ORDER : P. Jyothimani, J. 1. The writ petition is directed against the award passed by the Labour Court dated October 15, 2007 in I.D. No. 123/2003. On the industrial dispute raised by the second Respondent, the Labour Court under the impugned award, directed for reinstatement of the Petitioner with backwages and all benefits. The Respondent/management before the Labour Court filed the present writ petition challenging the said award. 2. The second Respondent was employed under the Petitioner as a Mechanic Trainee in 1971 and he is stated to have been orally terminated by the Petitioner management on September 20, 2002 and the last drawn salary of the second Respondent was Rs. 2340/- plus daily batta. The second Respondent sent a notice on November 16, 2002, for which the Petitioner issued a reply on November 30, 2002 stating that the second Respondent had worked from 1984 to 1991 only. Therefore, the second Respondent raised the industrial dispute. The second Respondent has also stated that the Petitioner has many other sister concerns including a cinema theatre and the Petitioner used to depute the second Respondent to work in the cinema theatre also which is under the same management and the Petitioner deducted EPF contributions and remitted in the accounts of the cinema theatre. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by the Petitioner before the Labour Court it was the stand of the Petitioner herein that the second Respondent was running a finance business and therefore, he abruptly stopped from coming to the job from 1993 onwards and after 1993, there was no relationship of employer-employee between the Petitioner and the second Respondent. It is stated that after the second Respondent closed his finance firm in 1998, he again demanded job and since there was no availability of job, the same was denied and it was stated in the reply notice. It was denied that the second Respondent was terminated orally from September 20, 2002. 4. Before the Labour Court on behalf of the second Respondent, the workman was examined and five documents were marked as Exhibits W-1 to W-5, while on the side of Petitioner management, four witnesses were examined and eight documents were marked as Exhibits M-1 to M-8. It was denied that the second Respondent was terminated orally from September 20, 2002. 4. Before the Labour Court on behalf of the second Respondent, the workman was examined and five documents were marked as Exhibits W-1 to W-5, while on the side of Petitioner management, four witnesses were examined and eight documents were marked as Exhibits M-1 to M-8. The Labour Court considered the case of management that the second Respondent had never been employed in the Petitioner management and as and when there were defects in engines, for repairing the same, the second Respondent used to come and do the work and get the salary. However, the Labour Court found that in the reply notice issued by the Petitioner management under Exhibit W-2, a contrary stand was taken to the effect that the second Respondent joined in the Petitioner management in the year 1984 and in the year 1993, with a desire to start a finance firm along with his wife and father-in-law, he abruptly left the job and therefore, there was a candid admission by the Petitioner that the second Respondent was employed under the Petitioner management till 1993 from 1984. 5. The Labour Court also considered the counter filed by the Petitioner management before it, wherein it was admitted that the second Respondent joined the job in 1984 and with a desire of doing some private business, he abruptly left the job in 1993-94 and thereafter conducted the finance business in the name 'Vijayalakshmi Finance', and therefore, from 1993 onwards there was no employer-employee relationship. Therefore, the Labour Court has found that it was a candid admission by the Petitioner management that the second Respondent worked as employee from 1984 to 1993. 6. The Labour Court has further found that the case of the Petitioner management by relying upon Exhibit M-7 that the second Respondent had abruptly left the job in 1993 after obtaining Provident Fund is not tenable on facts. The Labour Court has found that under Exhibit M-7 which is an application given by the second Respondent workman for getting provident fund benefits, wherein it is stated that he was working in 'M.R.S. Theatre, 34, Sedan Kuttai Street, Tindivanam 604 001'. The Labour Court has found that under Exhibit M-7 which is an application given by the second Respondent workman for getting provident fund benefits, wherein it is stated that he was working in 'M.R.S. Theatre, 34, Sedan Kuttai Street, Tindivanam 604 001'. When it was the contention of the Petitioner management that the second Respondent was not working in its MRS Motor Service, but he worked in MRS Theatre and therefore, there was no relationship of employer and employee, the management witness, M. W.4 who is the son of the Managing Director of the Petitioner management has astonishingly deposed that it is the habit of the Petitioner management to show in the provident fund records the names of three workmen as if they were working in cinema theatre run by it and the second Respondent was one among the three workmen. 