JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. R.R. Marshall for petitioner requested to permit petitioner to amend cause title and to add Article 226 along with Article 227 of Constitution of India in title of these petitions. Considering his submissions, permission has been granted by this court to add Article 226 of Constitution of India along with Article 227 of Constitution of India in title of these petitions. Such amendment is ordered to be carried out by petitioner immediately. 2. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. RR Marshall appearing with learned Advocate Mr. BN Patel for petitioner in this group of petitions. Notice issued by this court is served upon respondent employee in these petitions but respondent employees in these petitions have not appeared before this Court either in person or through an advocate, therefore, this Court is deciding these petitions in their absence. 3. Initially while issuing notice to respondents in these petitions, following order has been passed by this court on 27th January, 2011: “Notice for final disposal returnable on 17.02.2011. In the meantime and till the returnable date, there shall be ad-interim relief in terms of para-6(b). Direct service permitted. Registry is directed to keep the copy of this order in each matter.” 4. Thus, while issuing notice, ad interim relief in terms of para 6(b) is granted by this court on 27.1.2011 wherein proceedings of recovery application pending in labour court Surat have been stayed by this court. 5. In present petitions, petitioner has challenged order passed by labour court, Surat in Recovery Application dated 24.9.2010 annexure C page 16 wherein labour court Surat has rejected Exh. 6 application submitted by petitioner wherein preliminary issue has been raised by petitioner that present nature of recovery application filed by workman under section 33-C-2 of ID Act, 1947 wherein workman has not established preexisting right before filing such application, there was no adjudication made by labour court/industrial tribunal and, therefore, labour court has no jurisdiction to decide recovery application filed by workmen. That application Exh. 6 has been rejected by labour court on the ground that preliminary issue can be decided by labour court after leading evidence by both parties because preliminary issue raised by petitioner is mixed question of law and facts and, therefore, at this stage, such application for deciding preliminary issue is not maintainable and, therefore, same is rejected by labour court. 6 has been rejected by labour court on the ground that preliminary issue can be decided by labour court after leading evidence by both parties because preliminary issue raised by petitioner is mixed question of law and facts and, therefore, at this stage, such application for deciding preliminary issue is not maintainable and, therefore, same is rejected by labour court. Along with present petitions, petitioner has produced copy of recovery application under section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947 at Annexure A, copy of application raising preliminary issue submitted by petitioner before labour court Surat is produced at Annexure B. Copy of order dated 24.9.2010 passed by labour court on application for preliminary issue is produced at Annexure C to this petition. At annexure D to this petition, petitioner has produced reply of petitioner against recovery application. Reply filed by workman to application for preliminary issue is produced along with this petition by petitioner at Annexure E. Except that, no other documents are produced by petitioner on record. 6. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall for petitioner in these petitions submitted that looking to averments and nature of applications filed by workmen under section 33-C-2 of ID Act, 1947, certain benefits have been claimed by workmen and fixed amount of benefit has been claimed which cannot be claimed by workmen for want of prior adjudication of such rights and prior adjudication of such rights and benefits is required prior to filing of recovery application before labour court/industrial tribunal. Therefore, in absence of pre-existing right, workman is not entitled to file such application for recovery u/s. 33-C-2 of ID Act, 1947 and labour court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide such recovery application without establishing pre-existing right in favour of workmen and, therefore, order passed by labour court requires interference of this Court because question of jurisdiction raised by petitioner must have to be decided first and thereafter, matter has to be decided on merits. 7. He also submitted that labour court has committed gross error in rejecting application Exh.6 submitted by petitioner. In support of his submission, he relied upon decision of apex court in case of State of UP and another v. Brijpal Singh reported in 2005 (8) SCC page 58. 7. He also submitted that labour court has committed gross error in rejecting application Exh.6 submitted by petitioner. In support of his submission, he relied upon decision of apex court in case of State of UP and another v. Brijpal Singh reported in 2005 (8) SCC page 58. He emphasised upon observations reported under heading “Held” at page 59, which are quoted as under: “Held: The workman can proceed under section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under section 33-A or on a reference under section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. A proceeding under section 33-C (2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceedings in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefits in terms of money. The right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be n existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must rise in the course of and in relation to the relation between the industrial workman and his employer. It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under section 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under section 10 of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compare the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity required interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33- C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. (Para 11 and 12) Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand (1978) 2 SCC 144 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak (1995) 1 SCC 235 State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey (2001) 1 SCC 73 followed. The appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. Therefore, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim made by the respondent herein under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act in an undetermined claim and until such adjudication is made by the appropriate forum, the respondent-workman cannot ask the Labour Court in an application under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis to compute his wages. (Para 13) The Labour Court has erred in allowing the application filed under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act and ordering payment of not only the salary but also bonus to the workman although he has not attended the office of the appellants after the say order obtained by him. The High Court has also equally committed a manifest error in not considering the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. (Para 13)” 8. He also relied upon apex court decision in case of D. Krishnan and another v. Special Officer,Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and another, reported in 2008 (7) SCC page 22, para 12, 13 and 17 which are quoted as under: “12. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The fact that proceedings under Section 33 C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings is in no doubt, and such proceedings presuppose some adjudication leading to the determination of aright, which has to be enforced. Concededly there has been no such adjudication in the present case. It will be seen that the reliance of the appellant-workmen is exclusively on documentary evidence placed on record which consisted primarily of the punch time cards and the representations that had been filed from time to time before the respondents. Concededly there has been no such adjudication in the present case. It will be seen that the reliance of the appellant-workmen is exclusively on documentary evidence placed on record which consisted primarily of the punch time cards and the representations that had been filed from time to time before the respondents. It is also true that the claim raised by the appellants had been hotly disputed by the respondents. The question that arises in this situation is whether reliance only on the documentary evidence was sufficient to prove the case. 13. We are of the opinion that the reference to Municipal Corporation's case (supra) is completely misplaced as in that matter, the fact that different categories of workers were doing identical kind of work was virtually admitted but different scales of pay were nevertheless being paid to them. It is also relevant that oral evidence had been adduced by the workmen to supplement the documentary evidence and it was in that situation that the Court felt that an application under section 33 C(2) was maintainable. 17. Mr. Gonsalves, has, however urged that a pre-existing right could also emanate from a statute, in this case from Section 59 of the Factories Act, which provided for the payment of overtime wages and in this view of the matter, all that the Labour Court was called upon to do was to make a calculation of the amounts due to the appellants. The facts of the case are, however, not as clear cut and dried, as has been contended. The Division Bench has observed that though section 59 of the Factories Act undoubtedly provided for extra payment as overtime wages, but according to Rule 78B of the Tamil Nadu Factories Rule, 1950, only an employee authorised to work overtime by an overtime slip would be entitled to claim an overtime allowance. The specific case of the respondent-Management, which has not been contested by the appellants even during the course of the arguments before us, is that no such slips had ever been issued. Additionally, we are of the opinion that in the absence of any supporting oral evidence by the workmen which would also result in their cross-examination, a mere reliance on the documents filed by them is insufficient for determining the factual basis of the issues involved, in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In this view of the matter, Mr. Additionally, we are of the opinion that in the absence of any supporting oral evidence by the workmen which would also result in their cross-examination, a mere reliance on the documents filed by them is insufficient for determining the factual basis of the issues involved, in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In this view of the matter, Mr. Gonsalves's argument based on Rameshwar's case (supra) or the scope and ambit of Section 33C(1) vis-a-vis Section 33 C (2), is also unacceptable.” 9. Thereafter, he read over application filed by workman under section 33-C(2) of ID Act and also referred to order passed by labour court on application for preliminary issue and submitted that labour court has committed error in deciding application for preliminary issue and rejecting application made by petitioner. Except that, he further submitted that in many cases, jurisdiction question may be based upon facts but that does not mean that question of jurisdiction raised by employer cannot be examined by labour court without having evidence from both sides. Therefore, he submitted that employee must have to establish pre-existing right to receive certain amounts from employer and only thereafter, labour court can entertain recovery application under section 33-C(2) of ID Act and not otherwise. Except that, no other submission is made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall before this Court and except aforesaid decisions, no other decision has been referred to and relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall before this Court. 10. I have considered submissions made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall before this Court. I have also perused order passed by labour court Exh. 6 dated 24th September, 2010. I have also perused written application, reply of workman against application for deciding preliminary issue. 11. Most of arguments made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall for petitioner suggest that in such recovery application, unless and until pre existing right is not established by workman, labour court should not have to entertain such application and question of leading evidence does not arise. Recovery Application has been filed by workman under section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947. Therefore, section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947 is reproduced as under: “33C. Recovery of money due from an employer. Recovery Application has been filed by workman under section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947. Therefore, section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947 is reproduced as under: “33C. Recovery of money due from an employer. - (1) xxx (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then, the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this A ct, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months. Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit. “” 12. According to case of workmen, they were working with petitioner. They were receiving salary from petitioner and certain benefits under various labour laws including over time and notice pay and retrenchment compensation has not been received by workmen even though their services have been illegally terminated by petitioner. 13. In reply, petitioner raised first question that workmen are not employees of petitioner. When relationship of employee-employer has been disputed by employer means petitioner, in such circumstances, for establishing relationship of employee-employer between parties, oral and documentary evidence must be required to be produced by employees before labour court and for that, opportunity must have to be given to concerned employee for enabling them to establish such relationship of employee-employer between parties. Claim of workman has been totally denied by petitioner. Even existence of relationship of employer and employee has also been denied by petitioner . According to my opinion, merely because employer denies relationship of employer employee between parties, recovery application filed by workman cannot be rejected on such preliminary ground. In such case, workman is entitled to have an opportunity to establish his pre-existing right while leading proper evidence before labour court and workman is entitled to have such opportunity because it is a pure question of fact which is required to be ascertained by labour court on basis of evidence led by respective parties before labour court. In such case, workman is entitled to have an opportunity to establish his pre-existing right while leading proper evidence before labour court and workman is entitled to have such opportunity because it is a pure question of fact which is required to be ascertained by labour court on basis of evidence led by respective parties before labour court. According to my opinion, preliminary issue raised by petitioner before labour court is not pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and facts which is required to be examined by labour court according to law while considering facts emerging from evidence for deciding whether workmen herein are employees of petitioner or not. Labour Court has considered question raised by petitioner. Services of each of workman has been terminated against which T Application has been filed by each workman against present petitioner which are pending before Labour Court, Surat. Legality, validity and propriety of order of termination has been challenged by workman under section 78/79 of Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Mere pendency of T Application against termination would not give any cause to employer to raise preliminary issue in recovery application that workmen are not employees of petitioner establishment. Labour court has considered that according to submissions made by workmen before labour court that during course of employment, employer has not supplied any documents namely pay slip, identity card and presence card and, therefore, these are documents which are in possession of petitioner and while submitting application before labour court, demand for production of such document from employer can be made by workmen. So, when workmen are not able to establish their pre-existing right in absence of above documents, then, on such ground, recovery application cannot be rejected by labour court. Question of relationship raised by employer is required to be established by employee by calling for production of certain documents/record from employer and after production of relevant documents and/record by employer, question of such relationship can be examined by labour court and in absence of that, it is very difficult for labour court to decide whether workmen are having pre-existing right in their favour or not and whether workmen are employees of petitioner Establishment or not. Therefore, labour court has considered various contentions raised by employer and has come to conclusion that merely because employer has disputed relationship of employer-employee, for that alone, preliminary issue cannot be permitted to be raised as it would require appreciation of evidence from both sides and in absence of such evidence, this question cannot be examined by labour court at preliminary stage. Merely because employer has denied or disputed relationship of employer-employee between parties, that alone is not enough to reject recovery application. Whether workman is having any pre-existing right or not, that aspect also would require further evidence from workman which is relating to question of facts only and it is not relating to question of law alone. For that, opportunity must be given to workman for proving fact of having pre-existing right and relationship as employer and employees between parties by leading proper evidence before labour court. Workmen have claimed Over time and other benefits which claims are relating to facts. For that, workmen must have to establish it by leading proper evidence before labour court and merely because employer has denied, recovery application cannot be rejected by labour court considering preliminary issue raised by employer. Labour Court has rightly come to conclusion that it is always not necessary to decide preliminary issue though it may be relating to question of jurisdiction but even question of jurisdiction would also require some evidence and opportunity to workman and such opportunity must be given to workman and whatever contention raised by employer can be examined by labour court on basis of evidence. So, unless and until evidence is led, maintainability of recovery application cannot be decided by labour court and, therefore, labour court has come to conclusion that whatever dispute raised by employer against recovery application, that can be decided by labour court only after taking evidence on record and thereafter, labour court can examine whether workmen are having pre-existing right or not, therefore, labour court has come to conclusion that at this stage, application of present nature Exh. 6 raising preliminary issue is not maintainable and not necessary to be decided at this stage but it can be decided at the time of final determination of recovery application and, therefore, labour court has rejected application for preliminary issue filed by petitioner. 14. 6 raising preliminary issue is not maintainable and not necessary to be decided at this stage but it can be decided at the time of final determination of recovery application and, therefore, labour court has rejected application for preliminary issue filed by petitioner. 14. Rejection of application for determination of preliminary issue would not cause any prejudice to right of employer because labour court has given opportunity to workman to prove pre existing right and relationship as employer and employee by leading proper evidence before labour court. At that occasion, naturally, employer would also be having equal right to lead proper evidence for rebuttal against evidence of workman but it is the intention of employer to see that recovery application is dismissed without giving such opportunity to workman for establishing their pre existing right and relationship as employer and employee before labour court. In case, if workman has failed to establish pre-existing right and relationship as employer and employee in their favour, then, such recovery application is bound to be dismissed by labour court but before that opportunity is must,to be given by labour court to workman, in absence of that, such recovery application cannot be dismissed only on preliminary stage. Therefore, question before this court is whether petition under Article 226/227 Constitution of India challenging such interlocutory order on preliminary issue passed by labour court can be entertained by this court or not. 15. Decision of labour court on preliminary issue Exh. 6 is not deciding rights of either of parties but it is merely giving opportunity to employees to prove their pre-existing right and relationship as employer and employee by leading proper evidence before labour court and both issues, preliminary issue raised by employer as well as merits can be examined by labour court together and decide it finally whether workman has established his pre existing right or not, and whether workmen are employees of petitioner establishment or not, which is not causing any prejudice to petitioner. Decisions which have been referred to and relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall are not relating to question of preliminary issue. For it is not held that, labour court must have to examine first preliminary issue and no opportunity is to be given to employee for proving pre-existing right by leading proper evidence before labour court. Decisions which have been referred to and relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall are not relating to question of preliminary issue. For it is not held that, labour court must have to examine first preliminary issue and no opportunity is to be given to employee for proving pre-existing right by leading proper evidence before labour court. As regards law which has been laid down by Hon'ble apex court in aforesaid two decisions referred to and relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall for petitioner, this Court is not having any different opinion but merely employer has denied relationship of employer-employee, it is not necessary to be considered as sufficient to reject recovery application filed by workman, otherwise, in such cases, when application is filed by workman under section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947, then, in such case, employer would always raise dispute about employer-employee relationship and would raise preliminary issue to decide it and reject such application only on that ground and in such circumstances, provisions of section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947 would become nugatory. Right to receive certain due amount or benefit from employer is well recognised by statutory provisions under section 33-C(2) of ID Act, 1947 but when workman has filed such application to receive certain benefits and due amount from employer, at that occasion, employer denied existence of relationship of employer-employee itself and then, entire machinery which has been incorporated by statutory provisions would become meaningless and, therefore, such technical stand to avoid decision on merits and liability by employer is very easy for employer to raise such type of contention while disputing relationship means existence of employer-employee relationship between parties and, therefore, according to my opinion, in peculiar facts and circumstances of case, aforesaid two decisions cited by learned senior advocate Mr. Marshall are not applicable because both decisions are not on preliminary issues but on final adjudication on merits but this court is only examining issue whether order passed by labour court on interlocutory application Exh. 6 is legal and valid or not while exercising powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 16. The stand taken by petitioner before Labour Court is that workmen must have to first establish pre-existing right or prior adjudication of the issue, then only, recovery application under section 33(C)(2) of ID Act, 1947 is maintainable, otherwise not. 6 is legal and valid or not while exercising powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 16. The stand taken by petitioner before Labour Court is that workmen must have to first establish pre-existing right or prior adjudication of the issue, then only, recovery application under section 33(C)(2) of ID Act, 1947 is maintainable, otherwise not. But such stand of petitioner is abnormal and contrary to law. Because workmen can establish pre-existing right on merits after producing relevant record when facts stated by workmen are denied by employer. The law which is decided by Apex Court as relied by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall is based on final adjudication and not on preliminary issue. The facts stated by workmen are denied by employer but employer has not produced any documentary evidence in support of averments made in written statement and application for preliminary issue. So, before labour Courts, there are words against words. Therefore, labour Court has thought it fit to give opportunity to workmen to prove preexisting right for recovering due amount claimed in Recovery Application. In support of defence raised by employer, the