ORDER : D. Hariparanthaman, J. The writ Petitioner is a Transport Corporation. The writ Petitioner has questioned the rejection of approval application No. 365 of 2003 filed u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the Act) by the impugned order, dated 12.02.2005. The Petitioner has sought approval for dismissing the second Respondent by an order dated 06.10.2003. As stated above, the first Respondent refused to grant approval. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are stated as follows: The second Respondent was a driver employed by the writ Petitioner corporation. He was on duty on 29.03.2003 in the bus with registration No. TN 58 N 0178, which run between Thirumangalam and Courtallam. He started his trip at Thirumangalam and proceeded to Courtallam. When the bus was nearing Puliyangudi at 11.30 a.m. there was an accident with TVS 50 moped (the same is disputed by the workman). The accident took place when he attempted to over take TVS-50 moped. The pillion rider in the TVS 50 Moped fell down and the rear side left wheel of the bus run over on the pillion rider. The pillion rider died due to accident. An official of the transport corporation on hearing about the accident, investigated the manner of accident and gave a report. Based on the report, the Petitioner issued a charge memo dated 07.04.2003 alleging that the second Respondent committed misconduct of rash and negligent driving. The second Respondent submitted an explanation denying the charges. 3. The workman stated that there was road repair taking place at the place of accident. Due to road repair works, the road became narrow and therefore, he slowed the vehicle. The TVS 50 Moped attempted to over take on the left side of the bus and since it was not a proper road, he fell down and the rear side left wheel of the bus run over on the pillion rider. According to him, he did not over take the TVS 50 Moped and only the TVS 50 Moped attempted to overtake the bus and in that process the accident took place as the road was not in a good condition. Because of road condition, she fell down. 4. An enquiry was conducted. In the enquiry, the person who investigated the accident alone was examined and nobody else was examined. Because of road condition, she fell down. 4. An enquiry was conducted. In the enquiry, the person who investigated the accident alone was examined and nobody else was examined. Even the conductor, who gave the statement about the accident was not examined. The driver got examined himself in the enquiry. Thereafter, the enquiry officer gave a report alleging that the charges were established. Based on the finding, the Petitioner dismissed the second Respondent on 06.10.2003. Since an industrial dispute relating to charter of demand was pending before the first Respondent, the writ Petitioner sought approval for dismissal u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act and the same was taken on file in Approval Petition No. 365 of 2003. After hearing both sides, the first Respondent rejected the approval petition on the ground that the findings of the enquiry officer was perverse as there was No. legal evidence. The first Respondent held that the person, who investigated the manner of accident alone was examined and he has not examined any eye witness during his investigation and the conductor was also not examined. Therefore, it is the case of No. evidence. Hence, the first Respondent refused to grant approval by the impugned order, dated 12.02.2005. The writ Petitioner has filed the present writ petition to quash the aforesaid order, dated 12.02.2005 of the first Respondent rejecting the approval application No. 365 of 2003 filed by the writ Petitioner. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the first Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence as if it is a reference u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the first Respondent ought to have granted approval as it is only a proceeding u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act. It was further contended that the first Respondent also held that the enquiry officer failed to take into account the photographs filed by the workman regarding the accident. It is not so and the enquiry officer took note of the same and the learned Counsel took me through the portion of the finding of the enquiry officer referring to the photographs. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur, it should be upheld that the second Respondent was rash and negligent in driving the bus. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur, it should be upheld that the second Respondent was rash and negligent in driving the bus. He has relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions: (i) K.AYYAVU v. TIRUVALLUVAR TRANSPORT CORPN.LTD reported in 2003 (3) LLN 713 confirming the order of the learned single judge in TIRUVALLUVAR TRANSPORT CORPN. LTD. v. K.AYYAVU reported in 2003 (3) LLN 705; and (ii) CHOLAN ROADWAY, LTD. v. G.THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM reported in 2005 (1) LLN 633 8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that since the Petitioner sought for an opportunity if the authority came to the conclusion that the enquiry has not been properly conducted, the first Respondent ought to have granted an opportunity to lead evidence to prove the charges. He has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in BRAKES INDIA LTD., v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER of LABOUR reported in 1995 (1) LLN 1184 in this regard. 9. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the second Respondent submits that the road was a narrow one and there was a repair work in the road. Without seeing the conditions of the road and the repair work, the TVS 50 Moped proceeded very fast on the left side of the bus and over took the bus and in that process the pillion rider in TVS 50 Moped fell down and the pillion rider got in to the rear wheel of the bus and died. The second Respondent could not be held responsible as the accident took place on the rear wheel of the bus. The second Respondent counsel further submits that the second Respondent did not overtook the TVS 50 moped and only the TVS 50 moped overtook the bus. It is stated that since the road was very bad, he was proceeding very slowly. But the two wheeler rode very fastly and tried to overtake the bus and in that process, the accident took place. According to him, the investigating officer is not an eye witness and his evidence could not be termed as legal evidence. The investigating officer did not even bother to enquire the person who rode the TVS 50 moped. The person who rode the TVS 50 moped was a relevant witness to speak about the accident. According to him, the investigating officer is not an eye witness and his evidence could not be termed as legal evidence. The investigating officer did not even bother to enquire the person who rode the TVS 50 moped. The person who rode the TVS 50 moped was a relevant witness to speak about the accident. The conductor of the bus, who was present on the spot, was also not examined. Therefore, the first Respondent has correctly come to the conclusion, it is a case of No. legal evidence. Hence, the first Respondent characterized the same as perverse. He has also relied on the judgments of this Court reported in; (i) JEEVA TRANSPORT CORPORATION LIMITED v. I.T. MADRAS reported in 1993 (1) L.L.N. 870 (ii) CHERAN TRANSPORT CORPN. LTD v. P.O., I.T reported in 2002 (1) L.L.N. 388 (iii) PANDIAN ROADWAYS CORPORATION LIMITED v. P.O., ADDL.L.C reported in 2002 (1) L.L.N. 348 (iv) V.K.MURUGAN v. T.N.S.T. CORPN reported in 2010 (2) L.L.N. 738. 10. He submits that the judgment relied on by the Petitioner reported in 2003 (3) L.L.N. 705 (cited supra) relates to the death of a minor aged 7 years and in that context, the judgment was delivered and the same was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the decision cited supra and held that the judgment would apply to the facts of that case. As far as the judgment reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N. 633 (cited supra) relied on by the Petitioner, the learned Counsel for the workman submits that the judgment is not applicable to this case. In that case, the width of the road was 300 feet. Admittedly, the bus proceed at 80 km speed. It also went to the left extreme of the road and hit against a tamarind tree resulting in the death of 7 passengers and injuries to several others. The principle of res ipsa loquitur was applied to the facts of that case stating that accident would speak for itself. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the workman submits that that same could not be applied to this case. 11. The learned Counsel for the second Respondent brought to my notice the judgment of this Court reported in 2010 (2) L.L.N. 738 (cited supra), wherein it is held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur could apply only when there is No. witness to prove the material facts. 11. The learned Counsel for the second Respondent brought to my notice the judgment of this Court reported in 2010 (2) L.L.N. 738 (cited supra), wherein it is held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur could apply only when there is No. witness to prove the material facts. Hence, it is submitted that the principle of res ipsa loquitur could not be applied to the facts of this case. Lastly, the learned Counsel further submits that it was not the case of the workman that he was not given reasonable opportunity in the enquiry and that enquiry was not fairly conducted. On the other hand, the case of the workman was that the findings of the enquiry officer was perverse. The first Respondent agreed with the same and hold the findings of the enquiry officer as perverse. Therefore, the Petitioner could not seek for remand to let in evidence. It is submitted that otherwise, there is No. end, when the matter is decided on merits and the Petitioner would again and again seek for opportunity to lead evidence. 12. I have Considered the submissions made on either side. 13. The second Respondent drove the bus bearing registration No. TN58 N 0178 running between Tirumangalam and Courtallam on 29.03.2003 and the bus involved in an accident at Puliyangudi. It is admitted that at the place of accident there was road repair for a substantial distance. The road was also narrow due to the road repair works. According to the Petitioner corporation, the driver of the bus overtook the two wheeler. But, according to the driver of the bus, the two wheeler overtook the bus. The conductor gave a statement that the two wheeler overtook the bus, the driver also made a similar statement. It is the version of the official of the Petitioner corporation, who investigated the accident, that the bus overtook the two wheeler. There is No. damage to the bus or the two wheeler. The accident took place on the rear side of the bus. The person who rode the two wheeler was in hurry as per the charge sheet. According to the charge sheet, the left side body of the bus touched the two wheeler and the pillion rider fell down and the rear left side wheel of the bus ran over on her. The person who rode the two wheeler was in hurry as per the charge sheet. According to the charge sheet, the left side body of the bus touched the two wheeler and the pillion rider fell down and the rear left side wheel of the bus ran over on her. According to the driver of the bus, the accident was due to the negligent act of the two wheeler. According to the investigating official, it was due to the negligent act of the driver. In order to ascertain, who was responsible for the accident, there should be some eyewitness to speak about the accident. The only witness examined in the enquiry on the side of the Petitioner corporation was the official who investigated the accident. Admittedly, the investigating officer did not even enquire the person, who rode the two wheeler and the conductor of the bus, who was present at the time of accident. The two wheeler rider is an eye witness to the accident and he also gave F.I.R on the accident. The conductor was also not examined in the enquiry. In my view, the first Respondent was correct in his conclusion that the only witness examined on the side of the corporation was not an eyewitness and his evidence could not be termed as legal evidence to speak on the accident. Therefore, I am of the view that the findings of the first Respondent could not be termed as perverse. 