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2011 DIGILAW 315 (CHH)

PUKHRAJ GOLCHHA v. ANAND KUMAR JAIN

2011-09-09

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA

body2011
JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. :- 1. This second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been preferred by the defendant/tenant challenging the impugned judgment and decree whereby the trial Court as well as the first Appellate court has allowed and decreed the plaintiff's suit directing the appellant's eviction from the suit premises on the grounds enumerated under Sections 12(1)(f) and 12(1)(g) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The respondent/plaintiff preferred a suit for the defendant/appellant) eviction from the non-residential suit premises which is part of a larger premises situated on plot No.21 12/2, at Sadar Bazar, Rajnandgaon, which was purchased by the plaintiff from one Dev Kishan Lakhotia by a registered sale deed dated 17-4-1998. 3. According to the plaintiff, the defendant is his tenant at a monthly tenancy of Rs.250/-, as notice regarding purchase of the property was sent to the defendant by him as well as by the seller, however, the defendant failed to pay any rent to the plaintiff. Because of the said non-payment of rent, the plaintiff issued a legal notice on 22-5-2006 however, in spite of receipt of notice, the defendant did not tender the rent. ]t was also pleaded that the plaintiff is engaged in agency business and has no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for satisfying his need and the plaintiff bonafidely needs the premises for expansion of his agency business which is otherwise cannot be fulfilled even if the possession of area ad measuring 5" x 30" is delivered to him by the other tenants in pursuance of the decree of eviction granted in plaintiff's favour in civil suit No.201-A/2001 and Civil Appeal No.28-A/2003 decided on 30-3-2006. The plaintiff also pleaded the ground of reconstruction under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act on the ground that accommodation has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation and is required bona fide for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 4. The defendant/appellant filed his written statement and stated that premises was taken on rent from Nathmal Mohta, husband of Geeta Devi. The said Geeta Devi died prior to the death of Nathmal Mohta and the couple was issueless. 4. The defendant/appellant filed his written statement and stated that premises was taken on rent from Nathmal Mohta, husband of Geeta Devi. The said Geeta Devi died prior to the death of Nathmal Mohta and the couple was issueless. After their death, rent was recovered by Bal Kishan Lakhotia mentioning the name of late Geeta Devi in the receipt, however, the defendant is not aware about the relationship between Bal Kishan Lakhotia and Geeta Devi. The defendant denied to have any knowledge about the sale deed by which the plaintiff has purchased the property from Devi Kishan Lakhotia or as to how Devi Kishan Lakhotia received the property and became title holder and all these facts are required to be proved by the plaintiff and to seek eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act the plaintiff is required to prove his ownership over the property. For the first time the defendant came to know about the transaction between Devi Kishan Lakhotia and the plaintiff when he received legal notice dated 22-5-2006 and immediately after receipt of notice, the defendant paid arrears of rent from 17-4-1998 to 16-6-2006 amounting to Rs.24,500/- without raising any dispute in this regard. However, subsequent money orders sent by the defendant were not accepted by the plaintiff. It was further stated by the defendant that the accommodation presently in possession of the plaintiff is sufficient for his business and he has obtained vacant possession of another shop from a tenant Shantilal Vaidya and another part of the purchased property is already in his occupation. It was further stated that after purchase of the property, he has constructed one 2 storied pucca building on an area admeasuring 15" x 50" and further that part of the total area in occupation of the plaintiff remains vacant, therefore, the plea of expansion of business and its bonafide need is absolutely false. It was also stated that the plaintiff owned one aluminum factory in Industrial Area, Rajnandgaon and the present projected need is mere desire and in fact, the plaintiff does not require premises for expansion of business. The plea of accommodation being unfit for human habitation and requirement of reconstruction/repair was also denied by the defendant. It was also stated that the plaintiff owned one aluminum factory in Industrial Area, Rajnandgaon and the present projected need is mere desire and in fact, the plaintiff does not require premises for expansion of business. The plea of accommodation being unfit for human habitation and requirement of reconstruction/repair was also denied by the defendant. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff resides and carries on business as a member of the joint Hindu family and the said joint Hindu family has got enough alternative accommodation for satisfying the need of the plaintiff. Another part of the same house was purchased by the plaintiff's family in the name of his brother Sheetal Jain by a sale deed dated 23-6-1998 and since the family is joint, the need can be satisfied from the premises in possession of Sheetal Jain. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 297-2008. The trial Court had named issue No.1 regarding purchase of the property by the plaintiff and issue No.2 as to whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit house described in Schedule-A with the plaint. Both these issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No.3 was with respect to bonafide nonresidential need and issue No.4 was with respect to requirement of the premises for repairs and both these issues were also decided in plaintiff's favour. 