S.S. Chauhan, J.:- Through this petition, the petitioner has challenged the charge sheet filed in Criminal Case No.9 of 2009 (State Vs. Raj Gopal Singh Verma and Others) under Section 120-B read with Section 409 IPC and Section 8 & 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (a) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 along with the order dated 7.6.2011 and he has also prayed for discharge from the offences alleged against him. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner happened to be posted as Director Information in the Department of Information, Government of U.P., Lucknow from 19.12.1999 to 11.7.2000. Selection process for Group 'C' employees was initiated in the year 1998 and in pursuance thereof a written examination was held in 1998 itself. The said examination was conducted by IMDUP, Aliganj, Lucknow, a Government of U.P. establishment. Results of the examinations were forwarded to the Directorate of Information and Public Relations in the sealed cover by the said establishment and when this Court at Allahabad gave direction in Writ Petition No.3568 of 2000 to declare the results of the examinations within three months, the process of selection was initiated and number of Selection Committees were constituted to conduct the interviews for different types of posts as per rules. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, the then Additional Director was the Chairman of all such Selection Committees. The Committees also comprised of different nominees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, field experts and one nominee of Collector, Lucknow in respect of the said selection. Mr. Raj Gopal Singh Verma, the then Deputy Director was the Nodal Officer for recruitment since 1998 much before holding of the interview in May 2000. The process of selection went on and was completed in respect of certain posts and recommendation of the Selection Committee was required to be approved but at this juncture it is alleged that new Government was formed and with the formation of new Government, new Chief Minister ordered orally to stall the selection process. After receiving this information, the petitioner forwarded concerned selection file to the then Secretary (Information), who was also holding the charge of Secretary to the Chief Minister for guidance and further action. Later on, it came to the knowledge that the Chief Minister wanted to re-examine the necessity to fill the said posts. After receiving this information, the petitioner forwarded concerned selection file to the then Secretary (Information), who was also holding the charge of Secretary to the Chief Minister for guidance and further action. Later on, it came to the knowledge that the Chief Minister wanted to re-examine the necessity to fill the said posts. In the meantime, when all these processes were going on, the petitioner was transferred on 11.7.2000 from the post of Director, Information & Public Relations. As the selection process was withheld, various writ petitions were filed before the High Court and the High Court directed several times to complete the selection process and declare the results but the Government on one pretext or the other did not complete the selection process and declare the results and at the end of November 2001 Government of U.P. came forward with a plea before the High Court that the results could not be declared due to non-availability of result sheets and it was also pleaded before the High Court that the result sheets were missing from the file. As the process of selection could not be completed, the High Court passed an order in Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S ) of 2001 directing the Chief Secretary to get a thorough enquiry conducted by an officer in the rank of Principal Secretary. Accordingly, the enquiry was conducted by Mr. Ajit Seth, IAS, who suggested disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Raj Gopal Singh Verma, Nodal Officer, Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, Additional Director and Mr. Avadhesh Narain Dubey. In the said report Mr. Ajit Seth did not indict the petitioner in respect of any misconduct. In the report dated 22.2.2002 Mr. Ajit Seth, the Enquiry Officer, has observed that Mr. Prabhat Sinha, the then Additional Director, Information, has given his written reply dated 20.12.2001 to the show cause notice dated 6.12.2001 in which he pointed out that the said File No.55/98 TC was lastly submitted to the then Director Information on 24.8.2000 by his office and the final results were kept in a sealed cover in the said file. The High Court also passed an order on 28.7.2003 in Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S) of 2001 directing the Director CBI with a copy to DIG/SSP, CBI Lucknow to register a case and investigate the same and after investigation submit a report to the High Court within three months. The High Court also passed an order on 28.7.2003 in Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S) of 2001 directing the Director CBI with a copy to DIG/SSP, CBI Lucknow to register a case and investigate the same and after investigation submit a report to the High Court within three months. In compliance of the said order dated 28.7.2003, an FIR dated 24.9.2003 was registered by the CBI although an FIR in this regard had also been registered with the local police at Crime No.37 of 2002 under Section 409 IPC at police station - Hazratganj, Lucknow on 18.1.2002. The CBI submitted a report to the High Court alleging therein that Mr. Raj Gopal Singh Verma, Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha and Mr. Mahesh Kumar Gupta have committed the offences of criminal conspiracy, breach of trust and bribery by misusing their official positions and Mr. Akhilesh Chandra Shukla was also arraigned as co-accused as abettor of bribery. Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S) of 2001 was disposed of vide order dated 19.10.2006. While disposing of the said writ petition this Court made it clear that the interview sheets were misplaced from the office of Information Department in between 7.8.2000 and November, 2001. It is to be noted that the petitioner was transferred and handed over charge on 11.7.2000. No appeal has been filed against the said order of the High Court dated 19.10.2006 either in the Supreme Court or before any other forum and has attained finality. When in Writ Petition No.3772 (S/S) of 2000, an order was passed by the High Court on 25.7.2000 commanding the authorities to declare the results within fifteen days, then the Department came forward with an application along with an affidavit of the then Additional Director on 11.8.2000 and prayed for extension of time on the ground that the appointing authority was out of station. No allegation was made in regard to the missing of broadsheets in the said application. On 2.11.2000, another application along with an affidavit of Mr. Umesh Sinha, the then Director, Information, was filed seeking clarification of final order dated 25.7.2000 and again nothing was mentioned in this application in regard to the missing of broadsheets. He also stated that the file was placed before him on 17.8.2000. Thereafter contempt proceedings were initiated against the Department and Contempt Petition No.1706 (c) of 2000 (Amrendra Pratap Singh Vs. Sri Yogendra Narain and others) was registered. He also stated that the file was placed before him on 17.8.2000. Thereafter contempt proceedings were initiated against the Department and Contempt Petition No.1706 (c) of 2000 (Amrendra Pratap Singh Vs. Sri Yogendra Narain and others) was registered. In the said contempt petition, an affidavit was filed by Mr. Umesh Sinha, the then Director on 22.11.2000 and reply of the Director contained several reasons for not complying the order of the High Court but there is no whisper of missing of broadsheets of interview. Note-sheet of the said file is silent from 17.8.2000 to 7.8.2001 although the file moved to various tables in filing applications and affidavits in pending writ petitions and contempt cases. A letter was also written to the Additional Chief Standing Counsel of the High Court on 18.1.2001 for legal opinion regarding cancellation of results by the Chief Minister but in this letter nothing was said about missing of broadsheets. The State Government came out with a plea after 17 months that the broadsheets of the interview were missing from the record. The interviews were conducted in June 2000. After filing the charge sheet, summons were issued to the petitioner and thereafter an application for discharge was moved by the petitioner along with other accused persons. Objection was filed to the discharge application and reply to the objection was also filed and after considering the pleas of the petitioner and the opposite party, the discharge application filed by the petitioner was rejected vide order dated 7.6.2011. Hence this petition. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the prosecution of the petitioner is not permissible in view of the fact that the sanction has been refused by the State Government as well as by the Central Government. Central Government vide order dated 31st March 2008 has refused to grant sanction under Section 19 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act whereas the State Government has refused to grant sanction by means of order dated 2.1.2008. The State Government has refused to grant sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Section 409/120-B IPC and under Sections 8 & 13 (1) (a) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Central Government has refused to grant sanction against the petitioner to prosecute him under Section 19 (1)) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The State Government has refused to grant sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Section 409/120-B IPC and under Sections 8 & 13 (1) (a) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Central Government has refused to grant sanction against the petitioner to prosecute him under Section 19 (1)) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The alleged act of the petitioner is connected with the discharge of official duty and the same has been performed in the course of discharge of official duty, therefore, for prosecuting the petitioner, sanction is sine qua non and in case sanction has been refused, then the petitioner cannot be prosecuted. It has also been submitted that the prosecuting agency has not been able to collect any evidence in regard to the receiving of money by the petitioner and the confessional statement of the person, who has been relied upon, namely Pankaj Darbari did not accompany the other accused, who is alleged to have handed over the money. No transaction has taken before him. Other accused have emphatically denied any such transaction. The State Government came out with the missing of broadsheets at the very belated stage i.e. after 17 months whereas time and again letters were written and affidavits were filed in the Court. Reply was filed in the contempt Court and at no point of time, it was ever pointed out that the broadsheets were missing. The selection was cancelled maliciously with the swearing in of the new Government. Decision was taken to stall the process of selection. The petitioner immediately forwarded file and documents which were required at his end to the Secretary (Information), who was also Secretary to the Chief Minister and at no point of time it was ever pointed out that the broadsheets were missing whereas in the inquiry report of Mr. Ajit Seth it has specifically been stated that Mr. Prabhat Sinha in his reply dated 20.12.2001 has stated that he has sent file to the Director on 24.8.2000, on the last occasion and broadsheets were very much present in the file. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that there is no evidence on record against the petitioner to prosecute him either for missing of broadsheets or for transaction of money. Prabhat Sinha in his reply dated 20.12.2001 has stated that he has sent file to the Director on 24.8.2000, on the last occasion and broadsheets were very much present in the file. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that there is no evidence on record against the petitioner to prosecute him either for missing of broadsheets or for transaction of money. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there is no evidence on record along with the charge sheet to charge the petitioner for the offences alleged against him. He submits that so far missing of broadsheets is concerned, that cannot be attributed to the petitioner as the petitioner has been transferred on 11.7.2000 and the broadsheets and other records were very much there. He submits that the aforesaid fact is fully established from the finding recorded by this Court by virtue of Judgment dated 19.10.2006 rendered in Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S) of 2001 wherein a specific finding has been recorded that the interview sheet was misplaced from the office of Information Department in between 7.8.2000 and November, 2001. The finding of the Court has become final and prosecuting agency has not been able to lay its hands in regard to the custody of file by the petitioner and its removal by the petitioner. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner with emphasis that when there is grave suspicion, only then the person can be prosecuted and charge can be framed but if there is only suspicion, then on the basis of suspicion charge cannot be framed and the person cannot be prosecuted. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments rendered in the case of Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 , Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368 , Chittaranjan Das v. State of Orissa, (2011) 7 SCC 167 and Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 12 SCC 1 . Learned counsel for the CBI, on the other hand, has submitted that confessional statement of Pankaj Darbari and the statement of Sudhir Kumar Singh clearly indict the petitioner in regard to the advancement of money. Learned counsel for the CBI, on the other hand, has submitted that confessional statement of Pankaj Darbari and the statement of Sudhir Kumar Singh clearly indict the petitioner in regard to the advancement of money. It is also submitted that there is ample evidence on record and the act of the petitioner was not connected with discharge of official duty and therefore, the petitioner has to be prosecuted and no sanction is required in respect of criminal act committed by the petitioner. Learned counsel has submitted that the Additional Director along with Pankaj Darbari went to the house of the petitioner along with money. Apart from it, it has also been submitted that the file was in the custody of the petitioner and broadsheets were removed by him, which is evident from the record which has been collected by the CBI during the course of investigation. The petitioner continued as Director up till 11.7.2000 and thereafter he was transferred. After transfer, it revealed in the Department that the broadsheets were missing and so an enquiry was conducted under the orders of the High Court and then the matter was handed over to the CBI. The circumstances go to indicate that the record remained with the petitioner and in fact he has removed the broadsheets from the record. Learned counsel has also tried to justify the same by drawing the attention of the Court towards certain judgments. He has placed reliance upon the judgments rendered in the case of Abhay Singh Chautala v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 1, Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 294, State of U.P. Vs. Udai Narayan and another, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3845, State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 40, Smt. Om Wati and another v. State through Delhi Admn. and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 1507, State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and others, 2004 SCC (Cri) 353, Sushil Suri v. C.B.I. & Anr., AIR 2011 Supreme Court 1713, State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh, 2009 (5) ALJ 249. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The petitioner, who was posted as Director, Information, proceeded with the selection in the Department in pursuance to the order of the High Court. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The petitioner, who was posted as Director, Information, proceeded with the selection in the Department in pursuance to the order of the High Court. He posted in the Department on 19.12.1999 and was transferred on 11.7.2000. The selection process in regard to Group 'C' employees was initiated in the year 1998. The written examination was held in the year 1998, which was conducted by a Government agency, namely, IMDUP, Aliganj, Lucknow, an establishment of Government of U.P. The results of written examination was forwarded in the sealed cover to the Directorate of Information and Public Relations but the results were not declared. As the results were not declared, a Writ Petition No.3568 of 2000 was filed before this Court at Allahabad in which a direction was given to declare the results within three months. In pursuance thereof a number of Selection Committees were constituted, which were duly represented by the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, field experts and one nominee of Collector. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, the then Additional Director was made the Chairman of the Selection Committees and Mr. Raj Gopal Singh Verma was made the Nodal Officer for recruitment since the year 1998. Interviews were held in May 2000. By the time, the selection could mature and results could be declared, the new Government was sworn in and immediately, the then Chief Minister gave an oral direction that the selection process be stalled, which was endorsed in the file on 20th June 2000. The Petitioner forwarded the said file on 20.6.2000 to the then Secretary (Information), who was also holding the post of Secretary to the Chief Minister for further action. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred on 11.7.2000. After transfer of the petitioner, the file was received by the Additional Director on 8.8.2000. On failure to declare the results by the Department, several writ petitions were filed in the High Court in which directions were issued to complete the selection process and declare the results but the Government on one pretext or the other did not declare the results and so, in the end of November 2001, Government of U.P. took the plea that the results could not be declared on account of non-availability of result sheets. Later on, State Government came up with the plea that the broadsheets were missing from the file. It it to be noted that the aforesaid plea was never taken at any time anterior to the end of November 2001. High Court directed the then Chief Secretary to get the thorough enquiry conducted by an officer in the rank of Principal Secretary and accordingly, Mr. Ajit Seth, IAS, was appointed as Enquiry Officer and in the said enquiry, the petitioner was not indicted at all and neither he was found responsible for removal of broadsheet. There was no evidence against the petitioner in regard to the missing of broadsheets at the hands of the petitioner. Mr. Ajit Seth, the Enquiry Officer, in his report dated 22.2.2002 has specifically endorsed that in the reply of the then Additional Director, Information, Sri Prabhat Sinha to the show cause notice dated 6.12.2001, it has been pointed out that the File No.55/98 TC was lastly submitted to the then Director, Information, on 24.8.2000 by his office and final results were kept in the sealed cover of the said file. By the said time, the High Court ultimately passed an order on 28.7.2003 in Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S) of 2001 directing the Director, CBI to register a case and enquire into the matter and submit a report before the High Court within three months. In pursuance to the said order, an FIR was register by the CBI on 24.9.2003 although in respect of the said allegation an FIR already stood lodged at Police Station Hazratganj, District Lucknow at Crime No.37 of 2002 and the same was registered on 18.1.2002. CBI submitted its report and the High Court after taking into consideration the said report disposed of the writ petition vide order dated 19.10.2006. While disposing of the Writ Petition No.6532 (S/S) of 2001 vide judgment dated 19.10.2006, a specific finding was recorded by this Court that the interview sheet was misplaced in between 7.8.2000 and November 2001. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:- "The C.B.I appeared before the court through learned counsel Shri Bireshwar Nath, who apprised this court of the various stages of the investigation by virtue of submitting periodical reports. The C.B.I. took two long years to investigate the matter and submit its report. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:- "The C.B.I appeared before the court through learned counsel Shri Bireshwar Nath, who apprised this court of the various stages of the investigation by virtue of submitting periodical reports. The C.B.I. took two long years to investigate the matter and submit its report. However despite the deep and thorough investigation having been conducted by the C.B.I., the interview sheet could not be traced out, although the C.B.I. has found some offers of the department responsible for the loss. As is evident from the report of the Principal Secretary, the then Director of the Information Department submitted the file to the Secretary for further instructions on 11.7.2000 and on that very day, he had handed over charge from the said post on account of his transfer to some other department. This court had summoned the original file which had become voluminous and noted that the file was submitted to Government on 11.7.2000 and received back from the Secretariat on 7.8.2000 and till then the entire file was intact. Had it been noticed that the interview sheet was misplaced, the respondent of the Information Department would have noted down the loss and reported the matter to the Director. There was no noting on the file between 17.8.2000 to 7.8.2001. On occasions more than one, the applications and affidavits were filed in the pending and decided petitions. A letter was written to Additional Standing Counsel of the High Court on 18.1.2001 in which legal opinion was sought in regard to the cancellation of the results by the Chief Minister. In that letter, there was no whisper about the interview broad sheet being lost. The fact regarding the loss of the broad sheet was brought to the notice of the court in November, 2001. It thus, clinches that the interview sheet was misplaced from the office of the Information Department in between 7.8.2000 and November, 2001." This Court has recorded finding that the file was intact till the petitioner was present and the said order having not been challenged in any higher forum has attained finality. This Court cannot take any other view except to abide itself by the said finding. The said finding is ample proof of the fact that