JUDGMENT :- 1. Both writ petitions came to be posted on being specially ordered by the Hon'ble Chief Justice vide his order dated 19.4.2011. 2. It is a peculiar case where one writ petitioner is a nationalised Bank which gave sticky advance to a plantation owner and the second writ petitioner is that plantation management which is a chronic defaulter of all dues towards various labour legislations. They have come to this court challenging the action initiated by the PF Department in having recovered the amounts due to them by invoking the execution power conferred on them by virtue of Section 8 of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 3. In the first writ petition in W.P.No.8686 of 2010, the petitioner is the Union Bank of India challenges the sale notice dated 19.2.2010 issued by the recovery officer, EPF Organisation and seeks to set aside the same. In that writ petition, this court on 27.4.2010 had directed telegraphic notice to be issued to the plantation management and notice was directed to be taken by the Standing Counsel for the PF Department. Pending the writ petition, no interim order was granted. Subsequently, the third respondent herein was impleaded by the petitioner by filing M.P.No.3 of 2010. It was ordered by this court on 30.7.2010. On notice from this court, on behalf of first respondent, a counter affidavit, dated 10.6.2010 was filed and on behalf of second respondent, a counter affidavit, dated 25.4.2011 was filed. The third respondent purchaser has filed a counter affidavit, dated 25.4.2011. 4. Even while that writ petition was pending, the plantation owners had filed the second writ petition in W.P.No.15582 of 2010, challenging the recovery notice dated 25.5.2010 issued by the second respondent Recovery Officer and to set aside the sale of 144 acres in various survey numbers of tea plantation belonging to the petitioner company in favour of the third respondent purchaser and to direct the refund to the third respondent the sale consideration of Rs.4.41 crores paid by the third respondent. When that writ petition came up on 20.7.2010, this court had recorded that a sum of Rs.74,32,807/-was paid by the petitioner as found in the proclamation of sale and that an interim injunction was granted restraining the third respondent purchaser from altering the nature of properties and dealing with the properties by way of sale, lease, etc. When that writ petition came up on 20.7.2010, this court had recorded that a sum of Rs.74,32,807/-was paid by the petitioner as found in the proclamation of sale and that an interim injunction was granted restraining the third respondent purchaser from altering the nature of properties and dealing with the properties by way of sale, lease, etc. A counter affidavit, dated Nil (September, 2010) was filed by respondents 1 and 2. The purchaser has also filed an application in M.P.No.3 of 2010 to vacate the interim order together with supporting counter affidavit, dated 1.9.2010. The petitioner has also filed a reply affidavit, dated 13.11.2010. 5. Heard the arguments of Mr.A.V.Arun for Union Bank of India, Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.R.Parthiban, counsel for M/s.Mahavir Plantation Private Ltd., Mr.V.Vibhishanan, learned Standing Counsel for PF Department and Mr.K.M.Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.A.S.Balaji, learned counsel appearing for the purchaser M/s.Archana Industries. 6. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the sale of a portion of the estate of petitioner Plantation to an extent of 144 acres to satisfy the dues payable by the plantation owner towards PF claims is liable to be set aside by this Court? 7. When the PF Organisation had issued a proclamation of sale, dated 23.12.2009 bringing the landed properties of the petitioner to an extent of 144 acres in various survey numbers for sale towards the claim for recovery of the amount due to the PF Department which worked out to Rs.10,33,03,049/-, a public notice was also issued in Dinamalar, dated 8.1.2010 and followed by a further notice, dated 16.2.2010. In the notice it was indicated that the reserve value of the property was Rs.4,32,00,000/- and dues payable by the plantation was Rs.10,33,03,049/-. The auction was fixed on 18.2.2010. It was at that stage, the plantation management filed a writ petition being W.P.No.3363 of 2010, challenging the proclamation of sale. This court by an order dated 19.2.2010 had dismissed the writ petition. It was stated in the said order that the earlier petitioner had filed W.P.No.767 of 2010 questioning the auction sale of estate on the ground that in respect of the earlier proceedings, they had filed a special leave petition and that the special leave petition was likely to come up at any time. It was stated in the said order that the earlier petitioner had filed W.P.No.767 of 2010 questioning the auction sale of estate on the ground that in respect of the earlier proceedings, they had filed a special leave petition and that the special leave petition was likely to come up at any time. Therefore, this court had passed an order on 1.2.2010 in that writ petition that the department should wait for the outcome of the decision by the Supreme Court. After the disposal of the writ petition, the plantation management cleverly withdrew the special leave petition pending before the Supreme Court. This fact came to light when the plantation management filed the subsequent writ petition challenging the auction fixed on 18.2.2010 pursuant to the proclamation of sale dated 23.12.2009. 