6. The first appellate Court has affirmed by the finding recorded by the trial Court on all material issues. 7. This second appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: (1) "Whether documents Ex.P/4 is sufficient to establish plaintiff's ownership to satisfy requirement under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, 1961? (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff is entitled to a decree under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, 1961? (3) Whether in the state of evidence on record the plaintiff has established ground under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act, 1961?" 8. This Court shall proceed to take up third substantial question of law at the beginning before deciding substantial questions of law No.1 & 2. Third substantial question of law framed by this Court is to the following effect: "Whether in the state of evidence on record the plaintiff has established ground under Section 12 (1) (g) of the Act, 1961?" 9. Third substantial question of law framed by this Court is to the following effect: "Whether in the state of evidence on record the plaintiff has established ground under Section 12 (1) (g) of the Act, 1961?" 9. Under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, a landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction of the tenant if he proves that the accommodation has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and is required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 10. In the matter of Kikabhai Abdul Hussain Vs. Kamlakar and others), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has laid down the pre-requisites for the landlord as to the nature of pleading and evidence required to prove the grounds under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act. It has been held that the landlord has to plead and prove the following: I. That the accommodation has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation. II. That the plaintiff wants to carry out repairs of the suit premises. III. That the repairs cannot be carried out unless the defendant vacates the suit premises; and IV. That the plaintiff needs the bona fide premises for carrying out repairs as aforesaid. 11. Thus, it is required to be seen as to whether, in the case in hand, the plaintiff has successfully pleaded and proved the said pre-requisites for obtaining a decree under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act and whether the finding recorded by the two Courts below while passing the decree under Section 12(1)(g) of the Act suffers from any perversity. 12. The pleading as to the ground under Section 12(1)(g) of the Act has been made in para-3 of the plaint. In the said paragraph, the plaintiff has stated, amongst other things, that the premises in occupation of the defendant is very old and has become dilapidated and because of its poor condition there is danger of the same being fallen, endangering human life and reconstruction is needed for which the plaintiff has got resources and reconstruction shall be carried out after possession is handed over to the plaintiff. It is to be seen that the pleading, as mentioned above, is with respect to reconstruction has been referred as ^^iqfuZeZk.k** in para-3 of the plant whereas Section 12(1)(g) of the Act provides for a ground for eviction 'for repairs' and not 'for reconstruction'. Prayer for a decree for eviction on the ground of reconstruction can be made under Section 12 (1)(h) of the Act which provides that a decree can be granted when the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 13. In the matter of Abdul Hamid Vs. Hakeem Ahmad Ullah Khan it has been held that there is clear distinction between 'repairs' and 'building or rebuilding or making substantial addition or alterations' and that if the requirement is for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making substantial addition or alterations, the matter goes out of the scope of clause (g) and comes within the purview of clause (h). 14. While dealing with the similar provision under the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Metalware & Co. etc. Vs. Bansilal Sarma and other~ has held that when eviction is sought on the ground that building is needed for rebuilding or reconstruction, condition of the building is relevant factor. 15. Opposing the plea of landlord under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act, the defendant has stated in his written statement that condition of the building is very strong and there is no danger of same being fallen for hundreds of years and further that a plea has been raised only to get the accommodation vacated. In his statement in the Court, the plaintiff, who appeared as PW-1, has reiterated the plaint allegations in his examination in chief, however, he says that he is not aware as to whether the accommodation requires any repairs every year. In his entire evidence, the plaintiff has not stated as to what is the nature of damage occurring in the building which needs such repairs, which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 16. PW-2 Gyanchandra Jain, father of the plaintiff, makes similar statement. In his entire evidence, the plaintiff has not stated as to what is the nature of damage occurring in the building which needs such repairs, which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 16. PW-2 Gyanchandra Jain, father of the plaintiff, makes similar statement. However, he admits that no information has ever been sent to the Municipal Corporation informing the authority about poor condition of the building. There is absolutely no documentary evidence in the form of any spot inspection report by any architect or civil engineer or by any employee of the Municipal Corporation about the poor condition of the building. 17. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Kikabhai Abdul Hussainl (Supra), the plaintiff has failed to prove that the accommodation has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation. Since in the matter of Metalware & Co. etc. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that condition of the building is relevant factor when the plaintiff seeks a decree for eviction on the ground of reconstruction and if the evidence available in the present case is examined on the touchstone of the said judgment, it is found that there is absolutely no evidence on record justifying passing of a decree under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act. The finding recorded by the Courts below granting a decree under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act suffers from perversity and, therefore, the said finding deserves to be set aside. 18. The third substantial question of law is thus answered in favour of the appellant/tenant and against the landlord. 19. This Court shall now take up first and second substantial questions of law to decide them analogously, as both the substantial questions of law relate to ground under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. These substantial questions of law have been framed in the following manner:- "1. Whether documents Ex.P/4 is sufficient to establish plaintiffs ownership to satisfy requirement under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, 1961? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff is entitled to a decree under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, 1961?" 20. Undisputedly, the suit accommodation belonged to one Nathmal, who sold the property in favour of his wife Geeta Devi by a registered sale deed dated 17-3-1959. 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff is entitled to a decree under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, 1961?" 20. Undisputedly, the suit accommodation belonged to one Nathmal, who sold the property in favour of his wife Geeta Devi by a registered sale deed dated 17-3-1959. After the death of Geeta Devi in 1981, the property again reverted to Nathmal, who also died on 29th August, 1987. Couple was issueless and there is no evidence on record as to their legal heirs. Two brothers namely, Balkishan, resident of Sadar Bazar, Raiupr and Dev Kishan, resident of Amravati (Maharashtra), both sons of Ganga Kishan Lakhotia, filed succession case No.12/88 in the Court of Civil Judge Class-I, Rajnandgaon under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act seeking succession certificate to the effect that they are entitled to recover arrears of rent and future rent from 5 tenants of said Nathmal/Geeta Devi. In the said succession case, the tenants were not made party. According to said Bal Kishan and Dev Kishan, Geeta Devi was their sister, however, she was not mentally ~t and was under treatment at Nagpur. Her last rites were performed at Amravati after her death in 1987. According to them, Nathmal Mohta, husband of Geeta Devi, was involved in gambling activity, therefore, Geeta Devi purchased the property from her husband with their help and there are no legal heirs of Geeta Devi except them. In the absence of the tenants being joined in the said succession case and there being no opposition to the application, a succession certificate was granted in favour of Bal Kishan and Dev Kishan vide order (Ex.-P/4) dated 24-1-1989. The said two brothers started realizing the rent from the defendant/appellant and other tenants. Few of the rent receipt having been filed by the defendants as Ex.D/11, Ex.-D/12, Ex.-D/13 & Ex.-D/14. 21. Thus, it is the defendants' own case that they were paying rent to Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan Lakhotia. In due course, Bal Kishan Lakhotia executed a deed of relinquishment (Ex.-P/12) dated 9-3-1995 in favour of his brother Dev Kishan Lakhotia, and thus, whatever right both the brothers jointly had stood transferred and settled in the name of Dev Kishan Lakhotia. In due course, Bal Kishan Lakhotia executed a deed of relinquishment (Ex.-P/12) dated 9-3-1995 in favour of his brother Dev Kishan Lakhotia, and thus, whatever right both the brothers jointly had stood transferred and settled in the name of Dev Kishan Lakhotia. The said remaining brother Dev Kishan Lakhotia thereafter executed a sale deed in favour of the present plaintiff on 31-3-1998 (Ex.-P/1) and an information regarding execution of sale deed was sent by Dev Kishan Lakhotia to the defendants on 17-4-1998 (Ex.-P/10). 22. There is nothing on record as to the relatives of original owner Nathmal and Geeta Devi. The predecessor in interest of the plaintiff namely, Dev Kishan Lakhotia and his brother Bal Kishan Lakhotia claim to be real brothers of Geeta Devi. Ex.-P/4 is the succession certificate issued by the Court of Civil Judge Class-I, Rajnandgaon, certifying that Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan Lakhotia are the persons entitled to recover rent from the five tenants who are in possession of different parts of the property belonging to Nathmal/Geeta Devi. 23. It has been argued by Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that a succession certificate issued under Section 372 of the Succession Act, 1925 (for short 'the Act of 1925') neither gives general power of administration of the property of the deceased nor establishes title on the grantee as the heir of the deceased and that it only furnishes the grantee with the authority to collect the debts of the deceased and allows the debtor to make payment to him without incurring any risk. Thus, the plaintiff has no title at all to the suit property so as to seek eviction under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, which provides that for seeking a decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide non-residential need the landlord has to be the owner of the property. 24. Learned counsel has relied on the judgments in the matters of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma and others Vs. