JUDGMENT : Narendra Kumar Jain, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for eviction against defendant in trial court on the ground of default in payment of rent. Provisional rent was determined and the same was deposited by the defendant in time, therefore, learned trial court granted benefit of first default and did not pass a decree of eviction against the defendant. The due rent amounting to Rs. 7,417.50 paise had already been deposited by the defendant, but the trial court still passed a decree, while dismissing the suit, that the said amount be paid by the defendant to plaintiff within a period of two months. 3. Being aggrieved with said part of the order, the defendant preferred an appeal before the first appellate court. This fact was not disputed by learned counsel for the plaintiff also before first appellate court that the said amount had already been deposited by the defendant. In these circumstances, first appellate court partly allowed appeal of the defendant and set aside the order of the trial court with regard to direction to make payment of Rs. 7,417.50 paise. 4. An application under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. was filed by the plaintiff before first appellate court to pass a decree of eviction on the ground of default, but that application was dismissed, therefore, being aggrieved with the said order, plaintiff-appellant has preferred this second appeal. 5. Submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that defendant deposited rent of Rs. 322/- only in place of Rs. 322.50 paise, therefore, it was a duty of the trial court to pass a decree of eviction instead of dismissing the suit by giving benefit of first default. He submitted that said objection was taken by the plaintiff-appellant before first appellate court by moving an application under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C., but the same has wrongly been rejected on the ground that no such objection has been taken by way of cross-objections under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C., therefore, impugned order passed by first appellate court is liable to be set aside by this Court. 6. I have considered submissions of learned counsel for the appellant in the light of reasons assigned by first appellate court for dismissal of the application of the appellant under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. 7. 6. I have considered submissions of learned counsel for the appellant in the light of reasons assigned by first appellate court for dismissal of the application of the appellant under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. 7. So far as payment of arrears/provisional rent is concerned, learned trial court has categorically recorded a finding that the same has been deposited, however, a decree was passed by the trial court with regard to payment of Rs. 7,417.50 paise. Said part of the order passed by the trial court was set aside by the first appellate court on the basis of factual mistake committed by the trial court, as the said amount had already been deposited by the defendant. This fact has not been disputed by learned counsel for the appellant also. His submission is only with regard to dismissal of appellant's application under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. 8. Learned first appellate court has observed that plaintiff has not filed any regular first appeal to pass a decree of eviction, there is a specific provision for filing cross-objections under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C. and said cross-objections are required to be filed within a period of limitation prescribed for it, but the same was not filed. Provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. cannot be invoked in each and every case by a party. 9. There is no dispute that neither any cross appeal was preferred nor cross-objections under statutory provisions were filed by the plaintiff-appellant before first appellate court. In these circumstances, I find that learned first appellate court was absolutely right in rejecting the application of the appellant filed under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. I do not find any illegality or perversity in the said finding of learned first appellate court. 10. No substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.