Judgment J.C. Upadhyaya, J.—Both these two appeals arise out of judgment and decree dated 24.10.2008 rendered by learned 2nd Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Porbandar in Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 2002. First Appeal No. 1188 of 2009 is preferred by original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 and First Appeal No. 2747 of 2009 is separately preferred by original defendant No. 4. In FA No. 1188 of 2009, the Respondents No. 1 to 4 are original four plaintiffs and the respondent No. 5 is original defendant No. 4. In First Appeal No. 2747 of 2009, the Respondents No. 1 to 3 are original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 and Respondents No. 4 to 7 are original plaintiffs No. 1 to 4. Under such circumstances, parties to both these appeals shall be hereinafter referred to as per their original status in the suit, for the sake of convenience. The four plaintiffs, namely, Mer Rupiben Viram, Mer Rajubhai Viram, Mer Bhikhu Viram and Mer Ram Viram, happen to be the widow and sons respectively of deceased Viram Vagha. They prayed for declaration that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, namely, Mer Dhaniben Malde, Mer Liluben Malde and Mer Rambhiben Malde, who happen to be widow and daughter respectively of deceased Mer Malde Vagha, have no right or authority to sell lands Survey No. 95/2 and Survey No. 61/1 to the defendant No. 4, namely, Bhima Ranmal by a sale-deed dated 29.4.2002 and to declare said sale transaction as illegal, void and without any authority. They have also prayed for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 from transferring or otherwise alienating the land bearing S. No. 242. They have also prayed for the relief directing the defendants to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the lands bearing S. No. 242 paiki, S. No. 95/2 and S. No. 61/1 to them and they claimed mesne profit from the defendants till they deliver the actual and vacant possession of the above referred lands to the plaintiffs. 2. They have also prayed for the relief directing the defendants to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the lands bearing S. No. 242 paiki, S. No. 95/2 and S. No. 61/1 to them and they claimed mesne profit from the defendants till they deliver the actual and vacant possession of the above referred lands to the plaintiffs. 2. Learned civil Judge vide impugned judgment and decree dated 24.10.2008 partly allowed the suit and declared that the land bearing S. No. 242 paiki, admeasuring 4 acres and 35 gunthas and land bearing S. No. 95/1, admeasuring 1 acre and 16 gunthas are of the ownership of the plaintiffs in capacity as heirs and legal representatives of deceased Viram Vagha. The learned civil Judge also allowed the decree for declaration that the land bearing S. No. 61/1, admeasuring 1 acre and 16 gunthas is ancestral land and the plaintiffs as well as the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 are coparceners of the land. The learned civil Judge declared the sale transaction dated 29.4.2002 entered into between the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 on one hand and defendant No. 4 on other hand of lands bearing S. No. 95/2 and 61/1 as illegal, invalid and without any authority. The learned civil Judge also granted decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 from selling, transferring or otherwise alienating the land S. No. 242. The defendants were directed to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the lands S. No. 242, 95/2 and 61/1 to the plaintiffs. The revenue entries in the name of defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 regarding the above-referred lands were held to be illegal and liable to be cancelled. The defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal was permanently restrained from transferring or alienating the lands S. No. 95/2 and 61/1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and decree, the original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 preferred First Appeal No. 1188 of 2009 and original defendant No. 4, namely, Bhima Ranmal preferred First Appeal No. 2747 of 2009. 3. Vagha Laxman was original ancestor and he had four sons, namely, Viram, Malde, Karsan and Tapu. Viram died on 27.3.2000 whereas Malde died somewhere in 1984-85. 3. Vagha Laxman was original ancestor and he had four sons, namely, Viram, Malde, Karsan and Tapu. Viram died on 27.3.2000 whereas Malde died somewhere in 1984-85. Plaintiffs No. 1 to 4, namely, Rupiben, Raju, Bhikhu and Ram are widow and sons respectively of deceased Viram, whereas defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, namely, Dhaniben, Liluben and Rambhiben are widow and daughters respectively of deceased Malde. As per the case of the plaintiffs, land S. Nos. 242/1, 95/2 and 61/1 are situated in the outskirts of village Bhavpara and the lands S. No. 242/1 and 95/2 were purchased by Viram Vagha by a registered sale-deed dated 29.4.1957 (Exh.65) from one Kara Veja. It is the case of the plaintiffs that so far as the land S. No. 61/1 is concerned, it belonged to their original ancestor Vagha Laxman as Vagha Laxman had purchased said land on 2.6.1964 by a registered sale-deed, Exh.66. It is further the case of the plaintiffs that by executing the registered sale-deed dated 23.3.1979 (Exh.69) deceased Viram Vagha sold 2 acres and 3 gunthas of land out of S. No. 242 to one Devshi Haja (sale-deed dated Exh.69) and on the same date, deceased Viram Vagha sold 4 acres of land out of S. No. 242 to one Haja Mepa (sale-deed Exh.70). It is the case of the plaintiffs that after the sale transaction which took place on 23.3.1979, deceased Viram Vagha along with this family members left village Bhavpara and shifted to village Vadala. However, since Malde along with defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, continued their residence at Bhavpara and though in the original revenue records, in capacity as registered owner of land S. No. 242 and 95/2, the name of deceased Viram Vagha was mutated and about land S. No. 61/1, the mutation entry was in the name of Vagha Laxman, but because of cyclone and heavy flood in 1975, the relevant revenue record came to be destroyed and, thereafter, deceased Malde Vagha and his heirs and representatives in collusion with concerned revenue authorities got these lands mutated in their names. Before the year 1996, when deceased Viram Vagha came to know about such revenue entries, he challenged said revenue entries before Dy.Collector, first in point of time, and since Dy.Collector rejected the application of Viram, the said order was challenged before the Collector, Porbandar. That Collector, Porbandar confirmed the order of Dy. Before the year 1996, when deceased Viram Vagha came to know about such revenue entries, he challenged said revenue entries before Dy.Collector, first in point of time, and since Dy.Collector rejected the application of Viram, the said order was challenged before the Collector, Porbandar. That Collector, Porbandar confirmed the order of Dy. Collector and, therefore, the plaintiffs preferred revision application in the revenue department of the Government and it is stated at bar that till today, said revision application is pending. 3.1 It is the case of the plaintiffs that during the pendency of the revenue proceedings, the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, by executing a registered sale-deed, Exh.95 dated 29.4.2002 sold away 1 acre and 16 gunthas of lands out of S. No. 61/1 and 1 acre and 16 gunthas of land out of S. No. 95/2 to the defendant No. 4, namely, Bhima Ranmal. The plaintiffs in the result filed the above-mentioned suit against the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Malde Vagha (defendants No. 1, 2 and 3) and the purchaser of the lands, namely, defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal praying cancellation of the sale-deed, Exh.95 and other reliefs as detailed above in this judgment. 4. The defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 in the suit filed written statement at Exh.41 and inter alia they denied all the allegations levelled against them by the plaintiffs. They claimed that in the revenue record, all these three parcels of lands, namely, S. Nos. 242, 95/2 and 61/1 are mutated in their names. They contented that so far as two sons of Vagha Laxman, namely, Karsan and Tapu had got themselves separated by taking their respective shares in the year 1969 and the properties bearing S. Nos. 242, 95/2 and 61/1 came to be partitioned between two remaining brothers, namely, Viram and Malde in the year 1974 and both the brothers, namely, Viram and Malde got their shares out of the above-referred three parcels of lands. It is their contention that the lands which went to the share of Viram out of S. No. 242, came to be sold away by him by executing registered sale-deeds, Exh.69 and Exh.70 on dated 23.3.1979. That thereafter, since 1979, Viram along with his family members permanently left village Bhavpara and settled down at village Vadala. It is their contention that the lands which went to the share of Viram out of S. No. 242, came to be sold away by him by executing registered sale-deeds, Exh.69 and Exh.70 on dated 23.3.1979. That thereafter, since 1979, Viram along with his family members permanently left village Bhavpara and settled down at village Vadala. It is, therefore, their defence that they were in actual possession of the disputed lands since last more than about 30 years. It is further defence that by executing registered sale-deed dated 27.3.1978, registered at No. 1353, Viram Vagha had sold away land admeasuring 1 acre and 16 gunthas out of S. No. 95/2 to Malde Vagha. Thus, the principal contentions raised by the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 was that they became onwers of the disputed lands by virtue of a family partition, which took place in the year 1974 and by virtue of the sale of the land S. No. 95/2 made by deceased Viram in favour of deceased Malde by a registered sale-deed dated 27.3.1978 and that since last more than 30 years, the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 remained in actual and physical possession of the disputed lands and that in the revenue record the disputed lands stood in their names. They, therefore, inter-alia contended that they had right and authority to sell the disputed land to the defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal by executing the registered sale-deed dated 29.04.2002. They, therefore, contended that the suit of the plaintiffs deserves dismissal. 