ORDER Hon'ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioners assailing the correctness and validity of order dated 8/9/2010 passed by the appellate authority being the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Rajnandgaon Range, Rajnandgaon as also charge sheet dated 29/9/2010 issued by the disciplinary authority being the Superintendent of Police, District-Rajnandgaon. The factual matrix of the case giving rise to this petition at the instance of the two petitioners are in narrow encompass. 2. The petitioners who were at the relevant time posted as Constable in police station outpost - Anbagarh, were subjected to a departmental enquiry by issuance of a charge sheet dated 8/11/07. The enquiry was held on two heads against the petitioners in common proceedings as the proceedings of misconduct related to one and the same incident. The enquiry eventually ended in order of penalty passed on 28/4/09 by the disciplinary authority. The charge No. 1 was found proved whereas it was held that alter the decision of the Court, no penalty could be imposed on charge No. 2. Aggrieved by the order of punishment, a departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioners before respondent No. 3. The appellate authority came to the conclusion that charge sheet is mainly related to a charge relating to smuggling of forest produce on police vehicle and as the allegations contained in the charge sheet were subject matter of trial before the Court, the enquiry could not be held on those charges. On this consideration, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that the charge sheet itself was defective. Resultantly, the departmental enquiry, from the stage of charge sheet, was set aside. The appellate authority however, directed the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh charge sheet excluding the allegations which are subject matter of case pending in the Court and complete the enquiry. 3. The disciplinary authority thereafter, issued the impugned charge sheet dated 29/09/2010. As far as the first charge is concerned, it was one and the same as charge No. 1 in the first enquiry. The second charge under the new charge sheet related to an allegation of misconduct stating that the Government vehicle was unauthorisedly removed from the police station without the permission of the senior officer. 4. As far as the first charge is concerned, it was one and the same as charge No. 1 in the first enquiry. The second charge under the new charge sheet related to an allegation of misconduct stating that the Government vehicle was unauthorisedly removed from the police station without the permission of the senior officer. 4. Assailing the part of the order of the appellate authority by which direction was issued to the disciplinary authority to issue fresh charge sheet and a new charge sheet dated 29/9/2010, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that such an order for issuance of fresh charge sheet is illegal and in excess of the authority under the law. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the appellate authority, having held that the charge sheet was itself defective and having quashed the entire departmental enquiry and the charge sheet issued, could not have directed issuance of fresh charge sheet as such an order is beyond the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction and power of the appellate authority. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that once a departmental enquiry has been quashed, the appellate authority ought to have clearly exonerated the petitioners. He further submits that by issuance of a new charge sheet, a denovo enquiry on the same allegations have been initiated, which is not permissible under the provisions contained in the Police Regulations and Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short 'the Rules of 1966'). According to him, the petitioners have been vexed twice on the same charges, which is impermissible in law, in support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Kerba Jadhav and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra 1969 (2) SCC 793 and James Joseph Vs. State of Kerala 2010 (9) SCC 642. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State contended that the provisions contained in regulation 213 of the Police Regulations read with Rule 27 of the Rules of 1966 confer wide powers on the appellate authority to remit the case to the disciplinary authority with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case which would include a power to direct the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh charge sheet. Further contention of learned counsel for the respondent/State is that the appellate authority found that one of the main charges in the charge sheet issued against the petitioner related to theft and illegal transport of forest produce which was subject matter of Court proceedings. Therefore, the appellate authority rightly decided that such a charge could not be a subject matter of departmental enquiry. As part of the charges leveled against the petitioners related to the conduct as a Government Servant divorced from commission of forest offence, the appellate authority correctly exercised its jurisdiction directing the disciplinary authority to issue fresh charge sheet to hold enquiry only in respect of those allegations, which are not connected with the allegations of commission of forest offence and subject matter of trial before the Court. It is also submitted that the petition is premature as the petitioners without filing their reply to the charge sheet, which has now been issued, have rushed to file this petition. Learned counsel for the State submits that in the absence of there being any allegation of malafide or that the Superintendent of Police is not competent to issue charge sheet, this petition, at this stage, is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed as pre-mature. 