7. M.W.4 has clearly stated that other two persons viz., Gopal and Adhimoolam whose names were shown in Exhibit M-7, had never worked in the cinema theatre. Therefore, there is a positive admission by M.W.4 to the effect that three persons whose names found a place in the Provident Fund Register of the theatre run by the Petitioner had never been employed in the cinema theatre and on the basis of categorical evidence of M.W.4, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the case of the Petitioner management that the second Respondent had abruptly left the job in 1993 by placing reliance on Exhibit M-7 is liable to be rejected. The said finding of the Labour Court which has been arrived at based on factual aspects, does not require any reappreciation by this Court while deciding about the validity of the award passed by the Labour Court. 8. The Labour Court has further considered the genuineness of Exhibit M-1, which is a document issued by one Veerappa Motor 'Service to the effect that the second Respondent was working in that company only, which was stated to have been issued by the said Veerappa Motor Service at the time when the second Respondent resigned from the said company in the year 1984. To substantiate the same, M.W.3 was examined by the Petitioner management. On the other hand, the case of the second Respondent was that two bus owners in collusion have created the records. To substantiate the same, M.W.3 was examined by the Petitioner management. On the other hand, the case of the second Respondent was that two bus owners in collusion have created the records. The Labour Court found that if really, the second Respondent was working in Veerappa Motor Service in the year 1984, the Petitioner management would have called for the attendance register and salary register and produced the same through M.W.3, but such evidence has not been produced. Therefore, the Labour Court has disbelieved Exhibit M-1. 9. The further evidence which has been appreciated by the Labour Court is in respect of alleged finance firm stated to have been started by the second- Respondent workman. The management witnesses, M.Ws.1 and 2 who were also partners of the said finance firm, especially M.W.2 clearly stated that the second Respondent was only a partner in the firm and he was not the managing partner conducting the partnership firm at all and he was a partner only in Annamalai Finance. Therefore, there was an admission by M.W.2 to the effect that while he was a partner in Annamalai Finance, the second Respondent was still working in the Petitioner management. This is also again a factual finding given by the Labour Court which, in my considered view, does not require any interference. 10. The Labour Court has further found that when it is admitted that the second Respondent joined in service under the Petitioner in 1984 and left in the year 1993, there is nothing on record from the management to show that there was a final settlement which was given to the second Respondent. The Labour Court has also narrated the specific admission of M.W.2 Gopal who has stated that in the Petitioner management 40 people were working and provident fund contribution was being deducted for the second Respondent workman also. In such circumstances, the Labour Court has found that when the management was having 4 workmen, it should have produced all records to prove its case and if really in 1993 the second Respondent abruptly left the job, the management should have proved the same by producing the relevant records showing that final settlement was made and accordingly, the Labour Court rejected Exhibit M-7 totally. 11. 11. Even assuming that the second Respondent was a partner in a finance firm, when M.W.2 has specifically admitted that the second Respondent had never worked as managing partner, there was absolutely no impediment on the part of the second Respondent to continue in employment of the Petitioner management and that has been correctly found by the Labour Court on appreciation of evidence. The Labour Court in respect of backwages has also found that the second Respondent was suddenly pushed to poverty and starvation with family and therefore, the allegation made by the Petitioner management as if the second Respondent was employed elsewhere was also not correct. 12. As stated above, the Labour Court has considered Exhibits M-1, M-2, M-3 and M-7 and on merit, rejected the same, by giving proper reasons. In such circumstances, it is not for this Court to give different interpretation to the findings given by the Labour Court in respect of various documents. Law is well settled that in such circumstances, unless the finding is perverse which is beyond human comprehension and materially affects the very award, this Court cannot be expected to interfere with the same. Merely because there are two meanings which can be attributable to the document, when the Labour Court has applied one meaning and decided the issue, it is not for this Court to substitute its meaning. Therefore, there are absolutely no error apparent in the award of the Labour Court. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as if there has been any perversity in the findings, especially the one which was rendered based on Exhibit M-7, viz., EPF application, is not tenable. 