5. In the suit, defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal did not file any written statement. 6. In the suit, the deposition of plaintiff No. 1 Rupiben was recorded at Exh.64. The deposition of defendant No. 1 Dhaniben was recorded at Exh.79. The defendant examined Talati – cum – Secretary, namely, Babubhai Mavjibhai at Exh.87. Defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal was examined at Exh.97. Both the sides produced documentary evidence, like copies of registered sale-deeds, extracts of revenue records, orders passed by revenue authorities etc. 7. After examining, evaluating and analysing the oral and documentary evidence on record and considering the submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs successfully proved that they are owners of the land S. Nos. 7. After examining, evaluating and analysing the oral and documentary evidence on record and considering the submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs successfully proved that they are owners of the land S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 in capacity as heirs and legal representatives of original owner Viram Vagha and that so far as the land S. No. 61/1 is concerned, trial Court held that the said land is ancestral land and both plaintiffs Nos.1 to 4 and defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 have their shares in the land. Therefore, issues No. 1 and 2 came to be replied in the affirmative. Consequently, the trial Court held that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 had no right or authority to sell the disputed land to the defendant No. 4 and, accordingly, the issue No. 3 was also replied in the affirmative. The sale-deed was, therefore, ordered to be cancelled by replying issue No. 4 in the affirmative. The trial Court further held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for in the suit and they were entitled to recover possession of the disputed lands and, consequently, issues No. 5 and 6 were replied in the affirmative. However, so far as the claim of the mesne profit by plaintiff was concerned, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove said issue No. 7 and replied it in the negative. The trial Court also held that the mutation entries in the revenue record of the disputed lands in the names of the defendants were illegal and liable to be cancelled and, therefore, issue No. 8 was replied in the affirmative. The defendants had raised the contentions that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit was outright time barred and that the suit was bad on account of non-joinder of necessary parties, but the trial Court negatived said contentions and replied issues No. 9, 10 and 11 in the negative. The trial Court held that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 proved that they were in actual possession of the disputed lands since more than 30 years and, therefore, issue No. 12 was replied in the affirmative in favour of the defendants. The trial Court held that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 proved that they were in actual possession of the disputed lands since more than 30 years and, therefore, issue No. 12 was replied in the affirmative in favour of the defendants. Ultimately, the trial Court partly allowed and decreed the suit, as detailed above in this judgment. Hence, both these appeals were filed. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. A.J. Shastri for the appellants (original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3) in connection the First Appeal No. 1188 of 2009 submitted that the impugned judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court is illegal and erroneous and is contrary to law. It is submitted that in the revenue record, admittedly, the disputed lands stood in the names of the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3. Deceased Viram Vagha and after his death, the plaintiffs challenged those revenue entries, but they miserably failed in their attempts. Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel submitted that in the year 1974, partition of property had taken place between two brothers, namely Viram and Malde regarding the lands S. Nos. 242, 95/2 and 61/1 and both the brothers received their equal shares out of these lands. In 1979, Viram Vagha sold away the lands which had come in his share and had permanently left village Bhavpara and shifted to village Vadala. That, thus, since last more than 30 years, the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 remained in exclusive physical possession of the disputed lands and they used to cultivate the lands. 8.1 Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel for the appellants – original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 though submitted that it is true that in the year 1974 when the partition took place between two brothers, at that time, the same was not reduced into writing and no document of partition came to be executed, but according to Mr. Shastri, from the conduct of the plaintiffs, the defendants successfully established the disruption of joint family having been taken place in the year 1974. It is submitted that the conduct on the part of Viram to dispose of the lands of village Bhavpara on one day i.e. 23.3.1979 and then to permanently leave village Bhavpara along with his family members, would clearly reveal that the partition did take place. Mr. It is submitted that the conduct on the part of Viram to dispose of the lands of village Bhavpara on one day i.e. 23.3.1979 and then to permanently leave village Bhavpara along with his family members, would clearly reveal that the partition did take place. Mr. Shastri drew my attention to some averments made in the sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70 by virtue of which on dated 23.3.1979, some of the lands of S. No. 242 paiki came to be sold away by Viram to different persons. Drawing my attention to sale-deed, Exh.69, it was submitted that in the opening line of the sale-deed, it is clearly stated that land admeasuring 2 acres, 3 gunthas belonging to Viram out of the land admeasuring 6 acres and 3 gunthas out of the land admeasuring 10 acres and 35 gunthas of S. No. 242 came to be sold away by him. Relying upon the second sale-deed, Exh.70, it is stated that while disposing of 4 acres of land out of S. No. 242, identical averments are made. Moreover, relying upon both these sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70, it is submitted that while describing the boundaries of the properties, it has been specifically stated that towards the western side, there was the land of Malde Vagha and it has been further provided in both these sale-deeds that the buyers of the lands had right to fetch water from the well, which was situated in the land of Malde Vagha. Thus, relying upon such recitals in the sale-deeds, Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel for the appellants – defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 submitted that such conduct on the part of deceased Viram and his family members is sufficient enough to raise the presumption that disruption of joint family did take place and the properties were partitioned by metes and bounds in the year 1974. 8.2 Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel for the appellants – defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 submitted that since last more than 30 years, initially Malde and after his death, his heirs paid for the land revenue of the disputed lands, which came in their shares. Neither Viram nor his heirs, ever paid for the land revenues of Bhavpara lands after they left Bhavpara permanently. That the defence of family partition raised by the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 is duly supported by the mutation entries in the revenue records. Neither Viram nor his heirs, ever paid for the land revenues of Bhavpara lands after they left Bhavpara permanently. That the defence of family partition raised by the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 is duly supported by the mutation entries in the revenue records. In the revenue records, lands were got mutated in the names of Malde and his heirs on the basis of the partition which took place in the year 1974. That the plaintiffs miserably failed in their attempts to challenge the mutation entries. 