Judgment 1. If the learned Judges in the Supreme Court express doubt about their jurisdiction and are not sure of what kind of powers they have whether under the Constitution of India or under other Statutes, it does not become a law declared by the Supreme Court either within the meaning of Article 141 or a ratio decidendi having the effect of a biding authority/precedent over other courts; to submit, so, as is sought to be contended by Mr. Ravindra R. Mane, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Insurance Company in all these appeals nor does it mean that the Judges in all other courts and Tribunals in this country, also should necessarily entertain and have such doubts about their own power and authority. 2. But such are the submissions made by Mr. Ravindra R. Mane, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Insurance Company in all these appeals nor does it mean that the Judges in all other courts and Tribunals in this country, also should necessarily entertain and have such doubts about their own power and authority. 2. But such are the submissions made by Mr. Ravindra R. Mane learned counsel appearing for the appellant-New India Assurance Company Limited, appellant in all these appeals challenging the order of the tribunal in the context of a common order and award dated 17.09.2010 passed by the Fast Track Court-II and Additional MACT, at Belgaum, in M.V.C.Nos.2170/2007, 2171/2007, 2174/2007, 2175/2007, 2176/2007, 2178/2007, 2182/2007 and 2183/2007 whereunder the Tribunal while disposing the claim petitions of as many as of nine persons as injured persons due to the injuries that they had suffered in an accident that took place on 25.04.2007, involving a tempo trax bearing registration No.MH 12/JA-4908 proceeding on Belgaum Vengurla Road in which they were all traveling as gratuitous passengers, a vehicle though designed to accommodate nine persons apart from the driver had not been permitted for ferrying passenger on a commercial basis and as this vehicle was hit by an on coming truck bearing registration No.MH-06/9909 and as a result of the impact etc., the injuries having been suffered by the claimants and the Tribunal while quantifying the compensation payable to the claimants had found that the percentage of negligence on the part of the drivers of the two vehicles involved in the accident is equal and therefore the liability should be apportioned between the owners and the respective insurers of the two vehicles, but the Tribunal nevertheless, having found that appellant-Insurance Company, the insurer of the tempo trax was not liable to indemnify the insured, owner of the tempo trax for the reason that the injured claimants in the tempo trax were all gratuitous passengers, carried in a vehicle not duly authorized/permitted to carry passengers and therefore, the appellant insurance Company was not required to indemnify the owner of the tempo trax, as the owner has used the vehicle in contravention of the statutory provisions but nevertheless, having issued a direction that the 50% of the compensation amount which was liable to be paid by the owner of the tempo trax but the Insurer can later recover it from the owner of tempo trax, contrary to the law, which has been emphatically declared by the Supreme Court, that the Insurance Company was not liable to make good such claims arising against its insured nevertheless the Tribunal having directed the appellant first to make good the liability of its insured and to satisfy that part of the claim or compensation amount in favour of the claimants and later to recover it from the owner of the vehicle and it is aggrieved by this part of the order which has caused considerable hurt burn, grievance and has given use to a cause of action for the appellant-Insurance Company to come up with the above batch of nine appeals and to wriggle out of the direction for payment in the first instance by the appellant Insurance Company and then recover it from its customer. 3. It is for such purpose, the present appeals are filed and I have heard Mr. R.R. Mane, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company on a couple of days and in installments and Mr. R.R. Mane to support submissions has placed reliance on the following decisions: i) National Insurance Company Limited vs. Parvathneni and Another (2009 (4) T.A.C. 382 (S.C.); from out of this order, though styled as a judgment of the law journal or may be in the order of Supreme Court itself, what transpires is that it is only an order to refer the question to a larger bench as is indicated towards the end of it but nevertheless very strong reliance is placed by Mr. R.R. Mane on the following observations as found in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 which reads as under: “7. No doubt, there are some decisions which have taken the view that even if the Insurance Company has no liability, yet it must pay and later on recover it from the owner of the vehicle. (See for example National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Yellamma & Another (2008 (7) S.C.C. 562, Samundra Devi v. Narendra Kaur ( 2008 (9) S.C.C. 100 : 2008 (4) T.A.C. 746 (vide para 16), Oriental Insurance Co. v. Brij Mohan ( 2007 (7) S.C.C. 56 : 2007 (3) T.A.C. 20 (vide para 13), new India Insurance Co. v. Darshan Devi (2008 (7) S.C.C. 