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai and others4 and Banarsi Dass Vs. Teeku Dutta (Mrs) and another. He also argued that the tenant can challenge derivative title of the plaintiff, who is not original owner of the property and that attornment under the threat of eviction does not estop the tenant from denying the title. 25. Per contra, Shri Prashant Jayaswal, learned Sr. Teeku Dutta (Mrs) and another. He also argued that the tenant can challenge derivative title of the plaintiff, who is not original owner of the property and that attornment under the threat of eviction does not estop the tenant from denying the title. 25. Per contra, Shri Prashant Jayaswal, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent argued that to claim a decree for eviction under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, the landlord need not be an absolute owner of the property and that proof of ownership for the purposes of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act means prima facie proof of title to hold the property against all others and the said requirement has been satisfied by the plaintiff, therefore, no inference is called for. 26. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that there is concurrent finding of fact with regard to bona fide need of the plaintiff as well as other requirement of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. He has relied on decisions in the matters of K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S, Parihar, E. Parashuraman (dead) by LRs Vs. V. Doraiswamy (dead) by LR., Smt. Hansa Devi Vs. Kartar Singh Arora (dead) Smt. Sobhagywati Arora & others, Dashrath Rao Kate Vs. Brij Mohan Srivastava, and Asif Ali Vs. Rahandomaal to buttress his submission. 27. Before proceeding to discuss the nature of evidence regarding prima facie proof of title of the plaintiff on the basis of succession certificate (Ex.P/4), it is appropriate to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1925. Section 370 provides for restriction on grant of succession certificate under part X of the Act, 1925. Section 374 speaks about the contents of succession certificate whereas Section 381 makes a provision as to the effect of certificate. Section 386 provides for validation of certain payments made in good faith to holder of invalid certificate. Section 387 makes a provision regarding effect of decisions under the Act and liability of holder of certificate thereunder. The provisions contained in Sections 386 and 387 are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- "386. Section 386 provides for validation of certain payments made in good faith to holder of invalid certificate. Section 387 makes a provision regarding effect of decisions under the Act and liability of holder of certificate thereunder. The provisions contained in Sections 386 and 387 are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- "386. Validation of certain payments made in good faith to holder of invalid certificate.- Where a certificate under this Part has been superseded or is invalid by reason of the certificate having been revoked under section 383, or by reason of the grant of a certificate to a person named in an appellate order under section 384, or by reason of a certificate having been previously granted, or for any other cause, all payments made or dealings had, as regards debts and securities specified in the superseded or invalid certificate, to or with the holder of that certificate in ignorance of its supersession or invalidity, shall be held good against claims under any other certificate. 387. Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder of certificate thereunder.- No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefor to the person lawfully entitled thereto." 28. In the matter of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma (supra), the following has been held in paragraphs 13, 14 and 18 of the judgment: "13. This sub-section reveals two things: first, adjudication is in summary proceedings and secondly, if the question of law and facts are intricate or difficult, it could still grant the said certificate based on his prima facie title. In other words the grant of certificate under it is only a determination of prima facie title. This as a necessary corollary confirms that it is not a final decision between the parties. So, it cannot be construed that the mere grant of such certificate or a decision in such proceedings would constitute to be a decision on an issue finally decided between the parties. This as a necessary corollary confirms that it is not a final decision between the parties. So, it cannot be construed that the mere grant of such certificate or a decision in such proceedings would constitute to be a decision on an issue finally decided between the parties. If that be so how could the principle of res judicata be made applicable to a case in a subsequent suit? The effect of such certificate is also laid down in Section 381 which is quoted hereunder: "381. Effect of certificate.- Subject to the provisions of this Part, the certificate of the District Judge shall, with respect to the debts and securities specified therein, be conclusive as against the persons owing such debts or liable on such securities, and shall, notwithstanding any contravention of Section 370, or other defect, afford full indemnity to all such persons as regards all payments made, or dealings had, in good faith in respect of such debts or securities to or with the person to whom the certificate was granted. 