the petitioner was not responsible at all for the misplacement of the broadsheet as alleged by the prosecution. This Court cannot take any other view except to abide itself by the said finding. The said finding is ample proof of the fact that the petitioner was not responsible at all for the misplacement of the broadsheet as alleged by the prosecution. This Court is also in agreement with the said finding. The CBI was given opportunity to enquire into the matter after recording the aforesaid finding. So finding recorded by this Court could not have been diluted on the basis of investigation as the entire CBI enquiry emanated on the basis of the order of the High Court and so the finding recorded in the said judgment was binding upon the CBI. The prosecuting agency, therefore, could not have gone beyond it in filing charge sheet against the petitioner. The prosecuting agency has also not been able to connect the petitioner with the missing of the file and neither could collect any evidence in this regard and bring on record any evidence to connect the petitioner with the missing of the broadsheet. Statement of Alok Ranjan, the then Secretary has been made the basis but that aspect of the matter has already been taken into consideration by this Court in the judgment and order dated 19.10.2006. The prosecuting agency applied for grant of sanction to prosecute the petitioner to the State Government as well as to the Central Government. Government of India vide letter dated 23.6.2006 requested the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. to obtain sanction under Section 197 (1) of the Cr.P.C. in respect of the petitioner and it was also indicated in the said letter that the matter in regard to the grant of sanction by the Central Government for prosecuting the petitioner under the Prevention of Corruption Act has been referred to the concerned Department by the undersigned. The State Government vide order dated 2.1.2008 refused to accord sanction in respect of the petitioner under Section 409/120-B IPC and Section 8 and 13 (1) (a) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act finding that there was no prima facie evidence available to prosecute the petitioner. The Central Government also took a decision in regard to the grant of sanction against the petitioner vide order dated 31.3.2008 and the prosecution as sought under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was refused by the Central Government as well. The Central Government also took a decision in regard to the grant of sanction against the petitioner vide order dated 31.3.2008 and the prosecution as sought under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was refused by the Central Government as well. When the Central Government as well as the State Government both have refused to accord sanction in regard to prosecuting the petitioner for the offences arisen under the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, then the petitioner cannot be allowed to be prosecuted and the Court has to see that legal bar created for prosecuting the petitioner cannot be overridden by any device. What should be the approach of court and how the matter is to be dealt with, when sanction has been refused and the act of the offender is closely connected with the discharge of official duty then prosecution cannot follow. The Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka through CBI v. C. Nagarajaswamy, (2005) 8 SCC 370 , came down heavily against prosecuting such person as the court before proceeding against a person has to see as to whether sanction has been granted or not. Ordinarily the said question should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance but if the cognizance has been taken erroneously and it comes to the knowledge of the court at a later stage, a finding to that effect is permissible. The plea of sanction for prosecution can be taken for the first time before the appellate court also. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:- "13. The appellant proceeded against the respondents under the Act. Section 5 of the Act provides for the procedure and powers of the Special Judge. Section 19 of the Act mandates that no court shall take cognizance of offence punishable under the provisions specified therein except with the previous sanction by the authorities specified therein. 14. Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance. 14. Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance. But in a case of this nature where a question is raised as to whether the authority granting the sanction was competent therefor or not, at the stage of final arguments after trial, the same may have to be considered having regard to the terms and conditions of service of the accused for the purpose of determination as to who could remove him from service. 15. Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence. It is desirable that the question as regard sanction may be determined at an early stage. [See Ashok Sahu Vs. Gokul Saikia, 1990 (Supp) SCC 41 and Birendra K. Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 498 ]. 