JUDGMENT 1. WHETHER or not the order dated December 27, 2010 issued by the Chairman, Barrackpore Municipality (hereafter the Municipality) holding that the reply of the petitioners (to the notice dated December 8, 2010 calling upon them to show-cause why action shall not be initiated for raising unauthorised construction as indicated therein) is devoid of merit and therefore attracts action under Section 218 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993, and the resolution adopted by the Board of Councillors thereof on the next day approving the proposal of the Chairman to take action thereunder could be revised/reviewed by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution is the primary question that calls for an answer on this application filed by the petitioners. 2. MR. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners, submitted at the outset that the opposite parties being the Municipality, its Board of Councillors and its Chairman acted contrary to fundamental principles of law and justice while forming an opinion that there has been unauthorised construction on the second floor of the building known as 'Promod Bhawan'. According to him, there could be no dispute that all the opposite parties are statutory authorities. It is contended by him that an application under Article 227 would be maintainable against any order passed by a statutory authority if it is found to discharge part of the judicial functions of the State or exercises the inherent judicial powers of the State. Elaborating this point, it has been submitted that an authority constituted by law, here the Board of Councillors, which is required to act quasi-judicially while determining whether there has been unauthorised construction or not attracting action under Section 218 (1) of the Act ought to be comprehended within Tribunal', as referred to in Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be told off at the gate and the present application dismissed. It was further contended by him that the word Tribunal', both in Article 227 of the Constitution as well as in Article 136 thereof, ought to receive the same meaning. It was further contended by him that the word Tribunal', both in Article 227 of the Constitution as well as in Article 136 thereof, ought to receive the same meaning. He referred to several decisions of the Supreme Court to buttress his contention that applying the tests laid down therein to determine whether a particular body would constitute a Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136 or not, I ought to hold that the opposite parties are comprehended within the meaning of Tribunal' and hence the petitioners are entitled to receive a decision on the merits of the claim raised herein. He placed reliance on the decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 188 , Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 , Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma andAnr., AIR 1965 SC 1595 and Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 364 in support of his submissions. 3. THE opposite parties have not been called upon to answer since the decisions cited before me provide complete answer to the point argued and, therefore, I do not consider that their assistance is at all necessary. 4. THE decision of the Constitution Bench in Province of Bombay (supra) appears to be one of the first authorities on the point as to whether an administrative order could be amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. Point in issue therein was whether the impugned order of requisition under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance was an administrative order or an order issued in discharge of quasi-judicial functions and hence amenable to certiorari jurisdiction of the Court. Various decisions of Lord Justices of the English Courts were quoted with approval. Though the conclusions reached by the learned Judges on the above issue were different (the majority ruling that the impugned order was an administrative order and hence certiorari would not be available), the learned Judges were ad-idem that whenever a body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and a duty laid upon it to act judicially acts in excess of legal authority, a Writ of Certiorari may issue. Since the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 was not involved there and the facts were not quite as similar, this decision does not lend any assistance to Mr. Banerjee. In Manmohan Singh Jaitia (supra), the Supreme Court upon consideration of the relevant statutory provisions held that the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner exercising statutory powers under the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969 could be regarded as 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution and hence amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. There can be no doubt that an authority exercising statutory powers may well be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the said decision would have no application here since a combined petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is not entertainable in terms of the rules framed by this Court. 5. IN Associated Cement Companies (supra), the point that fell for consideration was whether the State of Punjab, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6(vi) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952 was a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136(1) of the Constitution. While answering the point of law in the affirmative, the Court also held that the word 'Tribunal' in Article 227 of the Constitution has the same meaning as the word 'Tribunal' in Article 136. 6. AN interesting discussion is found in Paragraph 9 of the decision. It reads:- "9. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one common characteristic, both the Courts and the tribunals are "constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions", (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh, 1955 (1) SCR 267 at p.272). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that procedure. They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution: but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State." (Underlining for emphasis by me) The Supreme Court then proceeded to formulate the test that is to be applied to determine whether a particular body could be regarded as a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136. It was ruled:- "The main and the basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) is a part of the State's judicial power. Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) is a part of the State's judicial power. It has been conferred on the State Government by a statutory rule and it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal. Having regard to these distinctive features of the power conferred on the State Government by Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1)." (Underlining for emphasis by me) 7. WHILE deciding Associated Cement Companies (supra), the Supreme Court referred to an earlier Constitution Bench decision in Indochina Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1964 SC 1140 . That was a case governed by the Sea Customs Act, 1878. An order was passed by the Collector of Customs confiscating the appellant's motor vessel under Section 167(12A) of the Act of 1878 and giving it option under Section 183 thereof to pay a fine of Rs. 25 lakhs in lieu of confiscation. It was contended that the order has been passed on a misconception of Section 52A. An appeal was preferred before the Central Board of Revenue. The Board expressed its concurrence with the conclusion of the Collector of Customs. Revision filed against the appellate order also failed whereupon the Supreme Court was moved and special leave to appeal was obtained. The Additional Solicitor General had urged that none of the Customs authorities that had dealt with the appellant's case is a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution and hence the appeal was incompetent. 8. PARTLY accepting and partly overruling the contention, it was held in Paragraph 10 as follows:- "10. The Additional Solicitor General had urged that none of the Customs authorities that had dealt with the appellant's case is a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution and hence the appeal was incompetent. 8. PARTLY accepting and partly overruling the contention, it was held in Paragraph 10 as follows:- "10. It is settled by decisions of this Court that the Customs Officer who initially acts under Section 167(12-A) is not a Court or Tribunal, though it is also settled that in adjudicating upon the question as to whether Section 52-A has been contravened by any ship and by such contravention the said ship has made itself liable to confiscation under Section 167(12-A), the Customs Officer has to act in a quasi-judicial manner. In Sewpujanrai Indrasanarai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1958 SC 845 this Court has held that an order of confiscation or penalty passed under the Sea Customs Act is not a mere administrative or executive act, but is really a quasi-judicial act, and, therefore, an application for a writ of certiorari lies in respect 'of such order under Article 226 of the Constitution......Similarly, in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 this Court has observed that the Collector and other Officers in the hierarchy mentioned by the Sea Customs Act may have to act judicially in the sense of having to consider evidence and hear arguments in an informal way; even so, the Act does not contemplate that in doing so, the said authorities are functioning as a Court. 10...... The result, therefore, is that it is no longer open to doubt that the Customs Officer is not a Court or Tribunal though in adjudicating upon matters under Section 167 of the Act he has to act in a judicial manner....." On the authority of the aforesaid decisions of the Constitution Benches, it can safely be concluded that in India, the State i.e. either the Union or its component states, has an inherent judicial power. The Courts of Law and other bodies such as Tribunals and other statutory authorities have been obliged to perform judicial functions and power has been vested in this behalf by the State. In discharge of their functions, these Courts, Tribunals and other statutory authorities are considered to be the delegates of the State. Insofar as Courts are concerned, there appear to be no problem. In discharge of their functions, these Courts, Tribunals and other statutory authorities are considered to be the delegates of the State. Insofar as Courts are concerned, there appear to be no problem. It is only in respect of the Tribunals and other statutory authorities that an enquiry is needed to come to a conclusion as to whether the judicial power of the State has been vested in them or not. The test formulated in Associated Cement Company (supra) has to be applied in such a situation. If vested with the State's judicial power, the Tribunals and other statutory authorities could be regarded as a Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 227 as well as Article 136; if not, they cannot be so regarded. 9. IN Bharat Bank Ltd. (supra), an INdustrial Tribunal functioning under the INdustrial Disputes Act, 1947 was held to be a Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. While holding that Article 136 gives jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to entertain an application for leave to appeal against an order passed by the INdustrial Tribunal, the Court noticed the observations of Scott, L.J. in the case of Cooper v. Wilson, 1937 (2) KB 309 and held that the same correctly distinguishes between a judicial tribunal and an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions. The observations are to the following effect:- "A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites:-- (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties, and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4). A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4). The place of (4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is determined by the Minister's free choice". It was also held therein that the expression 'Tribunal' as used in Article 136 does not mean the same thing as Court but includes, within its ambit all adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. 10. TAKING a cue from the above decisions and applying the test formulated by the Supreme Court, there can hardly be two opinions that insofar as the present dispute is concerned, the Municipality did not wear the hat of an adjudicator upon entrustment of judicial functions to it by the State by any legislation; on the contrary, it proceeded to discharge purely administrative functions as a part of its statutory duty of municipal governance in terms of the legislative mandate contained in the Act. In the real sense of the term there was no lis i.e. an affirmation by one party and denial by another involving the rights and obligations of the disputing parties. The Municipality in proceedings for demolition does not assume the character of an adversary of the person proceeded against. It may be the adversary of the person proceeded against if that person carries the order passed under Section 218(1) of the Act in appeal before the competent Court under Section 218(4) thereof, and an order passed by it would definitely be amenable to the High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 since it is in exercise of judicial powers that are State conferred. If the contention of Mr. Banerjee is to be accepted, every statutory authority duty bound in terms of statutory provisions to decide rights and obligations of citizens quasi-judicially before taking an administrative action would have to be regarded as Tribunal within the meaning of Article 227, for e.g. an authority acting under statutory provisions to cancel licenses/permits, an authority authorised to determine tax liabilities, an authority empowered to take disciplinary action against its employee on a finding of misconduct arrived at in pursuance of domestic enquiry, etc. The contention is misconceived and accordingly stands overruled. The contention is misconceived and accordingly stands overruled. The application stands dismissed, without order for costs. 11. THIS order shall not, however, preclude the petitioners from approaching the appropriate forum in accordance with law for redress of their grievance, if so advised. 12. URGENT certified photocopies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with requisite formalities.