion of the stamp duty together with a penalty amounting to ten times the deficiency or on his failure to remit the amount, to forward copy of the document to the collector for the purpose of adjudication on collecting the stamp duty on the instrument. Such not being the fact situation in this case that judgment has no application. 18. The record discloses that on 30.11.2010 respondent’s IA-6 for production of photocopy of the memorandum of understanding when produced was not permitted to be marked in evidence and it was only on 1.12.2010 when IA-7 was filed by the respondent to produce the original of the memorandum of understanding which was permitted although plaintiff sought time to file objections to the said application. Time was rejected by the trial court since there was a direction issued by this court in W.P.No.26055/2010 to conclude the trial on or before 18.12.2010 and to pass judgment within six weeks thereafter. There can be no dispute that once the Judge records his conclusion, neither the lawyer nor litigant can claim to contradict it except for the Judge himself and none else and hence the petitioner is unable to sustain his allegation in paragraph 3 of the affidavit accompanying I.A.No.8. The learned counsel for the petitioner (initials ‘JT’) infact did not oppose the marking of Ex.D29 when introduced in the evidence of DW-1. 19. In the circumstances, no exception can be taken to the reasons, findings and conclusions arrived at by the court below in rejecting IA-8 filed by the petitioner-plaintiff. In the result, the petition being without merit, is accordingly rejected.