4162) (vide para 21, ETC.) 8. We have some reservation about the correctness of the aforesaid decisions of this Court. If the Insurance Company has no liability to pay at all, then, in our opinion, it can be compelled by order of the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to pay the compensation amount and later on recover it from the owner of the vehicle. In our view, Article 142 of the Constitution of India does not cover such type of cases. When a person has no liability to pay at all how can it be compelled to pay? It may take years for the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner of the vehicle, and it is also possible that for some reason the recovery may not be possible at all. 9. When a person has no liability to pay at all how can it be compelled to pay? It may take years for the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner of the vehicle, and it is also possible that for some reason the recovery may not be possible at all. 9. Hence, we direct that the papers of this case be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger bench to decide the following question: (1) If an Insurance Company can prove that it does not have any liability to pay any amount in law to the claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act or any other enactment, can the Court yet compel it to pay the amount in question giving it liberty to later on recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. (2) Can such a direction be given under Article 142 of the Constitution, and what is the scope of Article 142? Does Article 142 permit the Court to create a liability where there is none? (2) Can such a direction be given under Article 142 of the Constitution, and what is the scope of Article 142? Does Article 142 permit the Court to create a liability where there is none? to submit that when the Supreme Court has very emphatically observed that the correctness of a decision of even the Supreme Court to direct the Insurance Company to first pay the amount and then recover it from its insured, though the Insurance Company was per se not liable to meet a particular claim against its insured, as one either nor covered by the Statute or not covered by the contract and in such situations giving a direction of this nature was found to be not a very proper course of action and that too when the Supreme Court itself had expressed doubt as to whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction or power to issue such directions, the fate of subordinate like a Judge in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal cannot be any different and at any rate the direction issued by the learned Judge in the Tribunal is akin to assuming some extraordinary jurisdiction which even the Judges of the Supreme Court had doubted for themselves as to whether they had or not and therefore submits that such a direction issued by the Tribunal should be set aside and correction applied in these appeals and for such purpose these appeals merit examination and to be ordered to bring the award of the Tribunal in conformity with the observations of the Supreme Court to ensure that the direction by the Tribunal to the Insurance Company first to pay and then recover from insured is nullified or set aside. 4. In support, Mr. R.R. Mane, has also placed reliance on yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, United India Insurance Co. 4. In support, Mr. R.R. Mane, has also placed reliance on yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., vs. M. Laxmi and others (2009 ACCI.C.R. 310 (S.C) and submits that in this case, the Supreme Court has emphatically observed or laid down that there is no liability of the Insurance Company which has issued an act policy to cover the risk of the owner for meeting any claim by a pillion rider due to injury or by dependents when it is fatal and on the same analogy submits that the status of a gratuitous passenger in a tempo trax cannot be any better than the status of a pillion rider on a two wheeler and therefore submits that this judgment constitutes an authority for the proposition that the Insurance Company is not in any way liable etc.,. 5. Submission of Mr. R.R. Mane, proceeds on the premise that the Insurance Company has issued only an act policy i.e., the policy to meet only third party claims and to cover the risk of the owner of the vehicle in respect of third party claims and nothing more. It is therefore submitted that the claims of the gratuitous passengers for injuries suffered by them against the owner of the vehicle are in the status or position of claims of gratuitous passengers and even assuming for argument sake that the owner is liable to make good the claims for he had allowed such persons to travel in the vehicle owned by him, the Insurance Company does not step in for protecting that risk of the insured either under the statute policy or under a policy as per contract as the policy is not a comprehensive policy and particularly as the Insurance Company had not collected any extra premium from the owner of the vehicle to cover the risks against the claims by passengers in the vehicle. 