14. So, this certificate merely affords full indemnity to the debtor for the payment he makes to the person holding such certificate. Thus when the debtor pays the debts or the securities as specified in the certificate, to the holder of such certificate, then on such payment, he is absolved from his obligation to pay to anyone else as it conclusively concludes his part of his obligation and such payment is construed to be in good faith. This safeguards such debtor or person liable to pay that he may not be later dragged into any litigation which may arise subsequently inter se between the claimants. The use of words "good faith" in Section 381 reinforces that the decision in these proceedings are not final. When statute recognizes such payment to be in good faith it gives clear undercurrent message that there may be in future better claimant but that would not affect the indemnification of the debtor. Thus we find accumulatively because of the grant of succession certificate being for a limited purpose. When statute recognizes such payment to be in good faith it gives clear undercurrent message that there may be in future better claimant but that would not affect the indemnification of the debtor. Thus we find accumulatively because of the grant of succession certificate being for a limited purpose. limited in its sphere the declaration of title being prima facie, payment tendered is declared to have been made in good faith, leads to only one conclusion that any decision made therein cannot be treated to be final adjudication of the rights of the parties, except such declaration being final for the purpose of these proceedings. If that be so, the amount received by the holder of such certificate can yet be questioned, and in subsequent proceedings it may be held to belong to other claimant, including the contesting party. 18. As far back as in 1937, this principle was upheld and recognized. In Charjo V. Dina Nath {AIR 1937 Lah 196(2)}: (AIR Headnote) "The inquiry in proceedings for grant of succession certificate ,is to be summary, and the Court, without determining questions of law or fact, which seem to it to be too intricate and difficult for determination, should grant the certificate to the person who appears to have prima facie the best title thereto. In such cases the Court has not to determine definitely and finally as to who has the best right to the estate. All that it is required to do is to hold a summary inquiry into the right to the certificate, with a view, on the one hand, to facilitate the collection of debts due to the deceased and prevent their being time-barred, owing (for instance) to dispute between the heirs inter se as to their preferential right to succession, and, on the other hand, to afford protection to the debtors by appointing a representative of the deceased and authorizing him to give a valid discharge for the debt. The grant of a certificate to a person does not give him an absolute right to the debt nor does it bar a regular suit for adjustment of the claims of the heirs inter se." (Emphasis Supplied) 29. In the matter of Joginder Pal Vs. Indian Red Cross Society and others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court following its earlier judgment in the matter of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma (Supra) has reiterated the same principle. 30. In the matter of Joginder Pal Vs. Indian Red Cross Society and others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court following its earlier judgment in the matter of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma (Supra) has reiterated the same principle. 30. In the matter of Banarsi Dass (Supra), it has been held that succession certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased and the grant of certificate does not establish title of the certificate holder as heir of the deceased. The following has been laid down in paragraph-14 of the judgment: "14. The main object of a succession certificate is to facilitate collection of debts on succession and afford protection to the parties paying debts to the representatives of deceased persons. All that the succession certificate purports to do is to facilitate the collection of debts, to regulate the administration of succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged representatives of the deceased persons. Such a certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased. The grant of a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased. A succession certificate is intended as noted above to protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person holding a certificate under the Act, or is compelled by the decree of a court to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged. The grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to make payments to him without incurring any risk. In order to succeed in the succession application the applicant has to adduce cogent' and' credible evidence in support of the application. The respondents, if they so choose, can also adduce evidence to oppose grant of succession certificate. The trial court erroneously held that the documents produced by the respondents were not sufficient or relevant for the purpose of adjudication and DNA test was conclusive. This is not a correct view. It is for the parties to place evidence in support of their respective claims and establish their stands. The trial court erroneously held that the documents produced by the respondents were not sufficient or relevant for the purpose of adjudication and DNA test was conclusive. This is not a correct view. It is for the parties to place evidence in support of their respective claims and establish their stands. DNA test is not to be directed as a matter of routine and only in deserving cases such a direction can be given, as was noted in Goutam Kundu Case. Present case does not fall in that category. The High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity. We, therefore, uphold it. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case relating to succession application." 31. In the matter of D. Satyanarayana Vs. P. Jagadish, it has been held that attornment of tenancy and payment of rent to the landlord who is holder of derivative title does not estop the tenant from denying the derivative title of the landlord. 32. In the matter of Subhash Chandra Vs. Mohammad Starif and others, it has been held that derivative title of a landlord can be challenged. Similar is the pronouncement in the matters of S. Thangappan V. P. Padmavathi4 and A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons and others Vs. T. Palanisamy Gounder. 