1. I have heard Mr. S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. J.C. Gaur, learned counsel representing the respondent. 2. This second appeal is directed against the appellate court's judgment and order dated 20.3.2008 passed by the learned District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati in Money Appeal No.73 of 2006, whereby the decision of the learned trial court was affirmed and the appeal preferred by the defendant appellants against the decree of payment of Rs.2,01,650 with interest @. Rs.18% per annum was dismissed. 3. Facts, leading to filing of this appeal, may be narrated. In brief, as follows: 4. M/s. Subash Trading Company, appellant No.1, is a partnership firm and the appellant-defendant Nos.2, 3 and 4 are the partners of the aforesaid firm. The said partnership firm on 9.5.1996 approached the plaintiff-respondent and requested him to provide a loan of Rs. 1,00,000 for smooth running of the business of the firm and also agreed to pay the principal amount together with interest @ Rs.18% per annum. 5. On being promised by the defendant appellant, the plaintiff respondent advanced a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 to the appellant. The loan of Rs. 1,00,000 was paid by a cheque dated 9.5.1996, bearing No. 066002 by the plaintiff/respondent and the cheque was drawn on SBI, Guwahati Branch, in favour of the appellant No.1. Immediately on receipt of the cheque, the defendant/appellant acknowledged the receipt of the aforesaid loan, and also made part payment of loan through cheque No.399811 dated 31.3.2000. However, thereafter, the defendant/appellant in spite of demand on many-occasions did not pay back the amount, which compelled the plaintiff/respondent to institute a suit for realization of the outstanding dues together with interest thereon. 6. The defendant entered appearance in the suit and contested it by filing joint written statement on various grounds. The defendant further contended that no loan was ever obtained by the defendant from the plaintiff. The learned trial court, framed the following issues, for just decision of the case: (1) Whether there is cause of action for filing the suit? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in law and facts? (3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (4) Whether the defendants bad taken loan of Rs. 1,00,000 from the plaintiff vide cheque No. 066002 dated 7.5.2000 drawn in favour of the defendant No. 1? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in law and facts? (3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (4) Whether the defendants bad taken loan of Rs. 1,00,000 from the plaintiff vide cheque No. 066002 dated 7.5.2000 drawn in favour of the defendant No. 1? (5) Whether the defendant agreed to pay interest @ 18% p. a. on the principal amount? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.2,01,650 with interest @ 18% p. a. till realization of the amount? (7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree as prayed for? 7. After due appraisal of the materials on records, learned trial court decreed the suit, for recovery of a sum of Rs.2,01,650 with interest @18% p.a. The defendant/appellant preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court after threadbare discussions of the issues raised in the suit dismissed the appeal. However, modified the rate of interest from 18% to 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realization of the decreetal dues. This second appeal has been instituted against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court of District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati on the following substantial question law: "Whether the judgment and decree dated 20.3.2008 passed in Money Appeal No. 73 of 2006 is perverse?" 8. Mr. S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants raising question regarding the admissibility of the documents filed with the evidence in affidavit of the plaintiff/respondent contended that at the time of adducing the plaintiff's evidence on affidavit only all the necessary documents were submitted in the court for the first time, at the time of hearing, without obtaining leave of the trial court in violation of the provisions of rule 7, order 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that neither the trial court nor the appellate court considered the issue regarding submission of the documents on the date of recording of cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that issuance of cheque and the receipt, of the cheque thereof and the transfer of the cheque amount in the account of the appellants was not proved by the plaintiff/respondent. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that issuance of cheque and the receipt, of the cheque thereof and the transfer of the cheque amount in the account of the appellants was not proved by the plaintiff/respondent. 10. However, learned counsel for the respondent by drawing the attention of the court to the original case records has clarified that all the documents except Exbt.1, were submitted in the court together at the time of filing of the suit and definitely before the settlement of the issues the suit, in terms of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Apparently, on perusal of the original case records, it appears that on 6.9.2002, all the original documents relating to the case were submitted by the plaintiff to respondent, well before the settlement of the issues in the court, except Exbt.1, the confirmation letter, issued to plaintiff/respondent, by the State Bank of India, regarding payment of cheque No.066002 dated 7.5.1996 for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 in the account of the appellant, M/s. Subhash Trading Company. However, this document, Exbt.1, was submitted later on by the plaintiff at the time of adducing evidence since the document was received after the settlement of the issues. However, for submission of the said letter with the record and exhibiting it as Exhibit 1, no express permission was taken from the court in terms of order 7, rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Facts remains that the defendant admittedly did not ask for production of the documents for his perusal in terms of the provisions of order 11, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, except exhibit-1 all other documents were submitted with the case record well in time. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant by referring to the provisions of order VII, rule 14 of Code of Civil Procedure, relying on a decision of this court reported in Saingura v. F. Sapa and Ors., 1992 (1) GLJ207, submitted that the document having been placed on record later during the hearing of the suit, are not admissible. The relevant extract of the decisions in Saingura reads as follows: "10. The relevant extract of the decisions in Saingura reads as follows: "10. Under sub-rule (1) of rule 14 of order VII, of CPC the plaintiff is required to file all the documents on which he sues along with the plaint, and he is also required to file a list of documents which he relies on (whether in his possession or power or not). From the plain reading of this sub-rules of rule 14 indicates that there are two types of documents, i.e., the documents on which the plaintiff sues; these are required to be filed along with the plaint, and the documents on which the plaintiff relies in support of his claim, he is required to give a list of such documents. The effect of non-compliance of sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 14 of order VII is that such documents shall not be received in evidence without the leave of the court under rule 18 of the said order. Therefore, rule 18 is a penal provision for non-compliance of order VII, rule 14. The object of rule 18 is to prevent suspicious and fraudulent document or documents which is not genuine or doubtful about the existence at the time of filing, and, therefore, duty casts on the court to see whether leave should be granted or not. Whale granting leave, it is the duty of the court to see the document sought to be evidenced as requires of rule 14, is a genuine document or not. If the document appears to be a genuine document, the court should always be lenient toward granting leave. 11. Under order 13, rule 1(2), the parties should produce documentary evidence of any description in their power and possession at and before settlement of issues. If the documents are not filed at that time, the court shall normally not receive such documents at a Safer stags unless good cause is shown. Of any good cause is shown, under sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of order XIII empowers the court to accept such document." 13. Learned counsel for the appellants has also referred to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court, L/C of India and Anr. Of any good cause is shown, under sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of order XIII empowers the court to accept such document." 13. Learned counsel for the appellants has also referred to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court, L/C of India and Anr. v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, AIR 2010 SCW 1900, to contend that mere marking of a document as an Exhibit would not mean that the document has been proved in accordance with law, wherein, their lordships observed as follows: "25. No doubt, it is true that failure to prove the defence does not amount to an admission, nor does it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff but still the duty cast on the defendants has to be discharged by adducing oral evidence, which the appellants have miserably failed to do. Appellants, even though a defaulting party, committed breach and failed to carry out a legislative impastation, then had still to convince this court as to what was the just cause for doing the same. Thus, looking to the matter from any angle, it is fully established that appellants had miserably failed to prove and establish their defence in the case. 26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does not amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. As has been mentioned herein above, despite perusal of the record, we have not been able to come to know as to under what circumstances respondent plaintiff had admitted those documents. Even otherwise, his admission of those documents cannot carry the case of the appellants any further and much to the prejudice of the respondent." 14. Learned counsel for the appellants has further referred to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. v. Surendra Oil and Dal Mill (Refineries) and Ors., AIR 2010 SCW 5200. The relevant extract of the observations made by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. (supra) reads as follows: 7. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior advocate, appearing for the appellant assailed both, the procedure adopted by the trial court and the view taken by the division bench of the High Court, on the basis of the provisions of order 41, rule 27. Mr. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior advocate, appearing for the appellant assailed both, the procedure adopted by the trial court and the view taken by the division bench of the High Court, on the basis of the provisions of order 41, rule 27. Mr. Rao submitted that if the trial court was of the view that the Xerox copies of the documents in question were not admissible in evidence, it ought to have returned the copies at the time of their submission. In that event, the appellant would have substituted them by the original registration certificates and that would have been the end of the matter. But once the Xerox copies submitted by the appellant were marked as exhibits, it had no means to know that while pronouncing the judgment, the court would keep those documents out of consideration, thus, causing great prejudice to the appellant. Mr. Rao submitted that the provision of order 13, rule 4 of CPC provides for every document admitted in evidence in the suit being endorsed by or on behalf of the court, and the endorsement signed or initialed by thq Judge amounts to admission of the document in evidence. An objection to the admissibility of the document can be raised before such endorsement is made and the court is obliged to form its opinion on the question of admissibility and express the same on which opinion would depend, the document being endorsed admitted or not admitted in evidence. In support of the submission he relied upon a decision of this court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752 ; AIR 2003 SCW 5316 (paragraph 20) where it was observed as follows: "20.........The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on format proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court." 12. On a careful consideration of the whole matter, we feel that serious mistakes were committed in the case at all stages. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court." 