ORDER As per Hon'ble Shri Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.: 1. This civil revision under Section 23-E of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act. 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been preferred by the tenant questioning the legality, validity, propriety and correctness of the impugned order of eviction passed against him by the Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur. 2. The respondent landlady preferred an application under Section 23A of the Act for the petitioner's eviction from the suit premises situated at Shukrawari Bazar within the municipal corporation area of Raipur bearing House No.290/20. The said non residential premises was let out to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs.625/- after executing rent note on 1-6-2004 for the period till 30th May, 2005. According to the landlady, tenancy came to an end on 30th May, 2005, as the tenancy was not extended thereafter. However, in spite of repeated oral requests, the tenant failed to vacate the premises even after informing that the landlady needs the premises for her personal need. The legal notice datcd 2-5-2005 was served on the tenant seeking delivery or vacant possession, however, the tenant did not comply with the request made in the notice. It was stated in the application that the landlady, an old aged widow, needs the premises for the business which will be carried along with her daughter-in-law Smt. Usha Waretwar, widow of late Ashok Waretwar and her grand son and to satisfy the said need, she has no reasonably suitable alternative' accommodation in Raipur town. 3. After seeking leave to defend, the tenant filed his reply, inter alia, pleading that he is in possession of the premises since 1983 and not from June, 2004 as pleaded by the landlady. It was further stated that the landlady wanted to increase the rent from Rs.625/- to Rs.2,000/-, however, on the tenant's refusal. the instant eviction petition has been preferred only to harass him and that prayer for eviction for the need of someone else is not maintainable. In para-11 of the reply, it was stated that the landlady's pleading that she needs the premises to carryon the business along with her daughter-in-law and grand son is denied and that she has an alternative accommodation which is available in the same suit premises. it was also stated that her grandson is in Government service, therefore, the need is not bonafide. 4. it was also stated that her grandson is in Government service, therefore, the need is not bonafide. 4. To substantiate her prayer for-eviction, the landlady examined herself and her witness Laxman Rao Channawar. On the other hand, the tenant examined him self and his witnesses namely, Mohd. Salim, Budhram Nirmalkar and Chandulal Ambwani. The landlady proved the rent note dated 1-6-2004 as Ex.-P/1, its reply by the tenant as Ex.-P/2 and the legal notice as Ex.-P/ 3. 5. The Rent Controlling Authority had earlier framed the issues and after recording the evidence, has passed the impugned order of eviction, inter alia, holding that the applicant/landlady is entitled to seek eviction as she has proved the need of her daughter-in-law and that to satisfy the said need, she has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in Raipur town. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the eviction application under Section 23-A of the Act was not maintainable because the need of daughter-in-law is not covered under Section 23-A(b) of the Act. He would further submit that the present application for eviction has not been filed within one year from the date of death of original landlady, therefore, the eviction petition was not maintainable for the need of daughter-in-law and in any case, the daughter-in-law having not been examined, the need is not proved. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the landlady/respondent argued that on true constructions of the pleadings made in the eviction application, it would appear that the projected need is for landlady herself and for her daughter-in-law and grandson because in para-11 of the eviction application, it has been pleaded that the landlady needs the premises to carryon business along with her widowed daughter-in-law and grandson and thus, even if the finding has been recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority that the need of daughter-in-law is proved, it was the need of landlady along with daughter-in-law and grandson which has been proved. He refers to the statement made by the landlady before the Rent Controlling Authority. . 8. Though in the application for eviction, the landlady has stated that she needs the premises for her own need which will be satisfied by opening business along with her daughter-in-law and grandson, yet in her statement, she says that the projected need is for widowed daughter-in-law, her husband (major son of the landlady) having died in 1997. . 8. Though in the application for eviction, the landlady has stated that she needs the premises for her own need which will be satisfied by opening business along with her daughter-in-law and grandson, yet in her statement, she says that the projected need is for widowed daughter-in-law, her husband (major son of the landlady) having died in 1997. Though in a proceeding for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority, a widow is entitled to move an application for eviction and the daughter-in-law of the landlady is a widow and she could have moved an application for eviction, as it has come in the evidence that the suit house is ancestral property and in that view of the matter, after the death of her husband, the daughter-in-law also becomes a co-owner of the suit accommodation, yet since in the present case, the eviction-application was moved by the landlady (mother-in-law of Smt. Usha Waretwar, widow of Ashok Waretwar) and not by her daughter-in-law, this Court shall consider the question as to whether the daughter-in-law would be a person for whose need the non residential accommodation can be got vacated under Section 23-A(b) of the Act or whether the need of the widowed daughter-in-law would be treated as the need of the landlady? 