6. For such purpose, Mr. 6. For such purpose, Mr. R.R. Mane has drawn my attention to the policy bearing No.151201/31/06/02/00010668 and captioned as a private car policy A liability only wherein the liability is only to cover the risk of one Gajanan Rajaba Pawar who figures as 4th respondent in these appeals having his address at A/P. Yashwant Nagar, Tal: Chandgad, Dist: Kolhapur, Kolhapur, Maharashtra-416002 and policy issued for the period from 14.02.2007 to 13.02.2008 and when the vehicle is used within the territory of India after having collected an amount of Rs.2,525/- as premium. 7. Though Mr. R.R. Mane, has emphatically submitted that it is an Act only policy and the policy also describes that to be so. Mr. R.R. Mane is not in a position to clarify as to on what basis a total net premium of Rs.2,525/-has been collected and while it is claimed that the entire premium amount is towards basic third party claims, one passenger who is the driver is also covered under this by collecting an additional premium of Rs.25/- and if other passengers also were to be covered, could have been covered if the owner should have paid additional premium at the rate of Rs.25/-for each of the passengers upto the permitted capacity of the vehicle and such additional premium having been not paid, there is absolutely no liability on the part of the Insurance Company and though the Tribunal itself had realized this position has nevertheless directed the Insurance Company to first pay and then recover from the owner which is the offending part in the order and award. 8. It is a fact that the policy describes it as Act policy-A liability only but the details of making up of the sum of Rs.2,525/-collected by way of premium is still not forthcoming. Be that as it may, even assuming that the policy is only an Act policy, but as no liability is in fact fastened by the Tribunal also, on the appellant-Insurance Company, the limited question is as to whether the Tribunal could have issued a direction of the nature that the Insurance Company can first pay the amount on behalf of its insured and then recover the amount from the owner and it is only this part of the direction that is the cause of action for the appellant-Insurance Company. 9. 9. General Insurance was nationalized in the year 1972 and simultaneously were introduced the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, providing for constitution of specialized Tribunals known as Motor accidents Claims Tribunal, an informal forum before which the victims of motor accidents could go for claiming compensation before an exclusive forum and without the hassles of the procedural aspects of a regular suit as the procedure before the Tribunal is a summary procedure. 10. The twin purpose of this legislative provisions was to ensure that the victims of motor accidents involving the use of motor vehicles on roads were not subjected to the routine travails of a litigant before the regular courts in the Indian Legal System and/are instead offered an informal specialized Tribunal to provide for expeditious remedy with exclusive attention only on such claimants, but the other more important purpose was to ensure that victims of road accidents due to negligence of the drivers of motor vehicles are not left high and dry by compelling the owners to take out a policy of Insurance to cover the risks of third party claims against the owners of vehicles a compulsory one and that no motor vehicle designed and permitted for use on public roads is permitted to be used without being covered by a policy of insurance issued in favour of the owner to cover the risks of the owner against the third party claims. 11. While so there is also the further objective of ensuring that the private Insurance Companies with an eye on profit and functioning on commercial principles do not defeat the legitimate and justifiable claims of the victims of accident involving use of motor vehicles on roads by putting forth all sorts of untenable, frivolous defences and cantankerously dragging on proceedings before the courts and Tribunals and virtually defeating the very purpose of providing expeditious remedy and therefore the business of general insurance was nationalized and it was expected that the Insurance Company would act in a fair manner, being a public and Central Government owned organization would abide by the laws and procedures, would not give scope for the victims of road accidents coming before the tribunals with grievances and claims to complain about the devious methods adopted by the Insurance Company, depriving or denying them a due compensation etc. 12. 12. It is to achieve such laudable twin objects and purpose, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are functioning under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and by applying the general principles of law of tort. 13. It is rather unfortunate that the legislature did not take care for providing a codified method of quantification of the compensation payable and for providing an answer without much cost. 14. Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act though is one attempt, it is more a failed attempt than a successful provision of law in the sense it is not one of providing necessary commensurate relief to the victims of road accidents involving use of motor vehicles on public roads. 