employer has not produced any documentary evidence viz. Muster and Presence Card, Pay Slip, Pay Register of Establishment. From that, petitioner can demonstrate before Labour Court that name of such workmen are not mentioned in it but in absence of such documents, the stand of petitioner employer is that whatever defence raised by employer must have to be accepted by court as Gospel Truth and other side is not entitled for any opportunity to prove otherwise while demanding certain documents,leading oral evidence and demanding documents from petitioner. So, preliminary issue which is raised by employer cannot be decided at preliminary stage in absence of such documents. For that, it required decision on merits and at that occasion, such defence raised by employer can be considered by Labour Court. So, it will not cause any prejudice to defence of petitioner employer. Therefore, according to my opinion, such application for preliminary issue Exh. 6 is not bona fide but it is after thought, arbitrary and amounts to legal harassment cause to workmen and avoid decision on merits by misuse of legal machinery and abuse of process of Court and law. 17. This aspect has been considered in detail by this court in case of Manager, AIR Control Engg. Co. 6 is not bona fide but it is after thought, arbitrary and amounts to legal harassment cause to workmen and avoid decision on merits by misuse of legal machinery and abuse of process of Court and law. 17. This aspect has been considered in detail by this court in case of Manager, AIR Control Engg. Co. Ltd. v. Kanaiyalal Ghusabhai Kunvaria, 2000(4) GLR page 2985. Relevant discussion made by this Court in para 8,9,10,11,13 and 15 is quoted as under: “8. After considering the submissions from both the learned advocates, it is undisputed fact that the Labour Court is having jurisdiction to adjudicate the industrial dispute, after the reference has been made to it by the appropriate Government. The Labour Court is required to adjudicate the entire dispute together finally and submit its award to the Appropriate Government. But usually whenever reference comes up before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, the employer/establishment, in order to delay the proceedings, raises the dispute whether it is an `industry' within the meaning and scope of Section 2 (j); or whether the dispute referred to it for adjudication is an `industrial dispute' within the scope of Section 2 (k) and/or also whether the employee concerned is a `workman' within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act. Such a tendency and practise of the employer to avoid decision on merits has been developed since last 15 - 20 years of inviting the interim orders from the Labour Court and thereafter to challenge the same before the higher forum and stall the proceedings pending before the Labour Court, wherein in any case, the sufferer is ultimately the workman and not the employer. Therefore, in such a situation wherein disadvantage has been taken by the employer by giving such application in almost all cases and inviting the orders from the Labour Court and thereafter to challenge the same in the higher forum, so naturally the workman has to surrender to the terms of employers because the workman is not able to bear the burden of expenses and to wait for a pretty long time for final adjudication and fruits of the award. Such tactics adopted by the employer should not be encouraged and it should have to be deprecated by the various decisions of the Apex Court. 9. Such tactics adopted by the employer should not be encouraged and it should have to be deprecated by the various decisions of the Apex Court. 9. In the matter of D.P Maheshwari [Supra], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that, `...it was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. ... There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issue first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardies industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait for dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. The Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences.." 10. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. The Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences.." 10. In the matter of S.K. Verma v. Maheshchandra, reported in 1983 (2) LLN 637 ], the Apex Court while strongly disapproving the practise of raising frivolous preliminary objections at the instance of the employer to delay and defeat the purpose of adjudication on merit, has observed that, `there appears to be three preliminary objections which have become quite fashion to be raised by all employers, particularly Public Sector Corporations, whenever an industrial dispute is referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. One objection is that there is no `industry'. The second that, there is no industrial dispute and the third, that the workman is not workman. It is pity that when the Central Government in all solemnity refers an industrial dispute for adjudication, the Public Sector Corporation which is an instrument of the State instead of welcoming the decision of the Tribunal on merits so as to absolve of any authority of being a bad employer or of victimisation, etc. should admit to evade decision on merits by raising such objection and Government thereby satisfy carry the matter often times to the High Court and to the Supreme Court wasting public time and money. It is expected that public sector corporation to be model employers and nodal litigants. They are not expected to avoid adjudication or to indulge in dragging workman from Court to Court merely to vindicate not justice but some rigid technical stand taken by them..' 11. It is expected that public sector corporation to be model employers and nodal litigants. They are not expected to avoid adjudication or to indulge in dragging workman from Court to Court merely to vindicate not justice but some rigid technical stand taken by them..' 11. In the matter between National Council for Cement & Building Materials and State of Haryana & Ors., the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the decisions rendered by it in the matters of Cooper Engineering Limited v. P.P Mundhe [ 1975 (2) LLN 321 ]; of S.K Verma v. Mahesh Chandra [ 1983 (2) LLN 637 ]; of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration [ 1984 (1) LLN 1 ] and Hindustan Lever Limited [ 1984 (1) LLN 460 ], in its judgment in paragraph 11 has observed that, ..`Usually, whenever a reference comes up before the Industrial Tribunal, the establishment, in order to delay the proceedings, raises the dispute whether it is an `industry' as defined in Section 2 (j); or whether the dispute referred to it for adjudication is an `industrial dispute' within the scope of Section 2 (k) and also whether the employees are `workmen' within the meaning of Section 2 (s). A request is made with that these questions may be determined as preliminary issues so that if the decision on these questions is in the affirmative, the Tribunal may proceed to deal with the real dispute on merits.'. In paragraph 12 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has further observed that, `we, however, cannot shut our eyes to the appalling situation created by such preliminary issues which take long years to settle as the decision of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue is immediately challenged in one or the other forum including the High Court and proceedings in the reference are stayed which continue to lie dormant till the matter relating to the preliminary issue is finally disposed of.' By the aforesaid decisions, the Apex Court has depreciated the old tactics of the employers of raising preliminary issues so as to prolong the adjudication of industrial dispute on merits. 13. This Court, while exercising the powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is also required to examine the another question with regard to the interim order made by the Labour Court below Exh. 10 on 1st November, 1999. 13. This Court, while exercising the powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is also required to examine the another question with regard to the interim order made by the Labour Court below Exh. 10 on 1st November, 1999. The Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the preliminary issue which has been raised by the petitioner Company shall have to be decided along with the final adjudication. While examining the legality and validity of such interim order, whether the power of this Court under Article 226 & 227 can be exercised or not, which is also a discretionary power possessed by this Court. This question has been examined by the Apex Court in a reported decision in the matter of The Copper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P.Mundhe [ AIR 1975 SC 1900 ] wherein it has been held that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It is also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at that stage. In the matter of Cadila Health Care Ltd.v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1998 (2) GLH 513 , this Court has held that the petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the interlocutory order not deciding the case finally in that event, even if the interlocutory order is illegal, in absence of failure of justice and in view of the right to challenge the said order when it becomes final, the petition against the interim order is not maintainable. In the matter between Chaggan Ranchodlal Kukvav v. G.M., Western Railways [ 1998 (1) GLH 461 ], the Division Bench of this Court has held that an order passed by the Tribunal can be challenged under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution only if there is no jurisdictional error or procedural error apparent on the face of the record. In the matter of Mohmad Unus v. Mohmad Mustak, reported in AIR 1984 SC p-38, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that mere wrong decision without in any manner is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. In the matter of Mohmad Unus v. Mohmad Mustak, reported in AIR 1984 SC p-38, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that mere wrong decision without in any manner is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to see that the inferior court or Tribunal functions within limits of its authority and not to correct error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court of the Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the interior Court or the Tribunal purports to be based or to correct the error of law in the decision. 15. Recently, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court has considered the very question in the matter between M/s. Swaroop Veg. Products Industries Limited v. The Labour Court-II, Meerut & Ors.,reported in 1997 (77) FLR 546, wherein the Full Bench has held that, `the importance of expedient disposal has been felt mainly for the reason that litigation is between mighty management and a poor workman and in such cases, experience shows that the Management usually tries to delay the proceedings as much as possible to harass the workman who has lost means of earning his bread on account of either dismissal or discharge or termination order. Viewed from this angle, it is not difficult to see that the answer to the question in the context of the matter is in favour of trying all the issues altogether. That is not to say that in an appropriate case judged on the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal / Labour Court cannot decide the issue relating to the validity of the domestic inquiry as a preliminary issue before proceeding further in the matter but it cannot be laid down as a larger number of universal application that the management as of right insist that the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court is bound to accept its request to take up such issue as a preliminary issue, whenever is sought for in the case.” 18. Similarly, legal aspect has been considered by this Court in Hindustan Salts Ltd. v. Nooradraj M. Pathan, 2004(2) GLH 495 . Similarly, legal aspect has been considered by this Court in Hindustan Salts Ltd. v. Nooradraj M. Pathan, 2004(2) GLH 495 . Relevant observations made by this Court in para 9,10,11,12,13 and 14 are quoted as under: “9. I have perused the entire order as well as the affidavit of Shri Bhagwansinh Zala and cross examination. These are finding of fact recorded by the labour court while appreciating the documents and evidence on record. It is relevant to note that this Court has limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate the same evidence which was appreciated by the labour court. This Court cannot act as an appellate authority and even when two views are possible, this Court cannot exercise the powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Even this Court cannot make any critical analysis of the order passed by the labour court as per the view taken by the Apex Court in reported decision 2003 [9] SCC 592. The relevant Head Note [h] is referred as under : "H. Administrative Law - Judicial review Nature, extent and possibility of Decision-making process and not the decision itself is amenable to judicial review - Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of materials by court not permissible - Person aggrieved must sufficiently establish his grievances before the Court Exercise of power by the authority concerned must be shown to have violated any provisions of the Constitution or statutory rules - Constitution of India, Article 32." "Judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the material by the Courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officers concerned or the system and institutions. Grievances must be sufficiently substantiated to have firm or concrete basis on properly established facts and further proved to be well justified in law, for being countenanced by the court in exercise of its powers of judicial review. Unless the exercise of power is shown to violate any other provision of the Constitution of India or any of the existing statutory rules, the same cannot be challenged by making it a justiciable issue before Courts." 