8. The auction purchaser paid Rs.10 lakhs towards EMD amount and successfully participated in the auction. He being the highest bidder for Rs.4.41 Crores, he was declared as a successful bidder. He had also paid Rs.1,00,25,000/- towards 25 % of the bid amount on the very same day. Subsequently, as per the auction condition, on 8.3.2010, the purchaser had also paid Rs.3,30,75,000/- being the balance amount. The purchaser also paid Rs.4,41,010/- towards foundation charges. 9. When W.P.No.3363 of 2010 came up, this court took exception to the conduct of the petitioner and also held that if there are any material irregularities in the auction notice, the Act provides for sufficient safeguards. It was also observed that the petitioner cannot successfully stall the public notice. After public auction was postponed to 24.3.2010 as per the earlier terms and conditions, the plantation owner filed a writ appeal in W.A.No.324 of 2010 challenging the dismissal of the writ petition. The petitioner plantation also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.5406 of 2010 to set aside the proclamation of sale dated 23.12.2009. Both the writ appeal and the writ petition were heard by a division bench and a common order was passed on 20.4.2010. In paragraph 2 and 3, the division bench had observed as follows: "2. An interim order was passed by this court earlier and today after the matter was heard for some time, Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram states that the appellant will work out its remedy before the Recovery Officer under Schedule II of the Income Tax Act as applicable to the recovery of Provident Fund. An interim order was passed by this court earlier and today after the matter was heard for some time, Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram states that the appellant will work out its remedy before the Recovery Officer under Schedule II of the Income Tax Act as applicable to the recovery of Provident Fund. She further states that an amount of Rs.74,32,807/- had been deposited by the appellant before the Provident Fund office. 3. The appellant will apply under the relevant provisions within one week from today and the officer will decide the application within 30 days from the receipt thereof after hearing the 3rd respondent and after hearing all concerned. The protection granted by our order dated 23rd March 2010 will continue for a period of 30 days. Both the writ appeal and the writ petition stands disposed of by this order. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. There shall be no orders as to the costs." 10. Pursuant to the direction, the plantation owner filed a petition under Rule 61 of the Income Tax Rules, 1961 to set aside the sale of immovable properties of the plantation on the ground of material irregularities and the issuance of notice for sale and the conduct of sale. The Recovery Officer pursuant to the direction, passed the impugned order, dated 25.5.2010 and refused to set aside the sale made in favour of the purchaser, third respondent herein and it had become the subject matter in the second writ petition. 11. Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the Bank submitted that the plantation was enjoying various credit facilities with the bank and had created an equitable mortgage by depositing of title deeds in respect of 708 acres of land in Kottur village on 14.11.1975. Subsequently, the firm was converted into a company and was dealing with the bank. In the year 1991, the company had become sick. The properties of the company were mortgaged on 10.01.1990 to an extent of 1398.08 acres in Aryanad village by deposit of title deeds. Since the accounts of the plantation owner became irregular, the petitioner bank had filed a suit in O.S.No.200 of 1996 before the Sub Judge, Nedumangad for recovery of Rs.10,22,82,983.72 together with interest. The suit was subsequently transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai after its formation and was renumbered as TA No.1050 of 1997. Since the accounts of the plantation owner became irregular, the petitioner bank had filed a suit in O.S.No.200 of 1996 before the Sub Judge, Nedumangad for recovery of Rs.10,22,82,983.72 together with interest. The suit was subsequently transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai after its formation and was renumbered as TA No.1050 of 1997. Subsequent of the formation of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam, the same was transferred to that court. On 1.2.2001, the Debts Recovery Tribunal had allowed the claim of the bank and had issued recovery certificate dated 13.9.2001. As against the same, the plantation management filed an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. Since the DRAT had refused to condone the delay, a petition was filed before the High Court of Kerala in O.P.No.32788 of 2002. The division bench of the Kerala High Court had dismissed the OP on 08.10.2003. Thereafter, the plantation owner moved the Supreme Court with SLP(C)No.23695 of 2003. 