15. Yet another aspect crying for attention but not attracting the attention of the Legislature is the provision-rather non-provision for coverage to inmates of vehicles designed to carry passengers. It is in this area, the dichotomy of fare paying passengers and gratuitous passengers has been brought about as though that should be a criteria for the injured (third party) claimant being provided with a statutory coverage to get his claim and compensation settled expeditiously and without much cost! 16. If the legislature had taken care to ensure that third party claims are not defeated in the manner as noticed above, it is equally important and was more necessary to ensure that the claims of persons who perhaps were traveling inside the vehicle, getting involved in an accident, giving rise to a like claim is equally taken care of and deserved a like treatment and therefore it was proper on the part of the legislature to have provided a like relief or a like course of action in law, for non-fare paying passengers also to get relief, through a compulsory coverage of Insurance and that an Act policy provided for such an exigency also. 17. 17. Here again the irony is that passengers of public service vehicles i.e., the vehicles used on commercial basis and duly authorized by Transport Authorities and permitted to carry passengers by collecting fare are covered by a compulsory insurance and by a statutory policy, the passengers traveling in a non-commercial vehicle are left high and dry; are not provided with any solace or succor which again appears to be illogical or one of acting in an irrational manner of dealing with same situation i.e., meting out differential treatment to like persons who are victims without any effort or contribution on their part whether as passenger who has paid the fare or is traveling as gratuitous which is a status that makes little difference when the accident and consequences are due to the use of a vehicle used on a Highway/other road and is the cause for the accident. It is also equally important to take note of the fact that a vehicle may get involved in an accident even when the driver of the vehicle is not negligent or the drier of the vehicle also being negligent and many a times an accident may occur due to a force/factor not within the control or reach of the driver of the vehicle and many a times by some external agency contributing for the cause of accident. In such a situation, it may never be possible for an occupant of the vehicle, involved in the accident to go after the other persons who might have been contributories to the cause of the accident and when the object of legislation is to provide a quick, expeditious and inexpensive relief to the victims, but on the other hand leaving gaping holes by not providing a like provision in like situations is a gross deficiency on the part of the legislative. 18. It is settled principle that while the legislature takes care of the business of law making, the function of the judiciary is to look into the laws and render decisions/judgments. 18. It is settled principle that while the legislature takes care of the business of law making, the function of the judiciary is to look into the laws and render decisions/judgments. In areas involving disputes and in situations where the understanding of a law gives room for some ambiguity or uncertainty to resolve that ambiguity by resorting to the method of interpretation and it is a settled principle of interpretation that any law should be so interpreted as to subserve the intent and object of the legislature to achieve the purpose for which the law is made and to remedy the mischief which was sought to be got over and to advance the cause for which the law is made. 19. While courts can never become a substitute for enacting a desirable law but not enacted by the legislature, but can definitely suggest to the legislature to take steps to enact suitable laws and infact courts have a duty to point out to the legislature, if there are areas to be addressed to; if there are areas where the legislature is required to become active, to bring it to their notice and to suggest wherever it is possible the manner of the law providing for remedy the situation. 20. It is ultimately the domain of the legislature to take care of this aspect, comprising of representatives of the people who have their hands on the pulse of the people, who can respond to their hopes and aspirations and who are more conversant with the day to day inter-actions communications amongst the members in the Society and can definitely respond suitably. But when courts are confronted with a situation where there are discrepancies, when the law fails and when technicality can only result in injustice etc., it is nothing new for the courts to become innovative and to provide a solution however temporary or ad-hoc it may be, to tide over a given situation. 