10. Unless the exercise of power is shown to violate any other provision of the Constitution of India or any of the existing statutory rules, the same cannot be challenged by making it a justiciable issue before Courts." 10. Recently also, the whole aspect has been reiterated by the Apex Court in case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors reported in 2004 [1] GLR 320. The Apex Court has observed that where the error in the impugned order is capable of being corrected by a superior Court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, albeit at conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion for High Court to refuse to interfere with such orders. Therefore, considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in above referred decision and the order passed by the labour Court below Exh.10, according to my opinion, the labour court has not committed any error which requires any interference by this Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. However, before parting with the judgment, this Court would like to highlight the view taken by the Apex Court in identical facts and similar situation in case of Cooper Engineering Ltd v. P.P.Munde reported in AIR 1975 SC 1900 . The relevant observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case in para-22 are reproduced under : "22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue.. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue.. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication." 12. Thus, it is clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. Not only that but the Apex Court has expressed in clear terms that "We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication." However, it is reluctant to note that looking to the facts of this case, it is considered that the anxiety expressed by the Apex Court stands meaningless. 13. This aspect has also been examined by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd v. Union of India And Others reported in 1998 [2] G.L.H. 513, wherein it is observed that challenging interlocutory order, order not deciding the case finally, in that event, even if the interlocutory order is illegal, in absence of failure of justice and in view of the right to challenge the said order when it becomes final, petition against the interim order not maintainable. Relevant observations made in para-11 are referred as under : "11. The matter is yet to be examined from another angle. From the scheme of the Act, 1958, it transpires that the application for registration of trade marks has to be disposed of expeditiously. Relevant observations made in para-11 are referred as under : "11. The matter is yet to be examined from another angle. From the scheme of the Act, 1958, it transpires that the application for registration of trade marks has to be disposed of expeditiously. Otherwise also, leaving apart the scheme of the Act aforesaid whether it is a proceeding before the Civil Court or Criminal Court or before this Court or even before any quasi-judicial authority or administrative authority, the same has to be disposed of expeditiously. This object, as well in some of the cases the mandate of the statute, can only be achieved or attained where the Courts which are having powers of superintendence or extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, do no permit the parties to stall the final adjudication of the matter by questioning the decision of the authorities with regard to interlocutory matters when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after final orders are passed. I consider it to be fruitful here to make reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. P.P.Mundhe, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1900 . The Apex Court, in this case, held : "10. In Management of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its workmen (1), this Court was required to deal with rather ingenious argument. It was contended in that case by the workmen, in support of the tribunal's decision, that since the management at the very commencement of the trial before the Tribunal adduced evidence with regard to the merits of the case it should be held that it had given up its claim to the propriety or validity of the domestic enquiry. While repelling this argument this court made some significant observations: "In enquiries of this kind, the first question which the Tribunal has to consider is whether a proper enquiry has been held or not. Logically, it is only where the Tribunal is satisfied that a proper enquiry has not been held or that the enquiry having been held properly the finding recorded at such an enquiry are perverse, that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute... Logically, it is only where the Tribunal is satisfied that a proper enquiry has not been held or that the enquiry having been held properly the finding recorded at such an enquiry are perverse, that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute... If the view taken by Tribunal was held to be correct, it would lead to this anamoly that the employer would be precluded from justifying the dismissal of his employee by leading additional evidence unless he takes the risk of inviting the Tribunal to deal with the merits for itself, because as soon as he asks for permission to lead additional evidence, it would follow that he gives up his stand based on the holding of the domestic enquiry. Other wise, it may have to be held that in all such cases no evidence should be led on the merits unless the issue about the enquiry is tried as a preliminary issue. If the finding on that preliminary issue is in favour of the employer, then, no additional evidence need be cited by the employer; if the finding on the said issue is against him, permission will have to be given to the employer to cite additional evidence". 14. This Court is inclined to referred the aforesaid two decisions just to remind that the anxiety expressed by the Apex Court that unnecessary undue delay may not occur in adjudication of Reference which relate to dismissal pending before the labour court at such preliminary point.” 19. This Court has also considered question whether labour court has rightly dismissed application for deciding preliminary issue filed by employer or not in case of Sarabhai M. Chemicals Ltd. v. Rajnikant V. Shah, reported in 2008(2) GLR page 1475. Relevant observations made by this Court in para 6,7,8,9 and 10 are quoted as under: “6. Legal harassment made by the company to the workman which has been visualised by this court is necessary to be noted. Reference NO. 102/96 is pertaining to closure of fine chemical department and reference no. 1060 of 1998 filed by the workman is challenging termination before the labour court which was referred to by the appropriate Government for adjudication. After about nine years or some more period, application Exh. 13 has been made by the petitioner company that the reference no. 1060 of 1998 is bad in law. 1060 of 1998 filed by the workman is challenging termination before the labour court which was referred to by the appropriate Government for adjudication. After about nine years or some more period, application Exh. 13 has been made by the petitioner company that the reference no. 1060 of 1998 is bad in law. Petitioner has not challenged the order of reference directly before this court. If at all the petitioner company was aggrieved by the order of reference made by the appropriate Government, then, petitioner ought to have challenged the order of reference. At the time when this reference against termination was made by the appropriate Government being Reference No. 1060 of 1998, original reference IT NO. 102 of 1996 was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Baroda. Merely raising contention in written statement that this reference is bad, then, it will be decided by the labour court finally but after 10 years but all of a sudden, application Exh. 13 is moved which is going to suggest about some legal harassment caused by petitioner company to the concerned employee or to avoid final adjudication under the pretext of issue of termination raised by the workman. Such harassment is not permissible as per the law decided by the apex court in number of cases. Recently in Special Civil Application No. 20826 of 2006 With Special Civil Application No. 20827 of 2006 decided by this Court on 19.3.2008,similar question was examined and it has been observed by this court as under: “I have perused the order passed by Industrial Tribunal in both the references in respect to both the petitions, wherein, interim order is challenged by the petitioner. I have considered the submissions made by both the learned advocates. Now, question is that whether it is must for the Tribunal to decide preliminary issue if it is raised by employer. The law on this subject is decided by Apex Court that normally, in an ordinary circumstances, preliminary issue cannot be examined by Tribunal, but, same can be examined along with final adjudication. The reason given by Apex Court that if Industrial Tribunal decides preliminary issue, then, either party can challenge before higher forum and obtained the stay, which, ultimately, adjudication process had been stalled while obtaining the stay from higher forum, therefore, main purpose to have quick adjudication by the Tribunal is frustrated. The reason given by Apex Court that if Industrial Tribunal decides preliminary issue, then, either party can challenge before higher forum and obtained the stay, which, ultimately, adjudication process had been stalled while obtaining the stay from higher forum, therefore, main purpose to have quick adjudication by the Tribunal is frustrated. The Tribunal is having the discretionary powers to decide that whether preliminary issue is to be decided or not or it can be decided along with final adjudication. In these both the petitions, vide Exh.110 application and vide Exh.67 application, the Tribunal has come to conclusion that such issue which has been raised by petitioner as a preliminary issue will be considered by Tribunal at the time of final adjudication. When such a discretionary power exercised by Tribunal, High Court cannot be interfered in writ proceedings. The view taken by Apex Court in case of National Council for Cement and Building Materials v. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1996 (2) LLJ 125 . The relevant discussion of the aforesaid decision of Apex Court are made in Para 11 to 16, therefore, the same are quoted as under : “11. Usually, whenever a reference comes up before the Industrial Tribunal, the Establishment, in order to delay the proceedings, raises the dispute whether it is an “industry” as defined in Section 2(j); or whether the dispute referred to it for adjudication is an “industrial dispute” within the scope of Section 2(k) and also whether the employees are “workmen” within the meaning of Section 2(s). A request is made with that these questions may be determined as preliminary issues so that if the decision on these questions are in the affirmative, the Tribunal may proceed to deal with the real dispute on merit. 12. We, however, cannot shut our eyes to the appalling situation created by such preliminary issues which take long years to settle as the decision of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue is immediately challenged in one or the other forum including the High Court and proceedings in the reference are stayed which continue to lie dormant till the matter relating to the preliminary issue is finally disposed of. 13. 13. This Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhe (1975 (2) LLJ-379) in order to obviate undue delay in the adjudication of the real dispute, observed that the Industrial Tribunal should decide the preliminary issues as also the main issues on merits all together so that there may not be any further litigation at the interlocutory stage. It was further observed that there was no justification for a party to the proceedings to stall the final adjudication of the dispute referred to the Tribunal by questioning the decision of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue before the High Court. 