12. During the pendency of these proceedings, the bank had moved the recovery officer of the DRT and brought sale of two residential flats mortgaged with the bank and recovered a sum of Rs.4.79 crores. In the meanwhile, the SLP was dismissed on 11.4.2005 by the Supreme Court. The plantation owner also filed an application before the BIFR under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1958. The said reference was registered by the BIFR. In view of the registration of the reference, the recovery proceedings had been stayed. Subsequently, the BIFR had rejected the reference on the ground that the plantation cannot be taken as industries. Aggrieved by the same, the plantation owner filed an appeal before the appellate authority in appeal No.106 of 2007. The appellate authority by an order dated 14.1.2009 set aside the order of the BIFR and remanded the matter to the BIFR. As against the order of remand, the bank had filed a writ petition before the Kerala High Court being W.P.No.14105 of 2009. The order of the appellate authority was stayed. There was also other proceedings pending before the settlement officer and that an appeal is pending before the District Court, Udhagamandalam. This court is not concerned with the same. 13. But, in the meanwhile, the PF authorities have brought the properties for auction towards satisfying their dues. The order of the appellate authority was stayed. There was also other proceedings pending before the settlement officer and that an appeal is pending before the District Court, Udhagamandalam. This court is not concerned with the same. 13. But, in the meanwhile, the PF authorities have brought the properties for auction towards satisfying their dues. Hence it was contended that the sale notice issued by the PF Department was illegal and contrary to Rule 55 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. The particulars of auctions ale should have been notified to the Bank. In any event, when the sale had taken place on 22.02.2010, the particulars of successful bidder was not notified to the Bank. It was also contended that the bank must be involved in any sale process so as to secure fair price of the land sold. 14. Refuting the stand of the bank, it was submitted by the PF Department that Rule 15 of the Income Tax Rules was scrupulously followed and that due notice was given about the sale. It was also published in the national dailies including Economic Times. The reserve price was categorically mentioned at Rs.Rs.4,32,00,000/-. The plantation owner had attended the hearing on 09.12.2009 pursuant to the notice issued as per Rule 53 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act and that the transactions of the entire affairs were transparent. 15. On behalf of the plantation owner, it was submitted that under Section 69 of the Transfer of Properties Act, the bank being the mortgagee is entitled to bring the property for sale. After sale out of sale proceeds, the dues of the PF Department can be satisfied. The Recovery Officer constituted under the Debts Recovery Tribunal Act has exclusive jurisdiction to sell the property. Since the DRT Act is the subsequent Central Act, they have primacy of jurisdiction to deal with the property. 16. However, the purchaser third respondent contended that he was an innocent purchaser. Pursuant to the public notice, he had participated in the sale and after being the highest bidder, he is entitled to have the sale confirmed in his favour. He is also entitled to take possession of properties. Because of the interim order, he could not take possession of properties and he was unable to deal with the property. He had already sunk more than Rs.4.54 crores. He is also entitled to take possession of properties. Because of the interim order, he could not take possession of properties and he was unable to deal with the property. He had already sunk more than Rs.4.54 crores. Hence he prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 17. Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned Senior counsel further elaborated her submission in W.P.No.15582 of 2010. The learned Senior Counsel had stated that the sale was made pursuant to the proclamation of sale, dated 23.12.2009. The recovery of the sum was only indicated as Rs.74,32,807/- as on 25.1.2010. Therefore, the sale cannot be for more amount that what was indicated therein. But the petitioner as per their own admission had paid a sum of Rs.4607114/- for a period from November, 2001 to August, 2007. These facts were not taken note of. Hence the sale had suffered material irregularities. 18. These allegations were refuted in the counter affidavit. In page 25 of the counter it was averred as follows: "...Eventhough the proclamation of sale for Rs.7432807/- along with the balance PF dues of Rs.23867943/-, arrear penal damages of Rs.3123914/- and arrear interest of Rs.235009/- which have been shown in the appropriate column of the proclamation of sale, the petitioner cannot be allowed to pick up certain recovery certificates for his advantage and isolate others, especially when the first charge created under Section 11(2) of the EPF Act, is existing always on the assets of the defaulter." 