6. The facts which are not disputed are that a charge sheet was issued to the petitioners on 8/11/07. The substance of two charges which were leveled against the petitioners were as under-- (a) That the petitioners remained unauthorisedly absent in police station in a naxalite affected area and thereby violated the code of conduct as provided in Rule 3 (1) (ii) of Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and Rule 64 (2) (3) of Police Regulations. (b) That the petitioners engaged in smuggling of Sal Wood by unauthorisedly using police jeep in the night of 26/11/07 and thereby violated the code of conduct as provided in Rule 3 (1) (i) (iii) of Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and Rule 64(2)(3) of Police Regulations. The disciplinary authority vide its order dated 28/4/09 found charge No. 1 proved. (b) That the petitioners engaged in smuggling of Sal Wood by unauthorisedly using police jeep in the night of 26/11/07 and thereby violated the code of conduct as provided in Rule 3 (1) (i) (iii) of Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and Rule 64(2)(3) of Police Regulations. The disciplinary authority vide its order dated 28/4/09 found charge No. 1 proved. As far as charge No. 2 is concerned, the disciplinary authority did not proceed with the same by recording that the Court has delivered judgment on charge No. 2 and therefore, no punishment is being imposed and taking into consideration, the past services, penalty of reduction of pay by one stage of increment was imposed on each of the petitioners. 7. The appellate authority, in its order, recorded that the very issuance of charge sheet was not justified in law. Such a conclusion was arrived at on the consideration that against the petitioners, case was instituted on allegation of commission of offence of smuggling Sal Wood and in the departmental enquiry that is the main allegation against the petitioners. However, having set aside the departmental enquiry proceedings from the stage of issuance of charge sheet, the appellate authority directed issuance of fresh charge sheet. 8. The order of the appellate authority shows that the appellate authority formed an opinion that as one of the main charges in the departmental enquiry is related to commission of forest offence which was subject matter of a criminal case pending in the Court, therefore, that could not be made a subject matter of a departmental enquiry. This view of the appellate authority cannot be said to be in any manner, illegal or contrary to the provisions of any of the statutory rules regulating conduct of a departmental enquiry. It has to be seen that in the charge sheet, there were two heads of charges. One related to allegation of commission of offence i.e. smuggling of forest produce whereas the other charge related to misconduct i.e. remaining unauthorisedly absent from the police station situated in a naxalite affected area. The allegation of unauthorized absence from the police station is clearly not within the ambit of allegation of commission of forest offence. One related to allegation of commission of offence i.e. smuggling of forest produce whereas the other charge related to misconduct i.e. remaining unauthorisedly absent from the police station situated in a naxalite affected area. The allegation of unauthorized absence from the police station is clearly not within the ambit of allegation of commission of forest offence. It was this in the mind of the appellate authority, which prompted it to direct issuance of fresh charge sheet in the matter so that enquiry is held only on those allegations, which did not relate to commission of forest offence in respect of which, case is pending in a Court of law. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a fundamental issue with regard to the power of the appellate authority to direct issuance of fresh charge sheet. 10. In the case of Shankar Kerba1 (Supra), the Supreme Court dealing with statutory scheme of appeal under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 held that an appeal is a creature of a statute and the powers and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court must be circumscribed by the words of the statute. It was also held that a court of appeal is a "court of error" and its normal function is to correct the decision appealed from and its jurisdiction should be co-extensive with that of the Trial Court. The aforesaid broad proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court has again been reiterated in the case of James Joseph2 (supra) wherein it has been held that the width, extent and limitations of/on appellate jurisdiction depends on the language employed by the statute conferring the appellate jurisdiction. The provisions relating to appeal applicable in the present case are therefore, required to be examined, keeping in mind the principles as stated and re-stated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. In the case of Soniram Dhruv Vs. The provisions relating to appeal applicable in the present case are therefore, required to be examined, keeping in mind the principles as stated and re-stated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. In the case of Soniram Dhruv Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others in W.P.