Judgment :- 1. Second appeal by the first defendant in OS No.562 of 2003, on the file of the Additional Civil Judge (Jr Dn), Bellary, who, along with co-defendant -second defendant and mother of three plaintiffs in the suit -though was successful in defending the suit for declaration of title and consequential recovery of possession of the suit schedule property -an agricultural land measuring 2.79 acres comprised in Sy. No.179B of D Kaggal village, Bellary taluk, as the learned judge of the trial court dismissed the suit on the premise that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their title to the property as absolute owners, which, very strangely formed as point No.1 in the suit and not framed as an issue by the trial judge, the success was short-lived, as in the appeal by the plaintiffs under Section 96 CPC, the learned Civil Judge (Sr Dn), Bellary, in RA No.30 of 2005, reversed this judgment, set aside the judgment and decree under appeal and decreed the suit by allowing the appeal noting that the finding as recorded by the court below that the suit is barred by limitation is not sustainable and with the second defendant vendor of the present appellant-second defendant under whom the first defendant set up title to the property, having remained absent and set ex parte, and the present appellant also having remained absent and also having been placed ex parte, with there being no defence on behalf of the defendants, but on the other hand, the plaintiffs having led evidence not only oral through the third plaintiff, but also having got marked documentary evidence at ExP1 to 7, found that the settled legal position in such situation was not to dismiss the suit but to decree the suit; that the plaintiff in fact had made much more than was needed to get the decree in a situation when the defendants had not set up any defence at all and therefore having allowed the appeal, the present second appeal by the aggrieved first defendant in the suit under Section 100 CPC. 2. 2. The appeal was registered before this court in the year 2006, to be precise as filed on 26-9-2006 and this court, perhaps, not finding a reason or justification to admit the appeal, only issued emergent notice regarding admission to the respondents and had called for records of the trial court, however granted an interim order to maintain status quo in terms of order dated 28-9-2006. 3. In this state of affairs, a memo had come to be filed before the court reporting the death of fourth respondent Smt. Leela Leela Bai [second defendant in the suit] and the appellant being required to take steps, the interim order granted earlier had been extended and with the respondents 1 to 3, arrayed as so in this second appeal, alone being the legal heirs of fourth respondent, a memo filed to this effect was accepted and the matter has remained before this court in this state of affairs even without the appeal either getting admitted or examining within the scope of Section 100 CPC or being dismissed and is listed today for admission in this background. 4. Sri. B Chidananda, learned counsel for the appellant initially pleaded for an adjournment of the case on personal grounds and difficulties etc., the appeal being Five years old even for admission and when that was refused, has made submissions on the merits of the case and has raised several points. 5. One such submission is that even without sufficient or commensurate pleadings, the learned judge of first appellate court has batted for the plaintiffs and decreed the suit, when the learned judge of the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit, as the plaintiffs had not made out any worthwhile case for the suit being decreed. 6. 5. One such submission is that even without sufficient or commensurate pleadings, the learned judge of first appellate court has batted for the plaintiffs and decreed the suit, when the learned judge of the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit, as the plaintiffs had not made out any worthwhile case for the suit being decreed. 6. It is also submitted that the suit in fact is barred by limitation and therefore the learned judge of first appellate court committed an error and for this purpose submits that whether the suit is for a declaration, as is the case, the limitation being three years as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [for short, the Act] or even if based on possession but not based on title etc., it is three years from the date of possession became adverse and the plaintiffs who were aware that the second defendant -their mother -had executed a sale deed in favour of the first defendant way back in the year 1998 and though they were all privy to this transaction and in fact having agreed for the sale and being persons who had consented for their mother to execute the deed on their behalf and even in fact having assured the first defendant that if need be, they will execute further documents to ensure that a proper title is conveyed to the first defendant, could not have turned round later to file a suit after five years thereafter and therefore the suit was barred by limitation and the plaintiffs were also estopped from speaking contrary to their own undertaking and the assurance to the first defendant and more so after having received sale consideration through their mother and in this regard draws the attention of the court to the application in Misc. Cvl. No.101552 of 2011 filed on 2-2-2011 under Order XL I Rule 27(1)(b) r/w Section 151 CPC, seeking permission to produce additional document which is termed as a consenting deed dated 27-11-1998. 7. Cvl. No.101552 of 2011 filed on 2-2-2011 under Order XL I Rule 27(1)(b) r/w Section 151 CPC, seeking permission to produce additional document which is termed as a consenting deed dated 27-11-1998. 7. It is also submitted that no cause of action or proper cause of action is pleaded in the plaint, particularly as the date and year of the arise of cause of action having not been mentioned in the paragraph mentioning the cause of action as it is stated that the plaintiffs had gone to their native village D Kaggal in the month of October for Deepavali festival and then they came to know that the suit schedule property was sold, is not a proper cause and therefore limitation aspect could not have been answered in favour of the plaintiff by the learned judge of first appellate court to hold that the suit was not barred by limitation. 8. It is, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter merits examination within the scope of Section 100 CPC and that the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is not tenable and it should be set aside and the matter remanded to the trial court for giving an opportunity to the first defendant-appellant to defend the suit in a proper and effective manner. 