19. With reference to recovery notice, the department had referred to proclamation of sale, dated 23.12.2009 referring various recovery certificates issued therein covering the entire sale. Though the petitioner had disputed the receipt of those notices, the very same proclamation of sale also finds place in the typed set. There is no communication ever made by the management that they did not receive such notices. Though the petitioner had disputed the receipt of those notices, the very same proclamation of sale also finds place in the typed set. There is no communication ever made by the management that they did not receive such notices. About the alleged payment made before sale by the employer and that there was no necessity to auction the property, in paragraph 34(VI) of the counter, it was averred as follows: "VI.....Without prejudice to the above, it is submitted that the petitioner's claims of payment of rs.393600/- in between 24.03.2008 and 23.12.2009 and further payment of Rs.549000/- between 23.12.2009 and 23.02.2010 do not tally with the details furnished by him on 23.03.2010, which is as follows: Sl.No. Amount Remitted Date of Payment Remarks 1 294710 12.01.2005 /16.05.2005Payment is made prior to Total (A) 294710 24.03.2008 23 5104852199 23.07.200811.08.2008 4 97172 10.09.2008 5 148437 03.10.2008 Payment made between 6 44744 24.03.2008 and 23.12.2009. 17.11.2008 7 73857 07.01.2009 Total(B) 467457 89 10020281518 Sl.No. Amount Remitted Date of Payment Remarks 10 110374 18.01.201018.01.2010 11 26779 20.01.2010 Payment made between 12 146919 20.01.2010 23.12.2009 and 23.02.2010 Total(C) 465792 17.02.2010 1314 8368256037 25.02.201025.02.2010 15 8109 Payment made after 25.02.2010 23.02.2010 Total(D) 147828 Grand Total 1375787 20. With regard to the contention that they had paid the entire amount, in paragraph 34 (VIII)B of the counter, it was stated as follows: "....It is denied that the petitioner paid the entire amount as specified in the proclamation of sale before 30 days. The petitioner has taken a illusory umbrage in clause 19 of terms and conditions of sale. The proclamation of sale is for realisation of a arrear of Rs.34659673 (Rs.6757097/- and cost & charges of Rs.675710/-, balance arrear PF dues – Rs.23867943/-, Arrear Penal Damages – Rs.3123914/-, arrear interest – Rs.235009/-) which has been shown in the appropriate places in the proclamation of sale. When the arrear payable by the petitioner was Rs.34659673/-, the petitioner cannot isolate the certificates and say that certified amount payable is Rs.6757097/-only. When the arrear payable by the petitioner was Rs.34659673/-, the petitioner cannot isolate the certificates and say that certified amount payable is Rs.6757097/-only. He cannot simply ignore the fact of other certified arrears for which 326.51 acres of land had been attached and the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court had allowed to auction the properties by order dated 17.09.2009 especially when the wordings of clause 19 is that "before 30 days if the entire arrear is paid by the defaulter then, the sale will become automatically cancelled." In the case of the petitioner certified arrears are Rs.34659673/- as stated above, the Division Bench of this court has permitted to sell 326.51 acres of land by order dated 17.09.2009, the respondents have held up the sale in view of the sale 144 acres by including the other certified dues in the proclamation of sale. The petitioner has not deposited the entire arrear amount even now." 21. Further, with reference to defence based on Section 8E of the EPF Act, in paragraph 34(VIII)C, it was averred as follows: "...It is pertinent to point out that the law makers have not been unmindful to the defaults arising out of bona fide reasons and to accommodate such bona fide reasons only the said section has been incorporated. The said section does not confer the petitioner with a licence of making PF payments at his whims and fancies spread over an indefinite and long time span. The contributions payable by the establishment pertains to the year 1998 onwards. The establishment has been in lavish enjoyment of time from the year 1998 till the year 2009 by stalling the recovery action through protracted litigations. A willful defaulter who has been flagrantly violating the labour laws for years together and who is interested in getting the issue of non-payment of Provident fund contributions, including the amount deducted from the hard earned wages of employees, locking them up in vexatious litigations, thereby purposefully preventing the social security benefits to thousands of hapless employees reaching them and enjoy cannot take any refuge on the said section...." 