JUDGMENT : S.K. Mishra, J. - Heard learned Addl. Standing Counsel and learned counsel for the opposite parties. 2. This is an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay occasioned in filing the appeal. 3. It is not disputed that there is a delay of 10 years and 233 days in filing the appeal. The State of Orissa, therefore, has filed this petition to condone the delay. The State pleads that in pursuance of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul, the plaintiff filed Execution Case No.8 of 2001. The concerned Government Pleader filed petitions before the executing court denying the liability of the court but the said petitions were dismissed. The learned Government Pleader, Angul vide letter no.30 dated 08.09.2008 advised the Collector, Angul to prefer an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree. On receiving the opinion of the Government Pleader, the case records were processed in various Sections of the Collectorate. Similarly records were obtained from the record room both at Angul and Dhenkanal Civil Courts. A certified copy of the impugned judgment was collected and a proposal of the appeal was routed in different departments for taking a final decision in the matter. Finally the Government in Law Department vide letter no.8136 dated 30.07.2010 has communicated the decision of the Government to the Advocate General, Orissa, Cuttack for preferring appeal against the impugned judgment and decree passed in Money Suit No. 10 of 1992 of the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul. After receipt of sanction order from the Government in the office of the Advocate Genera, Orissa, Cuttack, the same was placed before the learned Advocate General on 23.08.2010. Immediately thereafter, the learned Advocate General entrusted the matter to the Addl. Government Advocate for preparation of grounds of appeal. On 01.11.2010 the appeal has been filed. 4. It is submitted that there is no intentional delay and laches on the part of the Government functionaries in preferring the appeal, and therefore, the delay in filing the same be condoned. 5. The opposite parties have filed their counter affidavit, inter alia, denying all the averments made in the petition for condonation of delay. 4. It is submitted that there is no intentional delay and laches on the part of the Government functionaries in preferring the appeal, and therefore, the delay in filing the same be condoned. 5. The opposite parties have filed their counter affidavit, inter alia, denying all the averments made in the petition for condonation of delay. They further stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes no distinction between the State and the citizen and envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court. A reading of the petition clearly indicates that there is no such explanation by the State referable to the period, prior to expiry of limitation, and thereafter, for as long as eight long years. Claiming that the right has accrued in favour of the respondents-opposite parties, they objected to the petition for condonation of delay. 6. In course of hearing, the learned Addl. Standing Counsel argued that the suit filed before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Angul was barred u/s 26 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985, and as such, the judgment and the decree are nullity. It is further submitted that if at all the plaintiff has any claim the same can only be entertained before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in a case No.1 of 1987 and not in a Money Suit before the Civil Court. On the face of it, there appears to be a strong case in favour of the appellants. It also appears to the court that such submission is meritorious one, which requires careful consideration by the court. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, vehemently objected to the condone petition and relied upon the cases of AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council), AIR 1941 6 (Privy Council), Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat Rukumiddin and Another vs. Rajashekhara 1999 A I H C 502, Special Land Acquisition Collector vs. Baidhar Bhutia and Others 1999 A I H C 2945 and P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Another, . 8. State of Gujarat Rukumiddin and Another vs. Rajashekhara 1999 A I H C 502, Special Land Acquisition Collector vs. Baidhar Bhutia and Others 1999 A I H C 2945 and P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Another, . 8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:- Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 8. From the very word used by the Indian Parliament in Section 5, it is well understood that it is a beneficial peace of legislation aimed at providing relief of condonation of delay to persons, who were prevented by sufficient cause, from preferring the appeal in time. The powers of the court u/s 5 of the said Act are unfettered. Whether there was sufficient cause or not is always a question of fact. Secondly, it is observed that the State should given the benefit of the provision which is available to an individual citizen. If the State Government shows that there was sufficient cause in preferring the appeal, the said petition should be considered in his own merit without giving any preference to either side. 9. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others the Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines for considering the applications u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 in enabling the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing the matters on merit. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of the courts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that it has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted before it, but observed that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all other courts in a hierarchy. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that it has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted before it, but observed that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all other courts in a hierarchy. Any such a liberal approach is adopted on the principle as it is realized that: 1. ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, in order to delay condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merit after hearing the parties. 3. "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not in every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner. 4. when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in justice being justice done because of non-deliberate delay. 5. there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. it must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that it was a 'State' which was seeking condonation not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law that demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded, the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, has held that the law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for acts or omissions of its officers. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, has held that the law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat a different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and when the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for the purpose of Section 5, It might be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process Due recognition of these limitations on Government functioning, of course, within a reasonable limit is necessary. It would be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the delay in that case has occasioned by the conduct of the Government, which was perilously close to is such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean, the awards under the appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. 12. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. S.S. Akolkar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that delay in official business requires broach and, approach from public justice perspective. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead) by Lrs. and Others, dealing with similar matter has held that the expression "sufficient cause" as appearing Section 5, Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skilful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skilful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. Thus, applying the aforesaid principle, this Court comes to the conclusion that this is a meritorious matter, which requires a closer scrutiny of the appellate court and because of the ratio laid down, the appeal could not be filed in time. This Court is of the opinion that the petition for condonation of delay deserves to be allowed. 14. Accordingly, the application is allowed. The delay is condoned, subject to payment of cost of Rs.5,0007- (Rupees five thousand only) within a month to the respondent no.1. Final Result : Allowed