Order This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for seeking direction for quashing and setting aside the order dated 15.6.2006 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) whereby the respondents have superannuated the petitioner prematurely. 2. The petitioner's case is that he joined the service of the respondents in the year 1973 when his age was recorded as 23 years and no specific date of birth was given in the Personal Data For. The respondents have scored of the age entered in the Personal Data Form substituting the age 28 years instead of 23 years. 3. In the first round of litigation the writ petition of the petitioner bearing W.P.(S) No. 4538 of 2005 was disposed of with the observation that the respondents will give an opportunity to the petitioner before passing any order on the basis of the Personal Data Form and pursuant to the said order, the respondents issued a notice for hearing the petitioner on 30th May, 2006 and 'whereupon after hearing the parties, the impugned order (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the respondents finding that the age of the petitioner was 28 years at the time of joining in the company. Feeling aggrieved by the said impugned order, the petitioner has challenged the said order before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned. order has been passed without giving the petitioner a fair opportunity of hearing. He further pointed out that he was ill and admitted to the hospital of the Company though he appeared on the date fixed before the competent authority. He further pointed out that the petitioner demanded certain documents before hearing and those documents were not provided and a fair opportunity was also not given to him before passing the order. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the responc.3nts submitted that the order impugned (Annexure-7) itself is exemplary in nature. No documents were demanded at the time of hearing by the petitioner. The petitioner was given ample opportunity before passing the impugned order. It was' further contended that the petitioner did not make any request for documents at the time of hearing subsequently he sent a letter on 2nd June, 2006 demanding certain documents after the conclusion of the hearing. The letter annexed at Annexure-6 to the counter affidavit is evident to that effect. 6, Learned counsel. It was' further contended that the petitioner did not make any request for documents at the time of hearing subsequently he sent a letter on 2nd June, 2006 demanding certain documents after the conclusion of the hearing. The letter annexed at Annexure-6 to the counter affidavit is evident to that effect. 6, Learned counsel. for the petitioner further contended that the respondents while passing the impugned order have held that the age of the petitioner cannot be 16 years in the year 1963 when he joined earlier institution and thus the order is factually incorrect. 7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, it is settled position of law that if a tribunal or administrative authority passes any order in its jurisdiction, this Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court in the writ jurisdiction. Findings recorded by the Tribunal or the administrative authority is final even those are incorrect after the appreciation of the evidence. From the perusal of Aiinexure-7 as well as Annexure-6 to the 'Viii petition, it is clearly revealed that the sufficient opporunity has been given to the petitioner and after affording the sufficient opportunity, the authority has passed the order. The letter which is said to have been sent, was sent after the conclusion of the hearing of the matter. The principle of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straightjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situation. They must be continued within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. While interpreting legal provisions a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. The approach of the court in deciding such matters should be pragmatic rather than pendantic, realistic rather than doctrine, functional rather than formal, practical rather than precedental I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that the case of the petitioner covered by a decision of this Court rendered in Raj Bhuvhan Singh vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., reported in 2005(4) J.L.J.R. 290 . In this case, the age of the petitioner was written as 22 years and subsequently the figure of 22 years was made 28 years by a different ink. The Court held that the document was manipulated. In this case, the age of the petitioner was written as 22 years and subsequently the figure of 22 years was made 28 years by a different ink. The Court held that the document was manipulated. In the case in hand, the age of the petitioner was written 23 years at the time of initial appointment in the Personal Data Form and a cut was made, thereafter 28 was written by a subsequent writing. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents refuted the contention and contended that the said judgment is not applicable in this case. The aforesaid rulings is not applicable in this case because in that judgment the petitioner was appointed in the year 1973 and he filled up all the applications form and his date of birth was recorded as 2.4.1951 but the same was alleged to have been changed by the respondent behind the back of the petitioner. In the Personal Data Form, there was a cutting by making the figure 22 years as 28 years and the figure of 22 years was subsequently made as 28 years by the different ink. However, in the original records of Personal Data Form, the date of birth was still written as 2.4.1951. The specific date of birth recorded in a Personal Data Form was not changed. The change was carried out in figure 23 to 28. This court held that the date of birth which has been shown as 2.4.1951 will be the conclusive prove. In the instant case, the date of birth has not been shown but only there is a cutting in the figure 23 years as 28 years and it is also signed by the petitioner. In these circumstances, the above judgment is not applicable in this case. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in the previous round of litigation where this Court has given an observation that in the Personal Data Form and other documents, the age of the petitioner has been shown as 23 years, then it could not have been scored of in place of 28 years and it would have been rewritten without the consent and knowledge of the petitioner. This could have been done behind the back of the petitioner. At the best, the petitioner ought to have been given notice before taking the decision of his retirement. This could have been done behind the back of the petitioner. At the best, the petitioner ought to have been given notice before taking the decision of his retirement. The Court also observed that the respondents shall take a proper decision after giving an opportunity of hearing and the impugned order were quashed at that time. Learned counsel further contended that the writ court at that time has given a finding that the statutory Personal Data Form has been manipulated without the consent and knowledge of the petitioner, hence that finding is binding in the subsequent stage and he also contended that the said finding was binding upon the authority at the time of passing the order. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents refuted the contention and contended that the order itself gives the power to the authority to decide the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 12. It is settled principle of law that while interpreting the ratio of the decision, the entire decision had to be taken into consideration and part of the judgment cannot be taken in isolation, at the same time, the Court directed the respondents to give an opportunity to the petitioner. If Court would have come to the conclusion that it was scored of by the respondents themselves and the said signature is not of the petitioner, then there was no need of giving a direction to provide an opportunity to the petitioner for further hearing before passing the appropriate order and the writ petition would have been disposed of at that stage in favour of the petitioner. I do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the respondents had a malafides in manipulating the said Personal Data Form and he further pointed out that the Personal Data Form is binding on both the parties. Personal Data Form has been scored of by the respondents. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents has refuted the contention and contended that as far as the question of mala fide is concerned, it is settled position of law that mala fide has to be explained and the details has to be given in the writ petition. Learned counsel could not demonstrate the detailed facts which actuated the mala fides. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents has refuted the contention and contended that as far as the question of mala fide is concerned, it is settled position of law that mala fide has to be explained and the details has to be given in the writ petition. Learned counsel could not demonstrate the detailed facts which actuated the mala fides. It is settled principle of law that the details of mala fides should be alleged in the writ petition and it also should allege who actually is the person who actuated the mala fides and he should be arrayed as a party. Merely vague allegations of mala fides are not sufficient. I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is settled principle of law that the question of date of birth cannot be reagitated at the fag end of service. 15. In the case of Burn Standered Company Ltd. vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar and Another reported in (1995) 4 SCC 172 . In this case the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the date of birth entered in the service book on the basis of declaration made by the petitioner or the employee at the time of the appointment cannot be challenged at the fag end of the service. 16. It is also settled principle of law that the disputed questions of facts cannot be decided by the writ court. That disputed fact can be decided by the evidence which have to be adduced before the Court. For the same Civil Court is competent to decide the matter. 17. In view of the above, I do not find any force in the writ petition. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.