8.3 Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel submitted that the bare perusal of the impugned judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court would suggest that the trial Court mainly relied upon the sale-deed, Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957 whereby Viram Vagha is shown to have purchased the disputed lands bearing S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 from one Kara Veja and, therefore, without going deep into the evidence, the trial Court held that since Viram Vagha was registered owner of the disputed lands and, therefore, after his death, the plaintiffs received the lands in their hands and they are, therefore, owners of the lands. It is submitted that, however, if at all Viram Vagha, the purchaser of the lands was independent owner, then in the year 1974, when the partition took place, Viram Vagha would not have consented for partition of the lands S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 between himself and Malde Vagha. If at all Viram was the exclusive owner of the disputed lands, the above-referred certain recitals made in the sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70 would not have been made. It is further submitted that in the year 1957 Viram was only aged about 20-22 years and had no independent income and, therefore, the sale-deed, Exh.65 reveals only the benami transaction, as in fact the lands were purchased by his father Vagha Laxman, but Viram happens to be his eldest son, his name was shown as the purchaser in the sale-deed. 8.4 In the result, Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel for the appellants – defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment rendered by the trial Court deserves to be set-aside. Alternatively it is submitted by Mr. 8.4 In the result, Mr. Shastri, Learned Counsel for the appellants – defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment rendered by the trial Court deserves to be set-aside. Alternatively it is submitted by Mr. Shastri, learned Counsel that the trial Court merely relied upon the sale-deed Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957 and without evaluating, scrutinizing and analysing the evidence on record, regarding the above-referred conduct of Viram and his family members, and regarding the factum of partition having taken place in the year 1974, mechanically allowed and decreed the suit and further the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 were not given opportunity to produce other important documents, namely, the sale transaction of land bearing S. Nos. 95/2 by Viram to Malde in the year 1978 etc. Therefore, it is submitted that by allowing this appeal, the matter deserves to be remanded to the trial Court to decide the same afresh after affording reasonable opportunity to the defendants. In support of the arguments, Mr. Shastri produced written arguments which has been taken into consideration. 8.5 Mr. Vishal B. Mehta, Learned Counsel representing the appellants (original defendant No. 4) Bhima Ranmal in connection with First Appeal No. 2747 of 2009 submitted that the defendant No. 1 Bhima Ranmal had nothing to do with the family dispute of two brothers. That the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 in capacity as owners of the lands S. Nos. 61/1 and 95/2 sold away those lands to the defendant No. 4 by executing a registered sale-deed dated 29.4.2002 (Exh.95). The defendant No. 4 paid Rs. 1,75,000/- by way of consideration. That before purchasing the land, the defendant No. 4 had made due inquiry before the revenue authorities and after getting himself satisfied about the title, he entered into the transaction. That he is in actual and physical possession of the disputed lands. It is submitted that the defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal is, therefore, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. It is further submitted that before filing this suit, the plaintiffs did not issue any notice to the defendant No. 4. That he is in actual and physical possession of the disputed lands. It is submitted that the defendant No. 4 Bhima Ranmal is, therefore, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. It is further submitted that before filing this suit, the plaintiffs did not issue any notice to the defendant No. 4. Therefore, it is submitted that the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court cancelling the sale transaction and directing the defendant No. 4 to handover back the possession of the disputed lands to the plaintiffs is contrary to law and facts on record and, therefore, his appeal deserves to be allowed. 9. Mr. S.M. Shah, Learned Advocate for Mr. K.T. Dave, Learned Advocate for the original plaintiffs in his submission supported the impugned judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court and submitted that the trial Court correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record and rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree of declaration, permanent injunction and the recovery of possession as prayed for in the suit. It is submitted that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 being the heirs of deceased Malde Vagha, filed writeen statement in the suit at Exh.41. In the written statement, these defendants only relied upon the mutation entries in revenue records, which stood in their names regarding the disputed lands. In the impugned judgment, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the revenue entries are relevant only for fiscal purposes and cannot confer any title or ownership in any property. While coming to such conclusion, the trial Court rightly relied upon certain earlier decisions of this Court. Thus, the trial Court correctly came to the conclusion that merely on the strength of mutation entries in the revenue records, the defendants cannot establish their ownership and title over the disputed property. 9.1 Mr. While coming to such conclusion, the trial Court rightly relied upon certain earlier decisions of this Court. Thus, the trial Court correctly came to the conclusion that merely on the strength of mutation entries in the revenue records, the defendants cannot establish their ownership and title over the disputed property. 9.1 Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel drew my attention to Paragraph 4 of the plaint wherein the plaintiffs pleaded that Viram Vagha, the husband of defendant No. 1 and father of the plaintiffs No. 2 to 4 had purchased lands bearing S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 by a registered sale-deed executed in the year 1957 and that the land bearing S. No. 61/1 was purchased by Vagha Laxman, father of both Viram Vagha and Malde Vagha by a registered sale-deed executed in the year 1964 and, therefore, the lands bearing S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 exclusively belonged to Viram Vagha and after his death, the plaintiffs became the owners and that the land S. No. 61/1 after the death of Vagha Laxman came to the share of both the parties, namely, the plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 and defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 being Hindu undivided ancestral property. Mr. Shah, then drew my attention to Paragraph 11 in the written statement, Exh.41, collectively filed by the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 and submitted that in the said Paragraph, reply of Paragraph 4 of the plaint is given and it has been contended that the disputed properties came to be partitioned in 1974, but, neither in Paragraph 11 of the written statement nor in the entire written statement, any defence came to be raised about the specific case of the plaintiffs that Viram Vagha had purchased the lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 in the year 1957 by a registered sale-deed. Mr.Shah, submitted that even considering the oral deposition of the defendant No. 1 Dhaniben, Exh.79, nowhere any explanation is forthcoming as to how and why Viram Vagha agreed for partition of those lands, which, in fact, exclusively belonged to him. Mr.Shah, submitted that even considering the oral deposition of the defendant No. 1 Dhaniben, Exh.79, nowhere any explanation is forthcoming as to how and why Viram Vagha agreed for partition of those lands, which, in fact, exclusively belonged to him. It is submitted that now at the stage of arguments, on behalf of the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, it has been contended that in the year 1957 Viram Vagha was hardly aged 20-22 years and that in fact the amount of consideration was paid by his father Vagha Laxman, but Viram being the eldest son, in the sale-deed of the year 1957, as a buyer his name was shown. However, when defendant No. 1 Dhaniben, in her deposition, during the cross-examination, was confronted with the sale-deed of the year 1957, she pleaded her complete ignorance about the sale transaction. It is, therefore, submitted that in absence of any pleading, so also the evidence, such defence can never be considered. The trial Court in the impugned judgment mainly relied upon the sale-deed, Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957 whereby Viram Vagha purchased lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 from one Kava Veja for the consideration of Rs. 1000/-. It is submitted that the trial Court, therefore, rightly concluded that so far these lands were concerned, Viram Vagha was the exclusive and independent owner and after his death, the property devolved to his widow and children. It is, therefore, submitted that when there is a registered sale-deed showing the exclusive ownership and title of the property, mere mutation entries in revenue record shall not confer any right in favour of the defendants. It is submitted that even those mutation entries are not final and against the decision of the Collector, the plaintiffs preferred revision application before the revenue department and the same was pending, when the suit was decided and even till today the same is pending. 9.2 Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel further submitted that though defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 contended that family partition took place in the year 1974, but there is no dispute that no partition-deed was executed. The defendants did not adduce even oral evidence to substantiate their defence regarding oral family partition or alleged disruption of joint family having been taken place in year 1974. 9.3 Mr. The defendants did not adduce even oral evidence to substantiate their defence regarding oral family partition or alleged disruption of joint family having been taken place in year 1974. 