14. Again in S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983 (2) LLJ-429) this Court strongly disproved the practise of raising frivolous preliminary objections at the instance of the employer to delay and defeat the purpose of adjudication on merits. 15. In D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration (1983 (2) LLJ-425) this Court speaking through O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that the policy to decide the preliminary issue required a reversal in view of the “unhealthy and injudicious practices resorted to for unduly delaying the adjudication of industrial disputes for the resolution of which an informal forum and simple procedure were devised with avowed object of keeping them from the dilatory practices of Civil Courts”. The Court observed that all issues whether preliminary or otherwise, should be decided together so as to rule out the possibility of any litigation at the interfered stage. To the same effect is the decision in Workmen employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. 1984-LLC-1573. 16. The facts in the instant case indicate that the appellant adopted the old tactics of raising a preliminary dispute so as to prolong the adjudication of industrial dispute on merits. It raised the question whether its activities constituted an “industry” within the meaning of the Industrial Dispute Act and succeeded in getting a preliminary issues framed on that question. The Tribunal was wiser. It first passed an order that it would be heard as a preliminary issue, but subsequently, by change of mind, and we think rightly, it decided to hear the issue along with other issues on merits at a later stage of the proceedings. The Tribunal was wiser. It first passed an order that it would be heard as a preliminary issue, but subsequently, by change of mind, and we think rightly, it decided to hear the issue along with other issues on merits at a later stage of the proceedings. It was at this stage that the High Court was approached by the appellant with the grievance that industrial Tribunal, having once decided to hear the matter as a preliminary issue, could not change its mind and decide to hear that issue along with other issues on merits. The High Court rightly refused to intervene in the proceedings pending before the Industrial Tribunal at an interlocutory stage and dismissed the petition filed under Art 226 of the Constitution. The decision of the High Court is fully in-consonance with the law laid down by this Court in its various decisions referred to above and we do not see any occasion to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. The appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.” The petitions have been filed by petitioners challenging the interlocutory order that preliminary issue where the Tribunal has rejected the applications vide Exh.110 and vide Exh.67 by order dated 1st August 2006. In such petitions, whether High Court should interfere or not is examined by this Court in case of Cadila Health care Limited v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1998 (2) GLH 513 . This Court has made the observations in Para 9 and 11, which are quoted as under : “9. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Speaking for the Division Bench of this Court, Mr.Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, in the case of Chhagan Ranchod Kukava v. General Manager, Western Railway, Bombay & Anr., reported in 1998(1) GLH 461 , observed that an order passed by the Tribunal can be challenged under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India only if there is a jurisdictional error or procedural error apparent on the face of the record. Under the impugned interlocutory order, the respondent No.2 has decided that it is not the case where the opposition of the respondent No.3 should be deemed to have been abandoned. So, the matter has not been decided finally. Under the impugned interlocutory order, the respondent No.2 has decided that it is not the case where the opposition of the respondent No.3 should be deemed to have been abandoned. So, the matter has not been decided finally. Only the action of respondent No.2 taking on record of these proceedings, the evidence filed by respondent No.3 has been held to be justified. That evidence has been taken on record by extending the period of filing evidence and the petitioner has been given opportunity to produce its evidence in support of its application. So by this impugned order, the proceedings are not finally culminated in favour of the respondent No.3 The matter has to be decided on merits. An interlocutory order is always subject to challenge after the proceedings in which it has been passed are finally terminated while challenging the final order passed by the authority before the appropriate forum. One of the cardinal principles of exercising extra ordinary powers by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is that even if the order impugned in the writ petition appears to be illegal, in case it does not result in failure of justice to the party concerned or in denial of any right of challenging the same, this Court will not interfere in the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A reference in this respect may have to the two decisions of the Apex Court in the case of A.M. Allison v. B.L.Sen, reported in AIR 1958 SC 227 and in the case of Balvant Rai v. M.N.Nagrashna, reported in AIR 1960 SC 407 . In the present case, if ultimately the matter is decided against the petitioner by the respondent No.2, then while challenging the final order, the petitioner has all the right to challenge this interlocutory order also, if it is worthy of challenge, before the appropriate forum available to challenge the final order. In the present case, if ultimately the matter is decided against the petitioner by the respondent No.2, then while challenging the final order, the petitioner has all the right to challenge this interlocutory order also, if it is worthy of challenge, before the appropriate forum available to challenge the final order. Normally, the matters are to be decided on merits by affording to the contesting parties all the opportunities to produce their evidence, but even if it is taken that the respondent No.3 could not have been permitted to produce evidence in support of its notice of opposition, as what the petitioner contends, still the extension of time granted to respondent No.3, for filing the evidence, by respondent No.2 will not result in failure of justice as, as stated earlier, that order is always subject to challenge, but not at this stage. The petitioner has to wait for adjudication of the matter as well as for final termination of proceedings. There are all possibilities that the petitioner may succeed in the case and in that eventuality, there may not be any necessity of challenging this order. This is another point which favours the view which I am taking that against an interlocutory order, normally, the petitions are not maintainable. It is not gainsay that the present problem with the Courts is of heavy pendency of the matters and if the petitions are entertained against interlocutory orders, which can always be challenged while challenging the final orders passed in the proceedings, it will be nothing but only an act of injury which the litigants are suffering on account of delay in disposal of their matters by the Courts. Moreover, nor it can be justified at this stage to challenge this order when it will not result in failure of justice to the petitioner. The petitioner will have all the opportunity to submit its evidence upon the application and still if it feels that this order could not have been passed, it has all the right to challenge the same at the appropriate stage, for which it has to wait till the matter is finally decided. 11. The matter is yet to be examined from another angle. From the scheme of the Act, 1958, it transpires that the application for registration of trade marks has to be disposed of expeditiously. 11. The matter is yet to be examined from another angle. From the scheme of the Act, 1958, it transpires that the application for registration of trade marks has to be disposed of expeditiously. Otherwise also, leaving apart the scheme of the Act aforesaid, whether it is a proceeding before the Civil Court or Criminal Court or before this Court or even before any quasi-judicial authority or administrative authority, the same has to be disposed of expeditiously. This object, as well in some of the cases the mandate of the statute, can only be achieved or attained where the Courts which are having powers of superintendence or extra ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, do not permit the parties to stall the final adjudication of the matter by questioning the decision of the authorities with regard to interlocutory matters when the matter if worthy, can be agitated even after final orders are passed. I consider it to be fruitful here to make reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1900 . The Apex Court, in this case, held: "10. In Management of Ritz Theater (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen ( AIR 1963 SC 295 ) this Court was required to deal with a rather ingenious argument. It was contended in that case by the workmen, in support of the tribunal's decision that since the management at the very commencement of the trial before the Tribunal adduced evidence with regard to the merits of the case it should be held that it had given up its claim to the propriety or validity of the domestic enquiry. While repelling this argument this Court made some significant observations: "In enquiries of this kind, the first question which the Tribunal has to consider is whether a proper enquiry has been held or not. Logically, it is only where the Tribunal is satisfied that a proper enquiry has not been held or that the enquiry having been held properly the findings recorded at such an enquiry are perverse, that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute...... Logically, it is only where the Tribunal is satisfied that a proper enquiry has not been held or that the enquiry having been held properly the findings recorded at such an enquiry are perverse, that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute...... If the view taken by the Tribunal was held to be correct, it would lead to this anomaly that the employer would be precluded from justifying the dismissal of his employee by leading additional evidence unless he takes the risk of inviting the Tribunal to deal with the merits for itself, because as soon as he asks for permission to lead additional evidence, it would follow that he gives up his stand based on the holding of the domestic enquiry. Otherwise, it may have to be held that in all such cases no evidence should be led on the merits unless the issue about the enquiry is tried as a preliminary issue. If the finding on that preliminary issue is in favour of the employer, then, no additional evidence need be cited by the employer: if the finding on the said issue is against him, permission will have to be given to the employer to cite additional evidence." The relevant observations made by Apex Court in case of S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and Another reported in 1983-II-LLJ 429 in Para 2, which is quoted as under: “2. There appear to be three preliminary objections which have become quite the fashion to be raised by all employers, particularly public sector corporations, whenever an industrial dispute is referred to a tribunal for adjudication. One objection is that there is no industry, a second that there is no industrial dispute and the third that workman is no workman. It is a pity that when the Central Government, in all solemnity, refers an industrial dispute for adjudication a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality of the State, instead of welcoming a decision by the Tribunal on merits so as to absolve itself of any charge of being a bad employer or victimisation, etc, should attempt to evade decision on merits by raising such objection and, never thereby satisfied, carry the matter oftentimes to the High Court and to the Supreme Court, wasting public time and money. We expect public section corporations to be model employers and model litigants. We expect public section corporations to be model employers and model litigants. We do not expect them to attempt to avoid adjudication exercising no administrative control over them. The agents are not his subordinates. In fact, it is thus clear that the Development Officer, cannot be any stretch of imagination be said to be engaged in any administrative or managerial work. He is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act.” The said aspect has been considered by Apex Court in case of D.P. Maheswari