12. On a careful consideration of the whole matter, we feel that serious mistakes were committed in the case at all stages. The trial court should not have "marked" as exhibits the Xerox copies of the certificates of registration of trade mark in face of the objection raised by the defendants. It should have declined to take them on record as evidence and left the plaintiff to support its case by whatever means it proposed rather than leaving the issue of admissibility of those copies open and hanging, by marking them as exhibits subject to objection of proof and admissibility. The appellant, therefore, had a legitimate grievance in appeal about the way the trial proceeded. The learned Single Judge rightly allowed the appellant's plea for production of the original certificate of registration of trade mark as additional evidence because that was simply in the interest of justice and there was sufficient statutory basis for that under clause (b) of order 41, rule 27. But then the Single Judge seriously erred in proceeding simultaneously to allow the appeal and not giving the defendants/respondents an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal of the documents taken in as additional evidence. The division bench was again wrong in taking the view that in the facts of the case, the production of additional evidence was not permissible under order 41, rule 27. As shown above the additional documents produced by the appellant were liable to be taken on record as provided under order 41, rule 27(b) in the interest of justice. But it was certainly right in holding that the way the learned Single Judge disposed of the appeal caused serious prejudice to the defendants/respondents. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the proper course for the division bench was to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge without disturbing it insofar as it took the originals of the certificates of registration produced by the appellant on record and to remand the matter to give opportunity to defendants/respondents to produce evidence in rebuttal if they so desired. We, accordingly, proceed to do so. We, accordingly, proceed to do so. The judgment and order dated 25th April, 2003 passed by the division bench is set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge to proceed in the appeal from the stage the original of the registration certificates were taken on record as additional evidence. The learned Single Judge may allow the defendants/respondents to lead any rebuttal evidence or make a limited remand as provided under order 41, rule 28." 14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent, fairly admitted that the aforesaid document Exhibit-1 was exhibited without obtaining leave of the court. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent pointed out that even if the said document Exhibit-1 is excluded from the evidence on record, the plaintiff could still prove sufficiently with reasonable and cogent evidence that the defendant took a loan of Rs. 1,00,000 from the plaintiff and did not make the re­payment of the loan amount even in spite of demand. Apparently, the confirmation letter Exhibit-2, issued by the respondent/appellant to the plaintiff/respondent clearly reflects that the defendant/appellants received cheque bearing No.066002 of SBI, Guwahati on 9.5.1996, issued by the plaintiff/respondent, for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000, and, thereafter, series of documents from Exbts. 3, 4, 5 and 6, sufficiently established that the cheque was received by the defendant/appellant from the plaintiff/respondent. However, defendant/appellant did not come forward to deny the amount so tendered through the cheque aforesaid was not transferred to his account. However, it is not the stand of the defendant/appellant that no amount of money passed on to their account, even in spite of issuance of cheque by the plaintiff. Therefore, apparently in the circumstances, the exhibited documents 2 to 6 and evidence on record reveal that the defendant/appellant took the loan from the plaintiff/respondent but failed to repay the loan amount. 15. Admittedly, the document Exbt 1, which is not filed before settlement of issues, cannot be allowed to be admitted in evidence without the leave of the court. Any material document relied on by the parties, is required to be filed before the settlement of the issues, so that other side is not given a surprise later on during the hearing of the case. Any material document relied on by the parties, is required to be filed before the settlement of the issues, so that other side is not given a surprise later on during the hearing of the case. Any such document which is discovered later on and is found necessary to be placed on record for just decision of the case, either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, such a document may permitted to be placed on record only with the leave of the court, in terms of the provisions of order VII, rule 14(3) Code of Civil Procedure, Since Exhibit-1 was admittedly not filed by taking leave of the court, the said document cannot be admissible in evidence. 16. Now the question which arises for consideration is whether Exhibit 1 is the heart and soul of the suit and the entire case of the plaintiff/respondent hinges on this document alone? The answer is emphatic "No". Fact remains that even if the document Exhibit-1, which has been exhibited and proved, is ignored, the remaining set of admissible documents on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent, sufficiently and clearly established the fact of advancing loan by the plaintiff to the defendant and consequent non-payment of the loan by the defendant. Both the courts below clearly analyzed the evidence on record and then to come (sic.) to a finding that the defendant appellant did not pay back the loan amount to the plaintiff/respondent. 17. Judgment of lower court cannot be interfered unless some irregularities appeared. In Shri Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, JT 2001 (6) SC 591, the Apex Court observed that "it has been repeatedly pointed out by this court that concurrent findings recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellate court on proper appreciation of the materials on record should not be disturbed by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction in second appeal". But at the same time, it is not an absolute rule to be applied universally and invariably some exceptions to the same also were often indicated with equal importance by the Apex Court. However, in the instant case this court did not notice aberration or infirmity in the concurrent finding of fact by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court warranting interference in second appeal. 18. However, in the instant case this court did not notice aberration or infirmity in the concurrent finding of fact by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court warranting interference in second appeal. 18. In view of the above, in due consideration of the facts and circumstances discussed above, I am of the considered view that there is no merit in the appeal and the substantial question of law framed in this second appeal is answered in the negative, against the appellant. Accordingly, the second appeal stands dismissed, Send back the lower court records. The stay order, if any, stands vacated.