21. In fact that is how the common law developed in England. Our country governed by a written constitution and the laws made by competent legislatures and judiciary being one of the three organs of the State and the superior courts particularly in the High Courts and Supreme Court being creatures of the Constitution, always are required to function within the limits of the constitution and the laws. 22. Our country governed by a written constitution and the laws made by competent legislatures and judiciary being one of the three organs of the State and the superior courts particularly in the High Courts and Supreme Court being creatures of the Constitution, always are required to function within the limits of the constitution and the laws. 22. Here is a situation where the Tribunal more as a practical solution and being guided by equitable principles, has while being conscious of the law and even while the Insurance Company is not made liable and in fact no liability is fastened on it, it has issued a direction only to see that the affected claimants are not further delayed in receiving the compensation as determined and for such purpose has directed the Insurance Company which has a business transaction with the insured in the first instance pay the amount to the claimants and later get it reimbursed from its insured and though Mr. R.R. Mane nodoubt urges that the business transaction and relationship between the insurer and the insured is limited to the settlement of third party claims of the insured only as it arises under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it cannot be characterized that the Tribunal is acting with illegality or want of jurisdiction while doing so and in this background, if the Tribunal says that as between the victim/injured persons and the Insurance Company who has a business transaction with the insured and has a commercial relationship with the insurer, is directed in the first instance to pay the amount and then to recover it from the insured, the direction is not so very obnoxious as one warranting interference in an appeal u/s 173(1) of the Act. 23. In so far as the authorities relied upon by Mr. 23. In so far as the authorities relied upon by Mr. R.R. Mane is concerned, while the first authority cited is not an authority in the eye of law and it is only an order by a bench of the Supreme Court referring the matter to be placed before a larger bench, expressing certain doubts about their own power and jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that all other forums, courts and Tribunals also should express such doubts in their own sphere of functioning and therefore it is neither a law declared by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 nor a binding precedent having any ratio which is required to be applied by all courts below Supreme Court in the hierarchy of an judicial system! 24. The kind of power and jurisdiction enjoyed by the Supreme Court of India is unparalleled in the history of contemporary judicial system. Supreme Court of India is the envy and cynosure of all judicial institution in the world. 25. The constitution of India as such has conferred such unparalleled powers and jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of India and the judges of the Supreme Court are not only clothed with the jurisdiction to declare the law which binds all courts within the territory of India, but also are enabled to pass such decree or order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter before the Supreme Court and a decree or order so passed by the Supreme Court becomes enforceable throughout the territory of the country in a manner as provided for by the Parliament. “141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all Courts – The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc. – (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.” 26. When such are the enabling provisions of Constitution of India, as provided under Article 141 of the Constitution of India for former purpose and Article 142 of the Constitution of India for the later purpose, it is rather unfortunate, nay a misfortune of our times that two learned judges of the Supreme Court of India should have expressed doubts about their own power, authority and jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders in a given case. Any order passed, any decree issued by the Supreme Court of India so long as it is done in a bona fide manner and for a justifiable cause, is always within the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India. The only distinguishing feature between the powers under Article 141 of the Constitution of India or Article 142 is that while a law declared by the Supreme Court of India in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 141 is a law declared in rem and binding on all courts, a decree or order passed in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is a decree or order passed in personame, though may be capable of being enforced throughout the territory of India. Unfortunately, Sri R.R. Mane, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company also has got confused with the scope of Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India and is seeking to cite before this court even a doubt expressed by learned judges of the Supreme Court of India as though it is a law declared by the Supreme Court of India within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 27. 