22. With reference to the lack of transparency in sale, in page 45 of the counter it was stated as follows: "E... The property has been got valued by the Panel Valuer who is also an approved valuer with the Tea Board and also IT department. With reference to the lack of transparency in sale, in page 45 of the counter it was stated as follows: "E... The property has been got valued by the Panel Valuer who is also an approved valuer with the Tea Board and also IT department. The valuer has considered all relevant factors, including the claim of cultivation of the organic tea and its un-maintained nature and its status in the revenue records, while opining the value for the property. As per his opinion, the property of 144 acres could have fetched Rs.4.32 crores in the market, and he had recommended the upset price for the sale to be fixed at less by 25% of the said price. However, keeping the best interest of realisation of provident fund dues and the interest of the petitioner only, the Recovery Officer had fixed Rs.4.32 crores as reserve price. F) For the above reasons, it is absolutely unfair to allege that the property has been sold at a throw away price. Moreover, had the petitioner been much interested in the property and hopeful of fetching imaginary and fancy price of Rs.45 Crores, the petitioner could have well approached the Recovery Officer for a private sale of 144 acres or even a lesser portion under the ITCP rules, which he has never done." 23. With respect to the allegation that the sale price was low, in pages 46 and 47, it was stated as follows: "H)...Further it is humbly submitted that the petitioner has referred to transactions recorded in 2003. The respondents had also access to few transactions held in 2005. One of such transactions is between M/s.Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited and M/s.Adderly Estate Limited as on 30.05.2005 wherein 536.16 acres with plantations and building have been sold @ Rs.8.50 crores i.e. Rs.1.58 lakh per acre. Another transaction is between M/s.Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited and M/s.Glenworth Estate Limited dated 22.10.2005 of 1148 acres, buildings, factory etc. for Rs.22 crores i.e. Rs.1.91 lakh per acre. In the sale of 144 of acres of the petitioner (no plant and machinery), Rs.4.41 crores have been fetched i.e. Rs.3.06 lakh per acre against the guideline value of just Rs.1.70 lakh per acre. Therefore, on any count, it cannot be said that the property is either undervalued or sold in an unreasonably low price." 24. In the sale of 144 of acres of the petitioner (no plant and machinery), Rs.4.41 crores have been fetched i.e. Rs.3.06 lakh per acre against the guideline value of just Rs.1.70 lakh per acre. Therefore, on any count, it cannot be said that the property is either undervalued or sold in an unreasonably low price." 24. With reference to the proclamation of sale was not valid and there was violation of Rule 53 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, in page 51 of the counter, it was averred as follows: "There has been no violation of the rule 53 of Second Schedule to the IT Act, 1961. The Recovery Officer had clearly has mentioned all the mandatory requirements as per rule 53 of Second Schedule of IT Act. The sale proclamation dated 23.12.2009 clearly specifies the amount for which it has been drawn including the claims on the property for sale. It is submitted that on one hand the petitioner is alleging that the amount for which the proclamation of sale has been made as only 6757097/- whereas on the other hand he is trying the project the inclusion of claim of Rs.34659673 in the column 5 under the head "claims if any which are attached to the property and any other particulars having a bearing on its nature and value" as "not due". The above attempt clearly reveals the manipulative tactics of the petitioner. It is submitted that the above said amount includes the arrears for which the Second Bench of this Hon'ble Court has ordered to proceed with the sale by the order dated 17.09.2009." It was also contended that the respondents have only sold 144 acres out of 8300 acres owned by the plantation. 25. Since in the reply affidavit once again similar contentions were raised, this court is not inclined to accept the same. 26. Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel also referred to a non obstane clause found under Section 34 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Central Act, 51 of 993) and contended that in view of the same, the proceedings under the DRT will over ride the other claims. 27. 26. Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel also referred to a non obstane clause found under Section 34 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Central Act, 51 of 993) and contended that in view of the same, the proceedings under the DRT will over ride the other claims. 27. Supporting the said stand, Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the Bank had referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 for the purpose of contending that they are also secured creditors and in case of winding up proceedings, the RDB Act will even have precedent over the Companies Act. The Tribunal having upheld their claim and the recovery officer is entrusted with the execution orders, the PF Department cannot take away the entire property. In any event, they should have given notice to the bank and should have associated the bank. In the matters of sale, there should have been a joint sale of property by both creditors. 