9. To consider the question as to whether a widowed daughter-in-law would be covered as a person for whose need the landlady can seek an order of eviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Act, few provisions of the Act needs to be referred and are reproduced here under: "Section 2 (e) of the Act defines the term "member of the family". '2(e):- "member of the family" in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grand father, mother, grand mother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow, or brothers son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependent on him.' Section 23-A(b) of the Act, which is in pari materia to the provisions contained in Section 12 (I)(f) of the act is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-' . 23-A (b). 23-A (b). that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes IS required "bona jide" by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting 1lis business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned : .' Provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition.' to. While considering the issue within the swecp of the above quoted provision, cel1ain decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the similar legislations of the other States needs to be referred. In the matter of Dwarkaprasad Vs. Niranjan and another', the Supreme Court has observed that ground of eviction has to be liberally construed and a beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. Similarly, in the matter of Kailash Chand and another Vs. Dharam Das, it has been held that there is always a scope for the Court to interpret the law with a pragmatism consistent with the demand of varying situations and life is not static and so the law cannot afford to be static. 11. Before this Court proceeds to decide the question as to whether a widowed daughter-in-law would be covered as a person for whose need the landlady can seek an order of eviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Act or as to whether the need of widowed daughter-in-law can be construed as landlady's personal need for continuing or starting his business or as to whether a widowed daughter-in-law being widow of a major son of the landlady can be held to be covered within the term "major son", this Court shall refer to a few earlier decisions of the Supreme COUl1 dealing with similar legislations of other States. 12. In the matter of Joginder Pal Vs. 12. In the matter of Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore BehaP, while dealing with and interpreting the expression "For his own use" in Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning and that the requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. It has been held in paras-23 and 31 of the judgment thus: "23. We are of the opinion that the expression 'for his own use' as occurring in Section 13 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression must beassigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have found the pari materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependents and kith and kin in the requirement of hll1dlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be, obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to supp011 himself, and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himselfthe Court shall with circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close interrelation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. 31. We have already noticed that the purpose of the Act is to restrict increase of rent and the eviction of tenants in urban areas. Still the Legislature has taken care to provide grounds for eviction, one of then• being the requirement of the landlord. We have to strike a balance between the need of protecting the tenants from unjustified evictions and the need for eviction when ground for eviction is one such as the requirement of the landlord. If we do not meaningfully construe the concept of requirement the provision may sufter from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own use' in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own use' in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of ~ living thought to the skeleton of the words which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words 'for his own use' in Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) of the Act." 13. In the matter of Dwarkaprasad1 (Supra), while interpreting the word "for occupation by himself' in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and while holding that the need for settling the landlord's son and younger brothers in business would amount to landlord's own need, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras-15, 16 and 18 thus: "15. A beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. The term "family" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the head of the family. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kanhaiyalal V Bapurao {(1989) I AI RCJ 161} held that the term "family" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relatives of the head of that family. It would include not only the members of the landlord's family but also those persons who are dependent on him and whose responsibility he has accepted. 