27. Assuming for argument’s sake that in any given case, Supreme Court of India has for doing complete justice in any cause and for the purpose any appeal pending before it, has directed an insurance company like the present appellant to, in the first instance, satisfy the award passed in favour of a claimant by a tribunal, though, per se, the insurance company is not liable to make good the award either in terms of the statutory provisions or the contract as provided for in the policy, it, nevertheless, is an order or decree binding on the insurance company and if the Supreme Court has enabled the insurance company to recover the amount later from the insured, it is open to the insurance company to do so. But, an order of this nature can never become a law declared by the Supreme Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and remains an order within the scope and jurisdiction of Article 142 of the Constitution of India and therefore does not constitute either law declared or even a binding authority having a ratio and precedentiary value, which is to be followed and applied by other courts in the lower tier of hierarchy of Indian judicial system. It is for this reason, I am unable to accept the contention urged by Sri R.R. Mane, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company. 28. In so far as the second authority is concerned, it is not of much consequence as even the Tribunal has only followed and applied the law as is declared herein in not foisting any liability on the Insurance Company because of the reason that the claimants were gratuitous passengers in the vehicle, there is no liability fastened in law on the appellant-Insurance Company to make good the liability on behalf of its insured nor the Tribunal has made the liability joint and several vis-à-vis the insured and the insurer. Therefore, the second authority is only followed and applied by the Tribunal and there is no scope for finding fault with the order and award of the Tribunal on this count. 29. Therefore, the second authority is only followed and applied by the Tribunal and there is no scope for finding fault with the order and award of the Tribunal on this count. 29. On the first aspect, I am of the definite and clear view that the High Court need not interfere in an appeal u/s 173 to upset the direction issued by the Tribunal as even after examining the question from an equitable and practical point of view, the Insurance Company is better situated to embark upon recovering the amount from its insured vis-à-vis the victims of the accident, the respondent-claimants. Therefore, I do not find any error or illegality even from an equitable angle also in the order passed by the Tribunal and I do not find it necessary to further prolong the pendency of these appeals before the court and to cause issue of notice to the respondents-victims of motor vehicle accident to come and answer all grounds raised by the appellant-Insurance Company in these appeals. 30. Accordingly all these appeals are dismissed at the threshold. 31. Registrar General to forward a copy of this judgment to Central Law Commission and the State Law Commission and the respective Secretaries of Central Government and State Government. It is hoped that the legislature will step in to fill in the gaps to provide relief to such victims of accidents involving motor vehicles who accidentally happen to be passengers in vehicles constructed for carrying passengers whether or not they are fare paying or otherwise. It is also hoped that the Insurance Companies who have a public duty being nationalized Insurance Company to educate the owners of motor vehicles on such aspects with the risk of meeting the claims of such passengers and as noticed in this case a meager amount of Rs.25/-per passenger, a total sum of Rs.225/- could have very well covered the risk of the owner of the vehicle in respect of all the 9 injured claimants and when in the third party claims the Insurance Company is made compulsory, there is absolutely no reason to make a distinction between such third party claims and claims as of the present nature when the non-fare paying passengers are also in the same position as third parties but in fact they cannot be so called because the Supreme Court of India has described them as not third parties. (See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Sudhakaran K.V. and others ( 2008 ACJ 2045 ), United India Insurance Co., Ltd., Shimla vs. Tilak Singh and others ( AIR 2006 SC 1576 ), General Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M. Laxmi and others ( 2009 ACJ 104 ), New India Assurance Co. Ltd, vs. Asha Rani and others (2003 ACJ 1). But, otherwise perhaps they could have been termed as third parties and this is also an area in respect of which the legislature is required to pay attention and act. The legislature should ensure that the definition of third party is statutorily defined in the Act to take care of such situations so that it will definitely take care of all such claims and the purpose and intent of making insurance coverage against third party claims compulsory is not only useful and effective but also the victims are not left high and dry, in such situation as in the present appeals. 32. The registry is directed to transmit the amount deposited before this court by the appellant to the Tribunal concerned. The balance of the amount as awarded by the Tribunal to be deposited by the Insurance Company within four weeks. The claimants are permitted to draw the amount in terms of the award. 33. Mis.Cvl.Nos.101592/2011, 101602/2011, 101600/2011, 101598/2011, 101588/2011, 101590/2011, 101604/2011 and 101585/2011 do not survive for consideration. Hence, they are dismissed.