9.3 Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel submitted that on the one hand in the written statement, Exh.41, defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 contended that the partition of the disputed properties took place in the year 1974 and at the same time they contended that one of the disputed properties, namely, land S. No. 95/2 came to be sold away by Viram Vagha to Malde Vagha by a sale effected in the year 1978. Such contention that Malde Vagha became exclusive owner of the land S. No. 95/2 by virtue of sale-deed executed in the year 1978 runs contrary to their own defence that in the year 1974, family partition took place of the disputed lands bearing S. No. 242, S. No. 95/2 and S. No. 61/1. If at all any family partition or any family arrangement of the properties had taken place in the year 1974, then in 1978 there was no reason whatsoever to purchase land S. No. 95/2 by Malde Vagha from Viram Vagha. Neither it is specifically contended in the written statement by the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 nor defendant No. 1 in her deposition stated that in the year 1978 Viram Vagha had sold away only his share in S. No. 95/2 to Malde Vagha nor even the alleged sale-deed was produced by the defendants. 9.4 It is, therefore, submitted that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 failed to prove their defence regarding the family partition or disruption of joint family, having taken place in the year 1974, and also failed to prove that Malde Vagha had become independent and exclusive owner of one of the disputed lands bearing S. No. 95/2 by virtue of the sale-deed dated 27.3.1978. It is submitted that even to establish such conflicting defence, no evidence has been adduced by the defendants. 9.5 Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel submitted that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 relies upon certain recitals made in the sale-deed, Exh.69 and Exh.70 both dated 23.3.1979 whereby Viram Vagha sold part of his land S. No. 242 to Devshi Haja and Haja Mepa respectively. By executing sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70. 9.5 Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel submitted that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 relies upon certain recitals made in the sale-deed, Exh.69 and Exh.70 both dated 23.3.1979 whereby Viram Vagha sold part of his land S. No. 242 to Devshi Haja and Haja Mepa respectively. By executing sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70. Viram Vagha sold 2 acres and 4 acres of the lands respectively from S. No. 242 and in the description of the property, it is stated that towards western side, there is a land of Malde Vagha and that in both the sale-deeds buyers have been given right to fetch water from the well situated in the land of Malde Vagha. Mr. Shah submitted that by virtue of such recitals, no inference can be drawn that the land situated towards western side is of the ownership of Malde Vagha. It is submitted that there is no dispute that in the year 1979, Viram Vagha along with his family members permanently left village Bhavpara where the disputed lands were situated and his brother Malde Vagha with his family was residing. Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel submitted that after Viram Vagha along with his family left Bhavpara, Viram Vagha permitted his brother Malde Vagha to occupy the disputed lands. That, therefore, about the possession of the disputed land being of Malde Vagha, after Viram Vagha permanently left village Bhavpara, there is no dispute and, therefore, the recital in the sale-deeds that towards the western side there was land of Malde Vagha only reveals that, that portion of the land was occupied by Malde Vagha and nothing more. It is submitted that Viram Vagha permitted the buyers to fetch water from the well which was situated in the land of Malde Vagha, on the contrary supports the case of the plaintiffs about their ownership of that land as Viram Vagha would not have permitted the buyers to fetch water from the well of someone else’s property without his consent, if in fact that property was not of the ownership of Viram Vagha. This recital, therefore, supports the case of the plaintiffs that after the part of the land S. No. 242 came to be sold away, the remaining part remains in the ownership of Viram Vagha where the well was situated, though occupied by Malde Vagha and, therefore, Viram Vagha permitted the buyers to fetch water from the well. 9.6 Mr. This recital, therefore, supports the case of the plaintiffs that after the part of the land S. No. 242 came to be sold away, the remaining part remains in the ownership of Viram Vagha where the well was situated, though occupied by Malde Vagha and, therefore, Viram Vagha permitted the buyers to fetch water from the well. 9.6 Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel submitted that mere fact that from the year 1979 onwards Viram Vagha permitted Malde Vagha to occupy the lands, does not confer any ownership or title in Malde Vagha of the lands. In the written statement, Exh.41, no specific defence came to be raised by the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 that they have become owner of the disputed land on the strength of “adverse possession”. As a matter of fact, evidence reveals that their possession was permissible possession and where there is permissible possession, the question of “adverse possession” does not arise. It is submitted that as soon as Viram Vagha came to know that Malde Vagha attempted to get his name mutated in the revenue records of the disputed lands by taking disadvantage of the situation that on account of cyclone and heavy flood in the year 1976, all revenue records were destroyed, immediately Viram Vagha applied to the concerned revenue authorities ventilating his grievance. It is, therefore, submitted that neither the plea of adverse possession has been specifically raised nor the same can be said to have been established. Mr. Shah, Learned Counsel during the course of his submission read over the orders of revenue authorities, namely, the order of Dy. Collector dated 15.5.2000 and order of Collector dated 18.10.2002 from the record of the suit and submitted that the authorities did not consider the registered sale-deed of year 1957, but it transpires that the revenue entries came to be posted merely on the strength of actual possession. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs merely relied upon the revenue entries, but the revenue entries, but the revenue entries can never be treated as proof of ownership or title. As against this the plaintiffs have proved their title to the properties by virtue of registered sale-deed and, therefore, revenue entries or payment of land revenue etc. may pale into insignificance. 9.7 Ultimately, it is submitted that FA No. 1188 of 2009 preferred by the original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 may be dismissed. As against this the plaintiffs have proved their title to the properties by virtue of registered sale-deed and, therefore, revenue entries or payment of land revenue etc. may pale into insignificance. 9.7 Ultimately, it is submitted that FA No. 1188 of 2009 preferred by the original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 may be dismissed. 9.8 About the FA No. 2747 of 2009 preferred by the original defendant No. 4 is concerned, Mr. Shah submitted that in the suit this defendant No. 4 did not file any written statement. However, the defendant No. 4 was examined before the trial Court, but whatever he stated in his oral deposition was without any written statement filed by him on record. Even considering his oral evidence, it clearly transpires that before purchasing the disputed lands, he did not make any inquiry regarding the title of the defendants and merely relying upon the words of the defendants, he entered into the disputed sale transaction. Under such circumstances, his oral submission before the trial Court during the course of his deposition that he was bona fide purchaser cannot be accepted and the trial Court in the impugned judgment rightly set-aside the disputed sale transaction. Therefore, it is submitted that FA No. 2747 of 2009 may be dismissed. 10. Mr. A.J. Shastri, learned Advocate for the appellants (original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3) in connection with FA No. 1188 of 2009, in reply, relied upon a case of Ganesh Sahu and Anr. vs. Dwarika Sao and Ors. Reported in AIR 1991 Patna 1 and submitted that in the written statement filed by these defendants in the trial Court, necessary defence was pleaded, but a pleading, particularly mufassil pleading should not be read in a pedantic manner and should be considered in its entirety. In the written statement, the defendants have clearly contended that the family partition had taken place in the year 1974 and by virtue of said partition, the husband of defendant No. 1 Malde received the disputed properties in his share and after his death, the properties devolved to the defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3. It is, therefore, submitted that the defence raised by the defendants in their written statement should be broadly construed and should not be interpreted in a technical manner. 11. I have examined the record and proceedings in context with the submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides. It is, therefore, submitted that the defence raised by the defendants in their written statement should be broadly construed and should not be interpreted in a technical manner. 