9. Submissions do not carry conviction nor are tenable in law. The suit was filed in the year 2003 and though the suit was dismissed as per the judgment dated 18-1-2005, the regular appeal in RA No.30 of 2005 filed by the plaintiffs also did not elicit any response from the second defendant -mother of the plaintiff, but the first defendant in the suit was represented by counsel and in fact was heard by the learned judge of first appellate court. 10. It is in the wake of the submissions made at the Bar and the judgment of the trial court, the first appellate court formulated the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the observation made by the trial court that, the suit is barred by limitation, is sustainable? 2. What decree or order? 10. It is in the wake of the submissions made at the Bar and the judgment of the trial court, the first appellate court formulated the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the observation made by the trial court that, the suit is barred by limitation, is sustainable? 2. What decree or order? and the learned judge of first appellate court after considering the material available on record, considered the submissions, has answered the first point in the negative and consequently allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and decreed the suit as had been sought for. 11. Limitation question as urged before this court by Sri. B Chidananda, learned counsel for the appellant is more illusory than realistic, as the suit was one for declaration of title and consequential relief of recovery of possession of such property. A suit of this nature is covered by Article 65 of the Act and 12 years is the period of limitation and even assuming that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the precise date and year expressly in the plaint, the plaintiffs have mentioned that they came to know about the developments during their visit to their native place and mother's house during the month of October for Deepawali festival and the suit itself having come to be filed during December, 2003, it is obvious that they had visited their place some day in the month of October, 2003 and the suit filed within a couple of months of their knowledge is not barred under any Article of the Act warranting further examination in an appeal of this nature. Hence, the learned judge of first appellate court has correctly answered the limitation in favour of the plaintiffs. 12. Even the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the first appellate court has made out a case for plaintiffs even in the absence of a plea, is a submission of desperation and impertinence and nearer to committing contempt of court proceedings. It is an ignorant submission stemming out of lack of understanding of the contents of the pleadings in the plaint. 13. Pleading is not a perfect art or of precision in our country for presentation of factual versions of the case, but is more of a probable version of facts as is understood by the parties approaching the court. 14. It is an ignorant submission stemming out of lack of understanding of the contents of the pleadings in the plaint. 13. Pleading is not a perfect art or of precision in our country for presentation of factual versions of the case, but is more of a probable version of facts as is understood by the parties approaching the court. 14. Precision in language that too in a foreign language is the last thing one can expect from members of the Bar practising in mofussil courts, when it is not forthcoming even in lawyers practising in metropolitan cities. To search for a precise plea and then to dismiss the suit as one without a cause of action is the most negative thing to do. 15. To search for a precise plea and then to dismiss the suit as one without a cause of action is the most negative thing to do. 15. I have perused the plaint pleadings, a copy of the plaint having been produced by the appellant along with the memorandum of appeal papers and the plea to put it in simple words is that the subject property originally belonged to the grandfather the plaintiffs; that after the death of their grandfather, the father of plaintiffs was looking after the property and even after his demise, only family members -grandmother, mother and three daughters -were managing the property; that the present plaintiffs had filed a suit in OS No.80 of 1979, on the file of court of Principal Munsiff, Bellary, for partition and separate possession of the joint family properties and the said suit had been decreed on merits and while the plaintiffs therein had each been given one third share; that the grandmother of plaintiffs Smt. Veena had been given 2/5th share in the properties and their mother had been given schedule-B and C properties, but the grandmother had been given 2/5th share in schedule-E properties, in which is comprises the present suit schedule property and therefore the present suit for declaration of their title in respect of the entire property and on the premise that their mother who had been requested to take care of the property had, without their knowledge and permission, executed the sale deed in favour of the first defendant in the year 1998, though she did not have any right, title or interest in the property and as the first defendant was in possession pursuant to the said sale deed, purported to have executedby the mother of plaintiff, the suit was filed on and after the plaintiffs came to know about the transaction in the year 2003 for the relief of declaration of their title and for consequential recovery of property. 16. A plaint of this nature is sufficiently loaded with the pleadings to make out not only a cause of action for the suit, but also more in the suit, to indicate that the plaintiffs are entitled to be declared as owners to the suit schedule property and therefore are entitled to seek for recovery of possession based on their title. 17. Though Sri. 17. Though Sri. B Chidananda, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the plaintiffs had not sought for setting aside of the sale transaction of the year 1998 and therefore the learned judge of first appellate court could not have decreed the suit by reversing the dismissal judgment of the trial court, I find this argument also a fallacy, for the reason that there was no need for the plaintiffs to seek for a declaration to set aside the sale deed, as the sale deed did not create any right in favour of the present appellant -first defendant in the suit -as the vendor mother of the plaintiffs herself did not have any right, title or interest in the property, whether by herself or as a joint owner. 18. A relief for setting aside a sale transaction, which is of no consequence in law, need not be sought for and as the plaintiffs had prayed for the relief of declaration, that was enough to take care of their interest and therefore I am of the view that the learned judge of first appellate court is right in law and just in taking such a view, and there is no error of law on this aspect. 