R.K. Gupta J.:— This is an Appeal preferred by the Appellant under section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 challenging the order passed by the D.R.T. on 14th November, 2011, by which the Appeal preferred by the appellant under section 30 of RDDBFI Act, 1993 has been dismissed. Before the D.R.T. the Appeal was preferred by the appellant challenging the order dated 1st November, 2007 which was passed by the Recovery Officer while executing the Judgment and Recovery Certificate. It was the case of the appellant that the appellant as owner in possession of the property i.e., Land out of Khasra No. 75/2, 938 Hect., Village Jhakiya, Tehsil Sawer, Indore in Appeal No. R 183/2011 and the appellant as owner in the possession alongwith his brother Bharatchand of the property i.e., land out of Khasra No. 78/1,78/1,0.563 Hect. and Khasra No. 64 area 162 Hect., Village Jhakiya, Tehsil and Distt. Indore in Appeal No. R-184/2011, therefore, their properties could not have been put to auction. 2. There is no dispute in the present case that the appellants were the purchasers of the properties and at the time when they purchased the properties were already mortgaged with the Bank much before the date of the purchase by the appellants and thus, the properties were purchased by them on which the charge by way of mortgage was already created in favour of the Bank by the owner of the said property. 3. The auction was scheduled and the same was published in the newspaper. The appellants did not participate in the auction and without participating in the auction, after the auction an application/objection was submitted by the appellants to the Recovery Officer under Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said objection was rejected by the Recovery Officer, against which the Appeal was preferred to the D.R.T. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid, it is clear that a person who has purchased the property already mortgaged will have no valid right and interest in the property. Therefore, the next question arises for consideration by virtue of Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act 1961, whether he can lodge any objection against the auction sale ? In this reference, Rule 60 of the Sch. Therefore, the next question arises for consideration by virtue of Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act 1961, whether he can lodge any objection against the auction sale ? In this reference, Rule 60 of the Sch. II of Income-tax Act, 1961 is relevant, which is as under: "60. Application to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit.—(1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale, on his depositing.— (a) (XXX) the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, with interest thereon at the rate of (fifteen) per cent per annum, calculated from the date of the proclamation of sale to the date when the deposits is made ; and (b) for payment to the purchaser as penalty, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, but not less than one rupee. (2) Where a person makes an application under Rule 61 for setting aside the sale of his immovable property, he shall not unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule." 5. This is clear by reading the said rule that where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, the defaulter or any person whose interests are affected by the sale may at any time within 30 days from the date of the sale apply to the Recovery Officer to set aside the sale. In the present case there is no dispute under Rule 60 that the Appellants filed an objection to the Recovery Officer to set aside the sale and further there is no dispute that there are also certain amounts, which were deposited by the appellants in the both the Appeals. The said amount was deposited within 30 days from the date of auction sale. 6. The said amount was deposited within 30 days from the date of auction sale. 6. The main question in the Appeal is, whether a person who has illegally purchased the mortgaged property will have valid right and interest in the property for lodging a valid objection to the Recovery Officer and therefore, Rule 60 (1) (a) would be relevant for interpretation. The Legislature purposely has used the "any person" with qualification whose interests are affected by the sale are the words of great importance to qualify the word "any person". Once the sale is to be affected while of the property which was mortgaged by the borrower with the Bank, then a person who has no rightful interest or valid interest on the property as the property was purchased by him illegally which was already subject-matter of the mortgage, will not have any valid or enforceable interest and therefore, his interests are not affected by the purchase of such property. The appellant has never participated in the auction and on the contrary, he was making attempt to redeem the property by deposit of the amount without participating in the auction. But the reading of the rule and judgment as aforesaid indicate that the rightful interest, valid interest as well as enforceable interest if any created in favour of any person, then such a person by lodging an Application/objection to the Recovery Officer for setting aside the sale may apply. It has already been held earlier that the appellants since have purchased the mortgage property and such a sale is illegal and will not create any valid right or interest in favour of the appellants in such property, therefore, they cannot lodge a valid objection to the Recovery .Officer under Rule 60 of the Sch. II of Income-tax Act, 1961. In this reference, section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is also relevant, which is reproduced as under: "48. Priority of rights created by transfer.—Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immovable property, and such right cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created" 7. The next question which has been raised by the appellants is that the judgments which have been referred in the earlier para of this judgment will have no application in the present cases because in said case the persons concerned were objecting the auction sale and it is submitted that in the present case the objection was lodged after the sale to the Recovery Officer under Rule 60 of the Sch. II of Income-tax Act, 1961, therefore, the said judgments have no application in the present case. Submission so made is considered. This is to be seen that in the present case the question is, whether the appellants will have valid right and interest in the property and in absence of there being valid interest, he could not be said to be person whose interests are affected by the sale. The answer has already been given by me in the earlier paragraph. The answer is that the appellants since have illegally purchased the property and will not have any valid interest in the property, therefore, he has no right to file objection against the auction sale to the Recovery Officer. 8. This is also to be seen that in the present case there had been paper publication of sale proclamation to which the appellants submit that they had no knowledge of the same. In this reference, the Apex Court in Sunil Poddar v. Uinon Bank of India, 2008 (71) ALR 312 (SC) = 2008 (64) AIC 166 (SC) has held that once the notices are published in the newspaper, no persons can be permitted to say that either he had not read the newspaper or was not aware of the paper publication therefore, submission as such cannot be accepted. 9. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that notices under Rules 53 and 54 of the Sch. II of the Income Tax Act, 1961 are defective in the nature, as nothing was shown with respect to the amount for which the property was put to auction. This question at present is not relevant and the appellants cannot be permitted to raise the said issue in the light of the focus of the present appellants by virtue of Rule 60 of the Sch. This question at present is not relevant and the appellants cannot be permitted to raise the said issue in the light of the focus of the present appellants by virtue of Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and it has already been held earlier that under Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act, 1961 they have no locus to file objection against the auction sale of the property. Though, it is contended on behalf of the Bank that both the appellants, before lodging objection, were permitted to inspect the record of the Bank including the Form 17 which was a part of the record before the Recovery Officer and the same has been inspected and therefore, the appellants were aware of that how much amount was due to be recovered, for which the property was put to auction and it was submitted that the appellants were aware of the total amount, which was to be recovered by the sale of the property and the same was mentioned in the Form No. 17. As per Rule 60 (1) (a), the amount was specified for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, with interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum, calculated from the date of the proclamation of sale to the date when the deposit is made, was not at all deposited by the appellants therefore, none of the appellants can raise any objection for want of deposit under Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was contended in appeal No. R-184/11 that only a sum of Rs. 11.4 lacs were deposited by the appellant within a period of 30 days on different dates and within a period of 30 days in Appeal No. R-183/11, the amount of Rs. 10.40 lacs was deposited. II of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was contended in appeal No. R-184/11 that only a sum of Rs. 11.4 lacs were deposited by the appellant within a period of 30 days on different dates and within a period of 30 days in Appeal No. R-183/11, the amount of Rs. 10.40 lacs was deposited. It is contended that in the sale proclamation as per Form No. 17 the amount was much higher than deposited by them including interest and the condition precedent for deposit of amount of due, for which the sale of the property was ordered with interest, was not at all deposited, but the amount, which was deposited, was only the amount in relation to the auction amount and therefore, even otherwise the appellants cannot say that there was a valid objection lodged to the Recovery Officer by complying the pre-deposit of the amount as per Rule 60 of the Sch. II of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was contended that the appellants were not aware as to how much amount was to be deposited as sale proclamation does not show the amount of debt for which the property was to be sold, but the appellants since have inspected the record and there is no dispute to the Form No. 17 which was also inspected and this form includes the amount which is recoverable in relation to the debt, for which the properties were put to auction, yet full amount as required under Rule 60 has not been paid but only the auction amount has been deposited, therefore, for this reason also, there is no flaw in the order passed by the D.R.T. The D.R.T. came to a conclusion that the total amount, which was to be realized, was of more than Rs. 25.00 lacs, but the total amount in both the cases if calculated does not exceed to Rs. 22.00/- lacs and Rule 60 (1) (a) requires the deposit of whole amount. The appellants should have moved the application to the Bank to know, as far how much amount of debt is due for which the properties were put to auction they were not aware of the same, then, thereafter, the objection should have been lodged under Rule 60 by the appellants after deposit of the full amount of debt to be recovered. 