14. It is true that the first Respondent said that the photographs produced by the second Respondent were not adverted to. But, that is not correct. But, that is not the reason for which the approval application was rejected. The main reason that weighed with the first Respondent to reject the application was that there is No. evidence except the evidence of the investigating officer and his evidence could not be termed as legal evidence. It is not a case that No. evidence is available. As stated above, at least there are two witnesses, namely the conductor and the person who rode the two wheeler that involved in the accident are available. But No. statement was recorded by the investigating officer from the person who rode the two wheeler and he did not take any effort to examine him in the enquiry also. The conductor was also not examined in the enquiry. But No. statement was recorded by the investigating officer from the person who rode the two wheeler and he did not take any effort to examine him in the enquiry also. The conductor was also not examined in the enquiry. Therefore, the first Respondent held that there is No. legal evidence and the findings of the enquiry officer is perverse. It is not re-appreciation of evidence as alleged by the counsel for the Petitioner, but it was only discussion of evidence to find out whether the findings are perverse. The judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner reported in 2003 (3) L.L.N. 705 (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. That was a case wherein 7 years old minor boy died in the accident and it was held in that context that the driver should be careful and driver could expect a child to be careful. The said judgment was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 2002 (1) L.L.N. 348 (cited supra). The facts and circumstances of this case could not be applied to the facts of that case. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: 11. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant has very much relied on a decision rendered by K.Sampathy, J., in Management of Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation Ltd. v. K.Ayyavu [Writ Petition No. 14946 of 1994, dated 9 March 1999], which is affirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 2522 of 1999, dated 16 February 2000. A perusal of the judgment shows that due to the negligence of the driver of the bus a boy aged about 7 years has lost his life. It was in that context and on the basis of the proved evidence, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that it was the duty of the driver to keep proper vigilant on the users of the road and he ought to have used his skill to avoid accident. In that case, there is ample evidence to show that despite seeing the boy, who is aged about 7 years crossing the road, the driver proved to have driven the vehicle resulting in the death of the boy. In our case, we have already referred to the claim of the driver wherein he explained how the unfortunate accident had occurred and the stand taken by the management. In our case, we have already referred to the claim of the driver wherein he explained how the unfortunate accident had occurred and the stand taken by the management. Considering the materials and the factual position in both the cases, we are of the view that the said decision of Sampath, J., is not applicable to and cannot be compared to our case. All relevant aspects have been considered by the learned Judge in our case and correctly arrived at a conclusion that the award of the Labour Court does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge and we find No. merits in the writ appeal. 15. The other judgment relied on by the Petitioner is reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N. 633 (cited supra). In that case the accident took place in the road with 300 feet width. The driver of the bus proceeded at 80 km/hr and he drove the bus to the left extreme side of the road and hit against the tamarind tree. The impact of the said collision was so severe that the bus dashed against the protruding branches and stumps of the tamarind trees, resulting in the left side of the bus completely damaged as a result whereof 7 passengers died and several persons were seriously injured. The relevant passage of the judgment is extracted hereunder: According to the Appellant the said bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. The road at the place of the accident was 300 ft. wide and straight one. The Respondent allegedly despite noticing that another bus was coming from the opposite direction did not slow down the vehicle in order to avoid collusion therewith. It is said that the bus was being driven at a speed of 80 k.m.p.h. The bus driven by the Respondent herein is said to have swerved suddenly to the extreme left side of the road which was lined with tamarind trees on both sides. The impact of the said collusion was so severe that the bus dashed against the protruding branches and stumps of the tamarind trees, then dashed against the bus resulting the left side of the bus completely damaged as a result whereof 7 passengers died and several persons were seriously injured. The impact of the said collusion was so severe that the bus dashed against the protruding branches and stumps of the tamarind trees, then dashed against the bus resulting the left side of the bus completely damaged as a result whereof 7 passengers died and several persons were seriously injured. Furthermore, as noticed in paragraph 14 of the same judgment, the Tribunal refused to grant approval on the ground that the passengers of the bus ought to have been examined in the enquiry. The relevant passage in paragraph 14 of the judgment is extracted in this regard: 14. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, opined that the passengers of the bus should have been examined. It does not appear from the order, dated 29 April 1988, passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal that the Respondent herein made any prayer for cross examining the passengers who travelled in the ill-fated bus and who were examined by the said Sri M.Venkatesan. In the said context, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it is a case where the driver should have explained how the accident happened and he should prove his innocence and applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The said judgment could not apply to the facts of this case. In this case, even the Petitioner agreed that the accident took place on a narrow road and there was a road repair work and the accident took place at 11.00 a.m. and that Witnesses such as the person who rode the two wheeler and the conductor of the bus were available. Therefore the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. 16. On the other hand, the Division Bench judgment relied on the side of the second Respondent is directly applicable to this case. In the decision reported in 2010 (2) L.L.N. 738 (cited supra) in paragraph 11 it is stated as follows: 11. It is also pertinent to point out that the investigating officer was a witness before the criminal Court where the case ended in acquittal. It is pointed out that he was the only witness examined before the enquiry officer. In the decision reported in 2010 (2) L.L.N. 738 (cited supra) in paragraph 11 it is stated as follows: 11. It is also pertinent to point out that the investigating officer was a witness before the criminal Court where the case ended in acquittal. It is pointed out that he was the only witness examined before the enquiry officer. It is not in dispute that when the officials of the Corporation were informed about the accident, they went to the spot and prepared the report, but none of the officers were examined before the enquiry officer, for the reasons best known to the Corporation. It is well settled principles of law that when there is No. witness to prove the material facts pointing to the rash and negligent driving of the driver, the principle of res ipsa ioquitur can be applied. In this case also No. eye witness was examined and the only witness is the Investigating official and the principle of ipsa loquitur could not be applied where eye witnesses are available. 17. Furthermore, the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the second Respondent reported in 2002 (1) L.L.N. 388 (CHERAN TRANSPORT CORPN.LTD. v. P.O., I.T.) wherein this Court has considered various judgments including the judgment reported in 1993 (1) L.L.N. 870 and held that without the eyewitness being examined, the finding rendered by the enquiry officer should not be sustained for want of legal evidence. In this regard paragraph 16.1 to 16.4 are extracted in this regard: 16.1. In jeeva Transport Corporation, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras reported in 1993 (1) L.L.N.870 M.Srinivasan, J., as he then was, held, in para.6, at page 871, that: ... the Tribunal is entitled to consider whether the findings of the domestic enquiry officer is perverse or not. While doing so, the obligation on the part of the Tribunal is not to weigh or reappreciate the evidence for itself, but to examine the findings of the enquiry officer on the evidence of the domestic enquiry as it is, in order to find out whether there is a prima facie case; or if the findings are perverse, which renders essential to see whether the eye-witnesses, who alone could speak about the rash and negligent act of the employee, were examined or not. 16.2 R.R.Jain, J., in Cholan Roadways Corporation, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and another by order, dated 14 August 1997, made in Writ Petition No. 12383 of 1986, held that in a case where the workman is charged for a rash and negligent act, the persons present on the site of accident alone can speak about the occurrence and as the management failed to examine any such eye-witness, the findings of the enquiry officer cannot be sustained. 16.3 Similarly, in Cheran Transport Corporation, Ltd., Coimbatore v. K.S.Palanaisamy and another by order, dated 23 February 1998, in Writ Petition No. 1554 of 1989, V.S.Sripurkar, J., held that where the management failed to examine anybody who had seen the accident, the findings of the enquiry officer cannot sustain. 16.4 In the light of the decision referred to above, as it is not in dispute that the Petitioner-management had not examined any eye-witness before the enquiry officer, the finding arrived at by the enquiry officer itself is not sustainable in law, for want of legal evidence. 18. The last submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the Petitioner sought opportunity before the first Respondent to lead evidence, if the first Respondent came to the conclusion that the enquiry was not properly held. But, the first Respondent did not give opportunity when the first Respondent held that the findings of the enquiry officer is perverse. He sought for remand for letting in evidence to sustain the dismissal order. In my considered view, this contention of the writ Petitioner has No. merit. The request made in the approval application is as follows; xxx xxx The writ Petitioner sought permission to lead evidence if the first Respondent came to the conclusion that there was defect in the enquiry. There is No. defect in the conduct of the enquiry. The first Respondent has not held that the enquiry was not fairly conducted and that the workman was not given opportunity. The Petitioner did not seek opportunity to lead evidence if it is held that the findings of the enquiry officer is perverse. The first Respondent has not set aside the enquiry. Thus, there is No. question of granting permission to lead evidence would arise. The Petitioner did not seek opportunity to lead evidence if it is held that the findings of the enquiry officer is perverse. The first Respondent has not set aside the enquiry. Thus, there is No. question of granting permission to lead evidence would arise. The judgment cited by the writ Petitioner reported in 1995 1 LLN 1184 (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case, as the Petitioner did not seek opportunity to lead evidence, if the first Respondent came to the conclusion that the findings are perverse. It is also stated that the second Respondent was reinstated in service pursuant to the order of the first Respondent. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No. costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.