19. In so far as the application for production of additional document is concerned, to produce a consent deed dated 27-11-1998 as an additional document, it cannot be taken on record in this appeal, as no document in the first instance had been placed before the trial court nor before the lower appellate court and in fact there was not even a statement filed on behalf of the first defendant-appellant nor any effort made in the first appeal to file one such, though the first defendant was represented by counsel in the appeal. It is for this reason, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant did not have enough opportunity to file statement, as she was set ex parte cannot be accepted and at any rate such an argument is not available to a person who has not utilized the opportunity accorded to her both during the trial and before the lower appellate court in the appeal. In fact, it appears, no effort was made to set aside the ex parte status and for setting aside the ex parte decree. In fact, it appears, no effort was made to set aside the ex parte status and for setting aside the ex parte decree. The first defendant blissfully content with the suit being dismissed on some untenable, flimsy, technical ground by the trial court. 20. Be that it may, no foundation is laid to receive additional evidence in a second appeal and through an application in Misc. Cvl. No.101552 of 2011 filed under Order XLI Rule 1(b) r/w Section 151 CPC and in fact without a plea cannot produce evidence and as there is no plea at all in support of which plea the document is sought to be placed, the application only deserves to be rejected outright and it is accordingly rejected. 21. The submission regarding estopped and that the plaintiffs had agreed to execute a proper document to ensure that the title of the first defendant was made good, is only a submission at the Bar, neither in the plea nor in the say of the parties. 22. A lawyer is supposed to make submissions and not to lead evidence. A lawyer is neither a party to the proceedings nor has been examined as a witness on behalf of a party and a submission made at the Bar as a lawyer is not a substitute either for the pleading of the party or the evidence on behalf of the party. 23. It is rather unfortunate, that lawyers are of late converting their role, getting confused about the nature of their profession, starting to give evidence through arguments and even have assumed the status of an expert witness calling upon judges in the courts to accept their submissions as gospel truth and to act accordingly! 24. Sri Chidananda, learned counsel for the appellant, has pleaded for remanding the matter by setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. Submits that in the ends of justice, such a course of action should be resorted to Justice in our legal system is not based on personal perceptions of lawyers or even judges. It is justice in accordance with law and not justice in accordance with the perception of the lawyer or judges. 25. Submits that in the ends of justice, such a course of action should be resorted to Justice in our legal system is not based on personal perceptions of lawyers or even judges. It is justice in accordance with law and not justice in accordance with the perception of the lawyer or judges. 25. The concept of justice cannot be linked more to equitable principles or as, thought to be fit or not for judgment by individual judges, but the legislation has stepped in and a law is made for such purpose, to ensure uniformity and certainty in judgments irrespective of the Judge as law makers have their hands on the pulse of the people, they understand the hopes and aspirations of the people in the society and have accordingly made laws, and therefore the duty and responsibility of the judges in the courts is only deliver judgments in consonance with the laws; decide cases by applying relevant laws to the fact situation and come out with the resultant conclusion. In fact judges have no choice about it and judgments automatically fall in line the moment facts are clear and the law applicable to the case is also definite. It cannot keep varying with judges, depending on the individual judges perception and personal emotions! But irrespective of the judge, the result inevitably has to be the same and uniform. 26. An appeal under Section 100 CPC as envisaged in the Code is one to be entertained by a high court only if the court finds that the judgment under appeal is one giving rise to a substantial question of law which has been wrongly decided by the court below in the impugned judgment. If this test is applied, I find that the judgment of the lower appellate court does not suffer from this requisite for eliciting admission in Section 100 CPC jurisdiction. If this test is applied, I find that the judgment of the lower appellate court does not suffer from this requisite for eliciting admission in Section 100 CPC jurisdiction. The learned judge of first appellate court having applied his mind to the fact situation and having found that the suit was one necessarily required to be decreed in the wake of the pleadings and the supporting material that had been placed by the plaintiffs before the court, non-appearance of the defendants, non-filing of written statement and not leading any evidence cannot come in the way of a suit of this nature being decreed, the conclusion reached by the learned judge of the first appellate court, which, even on further examination, I find is a proper and correct conclusion and in fact it is the only possible and proper conclusion and does not give rise to a question of law, much less a substantial question of law which has been decided wrongly warranting a correction within the scope of Section 100 jurisdiction. 27. On the other hand, Sri. N P Kulkarni, learned counsel for the respondents, supporting the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, has pointed out to the relevant Article of the Act to contend that it is only Article 65 of the Limitation Act alone which is applicable, as the suit is one for recovery of possession based on title after having the title declared in terms of the prayers. Submission is apt. 28. The present appeal which has been languishing without admission and which only deserves to be dismissed, is dismissed, by vacating the interim order granted earlier and dismissing the application in Misc. Cvl. No.109219 of 2009 for extension of stay. With the respondents having been put on notice and unnecessarily dragged to the court, the appellant to compensate the respondents by paying cost of Rs.5,000/-in favour of each of the respondents. Cost to be deposited before this court within four weeks from today, failing which the registry is directed to issue a certificate in favour of each of the respondents for the amount of cost to enable them recover it as though it is a decree passed by a civil court. 29. Appeal is dismissed.