28. The learned counsel stated that the company did not have prior notice on the entire sale and that the recovery notice was only confined to payment. Inasmuch as sale was effected without serving notice, the sale is vitiated. For this purpose, reliance was placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohan Wahi Vs. Commissioner, Income Tax, Varanasi and others reported in (2001) 4 SCC 362 . 29. The questions raised herein are no longer res integra. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the power of the PF authorities in bringing the properties for sale pursuant to the execution power vested with it vide its judgment in Maharashtra State Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Provident Fund Commissioner reported in (2009) 10 SCC 123 . In answer to the queries raised by the learned counsel for the Bank, in paragraphs 57 to 63, it was observed as follows: "57. During the pendency of the appeal, the Division Bench made an interim order directing disbursement of a portion of the sale proceeds to the Labour Commissioner and the Cane Commissioner for being paid to the employees of the company and sugarcane cultivators. The bank challenged the interim order by contending that as the sugar was pledged with it, the High Court could not have ordered disbursement of a portion of the price. The bank challenged the interim order by contending that as the sugar was pledged with it, the High Court could not have ordered disbursement of a portion of the price. After making reference to various judgments including Bank of Bihar v. State of Bihar717 and Karnataka Pawnbrokers’ Assn. v. State of Karnataka3 this Court held: (Siriguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. case4, SCC pp.360-61, para17) “17. Thus, going by the principles governing the matter propounded by this Court, there cannot be any doubt that the rights of the appellant Bank over the pawned sugar had precedence over the claims of the Cane Commissioner and that of the workmen. The High Court was, therefore, in error in passing an interim order to pay parts of the proceeds to the Cane Commissioner and to the Labour Commissioner for disbursal to the cane growers and to the employees. There is no dispute that the sugar was pledged with the appellant Bank for securing a loan of the first respondent and the loan had not been repaid. The goods were forcibly taken possession of at the instance of the revenue recovery authority from the custody of the pawnee, the appellant Bank. In view of the fact that the goods were validly pawned to the appellant Bank, the rights of the appellant Bank as pawnee cannot be affected by the orders of the Cane Commissioner or the demands made by him or the demands made on behalf of the workmen. Both the Cane Commissioner and the workmen in the absence of a liquidation, stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights cannot prevail over the rights of the pawnee of the goods.” (underlining* is ours) 58.The abovereferred judgments do not have any bearing on these appeals because in both the cases, the Court dealt with the right of unsecured creditors vis-à-vis secured creditors i.e. the bank in whose favour the goods had been pledged/mortgaged. Moreover, in neither of the cases, a provision analogous to Section 11 of the Act was considered by the Court. 59.The next point which requires consideration is whether the sugar bags pledged with the appellant Bank constitute assets of the establishment within the meaning of Section 11(2) of the Act. Moreover, in neither of the cases, a provision analogous to Section 11 of the Act was considered by the Court. 59.The next point which requires consideration is whether the sugar bags pledged with the appellant Bank constitute assets of the establishment within the meaning of Section 11(2) of the Act. 60.As per Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edn.), the word “asset” means, an item that is owned and has value; the entries on a balance sheet showing the items of property owned, including cash, inventory, equipment, real estate, accounts receivable and goodwill; all the property of a person available for paying debts or for distribution. In Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (2nd Edn.), the word “assets” has been described as the property in the hands of an heir, an executor, administrator or trustee which is legally or equitably chargeable with the obligations which such heir, executor, administrator or trustee is, as such, required to discharge. Everything which can be made available for the payment of debts, whether belonging to the estate of a deceased person or not; property in general all that one owns, considered as applicable to the payment of his debts; as, his assets are much greater than his liabilities. In Velchand Chhaganlal v. Mussan18 it was held that the word “assets” means, a man’s property of whatever kind which may be used to satisfy debts or demands existing against him. 61.As per Salmond’s Jurisprudence, the word “property” means—in its widest sense, property includes a person’s legal rights, of whatever description. A man’s property is all that is his in law. This usage however, is obsolete at the present day, though it is common enough in the older books. In a second and narrower sense, property includes not all a person’s rights, but