JUDGMENT :- 1. These two Writ Petitions are directed against the common order dated 28.10.2003 in I.A. Nos.159 & 160 of 2003 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’], Chennai, as confirmed by the order dated 9.1.2004 in M.A. Nos. 78 & 79 of 2004 on the file of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal whereby and whereunder, the Application filed by the Petitioner to condone the delay of 179 days in filing the Application to set aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed. 2. The petitioner is an illiterate, hailing from Sholinganallur village in the district of Kanchipuram and he is stated to be a peasant, depending upon agriculture for his livelihood. According to the Petitioner, the Title Deeds in respect of his property was taken by one R. Munusamy under the pretext of arranging a loan. The documents were in turn given to Respondents 6 & 7. However, the documents were not returned. In the meantime, the Petitioner received summons from the Debts Recovery Tribunal in O.A.No.1381/2001, indicating that he stood as surety to a loan transaction. The Petitioner engaged a Counsel to represent him. However, the said Counsel did not appear and as such, the Petitioner was set ex-parte. It was followed by an ex-parte decree on 24-9-2002. When it was brought to the knowledge of the Petitioner that an ex-parte decree was passed, he filed two Applications in I.A.Nos.159 & 160/2003 to set aside the ex-parte decree after condoning the delay of 179 days. Those two Applications were dismissed by Debts Recovery Tribunal on the ground that each day’s delay was not explained. The orders were unsuccessfully challenged before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The present Writ Petitions are directed against the ultimate order of dismissal of Application. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. Discussion: 4. There is no dispute that notice in the original Application was received by the Petitioner. It is also an admitted position that the Petitioner was originally represented through a Counsel. However, the Counsel failed to represent the Petitioner subsequently. Therefore, the Tribunal declared the Petitioner ex-parte and subsequently, ex-parte decree was passed on 24.09.2002. Discussion: 4. There is no dispute that notice in the original Application was received by the Petitioner. It is also an admitted position that the Petitioner was originally represented through a Counsel. However, the Counsel failed to represent the Petitioner subsequently. Therefore, the Tribunal declared the Petitioner ex-parte and subsequently, ex-parte decree was passed on 24.09.2002. The Petitioner in his Affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory Application contended that he was not aware of the absence of his Counsel on the date of hearing and it was only on verification subsequently, he came to know that he was declared ex-parte and a decree in favour of the First Respondent was granted. It is true that the Petitioner has not explained each day’s delay in so many words. However, the fact remains that Criminal Court day’s delay in so many words. However, the fact remains that Criminal Court has already taken cognizance of the charge-sheet laid by the Police against Respondents 6 & 7 on charges of impersonation and forgery. It appears that the Fourth Respondent has impersonated the Petitioner and signed the documents. Neither the Debts Recovery Tribunal nor the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal made attempts to consider the question of sufficient cause in the light of the background facts of the case. 5. While considering the question of sufficient cause, the Court should not approach the issue with a pre-conceived notion that the delay was willful. It is not the number of days delay which is material. Rather it is only the reason to be considered. In ordinary circumstances, the Petitioner should get an opportunity to contest the case on merits. Law of limitation is not intended to destroy the substantive rights of the parties. Law expects culmination of proceedings at the earliest point of time. However, that does not mean that the party should be denied of an opportunity to contest the case on merits. The Authorities: 6. The Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, 2010 (2) Scale 645, observed that the expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. The Supreme Court said: “8. The law of limitation is not founded on public policy. The Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, 2010 (2) Scale 645, observed that the expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. The Supreme Court said: “8. The law of limitation is not founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is not shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression “sufficient case” employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable to Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the Applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate”. 7. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, 2005 (3) SCC 752 , the Supreme Court held that the length of delay is not material and the sufficiency of the cause alone is material. The Supreme Court said: “8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the Court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. 12. … The expression “sufficient cause” is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice – that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression “every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 8. In Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti, 2011 (2) CTC 329 (SC): 2011 (3) SCC 545 , the Supreme Court in the context of Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C., explained the concept of “sufficient cause” thus: 13. “Sufficient cause” is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. “Sufficient cause” is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been “not acting diligently” or “remaining inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. 9. The Supreme Court in G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 1988 (2) SCC 142 , indicated that “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. The Supreme Court observed thus: “14. … If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred Appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 must receive a liberal constructive so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.” 10. The Tribunal appears to have taken a too technical approach of the matter and closed the door to the Petitioner once for all. The Tribunal was more on technicalities. The delay cannot be said to be so abnormal so as to reject the Application filed by an illiterate person. The Petitioner was denied of opportunity to prove his defence on account of the dismissal of his Application to condone the delay. The Tribunal was more on technicalities. The delay cannot be said to be so abnormal so as to reject the Application filed by an illiterate person. The Petitioner was denied of opportunity to prove his defence on account of the dismissal of his Application to condone the delay. Therefore, we are constrained to set aside the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the order of confirmation by the Appellate Tribunal. 11. In the result, the order dated 28.10.2003 in I.A. Nos. 159 & 160 of 2003 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, as confirmed by order dated 14.09.2004 in M.A. Nos.78 & 79 by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal are set aside. The ex-parte decree passed against the Petitioner is set aside. 12. However, we make it clear that this order setting aside the decree passed in the Application filed by the Bank is only in respect of the Petitioner, meaning thereby, the decree would hold good against the other defendants. The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall dispose of the petition within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order or production of the same by the Petitioner. 13. In the upshot, we allow the Writ Petitions. No costs.