11. I have examined the record and proceedings in context with the submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides. 12. The bare perusal of the impugned judgment and order would reveal that the trial Court mainly relied upon the registered sale-deed dated 29.4.1957 (Exh.65) executed by one Kara Veja in favour of Viram Vagha, the husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiffs No. 2 to 4, pertaining to lands bearing S. No. 242/1 and S. No. 95/2. By virtue of this sale-deed, plaintiffs intended to prove that both these lands were purchased by Viram Vagha and, therefore, he was independent owner of lands and after the death of Viram Vagha, the lands devolved to the plaintiffs and now they are the independent owners. As against that, the defence of the defendants No. 1 to 3 is that in the revenue record, the disputed lands are mutated in their names and that the application moved by Viram Vagha initially before Dy. Collector, Porbandar challenging these mutation entries in revenue record came to be dismissed by Dy. Collector, Porbandar vide order dated 15.5.2000 (Exh.82) and the appeal preferred by the heirs of Viram Vagha (the present plaintiffs) before District Collector, Porbandar came to be dismissed by order dated 21.11.2002 (Exh.83). Therefore, as per the defence of the defendants, since in the revenue record the lands stand in their names and even the proceedings initiated by the plaintiffs challenging those entries came to be rejected, their claim should be considered. Now, there is no dispute that the order passed by District Collector, Porbandar in appeal has been challenged by the plaintiffs before concerned revenue authorities of State of Gujarat under revision and said revision was pending not only on the date on which the trial Court passed the impugned judgment and decree, but even till date, the same is pending. In the impugned judgment and decree, the trial Court discarded the evidence in the form of revenue entries relying upon certain decisions of this Court, namely, in the case of Lakhiben Dahyabhai vs. Bai Suna Chana reported in 1979(2) GLR 130 and in the case of S.J. Patel vs. V.J. Patel reported in 1997(2) GLR 1041. In the impugned judgment and decree, the trial Court discarded the evidence in the form of revenue entries relying upon certain decisions of this Court, namely, in the case of Lakhiben Dahyabhai vs. Bai Suna Chana reported in 1979(2) GLR 130 and in the case of S.J. Patel vs. V.J. Patel reported in 1997(2) GLR 1041. There is no dispute that the mutation entries are made in the revenue record for fiscal purposes and the sole evidence of mutation entry itself cannot be the conclusive proof of ownership or title. 13. Further considering the sale-deed, Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957, it clearly transpires that out of the three parcels of disputed lands, the lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 came to be purchased by Viram Vagha in the year 1957. The trial Court mainly relied upon this document. In the plaint, Paragraph 4, the plaintiffs categorically stated that their ancestor Viram Vagha became owner of these lands by virtue of a registered sale-deed executed in the year 1957. Exh.41 is the written statement filed jointly by defendants No. 1 to 3. The averments made by the plaintiffs in Paragraph 4 of the plaint have been referred by the defendants in Paragraph 11 in the written statement, Exh.41. It is pertinent to note that neither in Paragraph 11 in the written statement nor in any Paragraph in the written statement, the fact that Viram Vagha became owner of these lands by virtue of registered sale-deed, Exh.65 executed on 29.4.1957 has been specifically denied. On the contrary in Paragraph 11 of the written statement, these defendants contended that Viram Vagha had sold land bearing S. No. 95/2 to Malde Vagha, deceased husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants No. 2 and 3 by executing a sale-deed dated 27.3.1978. The sale-deed referred in Paragraph 11 in the written statement has not been produced by the defendants before the trial Court. It is true that in the case of Ganesh Sahu vs. Dwarika Sao (Supra), Patna High Court in Paragraph 28 in said decision observed that pleadings, particularly mufassil pleadings should not be read in a pedantic manner and should be considered in its entirety. There cannot be any dispute about such proposition. It is true that in the case of Ganesh Sahu vs. Dwarika Sao (Supra), Patna High Court in Paragraph 28 in said decision observed that pleadings, particularly mufassil pleadings should not be read in a pedantic manner and should be considered in its entirety. There cannot be any dispute about such proposition. However, in the instant case, as per the case of the plaintiffs, and as specifically pleaded by them in the plaint, their main foundation of the case is the sale-deed, Exh.65 executed in the year 1957 to set-up their case regarding the ownership and title. Such important fact has not been either specifically denied or explained by the defendants in their written statement in the instant case. In the result, in the instant case, the fact remains that the defendants have kept complete silence about the sale-deed, Exh.65. Even considering the oral evidence of defendant No. 1 Dhaniben, not only in her examination-in-chief, in form of her affidavit, she either denied or explained the facts regarding the sale-deed, Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957, but perusing her cross-examination, she pleaded her complete ignorance about the said sale-deed. Thus, absence of specific denial or any explanation forthcoming in the written statement in the first place, so also in the evidence of defendant No. 1 Dhaniben, would be an important factor in support of the case of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs proved this fact pleaded by them in the plaint by producing the documents itself at Exh.65. Now, as stated above, neither in the written statement nor in the evidence, the defendants attempted to explain the sale-deed, Exh.65. Only during the course of arguments before this Court, in this appeal, on behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that in the year 1957, Viram Vagha was only 20 to 22 years of age and in fact the amount of consideration stated to be Rs. 1000/- in the sale-deed, Exh.65 was paid by Vagha Laxman (the father of Viram and Malde) and since Viram was the eldest son of Vagha Laxman, his name was shown as buyer in the sale-deed. Now no such defence is forthcoming either in the written statement or in the evidence of the defendant. No evidence is forthcoming on record before the trial Court, even in absence of pleading, that in the year 1957, Viram Vagha was aged about 20-22 years or that he had no independent income. Now no such defence is forthcoming either in the written statement or in the evidence of the defendant. No evidence is forthcoming on record before the trial Court, even in absence of pleading, that in the year 1957, Viram Vagha was aged about 20-22 years or that he had no independent income. Under such circumstances, in absence of specific contention to that effect in the written statement, and in turn in the evidence, the oral submission made on behalf of the appellants pales into insignificance. 14. However, the predominant defence raised by the defendants No. 1 to 3 in the suit, appears to be a family partition and disruption of joint family having taken place in the year 1974, and by virtue of the same, according to the defendants, the dispute lands i.e. S. No. 242, S. No. 95/2 and S. No. 61/1 came to the share of Malde, the deceased husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants No. 2 and 3. Now, in support of such defence, it is admitted fact that the family partition as alleged by the defendants has not been reduced into any document. To put it differently, admittedly, no document came to be executed showing the partition of properties between the two brothers, namely, Viram and Malde having been taken place in the year 1974. So even according to the defendants, it was oral partition. Even though, considering the nature of such litigation, where the facts are required to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and even the evidence regarding the exact date in the year 1974 when the alleged partition took place is not insisted upon, yet, the defendants were required to prove the factum of partition itself as contended by them in their written statement. Nothing is pleaded in the written statement as to who was the mediator, under whose guidance the oral partition took place and who were present at the time of the partition. In the instant case, the defendants have not adduced any direct evidence in support of their defence of family partition of the properties having taken place in the year 1974. 15. In the instant case, the defendants have not adduced any direct evidence in support of their defence of family partition of the properties having taken place in the year 1974. 15. However, in the instant case, though the defendants have not adduced any direct evidence in support of their defence regarding the family partition, but they relied upon the conduct of Viram Vagha as well as of the plaintiffs to show that such family partition had taken place. The defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 relied upon the following conduct of Viram and of the plaintiffs, namely:— i. It has come in evidence that upto the year 1979, Viram along with his family members (i.e. plaintiffs) used to reside at Village Bhavpara, where the disputed lands were situated, but after 1979, Viram along with his family permanently left village Bhavpara and shifted to village Vadale and from 1979 onwards, he had never come to village Bhavpara either to cultivate the disputed lands or to look after the lands. ii. Before permanently leaving village Bhavpara, on dated 23.3.1979, Viram Vagha sold away two acres and three gunthas of land bearing S. No. 242 to Devshi Haja by registered sale-deed, Exh.69 and on the same day i.e. 23.3.1979, Viram Vagha sold away remaining part of land S. No. 242, admeasuring four acres to Haja Mepa by executing registered sale-deed, Exh.70. Therefore, according to the defendants, the conduct of disposing of his share of land situated at village Bhavpara on the same day and, thereafter, permanently leaving village Bhavpara and that the remaining part of the land S. No. 242 as well as the lands bearing S. No. 95/2 and 65/1 remained in possession of the defendants since last about 30 years suggests that family partition did take place. iii. Certain recitals were made by Viram Vagha in the sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70 to the effect that in the description of the property sold by him to different persons, it is stated that towards the west side of the property sold, there was land of Malde Vagha and that the buyers, namely, Devshi Haja and Haja Mepa were permitted to fetch water from the well of Malde Vagha. The defendants, therefore, demonstrated that such recitals made by Viram Vagha in the sale-deeds, support the defence of the defendants that partition in fact took place in the year 1974. 