16. But, even if a cognizance of the offence is taken erroneously and the same comes to the court's notice at a later stage a finding to that effect is permissible. Even such a plea can be taken for the first time before an appellate court. [See B. Saha Vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 , para 13 and K. Kalimuthu Vs. State, (2005) 4 SCC 512 ]." The question which falls for consideration before this Court as argued by the counsel for the opposite party that the sanction would not be needed in the case of the petitioner as the acts were not connected with the discharge of official duty. The Court has examined the facts of the case and it has been found that the petitioner was discharging his duty as Director, Information when certain allegations have been made against him in his official working. In regard to the broad sheet allegation made against the petitioner, the said act was certainly performed in the discharge of official duty while the file was sent by him and received by him and notes were made in the file. So working of the petitioner cannot be separated and it has to be held that the offence in question is connected with the discharge of official duty. So working of the petitioner cannot be separated and it has to be held that the offence in question is connected with the discharge of official duty. So far other offences under the IPC are concerned, sanction has already been refused finding that there was no credible evidence available against the petitioner and even from the statement and confessional statement, there is no evidence on record to substantiate that the petitioner has received the amount. In the case of Dilawar Balu Kurane (supra), it has been held as under:- "12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial [See Union of India versus Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979 ) 3 SCC 5)]." In the case of Chittaranjan Das (supra), it has been held as under:- "10. However, in the present case, we are faced with the situation in which the Vigilance Department asked the State Government to grant sanction while the appellant herein was in service which it refused. However, in the present case, we are faced with the situation in which the Vigilance Department asked the State Government to grant sanction while the appellant herein was in service which it refused. Not only that the Vigilance Department sought for reconsideration of the decision by the State Government which prayer was also rejected. In fact the State Government reiterated that there is no prima facie case against the appellant and the assets held by him were not disproportionate to the known sources of his income. 12. Sanction is a devise provided by law to safeguard public servants from vexatious and frivolous prosecution. It is to give them freedom and liberty to perform their duty without fear or favour and not succumb to the pressure of unscrupulous elements. It is a weapon at the hands of the sanctioning authority to protect the innocent public servants from uncalled for prosecution but not intended to shield the guilty. 13. Here in the present case while the appellant was in service sanction sought for his prosecution was declined by the State Government. The Vigilance Department did not challenge the same and allowed the appellant to retire from service. After the retirement, the Vigilance Department requested the State Government to reconsider its decision, which was not only refused but the State Government while doing so clearly observed that no prima-facie case of disproportionate assets against the appellant is made out. Notwithstanding that the Vigilance Department chose to file a charge-sheet after the retirement of the appellant and on that the Special Judge had taken cognizance and issued process. 14. We are of the opinion that in a case in which sanction sought for is refused by the competent authority, while the public servant is in service, he cannot be prosecuted later after retirement, notwithstanding the fact that no sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act is necessary after the retirement of Public Servant. Any other view will render the protection illusory. Any other view will render the protection illusory. Situation may be different when sanction is refused by the competent authority after the retirement of the public servant as in that case sanction is not at all necessary and any exercise in this regard would be action in futility." Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party upon the case of State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh (supra) does not come to his rescue and if one goes by the finding recorded in the said judgment, then a distinction has been clearly defined between the acts and omission in performing the official duties. Relevant paragraph of the the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- "7. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ) thus" "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ...there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty"." In the light of the ratio propounded by the Apex Court, if the act of the petitioner is taken into consideration then it has been performed in the purported exercise of official duty and therefore, the sanction is sine qua non for prosecuting the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also taken shelter to the argument that the charge can be framed against the petitioner only when grave suspicion is borne out from the evidence on record and if the grave suspicion is missing and the evidence on record gives rise to the suspicion only, then in these circumstances, prosecution against the petitioner would not be permissible and is liable to be quashed. He has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Sajjan Kumar (supra). In the said case their Lordships of the Apex Court has held as under:- "19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 21.On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:- (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal." Considering the dictum of the Apex Court, it has to be held that there is no grave suspicion existing against the petitioner in comparison to the suspicion. The entire prosecution evidence, which has been collected by the prosecuting agency goes to indicate that even if the evidence collected on its face value is accepted, then also the present case does not come in the category of grave suspicion and it remains in the category of suspicion only. The principals laid down by the Apex Court has