16. A latest decision of this Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal {(2002) 5 SCC 397} to which one of us (R.C. Lahoti, J.) was a party takes the same view. In fact, this judgment contains a detailed resume of the entire case-law on this point and holds that the expression "for his own use" occurring in Section t 3(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 has to be liberally construed and should be given a wide and useful meaning rather than a strict and narrow construction. In fact, this judgment contains a detailed resume of the entire case-law on this point and holds that the expression "for his own use" occurring in Section t 3(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 has to be liberally construed and should be given a wide and useful meaning rather than a strict and narrow construction. The requirement of a member of the family of the landlord who is dependent on the landlord for purposes of residence or for economic consideration can be considered as a requirement of the landlord. 18. In the case in hand, the landlord is the head of the family being the eldest amongst the brothers. All the brothers and sisters including the mother of the landlord live with him as members of the joint Hindu family. It is his obligation to settle his younger brothers in business as it is his obligation to settle his children in business. Therefore, he can legitimately seek eviction of a tenant by pleading that he needs the demised premises to settle his son and his younger brothers in business. This being the legal position, the conclusion is inevitable i.e, the plaintiff landlord must succeed and a decree for eviction is liable to be passed in his favour for the entire demised premises. Accordingly this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court which has granted only a-decree for half portion of the suit premises is hereby modified. The landlord is held entitled to a decree for possession of the entire demised premises. The decree for possession passed by the lower appellate court with respect to the entire suit premises is hereby restored. The respondents are granted three month's time to vacate the suit premises and hand over its peaceful vacant possession to the plaintiff landlord. Parties are left to bear their respective costs," 14. Yet again, in the matter of Kailash Chand and anothe,) (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while interpreting the word "bonafide requirement of landlord's own occupation" occurred in Section 14 (3)(a)(i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, has held in para-25 of the judgment thus: "25. The expression 'his own occupation' as occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. The expression 'his own occupation' as occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. 'His own occupation' does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. The expressions "for his own use" and "for occupation by himself' as occurring in two other Rent Control Acts, have come up for the consideration of this Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 and Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan and another, (2003) 4 SCC 549. It was held that the requirement of members of family of the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the landlord, is the landlord's own requirement. Regard will be had to the social or socioreligious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region to which the landlord belongs, while interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the family members for residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for 'his own occupation'." IS, In Section 23-A(b) of the Act also, the Legislature has used the words "his business", meaning thereby that the accommodation can be got vacated by the landlord for continuing or starting his own business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters. Thus, in view of the law bid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting the word "his own business" occurring in different States' Legislations in the aforesaid matters, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the need of the widowed daughter-in-law would be the need of the landlady herself and thus, eviction application filed by the landlady for the need of widowed daughter-in-law was maintainable. 16. There is yet another way of dealing with the case to decide as to whether the need of widowed daughter-in-law would be covered for filing application for eviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Act. 17. Concededly, a landlord/landlady can seek eviction of Po non-residential premises under Section 23-A(b) of the Act if the need of his/her major son is proved. The approach, for considering whether a widowed daughter-in-law of a major son would be covered within the term "major son" itself in the context and the area of operation in which the legislation in question deals, needs to he guided by principles of interpretation. The approach, for considering whether a widowed daughter-in-law of a major son would be covered within the term "major son" itself in the context and the area of operation in which the legislation in question deals, needs to he guided by principles of interpretation. The words in a statute are to be interpreted or defined in the context in which they are used in the legislation and the same cannot be construed in vacuum. It is true that ordinary rule of construction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries, but the concept of legislation and the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure from the rule or literal construction. following commentary from the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (12th Edition. 2010. at page 94-95) dealing with the issue "explanation of the rule of literal construction" would guide this Court to decide the question in hand. "In the statement or the rule "the epithets 'natural'. 