13. That was the view of the Supreme Court in Agnani (W.M.) v. Badri Das and Others 1963 (1) LLJ 684 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows at p. 689: The Tribunal took the view that this resolution clearly showed that the enquiry had to be held about the incident which took place on November 16, 1959 and it thought that the reference to his previous conduct was incidental and may have been necessary for determining the question of sentence, but it was not intended to be the subject-matter of the enquiry. The High Court has taken a different view. The High Court has taken a different view. Apart from the correctness of one view or another, it seems to us plain that in a matter of this kind, if the Tribunal put one interpretation upon the resolution and the High Court thought it better to put another, that cannot be said to introduce an error apparent on the face of the record inn the order of the Tribunal...... 14. When the Labour Court has analyzed the evidence on facts, the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the same to reappreciate the evidence, as it was held by the Supreme Court in Indian Overseas Bank Vs. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 245 wherein the Supreme Court held as follows at p. 1624 and 1628 of LLJ: 8.... The question is whether in view of such categorical findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal, the learned single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could reappreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. We have already pointed out that the learned single Judge had erred in appreciating certain documents and the evidence in the case. We are clearly of the opinion that the learned single Judge had no material to characterise the judgment of the Tribunal as perverse. We will once again refer to certain important matters which would go a long way to decide the matter. The inference drawn from Exhibit M-1 that it was the Union, who wanted the canteen is far from truth. The subsequent evidence has got to be looked into on this aspect of the case. In Exhibit M-4, dated April 23, 1988, the Union has informed the Bank about the new canteen promoters for the record of the Bank. The inference drawn by the learned Judge from Exhibit M-5 that the canteen was not exclusive for the Bank is based on a misconception. The evidence of M.W.1 clearly shows that the canteen is meant only for the Bank. His evidence is as follows: ... The canteen is meant only for the staff of the Bank and the canteen will remain closed only on bank holidays.... The evidence of M.W.1 clearly shows that the canteen is meant only for the Bank. His evidence is as follows: ... The canteen is meant only for the staff of the Bank and the canteen will remain closed only on bank holidays.... The observation that the Bank was running the canteen to retain good relationship between the union and the management is not appropriate and on the other hand, it only shows that the Bank was implicitly bound to maintain the canteen. The learned single Judge has not given due weight to the two principles enunciated in LIC case and undisturbed by RBI case. We have already quoted those principles. 9. to 16. xxx 17. The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a Tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether giving a complete go-by even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below. 15. That apart, as correctly submitted by the learned Counsel for the second Respondent, the evidence speaks for itself, especially the evidence of management witnesses who have categorically deposed that the second Respondent had never been the managing partner and even in respect of EPF applications regarding three workers of cinema theatre run by the Petitioner, the management witness has come forward and told that the Petitioner had never been employed in the cinema theatre. All would go to show that the case of the management has been totally disbelieved by the Labour Court which can never be said to be perverse. In the absence of any record produced by the Petitioner management under whom 40 workmen are stated to have been working, to show that the second Respondent had abandoned the service, particularly when the Labour Court has refused to believe M.Ws.3 and 4, it is not for this Court to take a different stand. 16. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is about the backwages. It is true that the payment of back wages is not automatic and the circumstances and factual aspects are to be taken into consideration, as it was held in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Transport Corporation Vs. V. Venkatesan, (2009) 9 SCC 601 . In the absence of any evidence to show that the second Respondent as a partner was earning any profit during the period in question, it is again not possible for this Court to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Labour Court has erred in granting back wages. 17. It is relevant to point out that the second Respondent as W.W. 1 has categorically stated in cross-examination that he was not aware of any provident fund deduction under cinema theatre service. 17. It is relevant to point out that the second Respondent as W.W. 1 has categorically stated in cross-examination that he was not aware of any provident fund deduction under cinema theatre service. That goes to add to the evidence of M.W.2 to the effect that the three persons whose names were found in the Provident Fund Register had never been employed in the cinema theatre. On the finding by the Labour Court that the Petitioner was put to poverty, there is absolutely nothing for this Court to hold otherwise. 18. In such view of the matter, looking into any angle, the award of the Labour Court cannot be said to be either perverse or illegal. Accordingly, the impugned award of the Labour Court is confirmed and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.