only his proprietary as opposed to his personal rights. The former constitutes his estate or property, while the latter constitute his status or personal condition. In this sense a man’s land, chattel, shares and the debts due to him are his property; but not his life or liberty or reputation.... In a third application, which is that adopted (here) the terms include not even all proprietary rights but only those which are both proprietary and in rem. The law of property is the right of proprietary rights in rem, the law of proprietary rights in personam being distinguished from it as the law of obligations. In a third application, which is that adopted (here) the terms include not even all proprietary rights but only those which are both proprietary and in rem. The law of property is the right of proprietary rights in rem, the law of proprietary rights in personam being distinguished from it as the law of obligations. According to this usage a freehold or leasehold estate in land, or a patent or copyright, is property; but a debt or the benefit or a contract is not. Finally, in the narrowest use of the term, it includes nothing more than corporeal property—that is to say, the right of ownership in a material object, or that object itself. 62.In the light of the above dictionary and legal meanings of the word “assets” and jurisprudential concept of the word “property”, it has to be seen whether the sugar bags pledged with the appellant Bank constituted assets of the establishment for the purpose of Section 11(2) of the Act. We have already held that even though symbolic custody of the sugar bags was given to the appellant Bank as security for repayment of loan, etc., the Sugar Mills continued to be owner thereof. In other words, the sugar bags pledged with the appellant Bank continued to be movable property i.e. assets of the establishment, which could be attached and sold by the Recovery Officer in terms of Section 8-B or by adopting alternative modes of recovery enumerated in Section 8-F. 63.At the cost of repetition, it is apposite to mention that Section 11 is declaratory in nature. Sub-section (2) thereof declares that any amount due from an employer shall be deemed to be first charge on the assets of the establishment and shall be paid in priority to all other debts. Sub-section (2) thereof declares that any amount due from an employer shall be deemed to be first charge on the assets of the establishment and shall be paid in priority to all other debts. For recovery of the amount due from an employer which is treated as arrear of land revenue, the Recovery Officer or any other authorised officer has to take recourse to the provisions contained in Section 8 read with Sections 8-B and 8-F. The recovery can be effected by attachment or sale of the movable or immovable property of the establishment or, as the case may be, the employer, or by arrest of the employer and his detention in prison or by appointing a Receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the establishment or, as the case may be, the employer or by taking action in the manner laid down in the Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961." 30. With reference to non obstante clauses found in Section 34 of the RDB Act and under Section 11 (2) of the EPF Act and that the RDB Act is the subsequent central legislation will over ride Section 11(2), this question was not considered by the Maharashtra State Coop. Bank Ltd.'s case (cited supra). 31. However, in Maharashtra State Coop. Bank Ltd.'s case (cited supra), referring the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Vs. State of Kerala and others reported in (2009) 4 SCC 94 , in paragraph 37 it was observed as follows: "37.... in Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala6 the issue was considered in a slightly different perspective. The appellant bank had challenged the vires of Section 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, whereby first charge was created on the property of the dealer or the person liable to pay tax by contending that the same was beyond the legislative competence of the State and was also inconsistent with the provisions contained in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1963 and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. In the connected appeals, vires of Section 38-C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 was challenged on similar grounds. In the connected appeals, vires of Section 38-C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 was challenged on similar grounds. This Court considered various facets of the challenge and held that the provisions contained in the Sales Tax Act were not beyond the legislative competence of the State. The Court further held that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the State and Central Acts and the non obstante clauses contained in the Central legislations will not override the provisions of the State legislations by which first charge was created in favour of the State in the matter of recovery of the dues of sales tax." 32. Further, the non obstante clause found in Section 34 of the RDB Act is of general nature, whereas Section 11 (2) of the EPF Act is of specific nature. Section 11(2) reads as follows: Section 11. Priority of payment of contributions over other debts: 11.