33. Undisputedly, the appellant/tenant has challenged the title of the landlord. He has also challenged the title of previous landlord Dev Kishan Lakhotia though he too was holder of derivative title in the limited sense of the term as he was armed with succession certificate in his favour which authorized him to collect rent from the tenants of Nathmal and Geeta Devi.. Thus, the appellant/tenant, who was faced with the order granting succession certificate in favour of Dev Kishan Lakhotia had no option but to tender rent• to Dev Kishan and Bal Kishan Lakhotia. The said right of collection of rent flows from succession certificate and whatever prima facie title they had on the property left by Nathmal and Geeta Devi was transferred to the present plaintiff, therefore, the tenants paid rent to the present plaintiff and attorned the tenancy after receiving legal notice, as admitted in paragraph-l of the written statement. The said right of collection of rent flows from succession certificate and whatever prima facie title they had on the property left by Nathmal and Geeta Devi was transferred to the present plaintiff, therefore, the tenants paid rent to the present plaintiff and attorned the tenancy after receiving legal notice, as admitted in paragraph-l of the written statement. Thus, according to the defendant, tender of rent to the present plaintiff was also under threat of eviction which will not preclude or estop him from denying the title, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of D,. Satyanarayana (Supra). 34. This Court has gone through the written statement and prima facie, it appears that tender of rent to the present plaintiff was under threat of eviction. Similarly, payment of rent to Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan Lakhotia was in view of grant of succession certificate in their favour. Therefore, in view of the nature of derivative title which existed in favour of Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan Lakhotia and thereafter in favour of the present plaintiff, the appellant/tenant cannot be said to have attorned the tenancy. 35. When the appellant has not attorned the tenancy because rent was paid under threat of eviction, this Court shall now consider the core issue as to whether (Ex.P/4) is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's ownership to satisfy the requirement under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. 36. In the matter of Sheela and others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to its earlier judgments in the matters of MM Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma {(1981) 3 SCC 36} and Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra {(1988) Supp. SCC 710} had held in paragraph-10 of the judgment thus: "10. While seeking an ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement under Cl. (f) abovesaid the landlord is required to allege and prove not only that he is a 'landlord' but also that he is the 'owner' of the premises. The definition of 'landlord' and 'tenant' as given in Cls. (b) and (i) of S.2 of the Act make it clear that under the Act the concept of landlordship is different from that of ownership. A person may be a 'landlord' though not an 'owner' of the premises. The definition of 'landlord' and 'tenant' as given in Cls. (b) and (i) of S.2 of the Act make it clear that under the Act the concept of landlordship is different from that of ownership. A person may be a 'landlord' though not an 'owner' of the premises. The factor determinative of landlordship is the factum of his receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent of any accommodation. Such receiving or right to receive the rent may be on the own account of the landlord or on account of or for the benefit of any other person. A trustee, a guardian and a receiver are also included in the definition of landlord. Such landlord would be entitled to seek an eviction of the tenant on one or more of such grounds falling within the ambit of S.12(1) of the Act which do not require the landlord to be an owner also so as to be entitled to successfully maintain a claim for eviction. Clause (f) contemplates a claim for eviction being maintained by an owner-landlord and not a landlord merely. Though of course. we may hasten to add. that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent Control Law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative• term the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In Rent Control Legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he 'is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation probably mayor may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. In MM Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma (1981) 3 SCC 36. it was held that an 'owner-landlord' who can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. In MM Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma (1981) 3 SCC 36. it was held that an 'owner-landlord' who can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra (1988) Supp SCC 710, this Court held that it was essential to sustain a claim for eviction under S. 12 (1)(f) of the Act to establish that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises. However, the Court upheld the ownership of the landlord having been proved on the basis of an admission of the ownership of the plaintiff made by the defendant in reply to notice given before the institution of the suit and the recital of the name of the plaintiff as the owner of the property contained in the receipts issued by the landlord to the tenant over a period of time. Thus. the burden of proving ownership in a suit between landlord and tenant where the landlord-tenant relationship is either admitted or proved is not so heavy as in a title suit and lesser quantum of proof may suffice than what would be needed in a suit based on title against a person setting up a contending title while disputing the title of the plaintiff. Nevertheless pleading and proving ownership, in the sense as it carries in Rent Control Law, is one of the ingredients of the ground under S.12 (1)(f) of the Act." (Emphasis Supplied) 37. Thus, the law is settled that in a suit for eviction filed by the landlord on the ground of bonafide non-residential need, the nature of title which the plaintiff is required to prove is not like proof of title in a title suit and the burden of proof of title in eviction matter is the proof of prima facie title and not absolute title or ownership. 