to be taken into consideration in the light of the evidence which has been collected by the prosecution. So far missing of broad sheet is concerned, except the statement of Mr. Alok Ranjan, the then Secretary, there is no other evidence and that evidence is also in the form of suspicion. He has stated in his statement that as to who was responsible for removal of the broadsheet is not known. The Enquiry Officer Mr. So far missing of broad sheet is concerned, except the statement of Mr. Alok Ranjan, the then Secretary, there is no other evidence and that evidence is also in the form of suspicion. He has stated in his statement that as to who was responsible for removal of the broadsheet is not known. The Enquiry Officer Mr. Ajit Seth, who had conducted the enquiry in pursuance to the order of this Court did not indicate that the petitioner was responsible. It appears that Mr. Alok Ranjan with a view to save his skin gave this statement but that statement does not make out a prima facie strong case as he has not said anything nor fixed any responsibility on the petitioner for misplacing the broadsheet. So far the question with regard to passing on the money is concerned, that also falls short of direct evidence and it is to be noted that alleged transaction has not taken place before the witness Pankaj Darbari whose statement has been relied upon strongly and whose statement was also got recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. When the direct evidence is missing in respect of any transaction with the petitioner, then the sanction which has been refused has rightly been refused to prosecute the petitioner. The aforesaid act will fall in the category of suspicion and not in the category of grave suspicion. The other evidence of Sudhir Kumar Singh is also of not assistance and he has not stated anything in respect of the petitioner. Therefore, in absence of any positive evidence against the petitioner, prosecution against the petitioner does not appear to be legally sustainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and another (supra) wherein principals in regard to quashing of the charge sheet or the complaint has been laid down. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder:- "23. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute." Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party upon the case of Sushil Suri (supra) but in the said case Directors along with the Chartered Accountant committed forgery by forging certain documents and vouchers to show purchase of machinery, which was a pre condition for release of installments of loan and they not only duped the Bank but also defrauded revenue by claiming depreciation on non-existent machinery and in that context it was held that the charge-sheet cannot be quashed although dispute between the company had been set at rest and strong suspicion has been found to be established. In the case of State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra), it was held that High Court cannot appreciate the evidence and on that score, the Apex Court held that quashment of charges was not proper. Case of Smt. Om Wati (supra) is related to a case under Section 302 IPC, which has no application in the present case. Case of State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi (supra) is also not applicable in the present case as facts were in regard to the prejudging the case in regard to the framing of charge under Section 304/34 IPC. Case of State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi (supra) is also not applicable in the present case as facts were in regard to the prejudging the case in regard to the framing of charge under Section 304/34 IPC. Case of Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil (supra) is altogether in different context and it related to the involvement of the Chief Minister in examination of copies. Similar is the case of Abhay Singh Chautala (supra), it does not apply in the facts of the present case and the issue involved in the said case was altogether different, which is not applicable in the present case. In the case of State of U.P. v. Udai Narayan (supra), the principle was laid down that scanning and scrutinizing of materials produced by the prosecution was not permissible. In the said case, the High Court considered the arguments elaborately and scrutinized and scanned the evidence and materials produced by the prosecution. In that very context the said proposition was laid down. After appreciation of the entire material on record, I find that the petitioner, who already stood transferred on 11.7.2000, could not be held responsible for missing of the broadsheet specially in the wake of the finding recorded by the High Court in earlier litigation, which has attained finality and the said judgment of 19.10.2006 has not been challenged in any higher forum. The Court has very carefully gone through the materials collected by the prosecuting agency and it has been found that the case of strong suspicion is not on record and neither the prosecuting agency has been able to prove and put forward the case of strong suspicion. The prosecution having already been refused, when the act itself has been committed in the purported exercise of official duty, then it cannot be said that the petitioner can be prosecuted or any charge can be framed against him on the basis of aforesaid evidence. The reasoning given by the trial court in regard to the framing of charge is not convincing and the trial court has failed to consider the law in regard to the framing of charge. On a conspectus of law and the evidence on record, prosecution against the petitioner is not permissible under law. The petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 7.6.2011 is quashed and the petitioner is discharged. Consequences to follow under law.