10. 10. In view of the aforesaid undisputed fact, the question in the present case is, whether the appellants being a person who has purchased the property on which the first charge was already created by the way of mortgage with the Bank by the owner of the property, who created the mortgage, will have any right or interest in the property. This question has already been decided by this Tribunal in Appeal No. R-937/8 (Authorized Officer, Punjab National Bank v. Aneeta Gupta,) decided on 15th February, 2011, Appeal No. R-1268/2010 (Mangilal v. (Central Bank of India,) decided on 11th August, 2011, Appeal No. R-103/201 (Shama Rahman v. Bank of Baroda,) decided on 16th August, 2011 and in Appeal No. R-1088/2009 (Indian Bank v. Bank of Baroda,) decided on 18th July, 2011. In- all the Appeals, I relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, Delhi in Ishwar Dass Malhotra v. Danwant Singh, 1985 AIR 83 (Del.) and the relevant para Nos. 12 to 16 have also been reproduced. In case of Authorized Officer Punjab National Bank v. Aneeta Gupta (supra) is held as under : "12. Question is also to be answered in reference to the fact that in the present case there is no dispute that the present respondent who was applicant before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, purchased the property through a sale-deed executed in her favour on 27th November, 2003 by Smt. Prem Lata Gupta and Smt. Prem Lata Gupta purchased the property from Shri Om Nath Mehrotra on 30th June, 2003. Thus, the present respondent subsequent purchaser of the mortgage created on the same property by the original owner Shri Om Nath Mehrotra and thus, any subsequent purchaser to the property already mortgaged neither would be covered by section 59-A of the Transfer of Property Act nor by section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act. For the purpose of convenience, both the sections are reproduced as under:— "59-A. Reference to mortgagors and mortgagees to include persons deriving title from them.—Unless otherwise expressly provided references in this chapter to mortgagors and mortgagees shall be deemed to include references to persons deriving title from them respectably. 45. For the purpose of convenience, both the sections are reproduced as under:— "59-A. Reference to mortgagors and mortgagees to include persons deriving title from them.—Unless otherwise expressly provided references in this chapter to mortgagors and mortgagees shall be deemed to include references to persons deriving title from them respectably. 45. Joint Transfer for consideration.—Where immovable property is transferred for consideration to two or more persons and such consideration is paid out of a fund belonging to them in common, they are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, respectively entitled to interests in such property identical, as nearly as may be, with the interest to which they were respectively entitled in the fund, and where such consideration is paid out of separate funds belonging to them respectively, they are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, respectively entitled to interest in such property in proportion to the shares of the consideration which they respectively advanced. In the absence of evidence as to the interests in the fund to which they were respectively entitled, or as to the shares which they respectively advanced, such person shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property". 13. And thus they will have no right to object to the recovery against the borrower/original owner of the debt by selling of the secured assets. Thus, the subsequent purchaser will have no priority over the earlier mortgage. In this reference, judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi Court In Ishwar Dass Malhotra v. Dhanwant Singh, 1985 AIR 83 (Del.) is relevant. This judment is also relevant to the question that there is no need to get the equitable mortgage registered under the Registration Act. Paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15 16 are relevant which are being reproduced herein as under : "12.The expression 'equitable mortgage' does not find mention in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 58 (f) of the Act describes mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is as good as any other mode of creating a legal mortgaged whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the property mortgage to the mortgagees. The expression 'equitable mortgage' which is known in the English Law is loosely used to mean a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is as good as any other mode of creating a legal mortgaged whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the property mortgage to the mortgagees. The expression 'equitable mortgage' which is known in the English Law is loosely used to mean a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Rather it can be said that in India a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is commonly known as an equitable mortgage but its incidents are not