38. In the matter of K.D. Dewan (Supra), it has been held that to claim a decree for eviction, the landlord need not be an absolute owner. Similar is the law laid down in the matter of V. Doraiswam/ (Supra). 39. 38. In the matter of K.D. Dewan (Supra), it has been held that to claim a decree for eviction, the landlord need not be an absolute owner. Similar is the law laid down in the matter of V. Doraiswam/ (Supra). 39. The main plank of the argument raised by Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant is that succession certificate authorizing the plaintiff's predecessor in interest to collect rent is of no document of title, therefore, there is absolutely no proof regarding title of Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan' Lakhotia so as to authorize the said Dev Kishan Lakhotia to transfer it in favour of the present plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be held to be the owner even in its limited sense and the decree on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act is illegal. The main thrust of this argument is his reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma, Banarsi Dass and Joginder Pal (Supra). 40. In the matters of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma and Banarsi Dass (supra), though it has been held that succession certificate does not establish title of the certificate holder, yet it has also been held therein (para13 & 14 of Madhvi Amma) that succession certificate can be granted based on prima facie title of the person who, according to the Court is entitled to the certificate. It has been held in para: "13 that 'In other words the grant of certificate under it is only a determination of prima facie title'. 41. When the law is thus settled with regard to nature of title in the hands of certificate holder and when no other person has surfaced in this world after 1987 i.e. for last about 24 years to claim any adversarial right against the said Dev Kishan Lakhotia or for that matter the present plaintiff, for the purposes of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, succession certificate (Ex.-P/4) is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's right to satisfy the requirement of ownership under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. 42. 42. It is also important to bear in mind that the appellant/tenant has not or rather cannot claim any title in himself His only right is to occupy the premises within the parameters of law as long as the landlord permits him to occupy the premises and a decree for eviction is not passed against him. The tenant, being an outsider, cannot challenge the instrument by which the title is passed on to the landlord, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dashrath Rao Kate (Supra). 43. Learned counsel for the appellant has read in extenso the evidence regarding availability of alternative accommodation. 44. In the matter of Smt. Bismillah Begum (dead) by LRs Vs. Rahmatullah Khan (dead) by LRs.17, it has been held that the question whether landlord requires premises for personal use and occupation is a question of fact. It is equally settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions, to I quote few of them, Narayanan Vs. Kumaran and others & Smt. Kamti Devi and another Vs. Poshi Ram, that a finding of fact based on evidence cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless the finding has been arrived at by complete misreading of evidence or is otherwise perverse. This Court has examined the evidence only to find that there is absolutely no perversity in the concurrent finding of fact regarding bonafide need and non-availability of alternative accommodation. The said finding to the effect that the plaintiff does riot have any reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in the town of Rajnandgaon is pure finding of fact which cannot be unshattered or reversed In this second appeal in exercise of power under Section 100 of the CPC, as it would require re-appreciation of the entire evidence, which is not permissible. Similarly, the plaintiff's bonafide non-residential need of the suit premises has been found to be proved by both the Courts below and the said finding cannot be disturbed in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the CPC. 45. Similarly, the plaintiff's bonafide non-residential need of the suit premises has been found to be proved by both the Courts below and the said finding cannot be disturbed in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the CPC. 45. In view of the above, this Court has no hesitation in holding that succession certificate (Ex.-P/4) granted in favour of Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan Lakhotia at least proves the prima facie title of the said Dev Kishan Lakhotia and Bal Kishan Lakhotia and subsequently, Bal Kishan Lakhotia has relinquished his share in favour of De v Kishan Lakhotia and later on Dev Kishan Lakhotia has sold the property to the present plaintiff. The said succession certificate (Ex.-P/4) is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's ownership to satisfy the requirement under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. 46. In view of the above, though the ground under Section 12 (1)(g) of the Act is not made out, yet the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. As a consequence, the instant second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.