(S) No. 1367/05 decided on 5/2/2010, it has been held by this Court that in view of the provisions contained in Clause 213 of the Police Regulations, the provisions contained in Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 shall regulate penalty and appeal in respect of police officers and therefore, in the absence of specific provisions contained in Police Regulations to prescribe the manner in which the appeal against the order of punishment shall be decided by the appellate authority, the provisions contained in Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 prescribing mode and manner of exercise and amplitude of appellate power by the Appellate Authority are applicable. A perusal of the provisions contained in Rule 27 (2) (c) (ii) shows that the appellate authority has power to remit the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. The aforesaid power has been conferred on the appellate authority without any restriction as to the directions with which the matter could be sent back to the disciplinary authority. The words used in the relevant provision are of wide amplitude. Therefore, the power of the appellate authority to remit the case with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case, cannot be disputed. 11. However, in the present case, the appellate authority has improperly exercised its jurisdiction while directing issuance of fresh charge sheet. The operative reason as stated in the appellate order is that the departmental enquiry has been instituted against the petitioners by issuing charge sheet, which mainly contains allegations, which are subject matter of enquiry in a Court of law. From the charge sheet and other material, which has been placed on record, it is not disputed by any of the parties and is clearly borne out that the petitioners were subjected to criminal trial for alleged commission of forest offence of smuggling Sal Wood in Government Vehicle thereby alleging commission of forest offence. From the charge sheet and other material, which has been placed on record, it is not disputed by any of the parties and is clearly borne out that the petitioners were subjected to criminal trial for alleged commission of forest offence of smuggling Sal Wood in Government Vehicle thereby alleging commission of forest offence. However, the first charge, which was leveled against the petitioners in the first charge sheet, is in no manner related to commission of forest offence, so as to say that the same is also subject matter of consideration in the trial before the Court of law. The first charge is related to unauthorized absence from the police station. 12. If aforesaid were the circumstances, taken as basis for holding the order of penalty and enquiry illegal against the petitioners, the appellate authority could have passed appropriate order directing the disciplinary authority to suitably amend the charge sheet by adding a new charge with regard to unauthorized use of police vehicle without permission of the higher authority, excluding allegation regarding theft / smuggling of forest produce in the Government vehicle. As a matter of fact, a close reading of the order passed by the disciplinary authority shows that the disciplinary authority also did not hold the petitioners guilty of second charge on the consideration that the same is subject matter of Court proceedings. This clearly shows that the disciplinary authority was fully alive to the legal position and therefore, did not hold the petitioner guilty of the second charge relating to smuggling of forest produce in Government vehicle but the first charge was found proved and penalty was imposed. The two charges (in the first charge sheet) were clearly distinct and separate and it was possible, as was rightly done by the disciplinary authority, to exclude the allegation of commission of offence from the purview of departmental enquiry and take a decision by holding enquiry on the first charge. 13. Curiously enough, the appellate authority also adopted the same line of reasoning. If that was so, in the absence of there being other ground to interfere with the finding of guilt and quantum of punishment on charge no. 1, the appellate authority, having found that charge no. 13. Curiously enough, the appellate authority also adopted the same line of reasoning. If that was so, in the absence of there being other ground to interfere with the finding of guilt and quantum of punishment on charge no. 1, the appellate authority, having found that charge no. 2, in so far as allegation of forest offence is concerned, required to be excluded and accordingly amended, all that was required to remit the case to suitably amend the second charge and hold enquiry and obtain report from the enquiry officer on the second charge and then pass appropriate order based on the report of the enquiry officer in respect of the two charges. 14. Therefore, the direction of the appellate authority to issue fresh charge sheet did not logically follow from its discussion, reasoning and conclusion in the appellate order. It is relevant to note that in the first and the subsequent charge sheet, the charge No. 1 is one and the same without any change whatsoever and enquiry on charge no. 1 has already been made and report has been submitted by the enquiry officer. Therefore, there was no rational or logic to direct issuance of fresh charge sheet. The order of the appellate authority therefore, to the extent it directs issuance of fresh charge sheet cannot be sustained in law and is accordingly set aside. 15. Consequently, the second charge sheet issued on 29/09/2010 is also to be quashed and is accordingly quashed. However, in view of the discussions as above, the matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority with a direction to exclude charge no. 2 from the charge sheet dated 8/11/07 and may suitably amend and add charge excluding the allegation of commission of forest offence confining it to the allegation of unauthorized use of police vehicle without permission and authority. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority may proceed to make enquiry into the amended charges in accordance with law and final decision may be taken on the basis of the findings already recorded on charge no. 1 by the enquiry officer and the findings that may be recorded in respect of the amended charge by holding enquiry in accordance with law. The petition is accordingly allowed to the extent and in the manner stated as above.