16. The defendants, therefore, demonstrated that such recitals made by Viram Vagha in the sale-deeds, support the defence of the defendants that partition in fact took place in the year 1974. 16. So far as the fact that after the year 1979, Viram along with his family members, left village Bhavpara is concerned, there is no dispute. The plaintiff Rupiben in her deposition, Exh.64 before the trial Court admitted this position and even she deposed that since last 35 years from the date of her deposition i.e. her deposition was recorded on 11.7.2007, Bhavpara lands were not cultivated by them. This situation is also accepted by the learned Civil Judge in the impugned judgment and award. There is also not dispute that on dated 23.3.1979, by executing two sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70, Viram Vagha sold two acres and three gunthas as well as four acres of land out of S. No. 242 to two different persons, namely, Devshi Haja and Haja Mepa. On behalf of the defendants, relying upon these two sale-deeds, it was submitted that the total area of land S. No. 242 mentioned in the sale-deeds, comes to ten acres and 35 gunthas and out of that area, by executing two sale-deeds, approximately 6 acres and 3 gunthas of land came to be sold and this suggests that 6 acres and 3 gunthas of land out of S. No. 242 had come to the share of Viram in the partition, which took place in 1974. Now, in this respect, perusing the entire sale-deed, nothing transpires that, land, which Viram sold away by executing these two documents, came to be received by him in any partition, much less in the partition that took place in the year 1974. In these documents, in the description of the properties sold, it is stated that towards the western side, there is land of Malde Vagha. No specific description of land of Malde Vagha i.e. survey number etc. has been referred. It is pertinent to note that after the year 1979, Viram along with his family members left village Bhavpara. There is no dispute that after he left village Bhavpara, the lands situated at village Bhavpara came to the possession of Malde Vagha. In that context, Learned Counsel Mr. has been referred. It is pertinent to note that after the year 1979, Viram along with his family members left village Bhavpara. There is no dispute that after he left village Bhavpara, the lands situated at village Bhavpara came to the possession of Malde Vagha. In that context, Learned Counsel Mr. S.M. Shah rightly submitted that in the description of the lands sold, towards the western side, land of Malde Vagha is referred, is suggestive of the fact that the land in possession of Malde Vagha is situated. About the possession of the land situated towards the western side, there is no dispute. 17. Moreover, these two sale-deeds as a whole are required to be considered. In both these sale-deeds, rights were given to the buyers to fetch water from the well situated in the land of Malde Vagha. The very fact that Viram permitted the buyers to fetch water from the well situated in the land of Malde Vagha, presupposes the right and interest of Viram in the land of Malde Vagha where the well was situated, otherwise in absence of any consent in writing on the part of the owner of particular land, the neighboring land owner would not have conferred right to his buyer to fetch water from the well situated in the land owned by other. Thus, on the contrary, the right given by Viram to the buyer to fetch water from the well situated in the land, which is in possession of Malde, without consent of Malde, rather supports the case of the plaintiffs, rather than to the defence of the defendants about the partition having taken place in the year 1974. The right to fetch water from the well was conferred by Viram to the buyers in the sale-deeds, Exhs.69 and 70 on dated 23.3.1979 and nothing has come on record to show that after the buyers purchased two pieces of land, they were ever obstructed or restrained by Malde from taking water from the well or that for that service, Malde charged any money from the buyers. Thus,in short, the recitals in the sale-deeds, Exh.69 and 70 would not corroborate the defence of the defendants that partition took place in the year 1974. 18. Thus,in short, the recitals in the sale-deeds, Exh.69 and 70 would not corroborate the defence of the defendants that partition took place in the year 1974. 18. It is further pertinent to note that in the written statement, defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 have stated that the oral partition took place in 1974, but such contention is general in nature. The disputed lands are S. Nos. 242, 95/2 and 61/1 and neither in the written statement nor in the evidence adduced by the defendants, any specific facts emerged that out of these three properties, how much land went to the share of Viram and how much land went to the share of Malde. Nothing specific has emerged on record as to how the metes and bounds partition of these 3 properties came to be made. Furthermore, as stated above, so far as the lands bearing S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 are concerned, Viram was registered owner by virtue of the sale-deed, Exh.65 executed on 29.4.1957. Nothing emerged from the evidence on record that despite the fact that Viram was registered owner (independent owner) of the lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2, yet, how and under what circumstances he consented to give share from his own independent lands to his brother Malde. Mr.Shastri,ld.advocate fo the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 relied upon the case of Ganesh Sahu vs. Dwarika Sau (Supra) to establish that conduct of the parties is relevant factor to prove disruption in the joint family. Now, bare perusal of the case relied upon would suggest that plaintiff in that case had filed suit for partition of admittedly coparcenery properties, wherein the defendants raised the dispute about previous partition. Thus, in that case, the plaintiff admitted that the properties sought to be partitioned were ancestral and HUF properties. In the instant case, so far as land S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 are concerned, the facts are otherwise. The plaintiffs did not admit that these lands were ancestral properties belonging to HUF. In that case, over and above such contention having been raised in the written statement by the defendants about the previous partition, evidence to that effect was adduced by the defendants. The plaintiffs did not admit that these lands were ancestral properties belonging to HUF. In that case, over and above such contention having been raised in the written statement by the defendants about the previous partition, evidence to that effect was adduced by the defendants. Every details regarding the previous partition, including the shares which went to the respective parties, have been not only pleaded in the written statement in great details, but even evidence was adduced by the defendants about the properties allotted to each of them. Over and above that, in said case, plaintiffs have themselves admitted that there had been disruption in the joint family. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, Ganesh Sahu’s case (Supra) relied upon on behalf of the defendants, would not help them. 19. Mere fact that Viram along with his family members after the year 1979 permanently left village Bhavpara and permitted Malde to use and occupy his land, would not thereby confer any title or ownership of Malde in the lands. The overall re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record rather suggests that the user of Malde and after his death by his family members of the disupted lands was permissible user. It is to be noted that both Viram and Malde were real brothers. As admitted by both the parties, when their two other brother, namely, Karsan and Tapu got themselves separated earlier in point of time, at that time also, Viram and Malde continued to remain as joint family. Nothing transpires that till Malde attempted to get his name mutated in the revenue record and, subsequently till defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 sold the disputed land to the defendant No. 4, there was any dispute between the two families, in other words, when Viram and after his death, when the plaintiffs felt that there was threat to their ownership of the disputed lands, then they took legal action. As stated above, the bare perusal of the orders passed by the revenue authorities only reveal that the entries were made in the revenue record only on the basis of the actual and physical possession. In the suit, the evidence of Talati-cum-Secretary, namely, Babubhai Mavjibhai, Exh.87, is recorded, but perusal of his evidence would reveal that he has no personal knowledge about the change in the mutation entries. In the suit, the evidence of Talati-cum-Secretary, namely, Babubhai Mavjibhai, Exh.87, is recorded, but perusal of his evidence would reveal that he has no personal knowledge about the change in the mutation entries. About the changed entries, he admitted that he did not come across any document by virtue of which the mutation entries came to be changed in revenue record. He went to the extent of saying that he cannot say as to on what basis the changed entries were mutated in revenue record. Thus, it is pertinent to note that here is not a case wherein, mutation entries came to changed on the basis of any document or statements recorded by the concerned revenue authorities of family members of the families of Viram and Malde to the effect that the necessity for change occurred on account of partition having been taken place in the year 1974. To put it differently, neither it is the defence of the defendants