the same as that of an equitable mortgage under the English Law. In K. J. Nathan v. S.V. Maruthi Rao, AIR 1965 SC 430 distinction between an equitable mortgage, as understood in the English Law, and the mortgage by deposit of title deeds had been brought out by the Supreme Court. Subha Rao J., (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court, observed as under : "under this definition (referring to section 58 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act) the essential requisites of mortgage by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt (ii), deposit of title deeds, and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt. Though such a mortgage is often described as an equitable mortgage, there is an essential distinction between an equitable mortgage as understood in English Law and the mortgage by deposit of title deeds recognized under the Transfer of Property Act in India. In England an equitable mortgage can be created either, (1) by actual deposit of title deeds, in which case parole evidence is admissible to show the meaning of the deposit and the extent of the security created, or (2). If there be no deposit of title deeds, then by a memorandum in writing, purporting to create a security for money advanced; see White and Tudor's Leading Case in Equity, 9th Edition, Vol. II, p. 77. In either case it does not operate as an actual conveyance though it is enforceable in equity ; whereas under the Transfer of Property Act a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the modes of creating legal mortgage whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. This distinction will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the scope of the English decision cited at the Bar. This distinction will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the scope of the English decision cited at the Bar. This distinction is also the basis for the view that for the purpose of priority it stood on the same footing as a mortgage by deed." 13. It will thus be seen that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is likely any other mortgage and there is a transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. The question, therefore, of the subsequent purchaser having bought the property subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds bona fide, with or without notice, is of no relevance. The subsequent purchaser cannot avoid the mortgage by leading evidence to show that he made all reasonable inquiries to find out if the property was subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or not, section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act does not admit of any such exception. According to this section, when a person purports to created, by transfer at different times, rights in or over the same immovable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created. Further, proviso to section 48 of the Registration Act enacts that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds shall take effect as against any mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered relating to the same property. Thus, subsequent sale cannot have priority over a mortgage by deposit of title deeds created before the sale. In my view, therefore, the Trial Court fell in an error in holding that Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, the subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged property, was not liable on the ground that he took all reasonable care and acted in good faith. 14. Before us the argument proceeded on a different line. It was argued by Mr. C.B. Thanai, learned Counsel for Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, that the memorandum (Ext. P-2), was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Registration Act and as the same was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence and any oral evidence was barred under section 91 of the Evidence Act. It was argued by Mr. C.B. Thanai, learned Counsel for Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, that the memorandum (Ext. P-2), was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Registration Act and as the same was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence and any oral evidence was barred under section 91 of the Evidence Act. At the time when Ext. P-2 was put in evidence it was objected to on the ground of admissibility. The Trial Court has not touched this point in its judgment. It is a legal point, and a vexed one. The law relating to registration of document, like in the instant case, is to be found in section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act and sections. 17 (b), 48 and 49 of the Registration Act. 15. There have been quite a number of cases in the High Courts all over the country, some of which reached the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, in which a mortgage, alleged to have been effected by deposit of title deeds, has been accompained by written document, and in which a question has arisen as to whether that document was of such a character as to require registration. The decision in each case has turned upon the nature of the document in question. It is, therefore, unnecessary to multiply the authorities, and it would be sufficient if reference is made to some of the cases decided by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court and also to one decision of this Court, 16. In M. Subramannian v. M.L.RM. Lutchman, AIR 1923 PC 50. it was held that if the memorandum was of such a nature that it could be treated as the contract for the mortgage which the parties considered to be the only repository and appropriate evidence of their agreement, it would be the instrument by which equitable mortgage was created and would come within section 17 of the Registration Act. Lord Carson, speaking for the Board, observed: "turning to the document itself, one is led to the same conclusion, "we hand you herewith title deeds, etc........ This pleas hold as security, etc. Please also hold this as further security. Lord Carson, speaking for the Board, observed: "turning to the document itself, one is led to the same conclusion, "we hand you herewith title deeds, etc........ This pleas hold as security, etc. Please also hold this as further security. "Their Lordships have no "doubt therefore that the memorandum in question was the bargain between the parties, and that without its production in evidence the plaintiff could establish no claim, and as it was unregistered it ought to have been rejected." In Rachpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka, AIR 1950 SC 272 the Supreme Court dealt with the question of registration of the memorandom given alongwith the title deeds. Patanjali Sastri, J., (as his Lordship then was) who spoke for the Court, stated the law as under : ".................................When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title deeds of his property with intent to create a security, the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is required under section 59 as in other forms of mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, the implication is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creating of the mortgage. As the deposit alone is not intended to create the charge and the document, which constitutes the bargain regarding the security is also necessary and operates to create the charge in conjunction with the deposit, it requires registration under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. The time factor is not decisive. The time factor is not decisive. The document may be handed over to the creditor alongwith the title deeds and yet may not be registrable...................." In Sundamchariar v. Narayana Ayyar, AIR 1931 PC 36 dealing with a memorandum which consisted of a list of the title deeds and contained a recital that 'as agreed upon in person, I have delivered to you the under mentioned documents as security, the Privy Council held that it recorded particulars of documents which, it stated, had been delivered as security in pursuance of an agreement reached in person. It did not state what were the terms of the agreement nor did it indicate the nature of the matter for which the deeds were deposited as security. Since the memorandum in question did not embody the terms of the agreement between the parties, it was held, that it did not require registration. In Hari Shankar v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1939 PC 167 the Board was of the opinion that : "..................... Where, as here, the parties professing to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds contemporaneously enter into a contractual agreement, in writing, which is made an integral part the transaction and is itself an operative instrument and not merely evidential, such a document must under the statute be registered," In United Bank of India v. Lakharam S. and Co., AIR 1965 SC 159 the Supreme Court examined the question as to whether the memorandum required registration, it held that: "applying the principle to the present case, we consider that the letter at Ext. 7 (a) was not meant to be an integral part the transaction between the parties. The letter does not mention what was the principal amount borrowed or to be borrowed. Neither does it refer to rate of interest for the loan. It is important to notice that the letter does not mention details of title deeds which are to be deposited with the plaintiff-Bank. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view of the High Court with regard to the construction of Ext. 7 (a) is erroneous and the document was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the immovable property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view of the High Court with regard to the construction of Ext. 7 (a) is erroneous and the document was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the immovable property. It follows, therefore, that the document 7 (a) did not require registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act." In V.G. Rao v. Andhra Bank, AIR 1971 SC 1613 Hegde, J, while dealing with the law relating to the nature of a memorandum given alongwith the deposit of title deeds or one filed thereafter, held as under: "therefore, the crucial question is: Did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of the title deeds to the form of a document? If so, the document requires registration. If on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, then there being no express bargain, the contract to create the mortgage arises by implication of the law from the deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document being merely evidential does not require registration." In Parkash Dev v. New Bank of India, AIR 1968 Delhi 244 a Division Bench of this Court held that where the memorandum itself constitutes the bargain, registration is necessary." 11. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the view that order passed by the D.R.T. is appropriate and does not call for any interference and accordingly, both the Appeals are without any merit and hence, the same are dismissed without cost. Appeal Dismissed. _____________