[(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), if any amount is due from an employer 15[, whether in respect of the employee’s contribution (deducted from the wages of the employee) or the employer’s contribution], the amount so due shall be deemed to be the first charge on the assets of the establishment, and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be paid in priority to all other debts.] 33. Therefore, with reference to the relative priority of payment, it states in an unequivocal terms that the PF authorities will have first charge on the estate of an establishment and that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force be paid in priority to all other debts. Even if there are two non obstance clause found in two Central legislations, it cannot be mechanically said that subsequent central legislation will over ride the prior central legislation. It has to be seen even in respect of two central legislations as to which one is the the special law on the subject. Even within a special law, a particular provision can be a general law and within the general law, a particular provision can be a special law. 34. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank's case (cited supra) and in paragraphs 39 and 40 it was observed as follows: "39. Even within a special law, a particular provision can be a general law and within the general law, a particular provision can be a special law. 34. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank's case (cited supra) and in paragraphs 39 and 40 it was observed as follows: "39. There can be a situation in law where the same statute is treated as a special statute vis-à-vis one legislation and again as a general statute vis-à-vis yet another legislation. Such situations do arise as held in LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur5. It was there observed: “... for certain cases, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes, it may be special and the court cannot blur a distinction when dealing with the finer points of law”. For example, a Rent Control Act may be a special statute as compared to the Code of Civil Procedure. But vis-à-vis an Act permitting eviction from public premises or some special class of buildings, the Rent Control Act may be a general statute. In fact in Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India1 (already referred to), this Court has observed that vis-à-vis the LIC Act, 1956, the Companies Act, 1956 can be treated as a general statute. This is clear from para 19 of that judgment. It was observed: “Further, the provisions of the special Act, i.e., the LIC Act, will override the provisions of the general Act, viz., the Companies Act which is an Act relating to companies in general.” (emphasis supplied) Thus, some High Courts rightly treated the Companies Act as a general statute, and the RDB Act as a special statute overriding the general statute. Special lawv. special law 40. Alternatively, the Companies Act, 1956 and the RDB Act can both be treated as special laws, and the principle that when there are two special laws, the latter will normally prevail over the former if there is a provision in the latter special Act giving it overriding effect, can also be applied. Such a provision is there in the RDB Act, namely, Section 34. A similar situation arose in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd.6 where there was inconsistency between two special laws, the Finance Corporation Act, 1951 and the Sick Industries Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Such a provision is there in the RDB Act, namely, Section 34. A similar situation arose in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd.6 where there was inconsistency between two special laws, the Finance Corporation Act, 1951 and the Sick Industries Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The latter contained Section 32 which gave overriding effect to its provisions and was held to prevail over the former. It was pointed out by Ahmadi, J. that both special statutes contained non obstante clauses but that the “1985 Act being a subsequent enactment, the non obstante clause therein would ordinarily prevail over the non obstante clause in Section 46-B of the 1951 Act unless it is found that the 1985 Act is a general statute and the 1951 Act is a special one”. (SCC p.157, para 9) Therefore, in view of Section 34 of the RDB Act, the said Act overrides the Companies Act, to the extent there is anything inconsistent between the Acts." Therefore, the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel must also fail. 35. Accordingly, this court is not inclined to interfere with the proclamation of sale impugned in the writ petitions and subsequent to the same, sale certificates issued in favour of the third respondent purchaser. Hence both the writ petitions will stand dismissed. It is hereby declared that there is no impediment for third respondent purchaser in taking over the property for which he had paid the entire sale consideration and for which he got a sale certificate. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.