v. Delhi Administration & Others reported in AIR 1984 SC 153 in Para 1, which is quoted as under : “It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise, industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction, by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.” It is necessary to note that industrial dispute raised by respondent Union in the year 1998 and in one case, in the year 2002, even though, in both the cases, the references are pending and legal fight is going on, in one case, more than six years and in another case, more than eight years. Still final adjudication on merits are awaited, which, ultimately, resulted into frustration because of the delay in mind of workmen working in the industry, which give a cause to the workmen for industrial unrest and justify to disturb industrial peace, but, for that, prima facie, workers are not responsible, but, a conduct of employer is basically responsible. Still final adjudication on merits are awaited, which, ultimately, resulted into frustration because of the delay in mind of workmen working in the industry, which give a cause to the workmen for industrial unrest and justify to disturb industrial peace, but, for that, prima facie, workers are not responsible, but, a conduct of employer is basically responsible. The said observations made by Apex Court in case of D.P. Maheswari (supra) and in case of S.K. Verma (supra) and National Council for Cement and Building Materials (supra) as relied upon by Industrial Tribunal and also this Court. In light of the observations made by Apex Court and this Court as referred above, according to my opinion, Industrial Tribunal, Baroda has not committed any error while rejecting the application vide Exh. 110 and vide Exh. 67 which requires interference by this Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In preliminary point, Tribunal cannot examine the facts. In both the references, petitioner has raised question of facts which cannot be answered by Tribunal while deciding preliminary issue. The Tribunal has rejected the application which is not having any adverse effect upon the petitioner or it will not adversely affected to any right of the petitioner because of rejection of applications by Tribunal. It is a discretionary powers with the Tribunal to consider such application of preliminary issue, and then, to take decision that whether it should have to be heard first or with final adjudication. The Tribunal has given cogent reason while rejecting the application. At the most, petitioner has to lead oral evidence to justify their defence on merits, but, except that, right of the petitioner are not adversely affected because of rejection of the applications by Tribunal. I have gone through the orders passed in both the cases by the Tribunal, the Tribunal has applied its mind and followed the law laid down by the Apex Court and rightly rejected the applications which is not contrary to law.” 7. Only two categories of issues can be decided as preliminary issue namely jurisdiction of Court or bar of suit created by any law for the time being in force. When the issue involved is a mixed question of law and facts, such issue cannot be determined as a preliminary issue. Only two categories of issues can be decided as preliminary issue namely jurisdiction of Court or bar of suit created by any law for the time being in force. When the issue involved is a mixed question of law and facts, such issue cannot be determined as a preliminary issue. This aspect has been examined recently by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in case of Rangaraj and Others v. P.R. Hemachandra Babu reported in (2008)2 MLJ page 1031. Relevant observations made by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in para 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are quoted as under: “12. In the decision in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon AIR 1964 SC 497 , the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction to try the issues of law apart from the issues of fact, may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court that the whole suit may be disposed of on the issue of law alone and the Code confer no jurisdiction upon the Court to try the suit on merely issues of law and facts i.e. mixed issues as preliminary issues and normally, all the issues should be tried by the Court and that failure to do so may result in a lopsided trial of the suit. 13. In the decision in Ramdayal Umraomal v. Pannalal Jagannathji AIR 1979 MP 153 , a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was of the opinion that an issue relating to jurisdiction can be tried as a preliminary issue only if it can be disposed of without recording any evidence; where the issue relating to jurisdiction is mixed question of law and fact, requiring recording of evidence, the same cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. 14. This Court in the decision in M. Sadaksharavel v. State Bank of India Coimbetore 1995 (1) CTC 266 , held that the plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and not merely issue of law. 15. In Lajivora v. Srividya AIR 2001 Mad 376 , this Court held that only two categories of issues can be decided as preliminary issues, namely the jurisdiction of the Court or the bar of the suit created by any law for the time being in force. 16. 15. In Lajivora v. Srividya AIR 2001 Mad 376 , this Court held that only two categories of issues can be decided as preliminary issues, namely the jurisdiction of the Court or the bar of the suit created by any law for the time being in force. 16. In the present case, as pointed out and noticed by the learned single Judge that the plaintiff has raised the question of fact and the issue involved is a mixed question of law and fact, we are in agreement with the learned single Judge that such issue cannot be determined as a preliminary issue, which can be determined at the time of trial along with the other issue.” 8. The apex court, after examining such issue, deprecated such practise adopted by the employer to stall further proceedings pending before the labour court and as per the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court as referred to above, only two categories of issues can be decided as preliminary issues, namely the jurisdiction of the Court or the bar of the suit created by any law for the time being in force. After ten years, all of a sudden, application Exh. 13 was pressed into service by the petitioner before the labour court to declare or to decide the preliminary issue that the reference No. 1060 of 1998 is bad because workman is concerned in Reference No. 102 of 1996 and his service was not terminated because of misconduct but he was terminated because of declaring him as surplus employee. What is the purpose behind to file such application after 10 years to have order which may be against the company but same can be challenged before the higher forum and to obtain stay and thus ultimate object of the company is to stall the proceedings which may be achieved if this court stays further proceedings while entertaining the petition filed by the petitioner company. At this stage, learned Advocate Mr. Nanavati for the petitioner submitted that the application Exh. 13 was filed by the petitioner in 2001 and not after ten years but the question is that if the petitioner has filed application Exh. 13 in 2001, then, why petitioner waited for decision thereon till this date and why not insisted before the labour court in 2001 itself for deciding the said application? 13 was filed by the petitioner in 2001 and not after ten years but the question is that if the petitioner has filed application Exh. 13 in 2001, then, why petitioner waited for decision thereon till this date and why not insisted before the labour court in 2001 itself for deciding the said application? In Reference of the year 1998, why petitioner waited to file such application Exh. 13 till 2001? Why not filed such application immediately or why not challenged the order of reference itself in 1998 if at all it was aggrieved by such order of reference made by the appropriate Government? Learned Advocate Mr. Nanavati for the petitioner has not been able to answer all these questions asked by this Court. 9. As regards the contention raised by the learned Advocate Mr. Kunal Nanavati that the dispute raised by the employee against the termination is bad in law and for that, application for preliminary issue was filed by the petitioner before the labour court and, therefore, labour court ought to have decided that aspect. But in fact, labour court is not having jurisdiction to decide whether the order of reference made by the appropriate Government is legal and valid or not but labour court is having jurisdiction to decide the industrial dispute raised to it by the appropriate Government. Labour Court has no jurisdiction to travel beyond the terms of reference and even while having incidental powers also, validity of reference cannot be examined by the labour court as per the various decisions of the apex court and this court. For that, it is the duty of the petitioner to challenge the order of reference before this court at the relevant time when the reference was made in the year 1998. No doubt, application Exh. 13 was filed in the year 2001 and it remained pending for about seven years before the labour court. However, immediately in 1998, order of reference was not challenged by the petitioner before this court nor such preliminary contention was not immediately raised before the labour court but raised in the year 2001 before the labour court. Said application remained pending before the labour court for about seven years and in view of such passage of time, such application seeking decision on preliminary issue becomes meaningless or infructuous by lapse of time. Said application remained pending before the labour court for about seven years and in view of such passage of time, such application seeking decision on preliminary issue becomes meaningless or infructuous by lapse of time. If the matter remains pending at the stage of preliminary issue for about more than eight years, then, when the main reference will be examined by the labour court for final adjudication. This disclosing the idea of the employer to avoid final out come of the reference by one or the other reason while adopting dilatory tactics and, therefore, according to my opinion, labour court has rightly rejected the application Exh. 13. 10. Considering the conduct on the part of the petitioner, apparently, there was an intention on the part of the petitioner to stall the proceedings by remaining silent on the application Exh. 13 and to have order and then to challenge the same before the higher forum and obtain interim relief against the further proceedings of reference pending before the labour court. Such type of practise has been deprecated by the apex court in number of cases referred to above and, therefore, according to my opinion, when the question of disputed facts is arising, which is requiring evidence from both the parties to have decision whether the workman is having any concern with the pending reference no. 102 of 1996 or not, whether the workman was an employee in Fine Chemical Department or Vitamin C Tablet Plant. All these are the questions which could be decided only on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence that may be produced by the parties before the labour court and such questions could not be decided as preliminary issue without having evidence thereon. Normally, final adjudication of the reference cannot be stalled by the either party by challenging interim order or order on preliminary issue before the higher forum and stall further proceedings of the labour court. Therefore, according to my opinion, labour court was right in examine the issue and has rightly come to the conclusion that the issue which was raised by the petitioner, looking to the evidence on record between the parties, is required to be decided by leading evidence. Therefore, according to my opinion, labour court was right in examine the issue and has rightly come to the conclusion that the issue which was raised by the petitioner, looking to the evidence on record between the parties, is required to be decided by leading evidence. If preliminary issue is raised by either of the parties before the labour court, then, labour court can examine such issue at the time of final adjudication but labour court is not duty bound to decide that preliminary issue when number of disputed questions of facts are raised in preliminary issue in application for preliminary issue and such issue can be decided along with the final adjudication of the reference. According to my opinion, labour court has not committed any error requiring interference of this Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, there is no substance in this petition and the same is required to be dismissed.” 