'ordinary', 'Iiteral', 'grammatical' and 'popular' are employed almost interchangeably", to convey the same idea. The word 'primary' is also used in the same sense. When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. what is meant is that the words must be ascribed that natural. ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject-matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. 13RETT. M.R. called it a "cardinal rule" that "Whenever you have to construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject-matter with regard to which they are used". "No word", says PROFESSOR II.A SMITII "has an absolute meaning. for no words can be defined in vacuo. or without reference to some context". According to SUTlIERLAND there is a "basic fallacy" in saying "that words have meaning in and of themselves", and "reference to the abstract meaning of words", states CRAIES, "if there be any such thing, is of title value in interpreting statutes". for no words can be defined in vacuo. or without reference to some context". According to SUTlIERLAND there is a "basic fallacy" in saying "that words have meaning in and of themselves", and "reference to the abstract meaning of words", states CRAIES, "if there be any such thing, is of title value in interpreting statutes". In the words of JUSTICE HOLMES: "A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged: it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are "slippery customers". Therefore, in determining the meaning of any word of phrase in a statute the first question to be asked is - "What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase". The context, as already seen, in the construction of statutes means the statutes as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. The above discussion relating to the meaning of a word or phrase in the construction of a statute has been approvingly quoted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases." 18. In Bidie Vs. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation4, Lord Greene observed thus: "The first thing one has to do, I venture to think, in construing words in a section of an Act of Parliament is not to take those words in vacuo so to speak, and attribute to them what is sometimes called their natural or ordinary meaning. Few words in the English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of their context. The method of construing statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which you may have to displace or modify. The method of construing statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which you may have to displace or modify. It is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question: 'In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word?" 19. In R Vs. Brown, Lord Hoffmann observed that The unit of communication by means of language is the sentence and not the parts of which it is composed. The significance of individual words is affected by other words and the syntax of the whole. 20. In the matter of KP. Varghese Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and another6, Bhagwati, J. observed thus :"........... as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in most felicitous language: ......... the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes,\and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create." 21. In Union of India Vs. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another Bhagwati, J. held thus:- "the words used in Statute cannot be read in isolation; their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a ~tatute must be exammed in its context. His Lordship explained what he meant by the word 'context" and prm;eeded to say "I mean it in its >.widest sense as incll~ding not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in, pari materia and the mischief which the statute intended to remedy:' ~Iis Lordship called upon the courts faced with the task of assigning meaning to a word to remember that a statute always has some purpose. or object to accomplish whose sympathctic and imaginative discover) is the surest guide to its meaning. The literal construction should not obsess the court because it has only prima facie preference. or object to accomplish whose sympathctic and imaginative discover) is the surest guide to its meaning. The literal construction should not obsess the court because it has only prima facie preference. In the same judgment, Krishna lyer, J. in his separate opinion emphasized the need of keeping in view "the roots of the past, the toliage of the present and the seeds of the future" while understanding and interpreting a statute and held that judicial interpretation should not be inlprisoned in verbalism and words lose their thrust when read in vacuo:' 22. When the principles concerning interpretation of word thus stood elaborated and defined by the High Courts and the English Courts as quoted (supra), this Court would pose a question as to whether by applying the process of interpretation, a widowed daughter-in-law can be held to be included within the term "major son" without doing any violence to the provision or the context in which the provision has been engrafted in the legislation. The question creeps in as t9 whether there is an independent existence of a widowed daughter-in-law without there being a major son whose wife is the said widowed daughter-in-law. To put it differently, whether during life time of the major son, his wife would have any independent existence so as to be conferred a benetit of Section 23-A(b) of the Act. Obviously when the need of a major son is projected, his family would include daughter-in-law and when the said major son leaves for heavenly abode, this vacuum is filled by the widowed daughter-in-law in the family. Thus, to conclude, in the absence of major son and after his death, the widow i.e. widowed daughter-in-law in the present case, would be covered under Section 23-A(b) of the Act, as she fills in the vacuum and takes the position of a major son in the family in his absence. 23. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, even if for the sake of argument, it is taken that the word "his business" would not include the business of widowed daughter-in-law, by process of interpretation widowed daughter-in-law would be otherwise covered as a widow of a major son and that major son being already covered under the provision, the widowed daughter-in-law is also covered by the process of interpretation so as to accord a practical and meaningful approach to the provision guided by the realities of life. 24. 24. To support the above line of interpretation. I may consider a hypothetical situation where in the given case a landlady loses her only majuri son who was employed in Government job and the widowed daughter-in-law being an illiterate lady or being otherwise incapable of seeking compassionate I appointment, needs the business premises for starting her business to support I the family. If in such a situation it is held that the widowed daughter-in-low is not covered within the ambit of Section 23-A(b) of the Act and the iandlady: cannot get an order of eviction on the ground of bona tide non-residential need. it will produce absurd result and consequences and would defeat thc ends of justice. Apart from this. in the concept of joint family or coparcenary property. j widow of a major son becomes a co-owner after death of major son and for ' this reason also, the need of widowed daughter-in-law would be covered under Section 23-A(b) of the Act and an eviction petition can be tiled for her need. 25. The other point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that in the absence of daughter-in-law having been examined in the Court her need is not proved. 26. In this regard. the judgment in the matter of Naval Kishore Tapadia Vs. Munnilal Tailor, needs to be referred wherein this Court in paragraphs17 & 18 of the judgment has held thus:- "17. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as above. it is to be seen whether in a suit for eviction preferred by the plaintiff/ landlord on the ground of bonafide need. it is necessary for him to enter the witness-box and if he has not entered the witness-box. but he tried to prove the case by examining his attorney-holder (his real brother in the present case) whether such evidence is sufficient Lind is legally acceptable to prove bonafide need even if it is treated that the attorney holder has not deposed as an agent of the plaintiff but as a witness of the plaintiff. 18. As already" referred above, a Single Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh (by Ilon'ble Shri O.M. Oharmadhikari, J. as His Lordship then was) in .Shiv Narayan Soni Vs. 18. As already" referred above, a Single Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh (by Ilon'ble Shri O.M. Oharmadhikari, J. as His Lordship then was) in .Shiv Narayan Soni Vs. Smt. Parwati Bai Meshram (supra) has held that there is no law that the bona fide need can be proved only by the evidence by the landlady and that it can also be proved through other witnesses. It was observed that she (the landlady in that case) being a lady and she having executed a power of attorney in favour of her. son it was not compulsory' for her to enter the witness-box. Another Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in Bashir Vs. Smt. Hussain Blmo {200S (2) MPU 230}, while faced with a similar question and after relying on Shiv Narayan Soni Vs. Smt. Parwati Bai Meshra (supra) has held that it is not necessary for the landlord to enter the witness-box to prove the ground of bona fide need. In yet another Single Bench judgment in Vim lade vi Vs. Dulichand {1994 (I) MPJR 144}. (by Hon'ble Shri R.C. Lahoti, J. as His Lordship then was) has held that even when the owner landlady did not enter the witness-box and her husband, a power of attorney-holder, appeared and deposed, non-examination of plaintiff was not fatal." 27. In view of the above, since the law is well settled that it is not I necessary for the landlady to enter the witness box to prove the need and that any member of the family can appear and prove the bona fide need, in the present case, the landlady herself has appeared in the witness box and proved the need of her widowed daughter-in-law, therefore, non-examination of widowed daughter-in-law is not of any consequence and in any case. it would not dilute the landlady's case that the premises is needed bonafidely for the need of her daughter-in-law. 28. The other argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is about failure of the daughter-in-law to file proceeding for eviction within one year from the date of death of original landlady. 29. it would not dilute the landlady's case that the premises is needed bonafidely for the need of her daughter-in-law. 28. The other argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is about failure of the daughter-in-law to file proceeding for eviction within one year from the date of death of original landlady. 29. In the present case, the landlady namely, Vimla Bai died on 20-122008, therefore, on the date of death, the eviction application already stood decided in her favour and in any case, the widowed daughter-in-law becomes the owner of the property after the death of original landlady Vimla Bai and thus, it is not necessary for her to file a fresh proceeding for eviction. Thus, this argument of learned counsel for the petitioner has also no substance. 30. In view of the above, the instant civil revision is dismissed. Revision Dismissed.