JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—List revised. No one appears for the respondent. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. This is defendants’ Second Appeal arising out of Original Suit No. 109 of 1972 which was dismissed by Munsif, Haveli, Azamgarh on 1.9.1975. Against the said judgment and decree plaintiffs-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1976 which was allowed by First Additional District Judge, Azamgarh on 27.9.1978. Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and plaintiffs’ suit was decreed and defendant respondent No. 1-Sohan (since deceased and survived by appellants) was directed to remove the constructions standing over the land shown by yellow colour in the map Ka-2/107 which was directed to be made part of the decree. 2. This Second Appeal is directed against the decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court. This Second Appeal was admitted on 7.11.1978 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether in the absence of a survey map, the location of the property in dispute could be determined for granting relief to the plaintiffs? 2. Whether the sale-deed has been wrongly interpreted by the lower appellate Court? 3. The plaintiffs’ case was that defendant No. 1 was owner of plot No. 338 and he had transferred 66 links area which was part of the said plot to Smt. Kausalya Devi and Smt. Prabhu Devi (defendant Nos. 2 and 3/respondent Nos. 3 and 4) on 16.3.1963 and thereafter Smt. Prabhu Devi sold 33 links of the land purchased by her to the plaintiffs on 20.3.1972 showing in the sale-deed that northern half portion of the property purchased by her and Smt. Kaushlya Devi on 16.3.1963 was being transferred. It was further pleaded in the plaint that Smt. Kaushlya Devi also agreed to sell her 33 links area to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further alleged that after purchasing the property from Smt. Prabhu Devi they constructed a wall towards eastern side. The relief claimed in the plaint was for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs over the land in dispute. Transferors of plaintiffs i.e. Smt. Kaushlya Devi and Smt. Prabha Devi were made defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit who admitted the case of the plaintiffs. 4. Defendant No. 1 pleaded that the portion sold by him to defendant Nos. Transferors of plaintiffs i.e. Smt. Kaushlya Devi and Smt. Prabha Devi were made defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit who admitted the case of the plaintiffs. 4. Defendant No. 1 pleaded that the portion sold by him to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 was not the portion shown in the plaint but it was towards south of that and on that southern portion Govind, father of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 had already constructed a house. The construction of wall by plaintiffs as alleged in the plaint was denied and it was asserted by defendant No. 1 that he and not the plaintiffs had constructed the wall. The trial Court held that plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were owners of the land in dispute. However, the trail Court held that the constructions in dispute lay in plot No. 338. The net result of findings of the trial Court was that plaintiffs had failed to prove the exact location of the land purchased by them or their predecessors. Transfer of 66 links area of plot No. 338 by defendant No. 1 to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 was not denied by defendant No. 1. 5. The lower appellate Court mentioned that in the Commissioner’s map in between the house of Anmol and land in dispute a gaddha (ditch) was mentioned. The argument of defendants-appellants that it meant that the land in dispute was not just adjacent to the house of Anmol on the basis of Commissioner’s report was brushed aside holding that gaddha was not a permanent feature and if in between a land and house a gaddha intervenes then in the boundary of the land gaddha sould not be mentioned and only house would be mentioned. This is wrong principle of interpretation of title deed. A gaddha may not be a permanent feature, however, it denotes that there is a land which at some of point of time may be low lying in the form of a ditch and at another point of time may be levelled. Whatever is mentioned in boundary shall be just adjacent to the described property. 6. Govind father of the plaintiffs who had purchased the property in the name of his daughters (plaintiffs) had constructed his house over the purchased land. He very conveniently asserted that it was constructed by him on a land which he had taken from zamindar. Whatever is mentioned in boundary shall be just adjacent to the described property. 6. Govind father of the plaintiffs who had purchased the property in the name of his daughters (plaintiffs) had constructed his house over the purchased land. He very conveniently asserted that it was constructed by him on a land which he had taken from zamindar. Neither zamindar was examined nor patta was filed. Moreover the house of Govind was in plot No. 338 which admittedly belonged to the defendants hence there was no question of taking any part thereof from zamindar. The lower appellate Court committed an error of law in holding that as sub plottings of the land shown in the Commissioner’s map had been set aside and the map had been treated as a site plan on the statement given by both the parties hence it did not prove that house of Govind was in plot No. 338. Sub plottings in the map were set aside. However, the map with the consent of the parties was treated to be a site plan. Accordingly, it clearly meant that the entire plot No. 338 as shown by the Commissioner was accepted to be correct which showed the house of Govind in plot No. 338. 7. Lower appellate Court further committed the illegality by holding that plaintiffs were always considering the land in dispute as their property. When the suit was filed on the basis of sale-deed, the question of considering some thing else was wholly irrelevant. Accordingly, both the substantial questions of law are decided in favour of the appellants. 8. Lower appellate Court has based its judgment upon irrelevant and inadmissible considerations and has ignored very relevant evidence and circumstance i.e. existence of a house of plaintiffs’ father. In such situation the findings are liable to be set aside under Section 100 C.P.C. vide State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, AIR 2005 SC 1868 ; Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board, AIR 2008 SC 956 ; U.R. Virupakshaish v. Sarvamma, AIR 2009 SC 1481 and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, AIR 2010 SC 2679 . Accordingly, Second Appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is restored. ——————