20. In Kolhapur Zillah Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Limited, Kolhapur v. Kolhapur Zillah Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Karmachari Sanghatana & Anr., reported in 2002 II CLR 62, it has been observed by Bombay High Court (DB) as under in para 1 of judgment : “1. The writ petition is directed against the order of the Industrial Court dated 9.10.2001 rejecting the petitioner's application for framing and deciding two issues as preliminary issues. The following two issues were required to be framed and to be decided as the preliminary issues as per the say of the petitioner. (i) Whether an industrial dispute existed or exists on the date of submission of the Charter of Demands by the Union dated 18.4.1998 and after refusal by an Employer to entertain and concede the said demands ? If not, whether this Hon'ble Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate this Reference, and whether the present reference is maintainable in law ? (ii) Whether the demands made by the IInd party Union made as per Charter of Demands dated 18.4.1998 are in violation of an Agreement/Settlement dated 28th December, 1996 ? If yes whether the Union has right to make such demands, during the pendency of the said settlement ? And if not, whether the reference is maintainable in law ? The Industrial Court found that some of the aspects pertaining to these issues could only be gone into and decided after recording of the evidence. If yes whether the Union has right to make such demands, during the pendency of the said settlement ? And if not, whether the reference is maintainable in law ? The Industrial Court found that some of the aspects pertaining to these issues could only be gone into and decided after recording of the evidence. The Industrial Court also relied upon the Apex Court decision that where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. The Industrial Court also relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 1999 LIC 971 in the case of Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. Pune v. Bhujang Krishnaji Kohale, Wardha and ultimately rejected the application on finding that it would be more appropriate to decide all the issues at one and the same time without trying to decide the two issues as preliminary issues. Mr. Anturkar appearing for the petitioner invited my attention to the two judgments of this Court reported in 1983 Mah.L.J. 143 in the case of Kranti Mohan Guruprasad Mehra and Anr. v. Fatehchand Vasuram behal and Anr., case reported in 1999 (1) Bom.C.R. 107 in the case of Meher Singh v. Deepak Swuhny and Anr., and contended that for deciding preliminary issues even if the evidence is required to be recorded, such issues have to be decided as the preliminary issues particularly when the issue related to the jurisdiction to adjudicate. Inviting my attention to the observations made in paragraph 13 of the Division Bench judgment in Meher Singh decision cited supra, it was contended that such an issue has to be decided as a preliminary issue. The portion brought to my notice of paragraph 13 is as under : “Once the issue is to be decided by raising it as a preliminary issue, it is required to be determined after proper adjudication. Adjudication would require giving of opportunity to the parties to lead evidence, if required.” The aforesaid observation only connotes what is to be done once the conclusion is reached that the issue is to be decided as a preliminary issue. What has been held however by the Industrial Court in the instant matter is concerned is that the issues are not necessary to be decided as the preliminary issue. What has been held however by the Industrial Court in the instant matter is concerned is that the issues are not necessary to be decided as the preliminary issue. The observations made in paragraph 13 and quoted above therefore is of not assistant to the instant case. The Industrial Court on the facts before it has ultimately found that the issues as raised cannot be dealt with as preliminary issues since they require leading of evidence and further also found that delay may lead to misery and jeopardy and that deciding all the issues at the same time without trying the two issues as preliminary issues would be more probably with such a reasoning no fault can be found. In any case it does not call to interference in writ jurisdiction. The instant petition in the result cannot be entertained and it is therefore summarily rejected. As ordinary copy of this order authenticated by one of my Personal Secretaries be given to the concerned parties.” 21. In M/s. Reckitt & Colman of India, Ltd., v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal and others, reported in 1980 Lab. I.C. 92, Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed as under in para 4 of judgment: “4 : Mr. Deb, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant company, submits that the aggrieved car drivers are not the employees of the appellant company as their names are not borne on the Roll of the company. He submits that as the Tribunal was considering the question as a preliminary point, the company did not adduce sufficient evidence before the Tribunal in regard to that question. It is contended by him that the company should be granted a further opportunity to establish the absence of relationship of employer and employees between the appellant company and the car drivers. We are unable to accept this contention. It is true that the point was being decided as a preliminary point, but did not mean that sufficient evidence should not be adduced by either party in support of their respective contentions. The company did not place before the Tribunal proper and sufficient materials in support of its contention that the aggrieved car drivers were not the employees of the company. On the other hand, the car drivers examined their witnesses who averred that they were all employees of the company. The company did not place before the Tribunal proper and sufficient materials in support of its contention that the aggrieved car drivers were not the employees of the company. On the other hand, the car drivers examined their witnesses who averred that they were all employees of the company. The Tribunal, after considering the evidence, came to the finding that the car drivers were the employees of the company. This finding of the Tribunal is a finding of fact and we are afraid, we cannot interfere with that finding.” 22. In light of aforesaid decisions and considering submissions made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall on behalf of petitioner and also after perusing order passed by labour Court, Surat Exh. 6, according to my opinion, labour court has rightly rejected application by order Exh. 6 filed by petitioner and in doing so, labour court has not committed any jurisdictional error warranting interference of this court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 23. It is necessary to note how delay has occurred in raising preliminary issue for avoiding decision on merits by employer. Facts are to effect that recovery application was filed by workmen on 15.9.2003. Reply was filed by employer against recovery application on 6.3.2006 after a period of three years. Exh. 6 application raising preliminary issue was filed by petitioner employer on 17.2.2005 and reply to it was filed by workman on 17.10.2005, means there was no any delay on part of workman in filing reply to application Exh. 6 for deciding preliminary issue but thereafter, it has been decided by labour court after a period of about five years on 24.9.2010. Therefore, on one hand, workman has challenged termination order while filing application under section 78/79 of BIR Act, 1946 and that application is still not decided and pending before Labour Court, Surat and thereafter, recovery application has been filed by workman in the year 2003 which remained pending at the stage of preliminary issue for about seven years and labour court Surat has not been able to decide such application on merits whether workman has established his pre-existing right to recover amount from employer or not. This being delay tactics adopted by employer for avoiding decision on merits and creating legal harassment to workman, so, he remain continue busy in legal fight, so, liability may not be arising of employer because decision on merits have been avoided with help of legal machinery and ultimately such challenge on preliminary issue may come to end if matter is prolonged and challenged by employer upto Highest Court of Nation means Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Therefore, in such circumstances, employer would be able to get desired result by avoiding decision on merits and workman may remain in complete dark in getting his rights determined by competent court and ultimately in such situation created by employer, with help of legal machinery with such purpose so ultimately workman must have to surrender to any terms suggested by employer This Court has made such painful observations because of such challenge made by employer wherein apparently this court has found that such challenge cannot be encouraged by this court while exercising powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India, otherwise, there is no end of such litigation merits. 24. This Court is having very limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India. While exercising powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India, this Court cannot act as an appellate authority over decision of labour court. This view has been taken by apex court in case of Jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr. With Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Sh. Jai Singh and Ors., 2010 AIR SCW pg. 5968. Relevant para 25 of said judgment is quoted as under: “25. Undoubtedly, the High Court has the power to reach injustice whenever, wherever found. The scope and ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution of India had been discussed in the case of The Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., [ (2001) 8 SCC 97 ] wherein it was observed as follows: "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition filed by MCD under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar circumstances of this case. The decision to exercise jurisdiction had to be taken in accordance with the accepted norms of care, caution, circumspection. The issue herein only related to a tenancy and subletting. There was no lis relating to the ownership of the land on which the superstructure or the demised premises had been constructed. The whole issue of ownership of plot of land No:2, Block-B, transport area of Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi is the subject matter of a civil suit being Suit No: 361 of 1980 in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have given any opinion on the question of ownership.” 25. In M.A. Azim v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 2011-I-CLR 283, it has been observed by Bombay High Court as under in para 11 and 12: “11. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have given any opinion on the question of ownership.” 25. In M.A. Azim v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 2011-I-CLR 283, it has been observed by Bombay High Court as under in para 11 and 12: “11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to few important judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court laying down therein the scope to entertain petition under of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of “Nagendra Nath Bora and Anr. v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Ors., reported in AIR 1958 SC 398 ” in para No. 30 held thus:- “30. the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. ” Yet in another case, in a case of “Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 ” the Hon'ble Supreme in its conclusion held :- (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (6) A patent error is an error which is self evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. And in a case of Babulal S/o. Navalmal Pipada v. Dropadbai W/o.Manohar Gore & Others reported in 2010(5) Mh. LJ, this Court has held thus: “One cannot be oblivious of the parameters required to be observed for the purpose of exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.Unless it is demonstrated that the impugned judgment suffers from vice of perversity, arbitrariness or is rendered without considering material evidence or is rendered on the basis of no material interference with the finding of Courts/Tribunals is impermissible.The writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for re-appreciating of the evidence or for the purpose of rectification of minor errors committed by the Tribunals. Unless it is demonstrated that the view taken by the MRT is per se against the settled principles of law, it is difficult to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunals below. 12. Therefore, it is clear from the pronouncements of Supreme Court and this Court which are referred supra that the Writ Jurisdiction cannot be invoked for re-appreciating the evidence or for the purpose of rectification a minor errors committed by the Tribunals. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked unless it is demonstrated that the impugned judgments suffers from the vice of perversity, arbitrariness or is rendered without considering material evidence or is rendered on the basis of no material evidence or is rendered on the basis of no material, interference with the findings of Courts/Tribunals is impermissible.Therefore, in light of above, it is relevant to summarised here in below the findings recorded by the Labour Court on the basis of evidence brought on record by the parties.” 26. Recently, in case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation AIR 2010 SC 1116 , apex court has observed as under in para 26 to 44 : “25. I entirely agree with the views expressed by my learned Brother Justice G.S. Singhvi. Having regard to the changing judicial approach noticed by His Lordship and if I, may say so, rightly, I may add a few words. 1 consider it a very important aspect in decision making by this Court. 26. Judges of the last Court in the largest democracy of the world have a duty and the basic duty is to articulate the Constitutional goal which has found such an eloquent utterance in the Preamble. If we look at our Preamble, which has been recognised, a part of the Constitution in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and others v. State of Kerala and another [ AIR 1973 SC 1461 ], we can discern that as divided in three parts. The first part is a declaration whereby people of India adopted and gave to themselves the Constitution. The second part is a resolution whereby people of India solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. The first part is a declaration whereby people of India adopted and gave to themselves the Constitution. The second part is a resolution whereby people of India solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. However, the most vital part is the promise and the promise is to secure to all its citizens : "Justice, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity; And to promote among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;" [See Justice R.C. Lahoti, Preamble - The Spirit and backbone of the Constitution of India, Anundoram Barooah Law Lectures, Seventh Series, Eastern Book Company, 2004, at p. 3]. 27. Judges and specially the Judges of the highest Court have a vital role to ensure that the promise is fulfilled. If the Judges fail to discharge their duty in making an effort to make the Preambular promise a reality, they fail to uphold and abide by the Constitution which is their oath of office. In my humble opinion, this has to be put as high as that and should be equated with the conscience of this Court. 28. As early as in 1956, in a Constitution Bench judgment dealing with an Article 32 petition, Justice Vivian Bose, while interpreting the Article 14 of the Constitution, posed the following question : "After all, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted?" [Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1956 SC 479 at Para 23, pg. 487] 29. Having posed the. question, the Learned Judge answered the same in his inimitable words and which I may quote : "I am clear that the Constitution is not for the exclusive benefit of Governments and States; it is not only for lawyers and politicians and officials and those highly placed. It also exists for the common man, for the poor and the humble, for those who have businesses at stake, for the "butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker". It lays down for this land a "rule of law" as understood in the free democracies of the world. It also exists for the common man, for the poor and the humble, for those who have businesses at stake, for the "butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker". It lays down for this land a "rule of law" as understood in the free democracies of the world. It constitutes India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and guarantees in every page rights and freedom to the individual side by side and consistent with the overriding 'power of the State to act for the common good of all." [Ibid, Emphasis supplied) 30. The essence of our Constitution was also explained by the eminent jurist Palkhivala in the following words : "Our Constitution is primarily shaped and moulded for the common man. It takes no account of "the portly presence of the potentates, goodly in girth". It is a Constitution not meant for the ruler "but the ranker, the tramp of the road, The slave with the sack on his shoulders pricked on with the goad, The man with too weighty a burden, too weary a load." [N. A. Palkhivala, Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled, MacMillan., 1974, p. 29] 31. I am in entire agreement with the aforesaid interpretation of the Constitution given by this Court and also by the eminent jurist. 32. In this context another aspect is of some relevance and it was pointed out by Justice Hidayatullah, as His Lordship was then, in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. [ AIR 1967 SC 1 ]. In a minority judgment, His Lordship held that the judiciary is a State within the meaning of Article 12. (See paras 100, 101 at pages 28, 29 of the report]. This minority view of His Lordship was endorsed by Justice Mathew in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) [at page 1949, para 1717 of the report] and it was held that the State under Article 12 would include the judiciary. 33. This was again reiterated by Justice Mathew in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others [ AIR 1976 SC 490 ] where Justice Mathew's view was the majority view, though given separately. At para 89, page 515 of the report, his Lordship held that under Article 12, 'State' would include "Court'. 34. At para 89, page 515 of the report, his Lordship held that under Article 12, 'State' would include "Court'. 34. In view of such an authoritative pronouncement the definition of State under Article 12 encompass the judiciary and in Kesavananda ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ) (supra) it was held that "judicial process" is also "State action" [Para 1717, pg. 1949] 35. That being the legal position under Article 38 of the Constitution, a duty is cast on the State, which includes the judiciary, to secure a social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people. Article 38(1) runs as follows : "The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life." 36. This is echoing the preambular promise. 37. Therefore, it is clearly the duty of the judiciary to promote a social order in which justice, economic and political informs all the institutions of the national life. This was also made clear in Kesavananda Bharati ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ) (supra) by Justice Mathew at para 1728, p. 1952 and His Lordship held that the Directive Principles nevertheless are : "...fundamental in the governance of the country and all the organs of the State, including the judiciary are bound to enforce those directives. The Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixed content; most of them are mere empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content in the light of its experience." 38. In view of such clear enunciation of the legal principles, I am in clear agreement with Brother, J. Singhvi that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. In doing so this Court should make an effort to protect the rights of the weaker sections of the society in view of the clear constitutional mandate discussed above. 39. Thus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity. 40. 39. Thus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity. 40. Commenting on the importance of Article 38 in the Constitutional scheme, this court in Sri Srinivasa Theatre and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others [ (1992) 2 SCC 643 ], held that equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet - the most commonly acknowledged, - is that there shall be not be any privileged person or class and that none shall be above the law. This Court held that Article 38 contemplates an equal society [Para 10, pg. 651] : (Para 10 of AIR SCW). 41. In Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India and others [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that : "The content of the expression "equality before law" is" illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46." [at Paras 643, pg. 633] : (Para 5 of AIR SCW). 42. Therefore, the Judges of this Court are not mere phonographic recorders but are empirical social scientists and the interpreters of the social context in which they work. That is why it was said in Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and another v. S. Naganatha Ayyar and others [ (1979) 3 SCC 466 ], while interpreting the Land Reforms Act, that beneficial construction has to be given to welfare legislation. Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Court, made it very clear that even though the Judges are "constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters" they should "also be responsive to Part IV of the Constitution being "one of the trinity of the nation's appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socioeconomic order". The Learned Judge made it very clear that when the Judges when "decode social legislation, they must be animated by a goal oriented approach" and the Learned Judge opined, and if I may say so, unerringly, that in this country "the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme." [Para 1, p. 468] 43. I am in entire agreement with the aforesaid view and I share the anxiety of my Lord Brother Justice Singhvi about a disturbing contrary trend which is discernible in recent times and which is sought to be justified in the name of globalisation and liberalisation of economy. 44. I am of the view that any attempt to dilute the constitutional imperatives in order to promote the so-called trends of "Globalisation", may result in precarious consequences. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in thousands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Here if I may quote the immortal words of Tagore : "We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariot-drive was progress, and the progress was civilisation. If we ever ventured to ask "progress toward what, and progress for whom", it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path." 27. In case of interlocutory order, if it is challenged before Higher Forum, before High Court, at that occasion, power and jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India is considered to be very limited. That aspect is recently considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kokkanda B. Poondacha & Ors. v. K.D. Ganapathi & Anr., 2011 AIR SCW 1737. Relevant discussion made by apex court in para 8 and 9 is quoted as under: “8.We have considered the respective submissions. We shall first consider the question whether the High Court could interfere with the order of the trial Court without considering the question whether the said order was vitiated due to want of jurisdiction or the trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the application of the respondents and the order passed by it has resulted in failure of justice. In Surya Dev Rai's case (supra), the two Judge Bench, after detailed analysis of the various precedents on the scope of the High Court's powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution culled out nine propositions including the following:- “(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (I) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby." 9. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), the Court again examined the scope of the High Court's power under Article 227 of the Constitution and laid down the following proposition: "Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), the Court again examined the scope of the High Court's power under Article 227 of the Constitution and laid down the following proposition: "Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court." 28. In view of above discussion and observations made in above referred decisions according to my opinion, no error found apparent on face of record has been committed by Labour Court, Surat and therefore it would not require any interference of this court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India. Therefore, contentions raised by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall for petitioner cannot be accepted. Same are, therefore, rejected. Hence, there is no substance in these petition and same is required to be dismissed. 29. For reasons recorded above, these petitions are dismissed. However, considering request made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Marshall on behalf of petitioners, ad interim relief granted by this Court on 27th January, 2011 in terms of para 6(b) shall remain continue upto 13th May, 2011 and thereafter, such ad interim relief shall automatically stand vacated. Petition dismissed.