nor it is in evidence that mutation entries came to be changed in revenue record, because the parties admitted in their statements recorded by the revenue authorities about the partition. However, the fact remains that the changed mutation entries were posted on the basis of only actual and physical possession. As stated above, the possession by Malde of the disputed lands can only be said to be nothing more than permissible user and enjoyment of the lands. However, in the written statement, defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 did not raise any defence that they have become owner of the disputed lands by virtue of adverse possession. Their only defence is having disruption of family on account of partition which took place in the year 1974. Thus, the defence regarding acquisition of ownership by adverse possession has not been set-up in the written statement as main defence or even alternative defence. As discussed above in this judgment, the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 failed to prove their defence of any partition having been taken place in the year 1974. On the contrary, in Paragraph 11 in the written statement, the defendants contended that on dated 27.3.1978, by executing a registered sale-deed, Viram Vagha sold land S. No. 95/2 to Malde Vagha. No such document is produced by the defendants. On the contrary, in Paragraph 11 in the written statement, the defendants contended that on dated 27.3.1978, by executing a registered sale-deed, Viram Vagha sold land S. No. 95/2 to Malde Vagha. No such document is produced by the defendants. Moreover, as stated above, such defence raised by the defendants in the written statement runs counter to their earlier defence regarding the partition having taken place in the year 1974. If in the year 1974, partition had already taken place, as alleged by the defendants, then there was no need for Viram to sell and for Malde to purchase the land S. No. 95/2 in the year 1978. 19.1 However, on this count, by way of alternative submission, Mr. Shastri, ld.counsel for the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 submitted that to enable the defendants to produce said evidence, the suit is required to be remanded. In context to such submission, it is required to be considered that the suit was filed in the year 2002. Sufficient opportunity was given by the learned civil Judge to both the parties to adduce full-fledged evidence. The suit came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.10.2008, meaning thereby that for the period of about 6 years, the suit remaining pending before the trial Court. Thus, there was sufficient opportunity available to the defendants to produce the evidence, including the sale-deed or the copy thereof referred by them in Paragraph 11 of the written statement. Even, during the pendency of this appeal, no attempt appears to have been made by the appellants (original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3) to produce any additional evidence. Thus, the request regarding the remand of the matter and to direct the trial Court to decide this matter aresh is devoid of any merits. 20. In the result, this Court finds no infirmity or any illegality having been committed by the learned Civil Judge in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs established that the lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 were independently owned by Viram Vagha by virtue of the sale-deed, Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957 and after death of Viram Vagha, the plaintiffs became joint owners of the lands. The trial Court did not err in coming to the conclusion that the defendants failed to prove their defence regarding any partition having taken place in the year 1974. 21. The trial Court did not err in coming to the conclusion that the defendants failed to prove their defence regarding any partition having taken place in the year 1974. 21. The next question is regarding the 3rd piece of disputed land bearing S. No. 61/1. So far as the land S. No. 61/1 is concerned, from the very beginning, it was the case of the plaintiffs that said land was owned by their common ancestor Vagha Laxman i.e. deceased father of Viram and Malde. As stated above, the defendants failed to proved about any partition having been taken place between two brothers and, therefore, in the impugned judgment, learned Civil Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the land S. No. 61/1 is ancestral property wherein both the parties, namely, plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 and defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 have their undivided shares. The defendants rely upon a copy of sale-deed produced at Exh.84 dated 22.3.1978. Perusing the sale-deed, Exh.84, it transpires that by virtue of sald sale-deed, Viram Vagha sold to Vagha Laxman land admeasuring 1 acre and 24 gunthas, situated in the outskirts of vilalge Bhavpara, but in the entire sale-deed neither the description of the land is given nor its survey number is mentioned, but only it is stated that the land was named as “pipri vali land”. In the impugned judgment, in Paragraph 15, the learned Civil Judge discussed this sale-deed, Exh.84 and observed that this “pipri vali land” was claimed to be S. No. 95/2, but the bare perusal of the sale-deed, Exh.84, does not reveal that the sale pertains to the land either S. No. 95/2 or S. No. 61/1. However, at any rate the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 are not going to be benefited in context to their defence, because the sale transaction contained in the sale-deed, Exh.84 was not in favour of Malde Vagha. As stated above, the sale transaction was between Vagha (father) and Viram (son). What exactly was the land involved in the said sale transaction is not specifically stated. If at all according to the defendants, the partition had taken place in the year 1974, then no attempt appears to have been made by the defendants for cancellation of the sale-deed, Exh.84. However, as a matter of fact, since the property for which the sale-deed, Exh.84 came to be executed is not mentioned. If at all according to the defendants, the partition had taken place in the year 1974, then no attempt appears to have been made by the defendants for cancellation of the sale-deed, Exh.84. However, as a matter of fact, since the property for which the sale-deed, Exh.84 came to be executed is not mentioned. As stated above in the impugned judgment, perusing Paragraph 15, on behalf of the defendants it was submitted that the sale-deed, Exh.84 pertains to land S. No. 95/2. However, perusing Paragraph 16 in the impugned judgment, the learned Civil Judge took into consideration the revenue entry, Exh.90 and observed that “pipri vali land” in fact is the land S. No. 61/1. In this respect, considering the relevant revenue entry, namely, village form No. 7 and 12, it transpires that the land known as “pipri vali land” is in fact, land S. No. 61/1. The fact that the land bearing S. No. 61/1 belonged to common ancestor Vagha Laxman has not been denied by the plaintiff, but has been admitted and, therefore, the plaintiffs have come forward with the case that members of both the families have their undivided share in the land S. No. 61/1. The plaintiffs produced copy of sale-deed at Exh.66 to show that on 2.6.1964, the ‘pipri vali land’ came to be sold by one Vikram Kara to Vagha Laxman. In it, even the survey number of said land is stated to be 61/1. Thus, even if regarding the land S. No. 61/1, the sale-deed, Exh.66 is taken into consideration, it can safely be said that the common ancestor Vagha Laxman was the owner of said land. Thus, in every respect, the plaintiffs successfully proved that the land S. No. 61/1 remained undivided between familes of the two brothers and it is still not partitioned. 22. Considering the disputed sale-deed, Exh.68, copy produced at Exh.95 in the suit, it transpires that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 sold to defendant No. 4, land admeasuring 1 acre and 16 gunthas, out of land bearing S. No. 95/2 as well as land bearing S. No. 61/1 and the said sale transaction is dated 29.4.2002. 22. Considering the disputed sale-deed, Exh.68, copy produced at Exh.95 in the suit, it transpires that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 sold to defendant No. 4, land admeasuring 1 acre and 16 gunthas, out of land bearing S. No. 95/2 as well as land bearing S. No. 61/1 and the said sale transaction is dated 29.4.2002. As stated above in this judgment, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that so far as land S. No. 61/1 is concerned, it is ancestral land wherein the plaintiffs and defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, both have shares and so far as land S. No. 95/2 is concerned, the said land exclusively belongs to Viram Vagha and he was independent owner of the land by virtue of the registered sale-deed, Exh.65 dated 29.4.1957 and after the death of Viram Vagha, the plaintiffs became joint owners of the land. In that view of the matter, the trial Court rightly cancelled the disputed sale-deed by holding that the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 had no right or authority to sell lands S. No. 61/1 and S. No. 95/2. As stated above, the original defendant No. 4 challenged the impugned judgment and decree by preferring F.A. No. 2747 of 2009, Mr. Vishal Mehta, ld.advocate for the appellant – defendant No. 4 during the course of his submission stated that the defendant No. 4 can be said to be a bona fide purchaser and, therefore, the trial Court should not have cancelled the sale transaction. In this respect, first of all, perusing the record of the suit, there is no dispute that the defendant No. 4 did not file any written statement in the suit. He only stepped into the witness box and his deposition was recorded at Exh.97. Thus, the defendant No. 4 adduced his evidence without filing any written statement in the suit. However, in his deposition, Exh.97, he only contended that he was bona fide purchaser. He further stated that he entered into the sale transaction after verifying revenue record. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he entered into the sale transaction only at the instance of defendant No. 1 Dhaniben and only relying upon her words. However, in his deposition, Exh.97, he only contended that he was bona fide purchaser. He further stated that he entered into the sale transaction after verifying revenue record. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he entered into the sale transaction only at the instance of defendant No. 1 Dhaniben and only relying upon her words. He further admitted that after he purchased the land, he came to know that the land S. No. 95/2 came to be purchased by husband of plaintiff No. 1, namely, Virambhai by a registered sale-deed. He pleaded his complete ignorance as to how the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 acquired the land S. No. 95/2. In the above view of the matter, appreciating the overall evidence on record, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Civil Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the defendant No. 4 can never be said to be bona fide purchaser. The defendant No. 4 did not make any inquiry as to how the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 became owners of the land S. No. 61/1 and S. No. 95/2. According to his examination-in-chief, he had made inquiry about the revenue entry. However, the revenue entries can never be said to be conclusive proof of title or ownership. Over and above this, the revenue entries are subject matter of challenge even before the concerned revenue authorities in the revenue department of State of Gujarat. The disputed sale-deed came to be executed on dated 29.4.2002 and even on that day, the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs before the District Collector challenging the order of Dy. Collector dated 15.5.2000 was pending, as considering the copy of the order passed by Collector, Porbandar, it transpires that the appeal came to be disposed of on 18.10.2002 and the order was issued on 21.11.2002. Thus, on 29.4.2002 the appeal was pending. There is no dispute that at the time when the trial Court passed the impugned judgment and decree, and even till today, the revision application against the order in appeal passed by the Collector is pending before the concerned authority in the revenue department of the Government. Thus, no infirmity or any illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned civil Judge in ordering cancellation of the sale-deed. 23. Thus, no infirmity or any illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned civil Judge in ordering cancellation of the sale-deed. 23. In the result, so far as F.A.No.1188 of 2009 preferred by the appellants – original defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 is concerned, the trial Court did not err in coming to the conclusion that these defendants failed to prove their defence that the suit lands were partitioned in the year 1974. The trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that so far as lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 are concerned, the same were purchased by Viram on 29.4.1957 by registered sale-deed, Exh.65, and after his death, the plaintiffs, who are his heirs and legal representatives, became the owners of the lands. There is nothing on record to show that the sale-deed, Exh.65, dated 29.4.1957 was cancelled and set-aside and the same is no longer in existence. So far as land, S. No. 61/1 is concerned, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the said land belongs to Vagha Laxman, father of Viram and Malde, and after the death of Vagha Laxman, the said land was not partitioned and the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 have their shares in the land. It is further pertinent to note that though the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 raised the defence that in the year 1974, the lands S. Nos. 242, 95/2 and 61/1 came to be partitioned, but the defendants did not adduce any evidence to show that those lands were belonging to Vagha Laxman, especially lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2. The question of partition, as alleged by the defendants would arise only if it is shown first in point of time that the lands S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 belonged to their common ancestor, namely, Vagha Laxman. In the instant case, on the contrary, the plaintiffs established that the lands S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 was of the independent and exclusive ownership of Viram. Thus, in every respect, the defendants failed to prove their defence regarding the partition having been taken place in the year 1974. 242 and 95/2 belonged to their common ancestor, namely, Vagha Laxman. In the instant case, on the contrary, the plaintiffs established that the lands S. Nos. 242 and 95/2 was of the independent and exclusive ownership of Viram. Thus, in every respect, the defendants failed to prove their defence regarding the partition having been taken place in the year 1974. The trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that mere permissive user and possession of the defendants of the disputed lands from 1979 onwards, itself would not confer any title or ownership upon them as, as soon as Viram came to know that Malde tried to make changes in the relevant entries in the revenue record, he immediately applied to the concerned revenue authority ventilating his grievance, and as stated above, against the order of concerned revenue authority, in the year 1996-97, he preferred RRT Appeal before Dy. Collector and, thus, as soon as Viram felt threat to his title and ownership regarding the lands, he immediately started taking action. Thus, so far as the defendants are concerned, the question of acquiring ownership by adverse possession shall not arise. However, in the instant judgment, all these aspects of the matter have been elaborately dealt with and discussed and, therefore, it would not be necessary to re-produce here the above discussions. Suffice it to say that F.A.No.1188 of 2009 deserves dismissal. It is true that in the impugned judgment and decree, the trial Court declared that certain changes made by the revenue authorities in the revenue record regarding the disputed lands, were illegal and deserved to be set-aside. It is also true that till date, the revision preferred by the plaintiffs before the competent authority in the revenue department of the State, is pending, and yet to be decided. It transpires that since the dispute regarding the ownership of these lands was pending initially before the Civil Court and, thereafter, before this Court, the concerned revenue authority may not have thought it fit to pass any final order in the revision. In the above view of the matter, and in light of the entire above discussions, there does not appear to be any just and sufficient reason to interfere with the said direction issued by the trial Court, pertaining to the disputed revenue entries, since the dispute about title and ownership had been resolved by the Civil Court. In the above view of the matter, and in light of the entire above discussions, there does not appear to be any just and sufficient reason to interfere with the said direction issued by the trial Court, pertaining to the disputed revenue entries, since the dispute about title and ownership had been resolved by the Civil Court. At the same time, it is true that the trial Court directed the defendants to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the disputed lands to the plaintiffs. So far as lands S. No. 242 and S. No. 95/2 are concerned, the plaintiffs successfully proved that they are the owners of these lands. However, so far as the land S. No. 61/1 is concerned, it is established that both the parties, namely, the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, have their shares in the land. The shares have not been divided by metes and bounds so far. The defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 shall be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law to claim their shares by metes and bounds in the land S. No. 61/1, if at all permissible under the revenue law or else, may take appropriate action against the plaintiffs in that regard. 24. So far as F.A.No.2747 of 2009 preferred by the original defendant No. 4 is concerned, in light of the above discussions, his appeal also deserves to be dismissed. It is true that as per the disputed sale-deed, he paid consideration amount to the tune of Rs. 1,75,000/- to the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3. The defendant No. 4 by filing any written statement in the suit, did not claim any refund of amount by way of alternative defence. No any such alternative contention regarding the refund of amount appears to have been taken in this appeal by him. However, if at all permissible under law, he may take necessary action pertaining to the refund of his money. 25. For the foregoing reasons, both these appeals stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 08.04.2011 After the pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, Mr. A.J. Shastri, ld. Counsel for the appellants requested that the stay granted earlier by this Court may be continued for six weeks, so as to enable the appellants to move higher Forum. Mr. K.T. Dave, ld. There shall be no order as to costs. 08.04.2011 After the pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, Mr. A.J. Shastri, ld. Counsel for the appellants requested that the stay granted earlier by this Court may be continued for six weeks, so as to enable the appellants to move higher Forum. Mr. K.T. Dave, ld. Counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed this request and stated that the request may not be entertained and may be rejected. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of stay earlier granted by this Court shall continue for four more weeks from today. P P P P P